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Introduction: 
The pacifist and the pope 
Not all moral issues have the same moral weight 
as abortion and euthanasia. For example, if a 
Catholic were to be at odds with the Holy Father 
on the application of capital punishment or on the 
decision to wage war, he would not for that reason 
be considered unworthy to present himself to 
receive Holy Communion. While the Church 
exhorts civil authorities to seek peace, not war, 
and to exercise discretion and mercy in imposing 
punishment on criminals, it may still be 
permissible to take up arms to repel an aggressor 
or to have recourse to capital punishment. There 
may be a legitimate diversity of opinion even 
among Catholics about waging war and applying 
the death penalty, but not however with regard to 
abortion and euthanasia. 
- Ratzinger, 2004 
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Moral diversity – this is, diversity in the moral views people have– is widespread 
(e.g., Robinson & Kurzban, 2007). The existence of moral diversity is not without 
problems (e.g., Haidt, Rosenberg, & Hom, 2003): Attitudes towards those holding 
other moral views vary from the outwards hostile and distrustful, over toleration to 
enthusiastic curiosity. How we react to moral diversity might depend on cultural 
and individual factors − such as one’s capacity for disjunctive thinking (Goodwin & 
Darley, 2010), level of education (Nichols, 2004a) or cultural background (Forsyth, 
O’Boyle, & McDaniel, 2008) – and, at the same time, on the kind of moral diversity at 
hand (Wright, Cullum, & Schwab, 2008). Thus, pacifists will not condone 
disagreement about the legitimacy of warfare but they may think of diversity in 
views about euthanasia as legitimate; the current pope though declares it should be 
the other way around. Nonetheless, the pacifist and the pope seem to agree that 
some moral diversity is legitimate.  
This attitude towards moral diversity does not tell us much about defensible 
reasons for this view, or about the philosophical and behavioral implications. Can 
we reasonably hold that different, incompatible views can both be legitimate at the 
same time? Can we consider this diversity beyond discussion, or do we need to see 
this approach as a matter of benign patience, waiting for an occasion to give rise to 
feisty debate or punishment? Certain philosophers defend the claim that features of 
morality, such as the nature, cause and extent of individual differences in moral 
cognition, suggest that some moral disagreements are fundamental, viz., they will 
remain unresolved after all rational and factual arguments have been deployed (e.g., 
Doris & Plakias, 2008), or that these features of morality lead to the conclusion of 
toleration (Wong, 1984) – for example, the idea that we should not interfere with 
certain, not all, morally diverging lives − or moral relativism (Hales, 2009; Prinz, 
2007) – for example, the idea that there is more than one moral truth. Others are 
skeptical about the existence of fundamental moral disagreement (e.g., Moody-
Adams, 1997/2001) or about moral relativism (e.g., Williams, 1972; 1996). 
In this dissertation, we defend certain philosophical consequences of moral 
diversity. When discussing the theme of moral diversity, we focus on individual 
differences in moral cognition, as opposed to individual differences in morally 
relevant behavior. When discussing the theme of philosophical relevance, we focus 
on moral relativism and practices of toleration. We argue that toleration can be a 
feasible option for groups that do not interact and when we can relativize our 
judgments. However, more has to be said about the conceptual link between 
tolerant attitudes and non-relativism, and more empirical research is needed to 
establish the causal link between moral relativism and practices of toleration.  
These themes are situated against the following background. On the one hand, 
most contemporary philosophers and scientists are convinced that there is a 
difference in meaning between descriptions of the world and how the world ought 
Introduction 
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to be – there is a gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’. Thus, the fact that we disagree about 
what right and wrong does not imply that different moral views are equally true or 
that we are permitted to do different things, and, relevant to this context, the 
existence of individual differences in moral cognition is not a sufficient reason to 
support moral relativism or toleration. On the other hand, it is not really clear how 
broad this gap is, and what exactly does or does not follow from it. Tellingly, recent 
findings about moral cognition are constantly being used to argue for or against 
theories in moral philosophy, most often by researchers who incessantly pledge 
their alliance to the is/ought gap. Still, they are also often accused of committing 
fallacies, of collecting irrelevant data or of misconstruing philosophy (for a 
discussion, see Knobe & Nichols, 2008). Thus, we will need to introduce some clarity 
on the is/ought gap.  
This dissertation consists of eight chapters, six of which are revised versions of 
papers written in collaboration with other researchers. In the first chapter, we 
situate this research in a broader context that is presupposed in the following 
chapters. We introduce the philosophical issues of the universalizability of moral 
judgments and the idea that there is a gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’. We subsequently 
go into relevant findings about individual differences in moral cognition, how they 
had a legitimate impact on moral philosophy despite the gap and how they create 
apparently irresolvable moral disagreements. These topics set the stage for more 
elaborate discussions in later chapters.  
The second chapter describes more individual differences in moral cognition. We 
focus on individual differences in moral condemnation, viz., moral judgments about 
others’ behavior. This chapter reports on the findings of an empirical study – 
conducted in collaboration with psychologist Keiko Ishii, evolutionary psychologists 
Jason Weeden and Robert Kurzban, and my supervisor Johan Braeckman − in which 
we compared two explanations for individual differences in moral attitudes towards 
sex and recreational drug use (Quintelier, Ishii, Weeden, Kurzban, & Braeckman, 
under review). We found that sexual attitudes predict views towards recreational 
drug use, irrespective of one’s ideological background. These findings support the 
theory that evolved reproductive strategies can account for individual differences in 
moral attitudes towards recreational drug use. However, this does not offer us very 
much insight into philosophical questions. For this, we need to have a background 
theory and method that clarifies how moral norms do and do not follow from 
empirical data.  
We defend such a theory and method in the third chapter. While certain scholars 
are quick to question any moral claim that relies on empirical data, naturalistic 
ethicists assert that science can guide and constrain ethics. Crucial in such a 
naturalistic ethics is that no moral statement irrevocably follows from descriptions. 
Instead one has to guide and constrain moral theories in the light of new empirical 
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evidence, but also in the light of their normative implications and practical 
outcomes. One reasons back and forth between the descriptive and normative sides 
of the debate. We argue that this view has upending consequences: It implies that 
one starts with existing varieties of moral lifestyles that are all legitimate, even 
though they might need to be constrained and polished (and even though they can 
still be rejected if untenable), rather than starting from a universal moral principle 
or even from the idea that moral prescriptions should hold universally. Select 
fragments of this chapter have been written in collaboration with my colleague 
Stefaan Blancke; the greater part of this chapter is a collaborative effort with my 
colleague Lien Van Speybroeck, and my supervisor Johan Braeckman (Quintelier, 
Van Speybroeck, & Braeckman, 2011).  
Chapter four brings together various advisable reactions towards moral 
disagreement. Here we review certain naturalistic arguments for and against 
versions of moral relativism and toleration. All discussed arguments either make 
empirical assumptions or make empirically testable predictions. We therefore 
peruse the empirical literature and ask if these assumptions and predictions are 
upheld. In doing so, we take into account that different versions of moral relativism 
and toleration populate the philosophical literature. Normative and empirical 
considerations suggest that some versions are preferable over others. This chapter 
is an extended version of a paper written in collaboration with anthropologist 
Daniel Fessler (Quintelier & Fessler, 2011). 
Chapters five and six report on an empirical study conducted in collaboration 
with Daniel Fessler and my colleague Delphine De Smet (Quintelier, Fessler, & De 
Smet, under review; Quintelier, De Smet, & Fessler, under review). Some naturalists 
insist that moral rules are irredeemably perceived as non-relative. Therefore, we 
should not advise individuals to relativize their moral judgments. In the fifth 
chapter we tackle this set of arguments. We report findings that question that 
people think of morality as non-relative. This study is situated in the debate 
surrounding the moral/conventional distinction. The here presented study 
replicates previous work that questions the existence of such a distinction and it 
criticizes the methodology that is commonly used by moral/conventional 
proponents.  
Some naturalists insist that moral relativism is behaviorally inconsistent. Much 
however depends on what kind of moral relativism one is talking about. In chapter 
six, we discuss the distinction between agent and appraiser relativism. We report 
findings that this distinction is not only relevant for philosophers, it also exists in 
people’s minds as some individuals employ agent relativist language while others 
employ appraiser relativist language. 
As an argument against moral relativism and toleration one can bring up that 
most morally relevant behaviors impact the lives of others as well as one’s own. 
Introduction 
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Moral relativism and toleration thus run into problems of coordination. In chapter 
seven, we explore the issue of commitment, a phenomenon that requires moral 
evaluations to be generalized over a range of individuals and situations. This 
chapter is a revised version of a book chapter on commitment (Fessler & Quintelier, 
forthcoming); it informs the topic at hand because moral attitudes can often be 
described as commitments.  
In the final chapter, we review and discuss the arguments that we put forward. 
Allying with naturalistic ethics, we explored the consequences of individual 
differences in moral cognition. We conclude that there is fundamental moral 
disagreement and we defend a moderate form of normative moral relativism. 
Depending on one’s values, one has good reasons to tolerate diverging moral views 
and behavior in accordance with these views. However, certain features of morality 
constrain the extent to which we can and want to tolerate different moral views and 
according lifestyles. Most of these proposed constraints are open to empirical 
investigation. As such, empirical findings can suggest when and how to tolerate 
diverging moral views. Previous work in naturalistic moral philosophy mainly 
discusses meta-ethical implications of individual differences in moral cognition. We 
think that the empirical issues surrounding normative implications of individual 
differences in moral cognition are underexplored. We hope that this work will show 
that their study is worth pursuing. 

  
Parts of this chapter are adapted from: 
Quintelier, K.J.P., & Fessler, D.M.T. (forthcoming, 2011). Naturalizing the normative and the bridges between ‘is’ and 
‘ought’. Commentary. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34(5). 
Quintelier, K. (2010). Feiten en normen in het moreel relativisme debat. Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor 
Wijsbegeerte, 102(1), 26-37. 
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Chapter 1  
Drawing lines in moral philosophy 
Never let your sense of morals get in the way of 
doing what's right. 
- Asimov, 1944 
1.1 Introduction 
When, and how, should we tolerate moral diversity? Is moral relativism an advisable 
consequence of the extent and nature of individual differences in moral cognition? 
In order to investigate these questions, we examine three topics which play 
important roles in answering this question: the is/ought gap, empirical findings 
about individual differences in moral cognition and moral relativism and toleration. 
This chapter introduces the first two topics and moral universalism, which is the 
antithesis of moral relativism.  
These topics are crucial for the rest of this dissertation in the following way. In 
chapters three and four, we use some recent findings about individual differences in 
moral cognition to argue for moral relativism and toleration. Moral relativism runs 
counter to existing arguments which attempt to show that moral judgments by 
definition apply universally and thus non-relatively. In this chapter, we therefore 
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critically evaluate the notion of the universalizability of moral judgments. The 
is/ought gap limits the extent to which one can reason from descriptive theories to 
normative theories. However, there are various interpretations of this constraint, 
and these are often vague. In this chapter, we aim to sketch a general image of the 
range and limits of the is/ought gap. We therefore introduce some recent and 
prevalent interpretations of the is/ought gap. We also give an example of the way 
empirical findings can have an impact on moral philosophy despite, and also by 
virtue of, the is/ought gap. Thus, the is/ought gap does not preclude the relevance 
of empirical findings for moral philosophy, whatever the exact implications of the 
is/ought gap may be. We put forward our own specific defense of the relation 
between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ in chapter three. We end this first chapter with a discussion 
of the nature and extent of individual differences in moral cognition, and ensuing 
problems for moral agreement.  
1.2 Gaps and bridges 
1.2.1 Ethics, the study of morality 
In this dissertation, the notion of moral relativism frequently pops up. One version 
of moral relativism suggests that the truth of moral statements is relative to the 
context of assertion, but there are other kinds of moral relativism (see Chapter 4). In 
any case, some prominent philosophers and psychologists have argued that moral 
relativism is a contradiction in terms: Speaking of morality necessarily implies 
speaking of universalizability, by virtue of the meaning of morality. By this they 
mean that a judgment can only be a moral judgment if it is an application of a rule 
with universal application. In order to remove this potential objection, we have to 
take a closer look at the meaning of morality.  
Morality is a set of evaluative statements, statements that are not about how the 
world is, but about the way it ought to be. These statements are action-guiding: they 
function to guide behavior, either our own or the behavior of others. ‘Moral’ is not 
the same as ‘morally good’; moral judgments, statements, issues, thoughts, and so 
on, are considerations (etc.) that are action guiding, but they can be wrong.  
This description is not exhaustive: not all action-guiding statements are moral 
statement. We will give reasons for not trying to give an exhaustive description 
further on (this Section, and Section 1.2.4). Throughout this dissertation, we hold to 
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this minimal description because it fits the purpose of this work – not because we 
think this captures the essence, nature or truth about morality.  
When discussing morality, some philosophers have been keen to present 
additional features that are sometimes taken to be part of the ‘substantial materials’ 
of morality (Williams, 1993/1972, p. 4). Often these philosophers have an 
authoritative definition in mind, viz., they dismiss dissimilar uses of the word 
‘morality’. One recurring feature is the supposed universalizability of moral 
evaluations or the universality of the moral viewpoint, moral rules or moral truths. 
This universalizability of moral judgments means that moral judgments follow from 
general moral rules that apply to everyone, everywhere, unless there are relevant 
differences between the relevant individuals or their contexts. Adhering to 
universalizability means that when moral philosophers devise a normative moral 
theory, they think of it as a theory that decides on right and wrong for everyone, 
everywhere, pace relevant moral differences. This is compatible with the existence 
of individual differences in moral attitudes or variation in contemporary normative 
theories: If moral evaluations are universalizable, the existence of individual 
differences in moral attitudes or theories just means that some people and some 
theories are wrong. Moral relativism on the other hand allows for the existence of 
moral rules that are not meant to apply to everyone or everywhere, even when 
there are no differences in moral circumstances.  
What are some of the arguments that have been used to defend a view of 
morality as universal? According to Hare (1954), moral evaluations can by definition 
be universalized. In his terminology, moral evaluations are U-type evaluations and 
U-type evaluations are universalizable in the sense that they are applications of a 
universal rule: When the rule applies to you, it also applies to anyone else unless 
there are relevant differences between you and the other person.  
Hare considers his thesis as being part of the very meaning of morality. By this he 
means that it is analytically true in virtue of the meaning of the word ‘moral’ (Hare, 
1954, p. 299). Analytic truth (assuming that there is such a thing) can be known to 
competent users of a language, when they find themselves in optimal epistemic 
conditions. They can find out what the meaning of a word is by consulting their own 
intuitions. As a consequence, when trying to find the analytic definition of a word, 
we can refer to ordinary usage of the term by competent users of that language 
(Wallace & Walker, 1970, p. 5). Hare accordingly defends his view by referring to his 
readers’ use and understanding of moral terms. He asks us to imagine a 
conversation between a Kantian (K) and an Existentialist (E) (Hare, 1954, p. 304-305):  
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E.: “You oughtn't to do that.”  
K.: “So you think that one oughtn't to do that kind of thing?”  
E.:”I think nothing of the kind; I say only that you oughtn't to do that.”  
K.: “Don't you even imply that a person like me in circumstances of this kind 
oughtn't to do that kind of thing when the other people involved are the sort 
of people that they are?”  
E.: “No; I say only that you oughtn't to do that.”  
K.: “Are you making a moral judgment?”  
E.: “Yes.”  
K.: “In that case I fail to understand your use of the word ‘moral’.” 
Now Hare asserts that “most of us would be as baffled as the “Kantian”; and 
indeed we should be hard put to it to think of any use of the word “ought “, moral or 
non-moral, in which the “Existentialist's” remarks would be comprehensible” (Hare, 
1954, p. 306). 
Thus ordinary language is taken to constitute an argument for or against a 
specific meaning of a word. MacIntyre referred to other examples of moral speech 
acts by ordinary competent users of the English language in order to argue that not 
all moral evaluations are universalizable. Notable cases he refers to are instances of 
moral dilemmas, such as Sartre’s example of a pupil who had to decide between 
joining the fight against the Nazis or caring for his sick mother. In this case, 
whatever the pupil decides to do need not necessarily rest upon a universal rule, but 
it may still be a moral decision. In addition, a morality based on private duties would 
still be a morality (MacIntyre, 1957/1970).  
There is no consensus on this in analytic moral philosophy, but the idea of moral 
universalism is a recurring view: Williams lists universalizability as an aspect of 
moral evaluations when he says that “the appeal to the consequences of an imagined 
universalization is an essentially moral argument” (Williams 1993/1972, p. 6). He 
proclaims that “the element of universalization […] is present in any morality” 
(Williams, 1993/1972, p. 23). Taylor (1978) lists two characteristics of standards and 
rules that are necessary (but not sufficient) to impart them the status of moral 
standards and rules. A moral rule must be general in form, meaning that it contains 
no terms referring to particular agents, actions or circumstances. It specifies only 
kinds of actions that any agent is to do or refrain from doing. A moral rule must also 
be universal, meaning that its intended range of application includes the actions of 
all moral agents of the same kind or having the same role. Taylor seems to refer to 
how people understand the notion of a moral rule to support this view. It is however 
not clear who he is referring to when he speaks about “our understanding of what it 
means to take the moral point of view […]” (Taylor 1978, p. 35, our emphasis): whose 
understanding is he talking about − his readers’, fellow philosophers’, Anglo-Saxons’ 
understanding?  
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We will speak of universalizability in a broad sense, entailing both 
generalizability (kinds of actions, agents, etc.) and universalizability sensu stricto 
(scope). According to the previously mentioned analytic philosophers, moral 
universalism is not compatible with moral relativism. Universalizability is 
postulated as an essential feature of moral evaluations by virtue of the definition of 
morality; therefore the possibility of moral relativism is ruled out a priori.  
Likewise, moral universalism and closely related views have been repeatedly 
defended in the field of moral development. In his earlier work, Lawrence Kohlberg 
(1982) insists that all moral principles − even those we use when we are acting from 
care – are universalizable (impartial in his words): what is wrong for you is also 
wrong for me. He famously backs up such claims with empirical data. According to 
his theory of moral development, individuals indeed come to perceive moral rules 
as impartial; in fact, moral development is characterized by several stages of 
increasing impartiality.  
We find a similar view in the works of thinkers who defend a distinction between 
the moral and the conventional: Elliot Turiel (1983) proposed that individuals come 
to perceive moral rules as different from conventional rules: While the latter are 
perceived to apply only in specific social situations, depending on the prevailing 
convention, moral rules are intended to be generally and universally justified. They 
hold generally, this is, over a wide range of situations and independent of the social 
conventions. They are justified by reference to universal principles of harm, justice 
and rights. Turiel argues that “moral prescriptions […] are universally applicable in 
that they apply to everyone in similar circumstances. They are impersonal in that 
they are not based on individual preferences or personal inclinations” (Turiel, 1983, 
p. 36). This view is backed up by empirical data. An entire research tradition is 
dedicated to corroborating that individuals indeed distinguish moral from 
conventional rules along these dimensions (see Chapter 4).  
Recently, the very idea of a single correct meaning of morality has come under 
severe attack and pressure. Many analytic philosophers assume that moral language 
is used in a more or less uniform manner, if only by moral philosophers. 
Philosophers (Gill, 2009; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2009), psychologists and experimental 
philosophers (Knobe & Nichols, 2008) criticize this view of linguistic behavior for 
assuming uniformity in the field of morality. Indeed, when the linguistic behavior of 
a greater range of individuals is documented, there appear to be substantial 
differences in the use and meaning of moral and other philosophical terms: these 
differences correlate with religiosity (Goodwin & Darley, 2008), educational level 
(Nichols, 2004a), or gender (Buckwalter & Stich, 2010). Moral terms are not always 
or by everyone used as applicable to every person or in every situation (Sarkissian, 
Park, Tien, Wright, & Knobe, forthcoming; Quintelier, De Smet, & Fessler, under 
review; Quintelier, Fessler, & De Smet, under review; see also Chapter 5 and Chapter 
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6). Also when constraining the set of relevant users of a language to experts, in casu 
moral philosophers, it is clear that different philosophers have different intuitions 
about the meaning of moral terms. Granted, the extent to which individuals or 
philosophers relativize their moral statements is still under investigation, but we 
cannot presuppose agreement on the universalizability of moral judgments.  
Earlier moral psychologists assumed that morality is a natural kind, or a concept 
that carves nature at its joints, viz. a feature that develops in the same way in most 
individuals and across cultures. But the idea of morality as a natural kind has been 
refuted by many psychologists, neuroscientists, anthropologists and philosophers 
alike (Verplaetse, 2006; Verplaetse, De Schrijver, Vanneste, & Braeckman, 2009; 
Casebeer, 2003a). The neural correlates of moral cognition are scattered across 
several functional networks, and none of these functions is in itself exclusive for 
moral cognition (Verplaetse, 2006). The features of individuals’ moral psychology 
vary between (Shweder, Much, Park, & Mahapatra, 1997) and within cultures 
(Nisbett, 1996). There might be core moral issues (Nichols, 2004b): Harm and justice 
concerns are moralized by most individuals and across cultures, but it is an open 
question what other features (e.g., universalizability), if any, are generally agreed to 
be part of moral evaluations.  
Nevertheless, the idea of universalizability is quite persistent – although not as 
an essential feature of morality. Certain philosophers are guided by the idea that 
their normative theories should be as general as possible. In the study of well-being 
(e.g., Tiberius & Plakias, 2010), the focus is on finding those values that increase 
everyone’s life satisfaction, not on, for example, what enables individuals to find 
and pursue their personal values. Casebeer (2003b) suggests that more general and 
more universal moral rules are better in an extra-moral sense (i.e., they are not 
morally better, but maybe more practical). However, none of these philosophers 
thinks of universalizability as a necessary feature of moral evaluations. As such, 
relative rules can exist alongside universal rules. 
The idea of moral evaluations as universalizable has been used by skeptics to 
argue against the possibility of relative moral evaluations (see Chapter 4). This 
however assumes that there is such a thing as a ‘nature’ or ‘very meaning’ of 
morality and that universalizability is part of it. This view is usually crucially 
dependent on a minimal degree of uniformity in people’s moral psychology, moral 
language, or moral development. While it is plausible that certain core issues are 
understood as being part of morality by almost everyone, very recent studies 
suggest that universalizability is not ‘uniformly’ or ‘naturally’ part of the intended 
meaning of moral evaluations. This does not mean that all aspects of morality are 
inherently relative either. Universalizability can be acknowledged as a good, 
valuable or useful principle, or as a feature of some moral rules, while other rules 
are relative. Thus, it may be a good thing to pursue universality in a normative 
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theory, but there is as yet no reason that this should be done to the exclusion of 
relativist moral evaluations. As things stand now, relativism in moral theories is a 
possibility that needs to be investigated. 
1.2.2 Normative ethics, meta-ethics, descriptive ethics  
Ethics, the study of morality, can be subdivided into normative ethics, meta-ethics 
and descriptive ethics. In this dissertation, the focus is on normative ethics and its 
relation to descriptive ethics.  
Normative ethicists try to defend a specific morality (a set of moral statements). 
Normative ethics is not about how the world is, but about how it should be. It 
concerns questions about right and wrong, the criteria to distinguish right from 
wrong and theories that systematize these criteria. It makes use of action-guiding or 
prescriptive terms such as ought, value, good, should, duty, obligation, right, wrong, 
permissible or forbidden. It is also called first-order ethics because normative 
ethicists engage in moral thinking or operate from within a moral point of view. 
Moral norms, moral judgments and moral evaluations are here used broadly to denote 
normative moral statements that prescribe how to behave in order to be morally 
good. These statements can be in the form of ‘X is good, valuable, right’ or ‘we 
should do X’, ‘we ought to do X’, etc. Moral principles and moral rules are general 
moral norms (e.g., ‘things are good in virtue of their consequences’). 
Equally important for our purposes is meta-ethics. Meta-ethics is not about what 
we ought to do but about statements about what we ought to do; it is about moral 
norms or normative moral statements – it is accordingly called second-order ethics. 
Inquiries about the ontology, epistemology or meaning of moral statements belong 
to meta-ethics. For example, instead of saying that ‘happiness is good’, we can say 
that ‘it is true that happiness is good’; ‘‘that happiness is good’ means that I like 
happiness’, or ‘it is an objective fact that happiness is good’. The same holds for 
normative theories: Instead of saying that ‘things are good in virtue of their 
consequences’ (a normative moral statement) we can say that consequentialism is 
true, a fact, etc.  
Finally, morality can also be studied descriptively. Some descriptive ethicists 
describe the morality (the set of moral norms) that prevails in a society. Descriptive 
ethics is here very broadly conceived as the empirical study of people’s moral 
language, their moral statements, meta-ethical statements, morally relevant 
behaviors and traits. It is a form of scientific inquiry, thus it draws from empirical 
observation and scientific theories in order to describe, systematize and predict 
how individuals will use moral concepts and exhibit behavior or traits that are 
amenable to such moral evaluations. Most often in this dissertation we use 
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descriptive statement or description to denote all statements concerning the nature of 
things in the realm of the natural sciences.  
As mentioned, in this dissertation we will explore normative consequences of 
empirical findings about lay people’s moral cognition. But how do these 
subdivisions relate to each other? At first sight, the boundaries between these 
approaches are blurry. For example, it seems that, if a meta-ethical theory 
concludes that ‘happiness is good’ is a true statement, it follows that happiness is 
good, which is a normative moral statement. Moreover, it might seem that if 
descriptive ethicists observe that we all agree that happiness is good, then 
happiness must be good. However, philosophers are adamant that one cannot 
directly reason from one division to the other. The boundary between normative 
and descriptive ethics deserves a section of its own (see Section 1.2.3). Let us first 
see if we can go from the descriptive domain to meta-ethics and from there to 
normative ethics.  
According to certain branches of analytic philosophy, the meanings of moral 
terms and the truth values of moral statements can be inferred from their patterns 
of use by lay people (Wallace & Walker, 1970, p. 5). Experimental philosophers 
accordingly collect the linguistic behavior of lay people and ask if they indeed use a 
certain concept in the way intuited by philosophers (Knobe & Nichols, 2008). As 
such, meta-ethics can build on descriptive ethics, albeit not directly. One needs a 
theory that explains why lay people’s use of moral concepts would say something 
about the meaning of these concepts. This theory though may well follow from 
other descriptive endeavors.  
Is meta-ethics relevant for normative ethics? It may seem that the relevance of 
meta-ethics for normative ethics is somewhat lacking. Certain philosophers 
complain that meta-ethics has been studied at the expense of normative ethics, 
implying that the former bears hardly any relevance to the latter. This may have 
been a problem of the past, when meta-ethics was dominated by the analytic 
approach. Williams suggests this in the preface of the 1993 edition of Morality, 
originally published in 1972:  
In one respect at least the book may seem dated, to the extent that it starts by 
complaining of a situation which no longer exists, one in which moral 
philosophy addressed itself to meta-ethical questions about the nature of 
moral judgment, the possibility of moral knowledge, and so forth, at the 
expense of discussing first-order ethical questions. (Williams, 1993/1972, xii) 
But is this complaint really dated? Recent meta-ethical theorists do not seem to 
lament this divide at all. They are often quick to point out that their theory does not 
have any straightforward bearing on normative ethics: Kahane (2011) for example 
states that meta-ethical theories “should leave our first-order evaluative beliefs 
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exactly as they are.” Others argue that meta-ethical relativism does not give reasons 
to prefer one normative theory over another, but they are willing to suggest a moral 
value (Wong, 1984; Harman & Thomson, 1996), extra-moral values (e.g. Hales, 2009) 
or a combination of extra-moral and moral values (e.g., Prinz, 2007) in order to 
morally evaluate the set of true moral statements. For example, in The Emotional 
Construction of Morals, Prinz (2007, p. 288-308) suggests that if we value consistency, 
universality, ease of implementation, conduciveness to well-being, etc. as features 
of moral theories, then we can evaluate moral theories according to these 
evaluations and make moral progress. These values are additional assumptions that 
do not follow from the meta-ethical theory proposed by Prinz (2007) in the 
remaining part of his book.  
This divide between meta-ethics and normative ethics is not simply a feature of 
meta-ethical relativism. In Taylor’s view, universality is a feature of moral principles 
but does not inform us about whether a statement is morally right or wrong: “A 
norm belonging to the class of moral principles as defined here, then, may be […] 
valid or invalid” (Taylor, 1978, p. 39). Thus, saying that ‘women must not be 
ordained in the Catholic church’ might be a moral norm, but that does not mean it is 
a eu-moral or morally good norm. Another example is prescribing that every 
woman should wear a headscarf. This may be a moral prescript even though it is 
open to question if this is a morally good prescript. It might be wrong even when it 
is a moral issue. Conversely, in Taylor’s view a principle may be valid but not in a 
moral way, simply because it is not a universal principle. Thus, ‘I should now keep 
my friend company’ might be a right action-guiding statement but it is not a moral 
evaluation because I do not intend this as a universalizable evaluation. In Taylor’s 
view, moral principles that satisfy the six criteria for moral norms which he set 
forward (those including generality and universality) only inform one about right 
and wrong if one is willing to accept another commitment, namely that a principle 
is a value if “it would be for the good of everyone alike that the norm be adopted as 
an overriding principle applicable to everyone” (Taylor, 1978, p. 53) – this is the 
mutual acknowledgment view. (For the sake of completeness, we must note that in 
Taylor’s view, the mutual acknowledgment view follows from the six criteria for 
moral norms. In other cases though (e.g., Prinz, 2007), the criteria that separate 
morally good from morally bad views in a set of true normative moral views do not 
follow from the meta-ethical view at all.) 
The present situation is thus similar to the boundary between descriptive ethics 
and meta-ethics: meta-ethics is relevant for normative ethics only if we accept 
additional assumptions. We need a theory that explains how descriptive statements 
relate to meta-ethical statements. We need normative assumptions that explain how 
meta-ethical statements relate to normative statements. In each case though, we 
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need to ask where those additional assumptions come from. We will argue in 
chapter three that these normative assumptions are also informed by science. 
1.2.3 The ‘is-ought’ gap and the naturalistic fallacy 
Nervousness increases when the links between descriptive ethics and normative 
ethics are discussed. It seems that there is not just a guarded boundary between 
them: there appears to be at least a gap, and only a mythical bridge. How would 
empirical findings about individual differences in moral judgments then ever be 
relevant to normative ethics? In this Section we will illustrate various uses of the 
is/ought gap and the naturalistic fallacy. The aim here is to introduce a short 
history of its expanding use.  
Historically, the is/ought gap and the naturalistic fallacy are related to each 
other. The is/ought gap is famously introduced by David Hume (1711-1776). In his 
Treatise of Human Nature he observes that: 
the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and 
establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human 
affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual 
copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is 
not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but 
is however, of the last consequence (Hume 1739-1740, Book III, Part 1, Section 
1) 
This is a problem, he says: 
for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a 
deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. (ibidem) 
So according to Hume, it is not clear how we can deduce propositions linked by 
‘ought’ from propositions linked by ‘is’, because ‘is’ denotes a different relation than 
‘ought’. It is quite obscure how exactly to interpret this statement but there is an 
intuitive appeal to the idea that ‘what is the case’ is different than ‘what ought to be 
the case’. This (unclear though useful) assertion is what is now commonly known as 
the is/ought gap. 
Through Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900), George Edward Moore (1873-1958) came to 
know about the ‘is-ought’ gap. He dubbed mistakes against this principle the 
‘naturalistic fallacy’. His reasoning supposes that the adjective ‘good’ is the subject-
matter of ethics (Moore, 1993/1903 §2-5) and that how this quality ‘good’ is to be 
defined is “the most fundamental question in all Ethics.” (id., §5) What Moore 
denounced was defining ‘good’ in any other terms, for example in natural terms. 
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This is wrong because ‘good’ always means something different than whatever 
defining term you come up with, just as for example ‘yellow’ always means 
something different than anything else one comes up with (Tanner, 2006). 
Therefore, you cannot define ‘good’ as something else. The version that became 
most famous is that, whenever someone defines ‘good’ as something natural, that 
person is committing the naturalistic fallacy. Again, this conclusion has a very 
intuitive appeal to it.  
Both Hume’s and Moore’s fallacy have been subject to a broad secondary 
literature. This will not concern us here as we are more interested in present day 
invocations of this fallacy. Though Moore’s and Hume’s fallacy are not entirely the 
same, they are often used interchangeably, and in a variety of subtly different uses 
(see, e.g., Curry, 2006). Nonetheless, these can all be said to deal with a difference in 
meaning between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, and for our purposes both notions can also be 
used interchangeably.  
The naturalistic fallacy has most often been invoked against evolutionary ethics. 
In most cases, the criticism that evolutionary ethicists commit a fallacy is 
warranted. Moore particularly aimed his critique at the evolutionary ethicists of his 
time (though his net is cast wider, see Chapter 3). Nineteenth century evolutionary 
ethicists indeed built normative theories by first defining normative terms by 
reference to a certain aspect of ‘evolution’. In so doing they not only neglected lay 
people’s and philosophers’ understandings of moral terms but also misrepresented 
the theory of evolution. Evolutionary ethicists often proposed or assumed a very 
specific and fixed definition of right, good, or ‘the moral sense’. Spencer for example 
assumed that happiness is good and that happiness can be acquired if one has the 
liberty to exercise one’s faculties. He then assumed that evolution went in the 
direction of more freedom (liberty), ergo, more evolution is better. Nonetheless, 
Spencer’s system rests on shaky ground because it is open to question if happiness is 
indeed the same as ‘good’, and we can certainly find counterexamples. Thus, 
Spencer’s system had not proven what it set out to prove. 
At the end of the twentieth century, there was a very short upsurge of this kind 
of evolutionary ethics, most notably by Richards (1986), who was subsequently 
accused of committing the naturalistic fallacy (Ferguson, 2001). Richards (1986, p. 
272) assumed that the moral sense is “a set of innate dispositions that, in 
appropriate circumstances, move the individual to act in specific ways for the good 
of the community.” Again, this definition is open to question.  
These definitions of moral terms are all open to question, and this is precisely 
one of Moore’s principal arguments against such attempts. Most of us can come up 
with examples of morally good things that do not fall under ‘happiness’, ‘freedom to 
exercise one’s faculties’ or ‘acting for the good of the community’, thus bringing 
into question the validity of these propositions. 
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In recent times, the naturalistic fallacy is also invoked to refute arguments that 
do not intend to postulate a definition of moral terms. For example, Tanner (2006) 
suggests that the following arguments are instances of the naturalistic fallacy: the 
argument that something is good because it is akin to a principle of evolution, e.g. 
capitalism is right because it promotes the survival of the fittest; something is good 
because it is normal, e.g. homosexuality is not good because it is not normal; and 
something is good because it is natural, e.g. meat eating is good because it is natural. 
In each case, we can say that this is a bad (because incomplete) argument, or 
fallacious thinking. However, it is questionable that anyone was trying to postulate 
a definition of a moral term or that anyone was trying to deductively infer ‘ought’ 
statements from ‘is’ statements. Nonetheless, the is/ought gap or naturalistic fallacy 
might be a useful tool to refute such arguments, despite expansion of its application 
beyond its original meaning.  
Very recently, Elqayam and Evans (in press) applied the understanding of 
descriptivity and normativity as two different domains to the study of human 
rationality instead of morality. Thus, they expand the is/ought gap to divide ‘how 
we ought to reason’ from ‘how we do reason’. They insist that human thinking has 
been subject to normativist research biases, and these research biases are caused by 
either interpreting normative theories as descriptive theories, or the other way 
around. Since Elqayam and Evans’ view plays an important role in the next section, 
we will also highlight these authors’ reasoning. First of all, as Elqayam and Evans (in 
press) point out, there are various normative theories that prescribe correct 
reasoning. For example, certain authors adhere to logicism, the idea that the rules 
of logic are the proper norms for seeking knowledge. Others suggest that the rules 
of Bayesian probability are far more apt, if one wants to reason correctly. These 
theories however do not necessarily describe how human beings reason, in fact, 
there is little reason to think they do. They have not been developed by studying 
human thinking but by developing rules that, for example, yield accurate 
predictions or that follow from very basic widely accepted principles. Thus, if the 
aim is to give an accurate description of human thinking, normative theories are not 
the best starting point. We can find a similar point in Kurzban (2010): 
The mind is the product of modules working together, often managing to look 
so good that, yes, they can be confused under certain conditions for 
something that conforms to some definition of rational. But it’s best not to be 
confused by this illusion. There is no reason, in principle, to start with 
monolithic perfection and rationality when studying human cognition and 
behavior. The mind is not a machine that evolved to some sort of idealized 
neo-classical economic perception, with a few wrenches in the works. The 
mind evolved, bit by bit, over time, and the scientific study of the mind ought 
to respect this fact.” (Kurzban, 2010, p. 185) 
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When studying human thinking however, instead of testing whether a specific 
descriptive theory is correct, cognitive scientists often ask whether human thinking 
accords with some specific normative theory. This leads to biased research 
assumptions such as the prior rules bias. This is the mistaken assumption that certain 
rules of a certain normative theory are built into people’s heads in some innate and 
a priori manner. Again, while it might makes sense to hypothesize that the 
corollaries of a descriptive theory about human cognition are built-in functions of 
our mental capacities (if it is an accurate theory), there is not much reason to think 
that the corollaries of normative theories ‘carve nature at its joints.’ As a 
consequence of this prior rules bias, when researchers study human thinking, they 
only use non-trained subjects (because they assume the rules are innately built into 
people’s heads) and do not study how the participants learn to think according to 
the ‘rational’ framework. When participants do not reason according to the 
proposed normative framework, their reasoning patterns are merely classified as 
‘wrong’ without further investigation of the exact heuristics that people use. This 
leads to the interpretation bias: Participants’ responses are classified as either in 
accordance or not in accordance with the rules of a proposed normative theory. As a 
consequence, researchers classify mental processes as either ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ 
and are then tempted to theorize that these two (artificial) categories of reasoning 
refer to two different mental processes: for example, reasoning in accordance with 
logic is supposed to be implemented by one cognitive function (maybe akin to a 
logical faculty) while reasoning that is discordant with logic is supposed to be 
implemented by some ‘illogical’ faculty – very often an emotionally biased one. The 
third research bias is the clear norms bias. When some of participants’ answers are 
somewhat in accordance with a normative system, it is thought that the 
participants strictly follow that specific normative system. However, there is no 
reason to assume that participants’ reasoning is exactly in accordance with a 
normative theory as normative theories were never developed with the aim of 
describing the workings of the human mind. Perhaps unsurprisingly, such research 
biases also occur in the study of moral psychology. We can think of the tendency to 
attribute correct moral reasoning to non-affective mental processes, while affective 
mental processes are then classified as ‘biased’ moral reasoning (see Berker, 2009, 
for a discussion). We will see another example of this kind of attribution in Section 
1.2.4.  
In order to avoid these research biases, Elqayam and Evans (in press) suggest a 
descriptivist approach to the study of human thinking. Their proposal entails 
“identifying which terms are descriptive and which are deontic, and concentrating 
on the former” (Elqayam & Evans, in press, Appendix). They contend that 
“evaluative considerations need only be invoked (…) where the object is to improve 
human thinking and performance” (id., sect. 8, §5, our emphasis). Moreover, 
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evaluative considerations are fine so long as norms precede research rather than 
follow from it. In line with this, they prefer to entirely avoid inferences from 
descriptive to normative terms.  
A broad interpretation of the is/ought gap would indeed have the upshot that no 
inference can be made from descriptive to normative theories, or the other way 
around. However, this could have detrimental consequences as it would preclude 
descriptive theories from evaluating normative theories. In such cases, the focus in 
psychology is on normative terms, while the aim is not to improve human thinking. 
Moreover, in this dissertation we reason back and forth between descriptive and 
prescriptive theories in order to evaluate normative moral theories. But to do so, we 
need a theory about how normativity is related to descriptivity – instead of 
presupposing a strict division between descriptive and normative theories. Thus, 
while most contemporary uses of the naturalistic fallacy and the is/ought gap are 
aimed against sloppy reasoning, the danger of this expanding use is that every 
interaction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ is deemed fallacious. We need a more nuanced 
view of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ and how they relate to each other. Such a view will be 
provided in chapter three.  
In the next section, we will argue that previous conceptions of morality were 
overly narrow. This provides a good reason for not trying to give an exhaustive 
description of morality. Moreover, the example we use shows how the is/ought gap 
and the naturalistic fallacy have already proven very useful in the wake of claims 
about individual differences in moral cognition.  
1.2.4 Gender differences in moral orientation and normativist 
research bias 
In 1982, Gilligan wrote an infamous critique on Kohlberg’s moral psychology, 
claiming that it excluded the moral psychology of women. She asserted that men 
and women differed in their general moral orientation: While women’s moral 
orientation is personal, directed towards relationships, caring and empathy, men’s 
moral orientation is impartial, directed towards autonomy, universal rules, rights, 
and non-interference. In short, women’s moral orientation can be characterized as 
‘care ethics’ while men’s moral orientation can be characterized as ‘justice ethics’. 
Her criticism wasn’t only scientifical. Among other things, she reproached Kohlberg 
for excluding the care orientation from morality itself. Indeed, in his earlier work, 
Kolhberg (1981) insisted that, even though care concerns are important, they are 
not moral concerns but merely personal concerns.  
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Many psychologists and philosophers (including Kohlberg in some of his later 
work (Kohlberg, 1984; see Blum, 1988) have accepted Gilligan’s criticism about the 
scope of the moral domain. Are these developments defensible, and if so, on what 
grounds? We will argue that a broader conception of morality is indeed warranted 
but mostly because Kohlberg’s conception of morality was too narrow from the 
start. While Gilligan’s research might have catalyzed the idea of a broader 
conception of morality, this conception is ultimately not justified by her findings 
but by the research bias that was present in Kohlberg’s work.  
First of all, Gilligan’s theory rests on a shoddy scientific basis. While Gilligan 
tested her claims with surveys, none of her studies have been published and she 
never made her raw data available (Sommers, 2001). Moreover, Gilligan’s theory was 
in fact never clearly corroborated. Women score as high or higher on Kohlberg’s 
Moral Judgment Interview, the most commonly used instrument to measure justice 
reasoning (Walker, 1984; Jaffee & Hyde, 2000). It is also a point of contention how to 
interpret ‘moral orientation’ (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000; Sherblom, 2008; 2009), and each 
gender can reason according to both orientations when prompted to do so.  
In Gilligan’s favor, a small majority of participants is usually found to speak 
predominantly from one moral orientation (Sherblom, 2009). When participants had 
to make up their own moral dilemmas, Gilligan’s predicted differences were found, 
but only because women chose different dilemmas than men (Sherblom, 2008). Of 
course, this might mean that women have different sensitivities as to what 
constitutes a moral problem. This either moves the gender difference to another 
cognitive moral function than moral orientation, or it suggests we should interpret 
‘moral orientation’ differently. In sum, while there are probably gender differences 
in moral cognition, it is unclear if and how they have to do with moral orientation.  
However, we do argue that expanding the scope of the moral domain was a good 
thing, irrespective of the existence of gender differences. The reason is that 
Kohlberg’s conception of morality can be seen as an example of findings which are 
based on a research bias. How is that? 
Kohlberg’s theory of moral development was inspired by Kantian moral 
philosophy according to which morality was characterized by impartiality, 
universality, and (a form of) reasoning. Kohlberg’s idea of morality as impartial was 
an a priori hypothesis (he assumed it before empirical observation). He 
subsequently did find a developmental increase in impartial reasoning in reaction to 
moral dilemmas. However, even if there is a development of impartial and Kantian-
like thinking in the human mind that captures aspects of moral reasoning, this is 
not an argument to conclude that morality is always characterized by impartiality. 
Maybe Kohlberg only used impartiality-inducing dilemmas, maybe he only classified 
impartial reasons as moral reasons, or maybe his participants had been raised in the 
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same culture as he was raised, having learned the same impartial outlook on 
morality.  
There are various other normative theories around, each of which high-light 
different aspects of morality. Any of these theories might also capture certain 
mental processes that are associated with moral judgments. Which mental processes 
are associated with moral judgments, however, is an empirical question. Kohlberg 
presupposed that, if impartiality could be found in human cognition, moral thinking 
was necessarily impartial. In this way, he confused a normative theory for a 
descriptive theory and committed something akin to the clear norms bias. There is 
no good reason to think that any normative moral theory would be an accurate and 
exclusive description of how individuals come to make moral judgments. Gilligan’s 
merit is that she pointed to this overly narrow conception of morality. Even though 
gender differences in moral orientation are not clearly corroborated, the question 
whether personal care concerns are part of human morality should have been an 
empirical question instead of being ruled out from the start.  
In the meantime, it has become clear that care concerns are core moral issues: 
care issues are moralized by most individuals and across cultures (Haidt & Joseph, 
2007; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). This is thus an empirical argument for not 
excluding care from the moral domain. However, there seems to have been less 
work on the moral relevance of personal concerns.  
In sum, it seems that clearly distinguishing normativity from descriptivity might 
have led to the rejection of overly narrow conceptions of morality in the past. We 
can concur with Casebeer (2003a, p. 842) when he points out that: “Given that the 
domain of what constitutes a moral judgment is itself in contention, we would be 
best served by casting our nets widely, narrowing them appropriately as the 
neurobiological, psychological and normative aspects of morality co-evolve”. This is 
another reason not to prematurely narrow morality down to universalizable norms. 
1.3 Individual differences and moral sentiments  
The last topic we need to introduce concerns the nature and extent of individual 
differences in moral cognition. We argue that recent findings in moral psychology 
suggest that there are many intricate problems in solving moral disagreements. 
These intricacies are sometimes used to argue for moral relativism and practices of 
toleration (e.g. Wong, 1984; Chapter 4).  
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During the last decades, cognitive scientists, psychologists, neuroscientists, 
evolutionary psychologists and psychopathologists converged on an affective 
intuitionist view of moral cognition. Everyday moral judgments are the result of 
(and emerge from) cognitive processes that are intertwined with emotions (Greene, 
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Haidt, 2001). To put it even stronger, 
the capacity to experience certain emotions is necessary for normal social and 
moral behavior (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Blair et al., 1996).  
Other features of this affective intuitionist view are that we seem to be unaware 
of what causes our everyday moral judgments (Wheatley & Haidt, 2003), and that 
the cognitive processes that we are aware of – viz. the reasons we give after we 
expressed our judgments − are usually not the cause of our moral judgments (Haidt, 
2001; Wheatley & Haidt, 2003).  
If people generally have the same affective intuitions giving rise to similar 
everyday moral judgments, then moral disagreements might be rare. If, however, 
individuals differ in their affective intuitions, giving rise to individual differences in 
moral attitudes, then we may ask how we could possibly reason our way to 
agreement. Namely, if we do not know what caused our judgments, we cannot know 
what we should change. If we do not have control over the causes of our moral 
judgments, then we might not be able to change them. A common view in moral 
philosophy is that we should use a ‘reasonable’ method to come to agreement 
(Wong, 1984; Daniels, 1996; Saunders, 2009). If however the reasons we give for our 
moral judgments really are post-hoc rationalizations that do not influence our 
judgments at all, then reasonable methods would be mute.  
In this section we ask two questions: are individual differences in moral 
judgments widespread and important, and if so, can we resolve them in a reasonable 
manner? We first argue that moral disagreements are socially and philosophically 
relevant. We then argue that, even though the above picture needs to be 
substantially nuanced, it is very likely that not all moral disagreements can be 
resolved by reasonable arguments.  
1.3.1 The extent of individual differences in moral judgments  
Since human beings all share the same evolutionary background, it has been 
suggested that there is a core moral sense to which we can appeal in order to agree 
about moral issues (Ruse, 1986; Ruse & Wilson, 1986). Indeed, all cultures make a 
distinction between good and bad (Brown, 1991), prevent certain issues such as 
incest between mother and son (id.) and value care and justice (Shweder et al., 1997; 
Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Graham et al., 2009). Robinson and Kurzban (2007) showed 
that there is even extensive agreement about the comparative punishment that 
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certain offenses warrant: When asked to rank offenses on a scale from ‘no 
punishment’ to ‘maximum punishment’, participants demonstrated substantial 
agreement about the rank of each offense.  
Nonetheless, the agreement is severely limited: There is much less agreement 
about the absolute amount of punishment one should give. Agreement in the 
Robinson and Kurzban (2007) study was mainly found for offenses concerning 
physical injury, taking without consent (stealing) and deception in exchanges 
(cheating). In contrast, there was substantial disagreement about sexual issues and 
drug use (see also Chapter 2). Graham et al. (2009) find disagreement about the 
moral importance of loyalty, respect for authority and feelings of disgust.  
These differences have been linked to political ideology and specific politico-
moral issues: American conservatives are more sensitive to disgust and more 
inclined than liberals to consider ‘disgust’, ‘loyalty’ and ‘respect for authority’ as a 
good basis for their moral views; the same holds for Dutch right-wing versus left-
wing adherents (van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). Disgust sensitivity has been linked to 
intuitive disapproval of homosexuality (e.g., Inbar, Knobe, Pizarro & Bloom, 2009). 
Thus, while moral agreement is widespread, there is robust diversity in the moral 
attitudes towards other issues, and this diversity is related to ideological dividing 
lines within a culture – thus, moral diversity is at least socially significant.  
A recent paper suggests that the existing patterns of moral disagreements are 
also philosophically relevant. Gustafsson and Peterson (2010, online first) adapted 
previous computer models in order to simulate what happens when individuals’ 
opinions about a single moral issue are influenced by a universal moral fact relevant 
to that issue. For example, what would happen if there was a true answer to the 
question whether abortion is permissible, assuming that all individuals would be 
affected by the truth (in addition to being affected by authorities, others’ opinions, 
random shifts etc.)? Gustafsson and Petersen find that, when all agents in the model 
are influenced by the moral fact, they quickly come to agree, or they converge to 
two extreme views on the matter (for example, either for or against abortion). 
However, moral disagreements are persistent and they cover a range of intermediate 
views (for example, ranging from ‘abortion is never permitted’, over ‘only in cases 
of rape’ to ‘abortion is always permitted’). Thus, it is not likely that there are moral 
facts that influence everyone’s moral opinions. This model can also explain why 
there is agreement about some moral issues: In cases where there is no moral fact of 
the matter, agents can also come to agree on moral issues, for example when they 
are influenced by an authority. However, it is only in the absence of a moral fact 
(that affects agents) that the model yields persistent disagreement, covering a range 
of intermediate opinions. Thus, given the observation that for some moral issues 
there is persistent disagreement covering a range of intermediate opinions, while 
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for other opinions there is moral agreement, the most plausible explanation is that 
there are no universal moral facts that influence individuals.  
Nonetheless, that does not mean that there are no moral facts, or that we cannot 
resolve such moral disagreements. Maybe we need a proper education in order to be 
influenced by moral facts or in order to be influenced by good reasons. Maybe we 
would agree if we learned how to reason correctly? We explore this possibility in 
the next section. 
1.3.2 The nature of individual differences in moral judgments 
At first sight, the affective intuitionist view suggests that factual and reasonable 
arguments will not influence our attitudes nor help us in reaching agreement. 
However, the sketched view is too pessimistic. While our everyday spontaneous 
moral judgments might indeed be caused by affective intuitions that are beyond our 
control, we can also reach moral conclusions by conscious reasoning.  
First of all, Haidt (2001) stresses that we do give reasons after we expressed our 
moral judgments. While these reasons are post-hoc rationalizations, there is ample 
evidence that they do influence other individuals’ affective intuitions (Haidt, 2001). 
According to Sie and Wouters (2008; 2010), these post-hoc rationalizations are 
crucial to our everyday moral practices and make up the reasons that justify and 
influence our own moral behavior. Namely, we discuss these reasons (a.k.a. post-hoc 
rationalizations) in moral discussions when we are held responsible for our actions. 
We can reach agreement on these reasons. Upon agreement, we can adapt our 
future behavior in line with these reasons by adjusting our affective intuitions in 
line with our reasons. As a consequence, even though the reasons we give are not 
the direct causes of our behavior, they might come to guide our future behavior in 
line with what is deemed justified by others in our moral community.  
Can we indeed adapt our affective intuitions and align them with our reasons? 
While everyday moral judgments need to be spontaneous, we can reason through a 
moral argument when we are in a more contemplative mood, not ‘in the heat of the 
moment’, or when we are ‘offline’. This can change our moral conclusions, but it will 
not necessarily in itself change our affective intuitions. Thus we additionally need to 
reevaluate and change our moral intuitions and the sentiments that give rise to 
quicker, spontaneous moral judgments. We can do that by using our imagination. 
For example, moral dilemmas can be seen from a care or from a justice perspective 
(cf. Section 1.2.4; Jaffee & Hyde, 2000) and we could practice taking the perspective 
that coincides with our consciously accepted conclusions. We can also increase or 
decrease the strength of emotions by imagining ourselves as participants in a 
situation, or by mentally distancing ourselves from a situation; we can additionally 
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exaggerate or minimalize the seriousness of a situation (Ochsner et al. 2004). Thus, 
even though our everyday moral judgments may need to arise automatically when 
we are ‘online’, when we are ‘offline’, we can reason through an argument and 
additionally practice our sensitivity for the moral conclusion we reached. 
This, of course, is a slow and laborious process. Even worse, it does not 
satisfactorily solve the issue of moral disagreement. In order to show this, let us first 
assume that we only want to solve disagreements in a reasonable manner. This 
amounts to referring to facts and to examining the reasons that each of us gives for 
supporting or rejecting a moral view. There are individual differences in affective 
intuitions (such as sensitivity for disgust). Therefore, different individuals will reach 
different moral judgments. But maybe they will all use the same reasons to 
rationalize their judgments? We will give an example to clarify why this is not the 
case. 
Assume that two disputants, K and M, discuss the case of marriage between 
cousins and come to find that K morally disapproves of cousin marriage and thinks 
it should be illegal. M thinks that it is morally permissible for cousins to marry and 
that this should be legal. They find out that K is highly disgusted by cousin marriage 
while M is not. However, K appeals to the increased chances of genetic disorders 
among the children from such marriages in order to drive his point home. M agrees 
that a child produced from cousins has an increased chance of genetic disorders, but 
she brings up that this risk is equally high for a 40-year old woman (Paul & Spencer, 
2008). Both K and M think that there is nothing wrong with a 40 year old woman 
giving birth. In this case, we might be inclined to think that this will solve the 
disagreement. We might think that even though the disagreement is caused by 
differences in affective intuitions, K cannot uphold his reasons to disapprove of this 
kind of marriage and should reasonably change his judgment and try to lower his 
disgust.  
So far so good, were it not the case that post-hoc rationalizations (reasons) are 
equally caused by our affects. Consider Graham et al.’s findings (2009): There is 
diversity in the perceived moral importance of loyalty, respect for authority and 
feelings of disgust. While liberals think disgust is not a relevant factor when 
deciding on the wrongness of an act, conservatives think it is. In this example, K can 
therefore adduce an additional reason, namely that cousin marriage is too 
disgusting to be permissible. M on the other hand will not think of disgust as 
morally relevant while K thinks it is morally relevant. Thus, the moral disagreement 
has not been solved by reasonable arguments.  
Some may think this is a weird example: disgust seems particularly irrelevant for 
moral matters and no sensible person will defend K’s view. However, Leon Kass 
(2001) has argued that disgust is morally relevant, just as liberals’ reasons to 
approve or disapprove on a moral issue are morally relevant. Namely, liberals’ 
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reasons are in the end equally justified by referring to their affects, or, more 
plastically:  
Can anyone really give an argument fully adequate to the horror that is 
father-daughter incest (even with consent), or bestiality, or the mutilation of 
a corpse, or the eating of human flesh, or the rape or murder of another 
human being? Would anybody's failure to give full rational justification for 
his revulsion at those practices make that revulsion ethically suspect? (Kass, 
2001) 
Indeed, it is hard to argue why empathy would be a valid reason while disgust is 
not. The fact that disgust sensitivity is more variable than sensitivity to care issues 
will not work: Disgust sensitivity and perceived relevance varies between 
ideological orientations, but sensitivity to care issues varies between other groups, 
for example between sexes (Chapter 3). We might try to say that the fact that 
disgust is deemed morally wrong by K does not make it morally wrong, but the same 
can be said about any affectively-justified reason, including the perceived rightness 
of acting on empathy.  
Thus, even though we can reason our way through a moral argument, our 
reasons are also shaped by certain sentiments, thus giving rise to individual 
differences in moral reasons. Therefore, no argument based merely on reasons and 
facts can resolve disagreements that are caused by differences in affective 
intuitions.  
This argument started from a specific view about reasonable discussion, a view 
that is akin to, but still slightly different from, narrow reflective equilibrium (Rawls, 
1971; Daniels, 1996). The method of narrow reflective equilibrium entails that we 
equilibrate our particular moral judgments with our general moral principles. In the 
process, we can either adapt a particular judgment or a moral principle until the 
moral system is coherent - a moral system is justified if it is coherent. In the 
previous example, we assumed that we only relied on reasons in order to resolve the 
disagreement. Here, we can refer to our shared particular judgments and our shared 
general principles in order to discuss a moral issue. However, different individuals 
have different moral judgments because of differences in affective intuitions. Again, 
this does not resolve all moral disagreements (see also Saunders, 2009).  
Another possibility is that we proceed by equilibrating our moral reasons or 
general moral principles with our particular moral judgments, and cut down the 
resulting moral theories to those that are in accord with non-moral facts about the 
world. In short, we should apply broad reflective equilibrium (Daniels, 1996). 
However, Daniels (1996) argues that this too will not work. Note that reflective 
equilibrium comes to an end when we have a coherent system. When confronted 
with incoherence, we should either adapt a general moral principle or a specific 
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moral judgment, or both. Now consider the previous example, and imagine for the 
sake of argument that K* and M agree that the risk of genetic disorders is the only 
relevant reason for considering the moral permissibility of cousin marriage. Both 
agree on the appropriateness of 40-year old women getting pregnant but they 
disagree on the permissibility of cousin marriage. M’s view is coherent but K*’s view 
is not. Now K* may possibly adapt his own moral judgment and perspective on 
cousin marriage. In this case, they would come to an agreement. However, it is 
equally possible that K adapts his view about the permissibility of 40-year old 
women reproducing. In this case, the disagreement has become deeper and it has 
intensified. Thus, reflective equilibrium does not guarantee agreement. (Suppose 
again that K thinks that disgust is a legitimate reason in moral consideration. As a 
consequence K does not change his mind about anything because his view is 
internally consistent. Cousin marriage is deemed morally bad because it is 
disgusting, 40-year old women can give birth because this does not disgust him. In 
this case as well, the disagreement is not solved.) 
In a strange twist, we concur that according to our reasoning so far, it may still be 
possible to resolve these disagreements – but not in a traditionally reasonable 
fashion. Metaphors, stories and vivid descriptions are often powerful tools to elicit 
certain sentiments in others and these are indeed being used to proselytize one’s 
moral convictions. The anti-abortion movement uses enlarged pictures of aborted 
fetuses, animal rights activists may point to the pain inflicted on animals and 
Christians elicit horrific stories of hell in order to scare each other into right 
conduct. A combination of reasoning through verbal argument and subjecting 
others to emotion-eliciting stimuli might be a good strategy to induce new moral 
attitudes. Kaliarnta, Nihlen-Fahlquist and Roeser (2011, online first) give a less 
extreme example: In the context of in vitro fertilization treatment, the emotional 
impact of a treatment could be taken into account when health care providers have 
to choose a specific optimal treatment. In order to do so, they can rely on first-hand 
anecdotes of couples who went through the process. We do not claim that this can 
solve all moral disagreements, but it is an interesting option to consider. 
A huge variety of techniques opens up if we go on where reasonable discussion 
left us. We can hypnotize someone for the sake of agreement, or condition 
psychopathic mass-murderers, as in A Clockwork Orange. We can punish or threaten 
criminals until they at least agree that murder is bad. However, the question now 
becomes if, or when, interference like this is morally allowed. This is a question that 
cannot be answered here but will be revisited in chapter four. 
So far, we have argued that there are fundamental moral disagreements. These 
are moral disagreements that we cannot resolve by referring to reasonable 
discussion. However, we may ask if some of these disagreements would not be 
resolved if we expanded our notion of reasonable discussion. Some convincing 
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‘arguments’ that may resolve this kind of disagreement seem to be morally and/or 
epistemically wrong. Other arguments entailing appeals to emotion provide 
promising avenues for further discussion. To date, it is an open question how far 
this will bring us.  
1.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have set out the problems that will confront us throughout the 
rest of this work. First we made clear that morality need not be by definition 
universalizable. Then we introduced the is/ought gap and the naturalistic fallacy. 
There is a consensus that descriptive data do not simply translate into normative or 
meta-ethical moral statements. This consensus is very useful, as it showed us how 
previous empirical studies of morality had been biased by confusing normative 
theories for descriptive theories. However, following recent developments in moral 
psychology and in the face of overly diligent invocations of the naturalistic fallacy 
or is/ought gap, we run the risk of not being able to evaluate normative theories. 
This is a reason to support a theory that links ‘is’ and ‘ought’. Finally, we gave an 
overview of the extent and nature of individual differences in moral cognition, and 
the problem of moral disagreement. It appeared that not all moral disagreements 
can be resolved. We may expand the range of accepted arguments, depending on 
what one considers epistemically or morally right. In chapters three and four we 
will discuss arguments for relativism or toleration in cases of moral disagreement. 
The next chapter first introduces some more differences in moral cognition.  

  
This chapter is a revised and expanded version of Quintelier, K.J.P., Ishii, K., Weeden, J., Kurzban, R. & Braeckman, J. (under 
review). Individual Differences in Reproductive Strategy are Related to Views about Recreational Drug Use in Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Japan. 
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Chapter 2  
Individual differences in moral condemnation of 
recreational drug use are related to reproductive 
strategy  
We have, in fact, two kinds of morality side by side; one 
which we preach but do not practice, and another 
which we practice but seldom preach. 
- Russell, 1928 
2.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we explored the extent and nature of individual differences in 
moral cognition. It appeared that some moral disagreements are irresolvable, unless we 
extend our notion of reasonable discussion. This chapter further explores individual 
differences in moral cognition, how to explain them and what kind of arguments might 
have an effect on these moral attitudes. We will see that empirical studies may inform 
us about affective intuitions that shape our moral attitudes (judgments and behaviors) 
and that we would otherwise remain unaware of.  
We can make a useful distinction between two kinds of moral cognition. On the one 
hand, moral attitudes may function to regulate one’s own behavior. On the other hand, 
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moral attitudes may function to influence others’ behavior. This refers to the 
distinction, made by DeScioli and Kurzban (2009), between moral conscience and moral 
condemnation. They assert that the mechanisms guiding our own morally relevant 
behavior need not be the same as the mechanisms inducing moral behavior in others. 
For example, the moral attitudes that incur us to condemn an unfaithful partner need 
not function in the same way, or even be the same moral attitudes, as those making up 
our conscience about the right sexual behavior for ourselves. Evolution can explain 
aspects of both conscience and condemnation, but evolutionary explanations that 
pertain to the former do not always pertain to the latter. The evolved functions of 
conscience are different from the evolved functions of condemnation.  
In this chapter, we discuss explanations of individual differences in moral 
condemnation of recreational drug use. We compare two explanatory models and argue 
that individual differences in these moral attitudes can be explained as the result of 
evolved reproductive strategies and that this is a better explanation than social learning 
or adherence to an ideology. Evolved reproductive strategies are implemented by sexual 
attitudes, such as the desire for monogamy versus promiscuity. We find that individual 
differences in attitudes towards recreational drug use correlate with one’s attitudes 
towards sex rather than with one’s ideological commitments, at least for students, and 
across cultures. A possible explanation is that recreational drug increases the chances of 
promiscuous sexual behavior. These findings are in line with previous findings: 
Kurzban, Dukes and Weeden (2010) found evidence in favor of their evolutionary 
inspired model in two US samples. We replicated their findings with students in 
Belgium, The Netherlands, and Japan.  
These findings have consequences for moral disagreement. They suggest that, to 
some extent, one’s ideological background might be a post-hoc rationalization instead 
of a cause of one’s attitudes towards recreational drug use. Moreover, sexual attitudes 
are also related to recreational drug attitudes and they are likely to cause these. 
Discussing one’s ideological background will therefore have only a limited effect on 
attitudes towards recreational drug attitudes. Rather, appealing to the hypothesized 
link between drug use and sexual promiscuity might be a more convincing discussion 
strategy because for certain populations and for certain drugs it taps into the real cause 
of attitudes towards recreational drug use.  
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2.2 Attitudes towards sex and recreational drug use 
What causes attitudes towards sex and recreational drug use? In the social sciences, 
individual differences in attitudes towards sex and recreational drug use are often 
explained as the result of social learning processes. Such processes cause one to 
internalize the ideological commitments prevailing in one's social environment. 
Alternatively, personality factors (with inherited and learned variation) cause one to 
affiliate with a general political or religious ideology. Again, specific moral attitudes are 
then seen as the downstream effect of this general ideological orientation. In both cases, 
we expect to find a relation between ideology and moral attitudes.  
In this view, one's ideological leanings would thus shape attitudes towards drugs and 
attitudes towards sex, causing both attitudes to correlate with each other. Reasoning 
from this perspective, when attitudes towards drugs and attitudes towards sex are 
related in a cultural group, one would predict that this is the result of shared ideologies. 
While ideological models suggest that general ideologies shape specific moral 
judgments, strategic interest models explain specific moral judgments as caused by 
one’s strategic interests. For example, individual differences in attitudes towards 
policies that benefit certain minorities are found to relate to one’s minority status 
(Erikson & Tedin, 2005). Also, despite a variety of approaches, ideological models are 
usually not informed by evolutionary theories. We present a strategic interests model 
that draws from evolved strategies: Recently, Kurzban et al. (2010) argued that evolved 
reproductive strategies, implemented by attitudes towards sex, can also shape 
individual differences in moral attitudes towards drugs. The reason is that drug use is 
causally related to sexual promiscuity. Promiscuous individuals therefore benefit from 
others’ recreational drug use and will have more permissive attitudes towards 
recreational drug use. 
In this view, contrary to the social science perspective, attitudes towards sex will 
correlate with attitudes towards drugs and this relationship is not the result of a more 
general ideology explaining both kinds of attitudes. Indeed, results from two American 
samples were in line with this prediction (Kurzban et al., 2010).  
Both research traditions also yield different predictions concerning cross-cultural 
variety. According to the strategic interests model, we will find individual differences in 
reproductive strategies in a wide range of environments. We will then find a 
relationship between attitudes towards sex and recreational drug use across various 
cultures, and this relationship cannot be entirely explained by ideology. However, 
reasoning from an ideological perspective, we do not expect to find a widespread 
relationship between attitudes towards drugs and sex. In order to test these predictions 
and further evaluate both models, we replicated the study of Kurzban et al. (2010) with 
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student samples in Belgium, the Netherlands and Japan. These three cultures have quite 
different mores surrounding recreational drug use and sex.  
In what follows we first evaluate the evidence for existing ideological models; where 
possible we highlight country-specific findings. Second, we elaborate on strategic 
interests models on individual differences in reproductive strategies, and these 
strategies' relationship with moral attitudes. In the main section of this paper we 
discuss the results of our study. As predicted, we found a relationship between attitudes 
towards recreational drug use and sexual attitudes in all three samples. This correlation 
is not explained by ideological variables in any of the samples. Moreover, we find cross-
cultural differences in the relationships between, on the one hand, political, religious 
and personality variables and, on the other hand, moral attitudes towards sex and 
drugs. This suggests that attitudes towards drugs track attitudes towards sex across a 
range of cultural milieus. We discuss our findings in the light of country-specific 
ideologies. Overall, our results strongly suggest that evolutionary psychology and 
strategic interests can be successful in explaining individual differences in moral 
condemnation.   
2.2.1 Ideological models 
There is a substantial body of research about the relationship between ideology 
(especially religiosity) and attitudes and behavior. In this research tradition, attitudes 
are seen as an intermediate step between the prevailing ideology in the social 
environment and individuals' behavior. Drug use and sexual behavior is then explained 
as the result of internalized norms which are acquired from a social group's ideology. At 
first sight, the effect of religiosity on drug use seems well-established, as well as the 
effect of religiosity on attitudes towards sex, and the findings speak in favor of a 
mediating role of attitudes or moral norms. 
In the U.S., the link between religiosity and moral attitudes and behavior is widely 
studied. Chitwood, Weiss, and Leukefeld (2008) systematically reviewed the findings of 
751 empirical studies - mainly on American participants - that test for a relationship 
between at least one measure of religiosity or spirituality and at least one measure of 
drug use. They find that there is a well-established association between 
religiosity/spirituality and substance use, mainly alcohol and marijuana, and conclude 
that religiosity is likely to be a protective factor against drug use. 
Recent studies corroborate these findings and suggest that social learning 
mechanisms are one of the causes of religion’s protective effect. Adamczyk and Palmer 
(2008) find that, independent of one’s own religious denomination, one's friends' born 
again identity is negatively related to marijuana initiation. They hypothesize that these 
friends' behavior or attitudes affect individuals' behavior. Allen and Lo (2010) find that 
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social bonding variables somewhat mediate the relationship between religiosity and 
substance use for a variety of substances (alcohol, marijuana, crack etc.). In their 
theoretical framework, social learning shapes one's values, which then shape behavior. 
Also Gryczynski and Ward (2011) found that religiosity was negatively linked with 
cigarette use, and that perceived disapproval of parents and close friends mediated the 
effects of religiosity on cigarette use. These authors equally suggest that proximity and 
exposure to norms shape internalized norms about cigarette use. Hence, socially learned 
attitudes are seen as the intermediate step between one's religious social environment 
and drug use. 
Similar theoretical frameworks are applied in explaining sexual attitudes. In a 40-
year period, more than 80 studies reported a relationship between religion and sexual 
attitudes and behavior (Cochran & Beeghley, 1991). Cochran and Beeghley (1991) 
likewise suggest that religious prescriptions and the group one identifies with influence 
an individual’s attitudes. More recently, Ahrold et al. (2010) find that certain religious 
variables predict conservative sexual attitudes and they assume that the social 
environment can explain this effect. Petersen and Donnenwerth (1997) refer to 
exposure to religious norms in the social environment to explain individual differences 
in attitudes towards sex. Concretely, their findings are consistent with their theory that 
conservative religions inhibit the development of progressive opinions of those who 
regularly attend church. 
However, most of these studies have been conducted with American participants. 
Prevailing ideologies in the U.S. are often either restrictive towards both sex and drugs 
or permissive towards both sex and drugs – they are generally not restrictive towards 
one and permissive towards the other. This begs the question why this is the case, if this 
is also the case in the rest of the world. Moreover, prevailing ideologies in the U.S. 
usually cover only a narrow spectrum on the restrictive-permissive continuum. We can 
expect permissive ideologies in the Netherlands to be more permissive than most 
ideologies in the U.S., and we can expect restrictive ideologies in Japan to be more 
restrictive than most ideologies in the U.S. Thus, we cannot simply extrapolate these 
findings to the rest of the world.  
Findings on the relation between religion and attitudes regarding drugs and sex in 
Western Europe are less abundant, but generally comparable with American studies. 
Wicki, Kuntsche, and Gmel (2010) review work that investigates the determinants of 
alcohol drinking at European universities. They find a negative relation between 
religion and alcohol use. Link (2008) has found a relationship between social factors and 
illicit drug use, both in Germany and the US. This study (Link, 2008) is likewise inspired 
by the theory that attitudes mediate the relationship between social context and 
behavior. 
Kraaykamp (2002) describes national changes in sexual attitudes in the Netherlands 
from longitudinal data. Similarly to Petersen and Donnenwerth (1997), he finds that 
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religious engagement, as indicated by church attendance, keeps individuals from 
developing progressive opinions concerning sexuality, and this especially among 
affiliates from conservative churches (here, the Dutch Reformed). Similar dynamics 
might be at work in Belgium regarding attitudes towards homosexuality. Hooghe, Claes, 
Harell, Quintelier, and Dejaeghere (2010) find that homophobic attitudes in Belgium 
(and Canada) are somewhat related to religious denomination, with Muslims being most 
restrictive. Moreover, regardless of denomination, those who more regularly attend a 
religious service are significantly more likely to show intolerance towards gay rights. 
Comparable results have been found by Adamczyck and Pitt (2009) in US samples, 
suggesting a possible congruence between Belgium, Canada and the US in this matter. 
Studies on moral attitudes in relation to religion in Japan are relatively scarce. 
Existing work on drug use usually describes drug abuse as influenced by nation-wide 
developments and demographic factors such as the criminal justice system, economic 
growth, unemployment and socioeconomic status; though the importance of informal 
social control is also acknowledged (Vaughn, Huang, & Ramirez, 1995). Also for sexual 
attitudes, while views on divorce, premarital sex and marriage changed remarkably in 
the 1980's, religiosity and worshiping ancestors stayed relatively stable (Atoh, 2010). 
Most studies do not take up religion as a possible predictive factor of moral attitudes; 
where they do, religion does not have a convincing effect. This need not be surprising: If 
we follow the reasoning of social scientists, religion might not be a determinant of 
attitudes towards sex or drugs in Japan even though it is in Europe and the US. In the 
latter two, social learning of concrete moral norms that prevail among one's social 
network is supposed to mediate the relation between religion and attitudes. Adherents 
of the major religions in Japan, Buddhism and Shinto, do not teach very concrete norms 
about drug use, nor about sexuality, at least towards lay followers of the religion. 
(Priests are assumed to practice celibacy, but it is known that they are not always so 
strict [Ishii, pers. comm.]). Moreover, Buddhist and Shinto religious practices do not 
consist of well-planned social gatherings (Roemer, 2010). Instead, private rituals are 
essential, such as funeral rituals, praying and offering for ancestors at home (Tanaka, 
2010). While it is hard to conclude anything about religion due to scarce data, there is no 
indication that this is an important factor shaping attitudes about recreational drug use 
or sex in Japan.  
Not only religion is studied in relation to moral attitudes. Others see specific moral 
attitudes as the downstream effect of more general political commitments (Jacoby, 2002; 
Janda, Berry, & Goldman, 2002; Bardes & Oldendick, 2003; Sears & Levy, 2003; Erikson & 
Tedin, 2005). This view is expanded with basic personality factors explaining individual 
differences: According to Graham et al. (2009), one's (partly inherited, partly socially 
learned) personality traits create adult moral and ideological identities, which in their 
turn influence affiliation with specific political orientations (Haidt & Joseph, 2007). 
Indeed, in the US, personality factors (e.g. fear of threat) have been found to relate to 
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political conservatism (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008), and the relative 
importance one assigns to each of five moral foundations is related to conservatism and 
liberalism (Graham et al., 2009).  
In the Netherlands, perception of social danger (which is comparable with fear of 
threat) has been found to relate to the relative importance of the same moral 
foundations, and to left- versus right-wing political attitudes (van Leeuwen et al., 2007).  
Zooming in on politics and drugs, in the US, democrats are found to be more likely to 
smoke compared to republicans (Subramanian & Perkins, 2010).  
Similar results are found in Japan, where those who identify as left-wing are more 
likely to smoke (Subramanian, Hamano, Perkins, Koyabu, & Fujisawa, 2010). Both studies 
refer to (but do not measure) latent attitudinal values as a possible mediator for these 
effects. However, at present, neither drug issues nor family values dominate the 
political debate in Belgium or the Netherlands. Therefore, we cannot assume that drug 
attitudes or sexual attitudes of the electorate align with their political orientation or 
with the respective views of the parties they vote for. Other unsettled matters include 
the extent to which sexual issues and drug views relate to individuals’ political 
orientation in Japan. 
We do not dispute that there is at least a relationship between, on the one hand, 
ideology or personality and, on the other hand, behavior and specific moral attitudes. 
However, based on these studies, one can raise doubts about the proposed causal 
direction. To the extent that members of religious social networks prescribe restrictive 
moral standards, they might indeed inhibit other affiliates from developing progressive 
attitudes. Alternatively, preexisting attitudes might (also) cause individuals to more 
strongly align with a certain ideological group. This is compatible with the discussed 
studies: While denomination was a factor shaping sexual attitudes, church attendance 
was important as well. Although individuals might not choose their specific 
denomination to a large extent, they might more freely choose their frequency of church 
attendance (see also Berghammer, 2008), and this choice might be based on their 
preexisting attitudes, thus causing the relationship between attitudes and ideology. As 
to attitudes towards recreational drug use, not only the causal arrow but also the 
relationship with ideology in itself is not proven. Existing studies measure drug use and 
ideology; the causal importance of attitudes is merely a theoretical assumption.  
Importantly, in relation to the present research question, we doubt that social 
science models are complete. Previous studies suggest that specific attitudes are the 
result of more basic or more general factors. They do not consider the possibility that 
different specific attitudes (in this case, attitudes towards drugs and towards sex) might 
be directly related to each other, unmediated by more general or basic factors. In the 
next section we suggest another set of theoretical models.  
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2.2.2 Strategic interests models 
Strategic interests models propose that moral condemnation tends to align with the 
condemning individual’s personal interests. Indeed, in various domains, people’s moral 
attitudes have been found to track their personal interests: Socioeconomic status is 
consistently related to preferences for redistributive policies (e.g., Edlund & Pande, 
2002; Gelman, Shor, Bafumi, & Park, 2007) and race is related to preferences for policies 
that benefit racial minorities (Erikson & Tedin, 2005). Analogously, Kurzban et al. (2010) 
predicted that individuals will endorse moral attitudes that benefit their own sexual 
strategy. 
Kurzban et al. (2010) suggest that evolved reproductive strategies might be useful in 
explaining individual differences in attitudes towards drugs. More specifically, they 
predict that there is a direct relation between reproductive strategy and attitudes 
towards drugs and that this relation is not the result of more general ideologies or basic 
personality factors. The argument consists of three steps. First, people differ in the 
extent to which they follow either of two kinds of strategies that evolved to enhance 
their reproductive success: a short-term, promiscuous strategy or a long-term, 
monogamous strategy. Each strategy is implemented by corresponding attitudes 
towards sex. Second, people's moral attitudes will track their interests and it is in the 
interest of short-term strategists to promote promiscuity, while it is in the interest of 
more monogamously inclined people to promote restrictive attitudes towards sex. 
Third, drug use is causally related to promiscuity. From these points it follows that 
individual’s attitudes towards recreational drug use will correlate with attitudes 
towards sex, at least in contexts or cultures where drug use and promiscuity are related. 
Contrary to the social science perspective, this relationship exists independent of 
ideological background or other personal factors. We will now further explain each of 
these four steps. 
During human evolution, both short term and long term mating strategies were at 
times adaptive for either men or women (Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Gangestad & Simpson, 
2000). Men could increase their reproductive success by mating with as many women as 
possible, thereby allocating less energy in parental effort. However, as regular food 
scarcities were a cause of child mortality in our evolutionary past, paternal effort 
increased the survival chances or reproductive success of their offspring (Geary, 1998). 
Therefore fathers could also increase their fitness by following a long term strategy, 
allocating their energy in parental effort while foregoing other mating opportunities. 
Women could increase their fitness by enhancing the survival of their children. They 
would therefore prefer a partner who was likely to be an investing father. However, in 
environments with a lot of pathogen stress, children’s survival was more affected by 
their resistance towards pathogens than by food scarcity. In such an environment, 
women would prefer men with ‘good genes’, viz., men that showed signs of optimal 
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development and therefore resistance to prevailing pathogens (Little et al., 2011). There 
is evidence of a trade-off between good genes and parental investment; men with good 
genes seem likely to invest less energy in their offspring and they seem to specialize in 
short term encounters instead (Booth & Dabbs, 1993). Hence, ‘good genes’ partners are 
not likely to be investing fathers and women may have to choose between either a short 
term encounter with a ‘good genes’ partner or a long term relationship with an 
investing partner. Because the optimal strategy depends, among other things, on 
personal factors (such as being endowed with ‘good genes’ indicators for men, or 
fertility and reproductive value for women – which is related to their age), we can 
expect to find strategic diversity in all cultures.  
There are ample data that moral attitudes are aligned with strategic interests: As 
mentioned, socioeconomic status is consistently related to preferences for 
redistributive policies (e.g., Edlund & Pande, 2002) and race is related to preferences for 
policies that benefit racial minorities (Erikson & Tedin, 2005). Analogously, we can 
expect that individuals endorse moral attitudes that benefit their own sexual strategy. 
People in a long-term relationship, who invest time and energy in their children, would 
benefit if others are sexually restricted – thereby reducing the risk of cuckoldry, 
seduction, mate-poaching or investing in children that are not their own. They would 
therefore admonish behavior that promotes short term sexual encounters in others. 
Recreational drug use is such a promiscuity-enhancing behavior. Studies have found 
that individuals are more likely to have a risky, promiscuous or short term sexual 
encounter when under the influence of recreational party drugs. This has been found in 
American (Lammers, Ireland, Resnick, & Blum, 2000; Weeden & Sabini, 2007) as well as 
European (Madkour, Farhat, Halpern, Godeau, & Gabhainn, 2010) and Japanese study 
groups (Takakura, Nagayama, Sakihara, & Willcox, 2001; Nemoto, Iwamoto, Morris, 
Yokota, & Wada, 2007; Nagata-Kobayashi, Maeno, Yoshizu, & Shimbo, 2009). If 
individuals perceive drug use as conducive to sexual encounters, attitudes towards 
sexuality are therefore likely to track attitudes towards recreational drug use. This is 
the main prediction of this strategic interests model: sexual attitudes will predict 
attitudes towards the use of recreational party drugs, irrespective of ideological or 
personality factors. 
While this argument adds new predictions to classical social science models, it does 
not explain why ideology and attitudes are consistently related to each other. In this 
regard, the evolutionary model may be seen as a complement to social science models: 
While attitudes toward sex directly (unmediated by ideology) shape attitudes toward 
drugs, both are additionally influenced by learning processes in an ideological social 
environment. An alternative argument is that reproductive strategies influence one's 
ideology (at least religiosity) and mediate the relationship between ideology and 
attitudes towards recreational drug use. According to recent studies (Weeden, Cohen, & 
Kenrick, 2008; Li, Cohen, Weeden, & Kenrick, 2010), it is likely that one's reproductive 
 40 
strategy shapes one's religiosity. In the U.S., religion might function to support a high-
fertility monogamous mating strategy. This support is both practical, for example by 
providing child care and social support, and ideological, for example by keeping an eye 
on others' behavior and preaching norms that support this strategy. As a result, 
individuals following a long term mating strategy will be inclined to stay more firmly 
aligned with religious groups; these religious groups in their turn support their 
members' convictions and behavior. Individuals who do follow an unrestricted sexual 
strategy, independent of religious upbringing or other personality factors, will be 
inclined to leave or stay away from religious groups. Indeed, Weeden et al. (2008) found 
that present and expected future religious attendance was better explained by 
reproductive variables (family desires and sexual attitudes) than by other moral 
attitudes and personality variables, and that the relation between other moral attitudes 
and religious attendance could be explained by sexual attitudes. This makes it unlikely 
that religiosity shapes moral attitudes in general. However, it is compatible with the 
view that sexual attitudes shape religiosity, which in turn shapes other moral attitudes. 
Finally, one’s political orientation can be seen as a post hoc summary as opposed to a 
causal ideology with respect to specific political and moral opinions. Therefore, 
restrictive attitudes towards promiscuous sexual activity increase political 
conservatism, rather than the other way around. In sum, according to the model 
proposed by Kurzban et al. (2010), divergent strategic interests in low-commitment, 
promiscuous sexual activity versus high-commitment, monogamous sexual activity are 
predicted to play a fundamental causal role in explaining both ideological orientations 
and drug attitudes  
If there is a relationship between sexual attitudes and ideology, and between sexual 
attitudes and drug attitudes, the relation between ideology and drugs attitudes will be 
partially explained by sexual attitudes. As predicted, Kurzban et al. (2010) found a 
relationship between attitudes towards drugs and ideology, and this relationship could 
indeed be explained by attitudes towards sex. Even stronger, the correlations between 
ideology and drug attitudes were mostly spurious: when controlling for sexual variables, 
these correlations were reduced to almost zero, indicating that there was no causal 
relation between ideology and drug attitudes.  
Is it plausible that the same dynamics are at work in Europe or Japan? We have seen 
that there is also a relation between religiosity and sexual attitudes in the Netherlands. 
In contrast, it is as yet more contentious that religiosity and attitudes towards drugs are 
directly related (we only know that drug use is related to religiosity). Moreover, there is 
likely a positive correlation between fertility ideals and religiosity in Europe. 
Berghammer (2008) used data of the ‘Netherlands kinship panel’ and found that both 
religious socialization (e.g. one's parents' religiosity) and current religiosity (especially 
current church attendance) are independently linked with greater fertility within a 
family. Combined with the previously discussed social science findings, these studies 
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support the hypothesis that also in the Netherlands religion functions to support a high 
fertility monogamous mating strategy. No studies about Belgium were found in this 
regard, but we see no reason why dynamics would be different there. Hence, we predict 
that sexual attitudes will likewise mediate the relationship between religiosity and 
recreational drug use in the Netherlands and Belgium.  
For Japan though, we saw that we could not conclude to a relation between religiosity 
and attitudes towards sex or drugs. Do Buddhism and Shinto in Japan provide social 
support for families? Miller (1998) suggests that, while religion indeed provides social 
services for families in the US and Europe, in Japan these services are provided by 
informal secular organizations such as colleagues, family and neighbors. Therefore, 
there is no need for religion to provide this support. This is not to say that religions in 
Japan do not provide any social support at all. Indeed, wherever those informal 
mechanisms fall away, one can see an increase in religious attendance and activity and a 
rise of 'New Religions' (Roemer, 2007). However, it is mostly unemployed, elderly and 
unmarried individuals whose participation in religious activities increases, because they 
have less access to support from colleagues and family. For Japan, we predict that there 
will be no relationship between religiosity and attitudes towards sex or drugs.  
Finally, as mentioned above, we do not know if attitudes towards sex are important 
in making up individuals’ political orientation in Europe or in Japan. 
2.3 This study 
A first objective of this study is to replicate the previous study by Kurzban et al. (2010). 
A second objective is to compare the cross-cultural predictions of the ideological models 
with the strategic interests model.  
The main predictions center on the relation between sexual attitudes and attitudes 
towards recreational drug use. Reasoning from ideological models, in Europe attitudes 
towards both recreational drug use and sex are caused by socialization in a specific 
ideology. When attitudes towards drugs and sex correlate, this can be explained by 
ideology: Thus, when statistically controlling for ideology, the correlation between 
recreational drug use and sexual attitudes will be reduced. In Japan, ideology does not 
explain moral attitudes; therefore, there will be no relationship between attitudes 
towards recreational drug use and sex. According to the strategic interests model, in all 
samples attitudes towards drugs will be related to attitudes towards sex and this 
correlation will not be eliminated when we control for ideology. The reason is that in all 
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sampled countries recreational drug use is thought to be causally related to 
promiscuous sexual behavior.  
Additional predictions center on the relation between ideology and recreational drug 
use. The relation between religiosity and drug attitudes will be partially mediated by 
sexual attitudes in Europe but not in Japan. The reason is that religion functions to 
promote family values in Europe but not in Japan. Therefore, the relation between 
ideology and recreational drug use will at least in part be the effect of the relation 
between religiosity and sexual attitudes. In Japan, we also do not expect to find a 
relationship between religiosity and attitudes towards drugs.  
All predictions are represented schematically in figures 1 (Belgium and the 
Netherlands) and 2 (Japan). 
 
Table 1: Predictions of the ideological models versus the strategic interests models for 
Europe 
 
Reasoning from ideological models, ideology shapes 
one’s moral attitudes in Belgium and the Netherlands.  
If there is a relation between attitudes towards sex and 
attitudes towards drugs, this can be explained by 
ideology.  
Statistically controlling for ideology will eliminate the 
correlation between attitudes towards sex and attitudes 
towards recreational drug use. 
Statistically controlling for attitudes towards sex will not 
eliminate the correlation between ideology and attitudes 
towards recreational drug use. 
 
According to strategic interests models, attitudes towards 
sex are causally central in Belgium and the Netherlands. 
Attitudes towards sex shape one’s attitudes towards 
drugs. Statistically controlling for ideology will not 
eliminate the correlation between attitudes towards sex 
and attitudes towards drugs. 
If there is a relation between religiosity and attitudes 
towards drugs, this can be explained by attitude towards 
sex. Statistically controlling for attitudes towards sex will 
reduce the correlation between religiosity and attitudes 
towards recreational drug use. 
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Table 2: Predictions of the ideological models versus the strategic interests models for 
Japan 
 
Reasoning from ideological models, ideology does not 
shape one's moral attitudes in Japan. As a consequence, 
there will be no relationship between attitudes towards 
sex and attitudes towards drugs in Japan. 
 
 
According to strategic interests models, attitudes towards 
sex shape one’s attitudes towards drugs in Japan.  
According to the strategic interests models, there is most 
likely no relationship between attitudes towards sex and 
ideology in Japan. As a consequence, there will also be 
no relationship between attitudes towards recreational 
drug use and ideology in Japan. 
 
2.3.1 Methods 
2.3.1.1 Measures 
We adapted the survey used in Kurzban et al. (2010) and translated it to Dutch for 
Belgium (B) and the Netherlands (NL) and to Japanese for Japan (J). For our dependent 
measure, participants answered questions about their views on the morality and legality 
of the use of various recreational drugs (Cronbach’s alpha = .88 (B), .89 (NL), and .86 (J)). 
High scores on Recreational Drug Attitudes indicate greater condemnation of drug use. 
An example of a question for this variable was:  
Eric is going to a dance-party and he considers taking XTC, an illegal mind-
altering substance. (1 = strongly disagree; 4 = neutral; 7 = strongly agree) 
 
Using XTC in this way is morally wrong:  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Using XTC in this way should be legal:  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
For our independent measures, we constructed 18 ideological and personality 
variables. Participants responded to region-specific measures of religiosity. For Belgium 
and the Netherlands, these included level of religiosity, level of spirituality, frequency of 
private prayer, frequency of current church attendance, expected future frequency of 
church attendance, and how orthodox versus liberal they were concerning their 
religious affiliation (Religiosity; Cronbach’s alpha = .80 (B) and .89 (NL)). For Japan, these 
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included level of religiosity, level of spirituality, how often they visit the family grave 
and make offers to the family altar, and how often they (now and in the expected 
future) visit a local shrine, temple or church, and participate in other religious activities 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .61). Higher scores indicate higher religious engagement. 
For Belgium and the Netherlands, we categorized participants in left-wing and right-
wing orientation based on their party affiliation (Left/Right-wing; Belgium: left= 
Belgische Alliantie, Groen!, LSP (Linkse Socialistische Partij), PVDA+ (Partij van de 
Arbeid) and sp.a (socialistische partij anders); right= CD&V (Christen-Democratisch & 
Vlaams), N-VA (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie), Open VLD (Vlaams, Liberaal, Democratisch), 
UF (Union Francophone) and Vlaams Belang; the Netherlands: left= GL (GroenLinks), 
PvdD (Partij voor de Dieren), PvdA (Partij van de Arbeid) and SP (Socialistische Partij); 
right= CU (ChristenUnie), CDA (Christen-Democratisch Appèl), D66 (Democraten 66), 
PVV (Partij voor de Vrijheid), SGP (Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij) and VVD 
(Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie)). For Japan, we asked if participants 
considered themselves right-wing or left-wing on a 7-point scale (1 = strongly support left-
wing, 7 = strongly support right-wing). 
For Belgium and the Netherlands, participants indicated their agreement with a 
range of socially salient political issues. One group of items concerned sexual issues 
involving prostitution, porn and abortion while the other group of items concerned 
nonsexual issues such as police and punishment, environmental policies, and welfare-
redistribution. We calculated a Sexual Politics variable consisting only of sexual items 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .60 (B) and .65 (NL)) and a Nonsexual Politics variable consisting 
only of nonsexual items (Cronbach’s alpha = .69 (B) and .71 (NL)). For both country 
samples, we removed an item about gay rights and an item about sex education since 
these items lowered the internal consistency when included in either Politics variable. 
Higher scores on Sexual Politics indicate stronger agreement with restrictive sexual 
policies; higher scores on Nonsexual Politics indicate stronger agreement with 
traditionally right-wing statements − such as harsher punishments for violent behavior 
− and less agreement with traditionally left-wing statements − such as protecting the 
environment. For Japan, the sexual items involved online dating sites, porn and 
prostitution while the nonsexual items involved, among other things, matters 
concerning the US marine base in Okinawa, North Korea, corruption, taxes, employment 
and violence. The a priori nonsexual variables did not show high internal consistency. 
In order to find the factors with the highest internal consistency, we performed a factor 
analysis (alpha factoring, oblimin rotation). This revealed a two-factor structure, where 
the item about gay rights and the item about sex education belonged to the nonsexual 
group rather than to the sexual group. Our final Japanese Sexual Politics variable 
consisted only of sexual items, excluding gay rights and sex education (Cronbach’s alpha 
= .85) – with higher scores indicating stronger agreement with restrictive sexual 
policies. The final Japanese Nonsexual Politics variable consisted of 5 nonsexual items, 
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the item about gay rights and the item about sex education (Cronbach’s alpha = .59). 
Higher scores on Japanese Nonsexual Politics could not be interpreted in Left-Right-
wing or liberal/conservative terms.  
Participants completed the Ten Item Personality Inventory (TIPI), a measure of the 
big five (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003). This scale was used to calculate five basic 
personality factors (agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness, neuroticism and 
extraversion). Participants completed the revised sociosexual orientation index (Penke 
& Asendorpf, 2008) (Sociosexuality; Cronbach’s alpha = .86 (B), .86 (NL), and .86 (J)). 
Higher scores indicate more permissive attitudes towards promiscuity. Participants 
completed Graham et al.’s (2009) moral relevance items (Cronbach’s alpha: Harm = .55 
(B), .44 (NL), and .62 (J); Reciprocity = .57 (B), .63 (NL), and .56 (J); Ingroup = .52 (B), .51 
(NL), and .53 (J); Hierarchy = .48 (B), .60 (NL), and .46 (J); Purity = .43 (B), .41 (NL), and .16 
(J)), and Tybur, Lieberman, & Griskevicius’ (2009) disgust scale (Cronbach’s alpha: Moral 
Disgust = .80 (B), .81 (NL), and .81 (J); Pathogen Disgust = .81 (B), .81 (NL), and .74 (J); 
Sexual Disgust = .78 (B), .83 (NL), and .86(J)). 
2.3.1.2 Participants 
In Belgium, we recruited first-year undergraduates in the Faculty of Literature and 
Philosophy at Ghent University. Participation was voluntary and participants did not 
receive credit for their participation. We only analyzed data from students that had 
never been married and did not have children. We thus included 476 participants (196 
men, 280 women, Mage = 18.54 +/- 1.95 SD years, age range = 17-46 years). 
In the Netherlands, we recruited undergraduates in the Faculty of Science at the 
University of Amsterdam. We additionally recruited undergraduate participants via 
lecturers and study organizations. They either made the paper surveys available for 
their members or advertised the URL of the electronic survey. These students were from 
various Dutch universities outside Amsterdam. Participation was voluntary and 
participants did not receive course credit for participation. We analyzed data from 299 
participants who had never been married and did not have children (107 men, 191 
women, Mage = 21.11 +/- 2.751 SD years, age range = 17-35 years). 
In Japan, we recruited undergraduates at Kobe University and at Hiroshima Shudo 
University. Participation was voluntary and participants did not receive course credit 
for their participation. We analyzed data from 296 students that had never been married 
and did not have children (92 men, 204 women, Mage= 19.89 +/- 1.141 SD years, age range: 
18-24 years). 
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2.3.2 Results 
There was a statistically significant difference between samples in recreational drug 
attitudes as determined by one-way ANOVA (F (2, 1070) = 254.76; p < .001). A Bonferroni 
post hoc test revealed that participants in the Netherlands were significantly less 
opposed to recreational drug use (Mdrugs = 4.07 +/- 1.28 SD) than Belgian participants 
(Mdrugs = 5.01 +/- 1.23 SD, p <.001) or Japanese participants (Mdrugs = 6.25+/- 1.00 SD, p 
<.001); Belgian participants were significantly less opposed to recreational drug use than 
Japanese participants (p < .001).  
Throughout, we compare the correlations of the undergraduate samples in Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Japan with the undergraduate sample in the U.S. from Kurzban et 
al. (2010). For comparison, the results from the American sample are shown in Table 1. 
(Note that ‘non-sexual items’ is placed too low: the non-sexual items start with ‘moral 
relevance-purity’.) In this sample, sexual variables (sociosexuality, disgust-sexual and 
politics-sexual issues) showed the highest correlations with recreational drug attitudes 
(first column), and these correlations were still significant and substantial when 
controlling for ideological and personality variables (second column). Recreational drug 
attitudes also related with the ideological variables (first column) but, after controlling 
for sexual variables, most of these correlations were reduced to almost zero (third 
column).  
 
Individual differences in moral condemnation 
 47 
Table 3: Bivariate correlations and partial correlations between recreational drug 
attitudes and other items from a U.S. undergraduate sample. Source: Kurzban et al. 
(2010) 
 
N = 516 
* p < .01 
** p < .001 
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The results from the Belgian sample are shown in Table 1. In this sample, sexual 
variables showed the highest correlations with recreational drug attitudes, and these 
correlations were still significant and substantial when controlling for ideological and 
personality variables. Recreational drug attitudes also related with the ideological 
variables in the Belgian sample (Nonsexual Politics, Left/Right-wing and Religiosity) 
and, after controlling for sexual variables, these correlations were still significant. This 
is different from both the U.S. samples. For the moral relevance and personality 
variables, moral disgust, harm, ingroup, hierarchy, purity, conscientiousness and 
agreeableness correlated significantly with recreational drug attitudes; only hierarchy 
and purity were still significantly related to recreational drug attitudes after controlling 
for sexual variables. 
 
Table 4: Bivariate and partial correlations between recreational drug attitudes and 
other items from an undergraduate sample in Belgium 
  Correlations with 
Recreational Drug 
Attitudes (r) 
Partial correlations, 
controlling for non-
sexual items (r) 
Partial correlations, 
controlling for sexual 
items (r) 
Sociosexuality -0.382** -0.308**   
Sexual Disgust 0.373** 0.258**   
Sexual Politics 0.364** 0.300**   
Nonsexual Politics 0.171**  0.149* 
Left/Right-wing 0.180**  0.188** 
Religiosity 0.216**   0.143* 
Moral Disgust 0.209**   0.075 
Pathogen Disgust 0.103   -0.003 
Harm 0.145*   -0.061 
Reciprocity 0.087   -0.021 
Ingroup 0.150*   0.125 
Hierarchy 0.325**   0.250** 
Purity 0.278**   0.162* 
Conscientiousness 0.248**   0.102 
Agreeableness   0.137*   0.011 
Openness -0.113   -0.046 
Extraversion   0.073   0.118 
Neuroticism   0.053   -0.021 
N = 476. 
*p < .01  
**p < .001 
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The results of the sample from the Netherlands are shown in Table 2. In this sample, 
the three sexual variables had three of the four highest correlations with recreational 
drug attitudes, and these correlations were still significant and substantial when 
controlling for ideological and personality variables. Recreational drug attitudes also 
related with the ideological variables in this sample (religiosity, nonsexual politics and 
left/right-wing); after controlling for sexual variables, two of these three correlations 
were still significant (nonsexual politics and left/right-wing). For the moral relevance 
and personality variables, hierarchy, purity, conscientiousness and agreeableness 
correlated significantly with recreational drug attitudes; only purity was still 
significantly related to recreational drug attitudes after controlling for sexual variables. 
 
Table 5: Bivariate and partial correlations between recreational drug attitudes and 
other items from an undergraduate sample in the Netherlands 
 Correlations with 
Recreational Drug 
Attitudes (r)  
Partial correlations, 
controlling for non-
sexual items (r)  
Partial correlations, 
controlling for sexual 
items (r) 
Sociosexuality -0.459** -0.294**   
Sexual Disgust 0.424** 0.313**   
Sexual Politics 0.413** 0.225*   
Nonsexual Politics 0.283**   0.220* 
Left/Right-wing 0.323**   0.240** 
Religiosity 0.323**   0.109 
Moral Disgust 0.075   -0.103 
Pathogen Disgust 0.069   -0.065 
Harm 0.001   -0.115 
Reciprocity -0.003   -0.121 
Ingroup 0.064   0.020 
Hierarchy 0.216**   0.156 
Purity 0.422**   0.255** 
Conscientiousness 0.313**   0.163 
Agreeableness   0.166*   0.044 
Openness -0.050   -0.109 
Extraversion -0.075   0.053 
Neuroticism 0.077   -0.028 
N = 299 
*p < .01  
**p < .001 
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The results from the Japanese sample are shown in Table 3. Here, sexual variables 
correlated most strongly with attitudes towards recreational drug use and these 
correlations remained significant and substantial when controlling for other variables. 
No ideological variables correlated with drug attitudes. Some moral relevance and 
personality variables correlated with recreational drug attitudes, namely moral disgust, 
harm, agreeableness, and neuroticism, but only the correlation with harm remained 
significant after controlling for sexual variables. 
 
Table 6: Bivariate and partial correlations between recreational drug attitudes and 
other items from an undergraduate sample in Japan 
  Correlations with 
Recreational Drug 
Attitudes (r) 
Partial correlation, 
controlling for non-
sexual items (r) 
Partial correlations, 
controlling for sexual 
items (r) 
Sociosexuality -0.341** -0.276**   
Sexual Disgust 0.322** 0.249**   
Sexual Politics 0.390** 0.329**   
Nonsexual Politics 0.016   -0.040 
Left/Right-wing -0.143  -0.099 
Religiosity -0.083   -0.056 
Moral Disgust 0.269**   0.141 
Pathogen Disgust 0.031   -0.042 
Harm 0.170*   0.198* 
Reciprocity 0.064   0.067 
Ingroup 0.045   0.025 
Hierarchy 0.057   0.077 
Purity 0.101   0.069 
Conscientiousness 0.009   -0.048 
Agreeableness   0.180*   0.087 
Openness   -0.092   -0.056 
Extraversion   -0.105   -0.054 
Neuroticism   0.152*   0.146 
N =296 
*p < .01 
**p < .001 
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Finally, we compared the bivariate (uncontrolled) correlations for the samples in 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Japan with each other and with the U.S. undergraduate 
sample from Kurzban et al. (2010). We tested if country had a significant effect on the 
bivariate correlations. The chi-square values and significance levels listed in Table 4, 
second column, indicate for each variable whether there are significant differences in 
the correlations between the respective variable and recreational drug attitudes 
(Arsham, 1994; Fisher’s z’-transformation). When we found a significant effect of 
country, we conducted pairwise comparisons of each country-pair’s correlations to 
investigate pairwise differences (Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken, 2003; Fisher’s z’-
transformation). The z-values and significance levels of pairwise comparisons of 
correlations are also listed in Table 4. 
 
Table 7: Differences between bivariate correlations 
  Overall difference in correlations 
(χ²(df=3)) 
Significant pairwise differences (z-
values) 
Sociosexuality 8.09  
Sexual Disgust 5.00  
Sexual Politics 1.19  
Nonsexual 
Politics 
21.50*** NL > US (4.12**); NL > J (3.34**); B > 
US (2.87*) 
Left/Right-wing 36.84*** NL > J (5.81**); US > J (4.59**); B > J 
(4.38**) 
Religiosity 30.63*** NL > J (5.07**); US > J (4.62**); B > J 
(4.07**) 
Moral Disgust 8.81  
Pathogen Disgust 5.00  
Harm 5.51  
Reciprocity 1.92  
Ingroup 2.76  
Hierarchy 19.78*** B > J (3.77**); B > US (3.72**) 
Purity 18.15*** NL > J (4.23**); NL > US (2.67*) 
Conscientiousness 16.94** NL > J (3.82**); B > J (3.29*) 
Agreeableness   1.07  
Openness   0.87  
Extraversion   7.62  
Neuroticism   11.57* J > US (3.19*) 
Note. Χ²-values indicate whether, for all 4 countries, the correlations of each variable with 
Recreational Drug Attitudes are significantly different from each other. Z-values indicate 
whether the correlations differ between two specific samples. 
*p <.01 
**p <.001 
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As shown in Table 4, the correlations between sexual variables and recreational drug 
attitudes did not differ between countries. In contrast, we found between-sample 
differences in the correlations between ideological variables and recreational drug 
attitudes. For nonsexual politics, the bivariate correlation was highest in the 
Netherlands, and significantly higher in Belgium and the Netherlands than in the U.S., 
and significantly larger in the Netherlands than in Japan. The correlations in the 
samples from Belgium and the Netherlands did not differ significantly from each other, 
nor did the correlations in the U.S. and Japanese samples.  
There were significant between-sample differences in the correlations between 
religiosity and recreational drug attitudes. Pairwise comparisons revealed that the 
bivariate correlation in the Japanese sample was significantly lower than in all other 
samples. The correlations in the other samples did not differ significantly from each 
other.  
We also found significant between-sample differences in the correlations between 
left/right-wing and recreational drug attitudes. The correlation in the Japanese sample 
was negative and significantly lower than in all other samples, where it was positive. 
The correlations in the other samples did not differ significantly from each other.  
Two moral relevance items differed significantly across the samples. The correlation 
between hierarchy and recreational drug attitudes was significantly higher in Belgium 
than in Japan or the US. The correlation between purity and recreational drug attitudes 
was significantly higher in the Netherlands than in Japan or the US. There were no 
significant differences between the other correlations. 
The correlation with conscientiousness was lowest in Japan, and significantly lower 
than in Belgium or the Netherlands. Finally, the correlation with neuroticism was 
highest in Japan and lowest in the US; only this difference reached significance. 
2.4 Discussion 
2.4.1 Comparing models 
In this study we evaluated two models by taking advantage of their opposing 
predictions with regard to mediation. Reasoning from the strategic interests model we 
predicted that there would be a relation between attitudes towards the use of 
recreational party drugs and attitudes towards sex in all three student samples, and that 
this relationship would not be explained by ideology or personality. Reasoning from the 
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ideological models we would predict that there would also be a relationship between 
attitudes towards sex and towards recreational drug use in Belgium and the 
Netherlands, but that this correlation would be explained by ideological variables. There 
would be no relation between sexual attitudes and attitudes towards recreational drug 
use in Japan.  
The predictions of the strategic interests model were upheld: In all samples, the 
relationships between drug attitudes and sexual variables were significant and 
substantial, before and after controlling for religious, political, and personality 
variables. Specifically, participants who score low in sociosexuality (i.e., are less 
promiscuous, thus, more sexually restricted), participants who are more easily 
disgusted by sexual items, and those who have more restricted attitudes towards 
politically salient sexual issues are more opposed to recreational drug use. Kurzban et 
al. (2010) found the same patterns in a U.S. student sample and in a U.S. internet sample. 
Comparing the student samples revealed that the bivariate correlations did not differ 
significantly among the four groups. This provides substantial evidence that 
recreational drug attitudes are powerfully influenced by sexual strategies, independent 
of local political and religious dynamics or the prevailing local permissiveness towards 
recreational drug use.  
Kurzban et al. (2010) suggested that their findings in the U.S. should be replicated in a 
cultural milieu with different mores surrounding sex and recreational drug use. We 
included at least two different milieus regarding drug attitudes and sex attitudes. Japan 
has a very restrictive drug policy. According to Greberman (1994) the maximum 
sentence for possession of amphetamines and heroin in Japan is 10 years, while it is 1 
year in the U.S. In contrast, the Netherlands is unique in the extent to which cannabis is 
tolerated. Attitudes towards sex in Japan have long been more in line with a 
monogamous, family oriented life style. In our samples, we find significant differences 
across all three countries for recreational drug attitudes, and we find that participants 
in the Netherlands and Belgium are more permissive towards sex than the Japanese.  
Despite this variation, it can be interesting to replicate these findings in an 
environment where the relation between attitudes towards sex and drugs is eliminated. 
According to our predictions, attitudes towards sex and drugs will only correlate if drug 
use correlates with promiscuous, unrestricted sexual behavior. In this cross-cultural 
study, we only tested undergraduates and only tested attitudes towards recreational use 
of typical party drugs, i.e., drugs that are used by younger people in social settings 
where they meet mostly other young people (and, as a consequence, where the chances 
of a sexual encounter are increased). It would be informative to test attitudes towards a 
range of drugs that are not typically used in such circumstances, e.g., stimulants that 
increase work or study performance. Indeed, the relation between sexual behavior and 
drug use holds for alcohol and illegal party drugs, but has not been tested – to our 
knowledge – for other drugs.  
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While the relationships between sexual attitudes and drug attitudes did not differ 
among the four student samples, there were several differences in the relationships 
between drug attitudes and ideological, moral, and personality variables. A key 
difference across samples was that in the Japanese sample, religiosity did not 
significantly correlate with recreational drug attitudes, whereas there were significant 
correlations in the samples from the Netherlands, Belgium, and the United States. This 
is in line with the suggestion that Shinto-Buddhism in Japan does not particularly 
provide support for those pursuing a monogamous, committed sexual strategy. In 
Belgium and the Netherlands, the relationships between religiosity and recreational 
drug attitudes seemed to be partially mediated by sexual variables, which supports the 
suggestion that religion in these European countries supports child-oriented family 
values to some extent. However, as we did not directly test for relationships between 
sexual and reproductive attitudes and religiosity, more research is needed to 
substantiate these hypotheses. So far these findings are compatible with ideological 
models and the strategic interests model. 
Looking at the cross-sample comparisons, the correlations of recreational drug 
attitudes with general political orientation (left/right-wing or liberal/conservative in 
the U.S. sample) followed a similar pattern as the correlations with religiosity. In the 
U.S. undergraduate sample, political orientation correlated with recreational drug 
attitudes because of its relationship with sexual attitudes. In contrast, in both Belgium 
and the Netherlands, political orientation correlated significantly with recreational 
drug attitudes and these relationships were hardly mediated by sexual variables, which 
is different from the relationships with Religiosity. Hence, while sexual attitudes play a 
very important role in determining U.S. undergraduates’ political orientation, drug 
issues are clearly important statistical predictors of the political orientation of students 
from Belgium and the Netherlands. In the Japanese sample, left/right-wing never 
related significantly to recreational drug attitudes. This suggests that drug issues do not 
divide the Japanese political landscape.  
In the U.S. undergraduate sample, agreement with specific nonsexual policy 
statements did not correlate significantly with recreational drug attitudes. This was 
significantly different in Belgium and the Netherlands: The correlations between 
nonsexual politics and recreational drug attitudes were significant, they were 
significantly stronger than in the U.S. undergraduate sample, and they were hardly 
mediated by sexual variables. Thus, as is the case with left/right-wing, drug issues 
clearly relate to political attitudes in Belgium and the Netherlands. Again, in Japan, 
political attitudes did not track drug attitudes.  
We think one final pattern is noteworthy. For hierarchy, purity and 
conscientiousness, we found significantly higher correlations in the samples from 
Belgium and/or the Netherlands than in the samples from the U.S. and/or Japan. 
However, when looking at the significance levels in Kurzban et al. (2010), the U.S. 
Individual differences in moral condemnation 
 55 
relationships seem to be more similar to the relationships in the samples from Belgium 
and the Netherlands than to the relationships in the Japanese sample: In Japan, none of 
these variables related significantly to recreational drug attitudes, before or after 
controlling for sexual attitudes. In Belgium, the Netherlands and the U.S., some of these 
variables are significantly related with recreational drug attitudes before controlling for 
sexual attitudes, and some are still significantly related with recreational drug attitudes 
after controlling for sexual attitudes. Previously, these (but also other) variables have 
been found to relate to ideological conservatism (Graham et al., 2009; Carney, Jost, 
Gosling, and Potter, 2008). As such, it might be tempting to speak of a ‘conservative 
personality’ and to suggest that in Belgium, the Netherlands and the U.S., but not in 
Japan, ‘conservative personality traits’ relate to recreational drug attitudes and/or 
sexual variables. At present though, this is merely a speculative possibility that should 
be tested. 
These findings support strategic interests theories because we found that, across four 
diverse countries, attitudes towards sex and drugs are related, even when controlling 
for ideological and personal variables. Our findings also indicate that relationships 
between general ideological orientations and concrete attitudes crucially depend on 
regional dynamics. In the U.S., political conservatism and religiosity promote and 
support restrictive, high-commitment sexual strategies (Weeden et al., 2008; Li et al., 
2010); as a consequence, sexual variables explain the relationship between drug 
attitudes and ideology (Kurzban et al., 2010). In contrast, in Japan and Europe, 
conservative ideologies are not, or to a lesser extent, organized around restricted sexual 
strategies and family values. As a consequence, if drug attitudes are related to 
ideological variables, this relationship cannot be (entirely) explained by sexual 
attitudes. 
2.4.2 Moral disagreement 
Public debates about recreational drug use usually revolve around public health and 
criminality. For example, when checking political parties’ websites, we find that in 
Belgium (Flanders), Vlaams Belang defends a merciless war against the sale of drugs1 
and refers to criminality, public health and the stepping stone theory, linking drug use 
to addiction2. Groen! equally focuses on the negative health effects of drug use but adds 
that repression and criminalization exacerbate the detrimental consequences for public 
 
                                                     
1 http://www.vlaamsbelang.be/3/18/dossier/239 
2 http://www.vlaamsbelang.org/0/7128/ 
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health and criminality3. They argue for the legalization and regulation of cannabis. 
These parties’ reasoning provides a clear example of how explicated arguments are not 
necessarily the real causes of one’s view. This is not to say that other parties’ opinions 
are more or less consistent. We discuss these two parties because Groen! and Vlaams 
Belang are particularly clear and outspoken on these issues. 
Both parties’ websites mention the existence of scientific information that supports 
their arguments. However, when taking a closer look, it is unlikely that only the 
mentioned arguments determine these political instances’ views towards recreational 
drug use. Reasoning from public health concerns, alcohol use should be prevented 
because alcohol’s health effects rather ban it to the group of hard drugs (Nutt, King, 
Saulsburry, & Blakemore, 2007). Not one party argues for more prevention of alcohol 
use in the context of the debate on drugs. Reasoning from criminality concerns, the sale 
of all drugs should be regulated instead of criminalized. According to the United 
Nations’ World Drug Report, the war on drugs has had detrimental consequences 
irrespective of the kind of drugs (World Drug Report of the United Nations, 2011). But 
Vlaams Belang argues for continued criminalization of all drugs (except alcohol, 
tobacco, coffee and tea). Groen! explicitly rejects decriminalizing ‘hard drugs’ (without 
further specification) because of the dangers to society. One might try to argue that 
health concerns warrant a distinction between hard and soft drugs, where the former’s 
use should be prevented with more rigorous means than the latter. However, Groen! 
suggests treating cannabis (‘soft’ in regard to health risks) on a par with alcohol (‘hard’ 
in regard to health risks) and tobacco, and refers to ‘scientific information’ to 
substantiate this view. Consequentially, if the advanced arguments are the only ones 
that matter, one should decriminalize and regulate the sale of all drugs or focus on the 
prevention of alcohol use. Clearly other things matter too in this discussion.  
In the case of politicians, the fact that the average view of their electorate is 
inevitably inconsistent is without doubt an important cause of their public standpoints. 
Studies showing that the electorate’s views have changed would thus constitute 
influential information: Such studies will not immediately change political 
representatives’ minds, but they will certainly motivate them to look for evidence in 
favor of their voters’ views. However, the fact that some standpoint accords with public 
opinion is rarely accepted as a good reason to hold that view.  
Likewise, the here presented study shows that other concerns implicitly matter when 
making up a view towards recreational drug use. In the case of our surveyed students, 
this is the potentially lewd behavior of drugged party animals. It is important to stress 
that we only sampled students’ answers. While students are likely to associate party 
 
                                                     
3http://www.groen.be/ideen/vraag-en-antwoord/wat-is-het-standpunt-van-groen-inzake-
drugsgenotsmiddelen_383.aspx?searchtext=drugs 
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drugs with lascivious party behavior, it is plausible that the same drugs elicit other 
associated thoughts in older individuals − e.g., cocaine may be seen as a work 
performance-enhancing yuppie drug instead of a party drug. In the case of students 
though, the link between recreational drug use and promiscuous sexual behavior might 
be co-opted in the discourse. Observing the present political debate would not predict 
the efficacy of this argument, but studies like the present one suggest it matters for at 
least specific groups in society.  
Here we see that empirical studies might inform us about relevant causes of people’s 
judgments, and these causes can be taken up as arguments in the discussion. Of course, 
this will not solve the disagreement and certain causes of the disagreement are likely to 
stay beyond discussion (e.g., one’s own sexual attitudes). So how should we deal with 
such a stand-off? Is there anything normative or practical that we can conclude from 
this? It is time to discuss the is/ought gap again. 

  
This chapter is a revised and expanded version of Quintelier, K.J.P., Van Speybroeck, L., & Braeckman, J. (2011). Normative 
ethics does not need a foundation – it needs more science. Acta Biotheoretica, 59(1), 29-51. doi: 10.1007/s10441-010-9096-7 
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Chapter 3  
Normative ethics does not need a foundation – it 
needs more science 
Once a man wanted to cross the river in a skiff with a 
billy-goat, a dog (wolf) and a cabbage. The skiff carried 
only the man and one of the others. Had the man taken 
the goat across the river, it would have been a good 
start, but had the man gone back to bring the 
cabbages or the dog, the goat would have eaten the 
cabbages on the other bank, or the dog (wolf) would 
have killed the goat. The man didn’t know what to do. 
Finally he came to an idea. Took the goat across the 
river, came back, took the dog across, but also brought 
the goat back to the cabbages. Took the cabbage to the 
skiff and left the goat on the riverbank. Took the 
cabbage to the dog – and the goat couldn’t eat it – and 
now went after the goat. Finally took the goat across 
the river for the second time. Now all three were 
together on the bank, and the man did not let them eat 
or kill each other  
- folklore tale, cited in Voolaid (2007) 
 60 
3.1 Introduction 
In chapter one, we introduced the ubiquitous is/ought gap, the related naturalistic 
fallacy, and some contemporary understandings or uses of these retorts. In both 
chapters one and two, we drew attention to previous findings in descriptive ethics that 
explore the nature and extent of individual differences in moral cognition. Such 
findings have had an impact on moral philosophy (Chapter 1), but it remains an open 
question what to do when confronted with moral disagreement. In this chapter, we 
explain how recent naturalistic ethicists defend an interaction between science and 
ethics. In chapter four, we use this discussion and empirical findings to critically 
evaluate arguments for and against normative moral relativism and toleration. 
Despite the idea that descriptions are not prescriptions, some ethicists defend the 
view that scientific findings can be a guide in determining how one should live (e.g., 
Kurtz, 2007; Pigliucci, 2003). Such scientifically informed normative ethics (hereafter, 
scientific ethics) generally meets two kinds of criticism (see Section 3.3.2). First, the idea 
that normative statements can be deduced from scientific statements is accused of 
committing the naturalistic fallacy (e.g., Farber, 1994; Woolcock, 1999) or of illegitimately 
bridging the is/ought gap (Rosenberg, 2000). Second, when not committing this fallacy, 
it is claimed that scientific ethicists fail in demonstrating the relevance of science for 
normativity because science cannot offer a foundation for ethics (e.g. Farber, 1994; 
Woolcock, 1999; Rosenberg, 2000). While the first criticism is often debated, the second 
criticism is not systematically discussed in the literature. Still, it is not unusual for 
critics of scientific ethics to endorse both statements as valid.  
The first aim of this chapter is to defend scientific ethics against these two major 
criticisms. In Section 3.3.1, it is illustrated that science can be pragmatically relevant to 
normative questions without committing the naturalistic fallacy. The second aim of this 
chapter is to argue that a difference in conception of normative ethics underlies the 
disagreement between proponents and opponents of scientific ethics. We hold that the 
discussed criticisms of scientific ethics imply a foundational view of normative ethics, 
while scientific ethicists see normative ethics as nonfoundational. The third aim of this 
chapter is to analyze the reasoning behind scientific ethics and highlight some plausible 
consequences. Present-day scientific ethicists refer to naturalism to defend their view – 
this chapter is thus dedicated to naturalistic ethics. We specifically ask how naturalistic 
ethics bears on the quest for foundations and how it deals with individual differences in 
moral cognition. The main conclusions are that, first, a naturalistic normative ethics is 
not committed to the quest for a normative foundation – instead it opts to reason back 
and forth between the descriptive and the normative domain. Second, the discussed 
naturalistic ethicists allow that different moral norms apply to different individuals or 
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groups. This provides the link with chapter four where we discuss moral relativism and 
toleration.  
In order to substantiate the arguments put forward in the present chapter, we first 
have to revisit Hume’s is/ought gap and George Edward Moore’s notion of the naturalistic 
fallacy, explain what is meant by foundations in normative ethics and indicate how both 
themes are related to each other. 
3.2 The naturalistic fallacy and the impossible quest for 
foundations 
3.2.1 Skyhooks1 and other foundations  
The words foundation, grounding and their derivatives are differentially used in the 
ethical literature. In this dissertation, foundational normative ethics, shortly foundational 
ethics, refers to any attempt at deriving a normative system from one or several first 
moral norms. Grounding ethics, then, refers to the act of finding such first norms.  
The distinction that we want to draw out in this chapter, between foundational and 
non-foundational ethics, has to do with the proper methods of moral investigation. We 
are concerned with the quest for first norms for normative ethics. What, then, is a first 
norm? Some philosophers have attempted to find one or a very limited amount of moral 
norms that are determined by something entirely non-normative and cannot be 
changed by other norms, moral rules or moral prescriptions. They can be grounded in, 
or determined by, a descriptive theory, a metaphysical theory, intuition, religion etc. It 
means that the non-normative theory in itself, without the help of any purely 
normative statement, determines at least one moral norm. That moral norm can be 
refuted on the basis of new non-normative information but it cannot be refuted on the 
basis of other moral norms, rules or prescriptions. We thus denote such determined 
moral norms as first moral norms. The quest for such first moral norms is accordingly 
 
                                                     
1 The term ‘skyhook’ refers to Dennett’s (1995) ‘Darwin’s Dangerous Idea’. Dennett uses this term to refer to 
miracles, sources of complex, seemingly designed natural phenomena, that do not build on lower, simpler 
layers. Explanations referring to God, intelligent design, or the explanandum’s own ground are examples of 
skyhooks. Some foundational ethicists refer to skyhooks to explain a normative system.  
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called grounding ethics. Grounding ethics results in a foundational ethics. We will now 
give illustrations to further clarify these concepts.  
Natural law theories in ethics can serve as examples of foundational ethics. 
According to Feser (2010), natural law theories evolving from the classical tradition (e.g. 
Thomas Aquinas) ground moral rules in nature by asserting that there is no strict 
distinction between descriptive and normative statements: Moral norms, including 
their moral force, are part of nature and can be described as such. In other words, in 
natural law theories purpose and normativity are taken to be part of the world, hence of 
physical nature. For classical natural law theorists, a description of nature also 
determines general moral norms from which specific rules can be inferred. According to 
Thomas Aquinas’ natural law theory, for instance, the precepts of moral law theory are 
given by God and are to be found in nature. They are universally binding and universally 
knowable (Murphy, 2008). The content of Aquinas’ moral theory is that good should be 
done and evil avoided. This is an abstract ‘first moral norm’ and it is conceivable that 
many agree with it – indeed, it might be the case that all nonfoundational normative 
systems agree on this. The content of the moral norm however is not important in 
deciding if it is a foundational ethics or not: for this we must consider the procedure for 
finding substantive moral norms and ask how the moral norms in the system relate to 
each other. In this case, all moral norms are derived from this moral norm. Moreover, 
the norm is determined by nature and cannot be refuted by moral norms that follow 
from it. This, then, is a clear instance of foundational ethics.  
Another example is a new natural law theory as developed by Walsh (2008). In his 
theory, friendship, offspring and life are first identified as ends in themselves, as basic 
human goods. These first values cannot be questioned within the moral system that 
follows from them. In fact, it is unclear how he derives these ends, so it remains an open 
question what, if anything, would constitute evidence for or against them. They are the 
touchstone against which all acts must be evaluated. Acts can be chosen because of the 
act itself, or because of its consequences. Either way, if the choice to perform an act 
entails the choice of an appropriate human good, then this act is morally good; if not, it 
is morally bad. As such, Walsh (2008) argues, sexual acts are only morally good if the 
choice to perform them entails the choice of a basic human good. According to Walsh’ 
new natural law theory, sex in itself is not a basic human good, but procreation is. 
Hence, a sexual act must entail the choice to procreate. Following this reasoning, Walsh 
considers homosexual sex to be morally wrong because the choice for homosexual sex 
cannot entail the choice to procreate. This shows that specific basic human goods here 
function as independently derived foundations of a moral system. Walsh’ religiously 
inspired new natural law theory is also a foundational normative ethic. Contrary to the 
former example though, the content of its first moral norms is much more concrete and 
more likely to be controversial. But again, in deciding if the system is foundational or 
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not, one has to consider the procedures for finding or changing moral norms and not 
the content of the moral norms. 
The popular religious normative systems put forward by the Intelligent Design and 
Creationist (IDC) movement are also examples of foundational ethics. According to 
writers such as the young earth creationist Wysong (1976), the Christian creation myth 
explains where we come from, but, at the same time, it also legitimates a certain social 
order. As a consequence, we can find what is right and wrong in the creation story, viz., 
genesis. For example, if we want to know the right place of men and women, we can ask 
one of the creationist websites Answers in Genesis, which provides us with the following 
advice (Stelzer, 2007): “One of the keys to maintaining the order God desires is 
recognizing the authority structure He established. (…) The Creator chose to form man 
first and to entrust to him the role of leader in the home, for His glory” (Stelzer, 2007). 
Thus God has made man the leader of the home; we should maintain God's desired 
order, therefore we must keep this structure. The role of women is similarly explained 
and legitimized: “God assigned the married woman the responsibility of being a 
helpmate to her husband (Genesis 2:18, 20).”  
Certain nineteenth century intellectuals such as Leslie Stephen and William Kingdon 
Clifford developed a normative system, attempting to ground ethics in biological 
evolution (for an overview, see Farber, 1994). Herbert Spencer’s (1820-1903) 
evolutionary ethics epitomized this approach. At first, Spencer inferred his first 
principle from God’s will in Social Statics (Farber, 1994, p. 40). Only later in Data of Ethics 
and Principles of Ethics did Spencer ground his normative system in evolution. He 
reasoned that evolution by natural selection results in adaptations that are morally 
superior. Whatever is further evolved by natural selection is therefore better. 
Everything following from this first principle must be a correct norm. Whether one 
agrees with the content of this moral norm or not, the basic idea is again that it is a first 
moral norm.  
Precisely because it was a foundational system, philosophers instantly refuted 
Spencer’s ethics. George Edward Moore (1873-1958) dedicated substantial parts of his 
Principia Ethica to Spencer’s evolutionary ethics (Moore, 1993/1903, §33). According to 
Moore, Spencer committed the crucial fallacy that he coined the naturalistic fallacy.  
As illustrated in chapter one, this fallacy, as well as Hume’s is/ought gap, are 
nowadays often invoked to argue that one cannot ground ethics in evolution. However, 
a close reading of the Principia Ethica reveals that both Hume and Moore in fact argued 
that one cannot ‘ground’ ethics in anything.  
In the next section, we discuss Hume’s and Moore’s reasoning that leads to the 
is/ought gap and naturalistic fallacy argument. It is important to know that we do not 
purport to discuss the validity of their conclusion. The aim is to make their reasoning 
clear in order to better understand what exactly is deemed fallacious and why. This will 
allow us to ask if scientific ethicists are indeed committing the naturalistic fallacy as its 
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critics suggest, and to evaluate the coherence of critics’ arguments in Section 3.3.2. The 
here presented interpretation of Moore’s naturalistic fallacy is similar to the 
interpretation put forward by diCarlo and Teehan (2007). However, we specifically 
stress that the is/ought gap and the naturalistic fallacy relate to grounding ethics. Since 
this is crucial to evaluate the criticisms of scientific ethics, we will highlight the 
relevant parts in Hume’s and Moore’s reasoning. 
3.2.2 Hume’s and Moore’s famous arguments 
In his explication of the naturalistic fallacy, Moore built on the insights of Sidgwick. 
Sidgwick, a British utilitarian moral philosopher, was in turn influenced by Hume’s 
work. Hume noticed that the author of every moral system seems to make prescriptive 
or normative conclusions from descriptive statements (Hume, 1739-1740). By now many 
interpretations of Hume’s and Moore’s reasoning exist (Curry, 2006), and philosophers 
refer to either Hume or Moore to criticize scientific ethics.  
According to Hume, that something is right or wrong cannot be true or false (i.e., such 
statements have no truth value) and cannot be shown a priori; neither can it be 
demonstrated that something is right or wrong; there is also no system of eternal 
measures of right and wrong. It seems then that this kind of foundation is impossible: 
that we start with the existence of a first moral norm (or set of norms) that is eternal, 
thus cannot be changed by anything that follows from it.  
Hume’s reasoning goes as follows. We do not distinguish between right and wrong 
(vice and virtue) by means of reason. This is because morality is a practical matter: it 
influences our actions. Reason does not influence our actions – in fact, its force is very 
hard to keep, as the following beautiful paragraph makes clear:  
There is an inconvenience which attends all abstruse reasoning that it may 
silence, without convincing an antagonist, and requires the same intense study to 
make us sensible of its force, that was at first requisite for its invention. When we 
leave our closet, and engage in the common affairs of life, its conclusions seem to 
vanish, like the phantoms of the night on the appearance of the morning; and it is 
difficult for us to retain even that conviction, which we had attained with 
difficulty. (Hume, 1739-1740, Book III, Part I, Sect. 1) 
Only reason can a priori show us what is true and false. Therefore, because morality 
is not perceived by reason, we cannot a priori show that that something is right or 
wrong.  
We cannot demonstrate that right and wrong are properties of the external objects 
either, because for every statement that equates virtue with a certain relation between 
external objects, we can find another example, that is another instance of the same 
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relation between external objects but is not a virtue. Hume gives the example of 
ingratitude towards one’s parents. This, he says, is clearly a vice, but it does not follow 
that we have demonstrated that gratitude towards one’ s parents is always a vice. For if 
an oak’s sapling overtops and destroys the parent tree, this is clearly ungrateful of the 
oak towards its parent, but we cannot say that it is wrong. Thus, neither demonstration 
nor reason yield moral norms; the result is that no eternal norm can be established: 
Thus it will be impossible to fulfil the first condition required to the system of 
eternal measures of right and wrong; because it is impossible to shew those 
relations, upon which such a distinction may be founded: And it is as impossible to 
fulfil the second condition; because we cannot prove A PRIORI, that these 
relations, if they really existed and were perceived, would be universally forcible 
and obligatory. (Hume, 1739-1740, Book III, Part I, Sect. 1) 
Moore’s reasoning is somewhat different, but has similar implications: It focuses on 
rejecting all such premises that link normativity to something descriptive. As such 
Moore deemed it equally impossible to find a demonstratively true first moral principle. 
More correctly, he rejected a certain class of first principles, namely those that are 
considered to be analytically true. Before clarifying this, let us first revisit Moore’s 
reasoning in the Principia Ethica.  
Ethics – in Moore’s terminology – is about moral truth, not about practice (Moore, 
1993/1903, §3-§5, §14). It is about finding a first statement upon which Ethics – 
including the discussion of our everyday normative judgments (idem, §1) – can be built. 
This first statement provides an answer to Ethics’ first question, i.e. “What is good?” 
(idem, §2). Moore adds: “Unless this first question be fully understood, and its true 
answer clearly recognized, the rest of Ethics is as good as useless from the point of view 
of systematic knowledge” (idem, §5). In other words, to save Ethics, one must find a first 
moral statement – such as the second premise in the example above. This principle must 
define what is good and it must be true by definition. This means that it must be 
analytically true (cf. infra).  
So far so good, were it not that Moore insisted that finding a first moral principle that 
truly defines what is good is impossible. This has to do with the fact that he has an 
analytic definition of the word ‘good’ in mind (idem, §6). In general, a true analytic 
definition describes the real nature of a notion denoted by the word; it enumerates the 
simple notions that are already in the meaning of the complex notion (idem, §7). 
Analytic statements hence only explicate what is already in the meaning of the subject. 
The meaning of ‘good’ then describes its true nature. How does one find this meaning 
according to Moore? One does not need any observation to establish the real nature of a 
notion. Every normal user of a certain language, when thinking clearly, instantly grasps 
when an analytic statement is true. Hence one can derive the true meaning of ‘good’ by 
clear thinking alone. Now, ‘good’ is indefinable, says Moore: it is already a simple notion, 
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meaning that there is nothing in the meaning of ‘good’ than ‘good’ itself. Those who 
define ‘good’ as something else and claim this definition to be true all commit the 
naturalistic fallacy (idem, §1 - §15). Moreover, Moore continues, we intuitively 
acknowledge that we cannot define ‘good’ because for any definition of ‘good’ as 
something else, we can meaningfully ask whether this ‘something else’ is indeed ‘good’. 
This means that we never instantly see such a statement to be true, thus it can never be 
analytically true. This argument is since known as the ‘open question argument’ (idem, 
§13).  
Moore’s idea that all of Ethics should be built upon an analytic truth logically implies 
that nothing that follows from this truth can refute this first definition – otherwise it 
would not be an analytic truth. Hence Moore was looking for a first norm and he 
concluded that it was impossible to find one. The core idea of Moore’s reasoning is thus 
that one cannot ground a first moral principle: not in nature, not in metaphysics, and 
not in ethics itself. Only analysis of the meaning of a moral concept like ‘good’ would 
provide a solution, but this is impossible. According to Moore, naturalists – up to his 
time, and especially Spencer – made this very mistake. They tried to analytically 
identify ‘good’ with something else.  
Contrary to what the term ‘naturalistic fallacy’ seems to imply, Moore’s argument 
hence also applies to metaphysical properties (idem, §66 - §85). Similarly, religiously 
grounded normative systems are equally debunked if they rely purely on conceptual 
analysis for their foundations (cf. diCarlo & Teehan, 2007). 
Thus, in this interpretation, both Hume’s is/ought gap and Moore’s naturalistic 
fallacy preclude the possibility of foundational ethics, and the derivation of a first 
normative principle from descriptive theories, unless we can conceive of another kind 
of foundation that does not rest on similarity in meaning. Because the subtle differences 
between these two fallacies are less important for my argument, we will use them 
interchangeably in the remainder of this dissertation.  
Accepting this interpretation of Hume’s is/ought gap and Moore’s naturalistic fallacy 
has direct consequences for any scientific ethics. If scientists find that something is the 
case, it does not demonstratively or logically follow that the descriptive statement, or 
parts of it, ought to be the case. There is no such simple connection between scientific 
statements and ethical statements. Also, unlike in the field of mathematics, no first 
moral norm will be discovered by reasoning about (the definition of) moral terms.  
Before we proceed with an example of the relevance of science for ethics, we should 
point out that one might also aim to build a conditional normative system. In such a 
system, we do not aim to demonstrate an eternal, analytical, or a priori truth. Neither 
Hume nor Moore argue against conditional normative systems. What do these look like? 
Take the following reasoning (cf. Ferguson, 2001): 
(1) Premise 1: Humans are evolutionary disposed to act altruistically. 
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(2) Conclusion: Humans ought to act altruistically. 
This is a wrong kind of reasoning because the conclusion does not logically follow from 
the premise: There is a difference in meaning between ‘are evolutionary disposed to’ 
and ‘ought to’. How can we make the inference correct? This, we reckon, can be done by 
adding a second premise, as is done below: 
(1) Premise 1: Humans are evolutionary disposed to act altruistically. 
(2) Premise 2: It is good to do everything humans are disposed to do by their 
evolution. 
(3) Conclusion: It is good to act altruistically. 
Here, the conclusion does follow logically from the premises. Of course, and 
problematically so, it comes at the cost of premise 2 being a prescription instead of a 
description. As a result, one has not derived a moral principle from descriptive 
statements only. In other words, it is not demonstrated that one can go from 
propositions merely linked by ‘is’ to propositions merely linked by ‘ought’. The 
conclusion only follows if we accept the normative premise. Now, what if one does not 
agree with this premise? In that case, the reasoning will simply not appeal to you. This, 
however, does not mean that we are simply divided between those who accept the 
premise and those who do not. We can give reasons for or against each normative 
premise, as we will see in Section 3.3.1 and further.  
This might all seem quite trivial. Nonetheless, most of the time, scientific ethicists 
engage in conditional reasoning. If, however, they are not accused of committing a 
fallacy, it is objected that science has not been relevant for the normative argument. Let 
us now illustrate that science can be relevant for ethics without committing the 
naturalistic fallacy, and explain why some critics of scientific ethics contradict 
themselves.  
3.3 Twentieth century scientific ethics and its critics 
3.3.1 Moral guidance without foundations 
Though Moore denounced all ‘naturalist’ moral systems, there were numerous early 
approaches in evolutionary ethics that did not commit the naturalistic fallacy (e.g., 
those of T. H. Huxley and G. G. Simpson). Also from the last decades of the twentieth 
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century on, several accounts proliferate in defense of a closer and argumentatively 
sound interplay between science and normative ethics (e.g., Ruse, 2008). What typifies 
these approaches is the argument that science is relevant for ethics, without there being 
an attempt to start from or derive a first moral principle.  
Proposals in which scientific findings are claimed to play an important role for 
normativity vary from being uncontroversial but allegedly ‘trivial’ to supposedly 
reductionist accounts. Most authors stress the philosophical question of how moral and 
empirical concepts are connected (or unconnected); rarely do they make their proposals 
concrete, e.g. by exemplifying how science informs ethics in everyday issues. A 
refreshing exception, though in the field of ethics broadly conceived, can be found in 
Pigliucci (2003).  
Our aim here is to discuss how scientific findings have an impact on normative ethics 
and ethical practice, even if they do not yield demonstratively true ethical principles. 
Scientific ethics deviates indeed from Moore’s ‘Ethics’, in being preoccupied less with 
absolute truth and more with practice (e.g., Kurtz & Koepsell, 2007). In Section 3.4, we 
look closer at the philosophical assumptions underpinning this view of ethics. Scientific 
information is at least conditionally relevant for ethics. That is, if we accept certain moral 
principles, then everything known can be used to infer rules that help us to reach these 
moral ends. In this scenario, scientific knowledge is instrumental to ethics (Rosenberg, 
2000), or science can help us to infer hypothetical imperatives (Binmore, 2005). This is 
not controversial, and both foundational and nonfoundational systems can accept this 
procedure. Hence scientific findings are important for ethics in general. However, 
scientific ethics relies mostly on this conditional procedure, while foundational ethics 
allocates most philosophical activity on the quest for first moral norms. Moreover, in 
scientific ethics, the moral principles we use as assumptions can be evaluated by 
scientific findings and abductively inferred from scientific findings. In the following 
paragraph we illustrate that these procedures do not commit the naturalistic fallacy.  
A clarifying example is provided by the Kibbutzim in Israel, modern communities 
that are unique in their organization of production, ownership, consumption and child 
care (Agassi, 1989). From the start these communities aimed to create a society where all 
would be equal and free from exploitation. Property was common. Every member 
received an equal wage depending on his or her needs. Men and women were expected 
to participate equally in all kinds of work: household chores, childcare, politics, farming 
and so on. Trained nurses and teachers raised children away from their parents. It was 
hoped that this would liberate women from their traditional mother roles. However, 
after one generation already this organizational structure weakened. Women were 
found to be more active in teaching and child care, while men participated more in 
politics and field work. Men also took up the majority of leading and managing 
positions. Because of these role patterns, men had easier access to some assets such as a 
car, an office and an apartment in town.  
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Some commentaries (e.g., Agassi, 1988) remained convinced that these gender 
differences could and should be eradicated. To do so, it would be helpful – or even 
necessary – to identify the precise factors causing the gender differences. Other 
commentaries (e.g., Palgi, Jones, & Sklar, 1983) saw in the unique constellation of the 
Israeli Kibbutzim a test case for social theories explaining gender inequality as a 
consequence of the unequal social organization of production, ownership and so on. 
Since gender differences were not eradicated in the Kibbutzim, where social 
organization started out equal for men and women, these theories are not supported. 
Maybe then one can consider biology as a factor accounting for at least some gender 
differences?  
Let us zoom in on explanations of childcare asymmetries (yet without claiming these 
explanations to apply to other aspects of role patterns – indeed, for this more scientific 
information would be needed).  
Concerning child care asymmetries, in all cultures mothers spend more time with 
their children than fathers do (Lamb, 2003; Blakemore, Berenbaum, & Liben, 008). In 
addition, women have a lower threshold for responding to babies than most men (Silk, 
2002) and feel more protective towards infants (Alley, 1983). More recently, it was found 
that women are more interested than men in babies and caretaking (Maestripieri & 
Pelka, 2002) and that women feel somewhat more motivated than men to take care for 
babies when these have (manipulated) very baby-like faces (Glocker, Langleben, 
Ruparel, Loughead, Gur, & Sachser, 2009). This can be modified partly by the social 
environment. For example, pregnant women who had more prior childcare experience 
(for example due to baby-sitting) feel more positive about caretaking, children and their 
own fetus (Fleming, Ruble, Krieger, & Wong, 1997), and women may be asked to baby-sit 
more than men. But biology also plays a role in ‘molding’ mothers into this role. 
Pregnancy hormones seem to influence nurturing behavior: a pregnant woman’s body 
experiences a change in the estrogen/progesterone ratio. The change in this ratio 
during pregnancy correlates with maternal behavior immediately after birth (Fleming 
et al., 1997). Lactation as well may influence mothering behavior due to lactation-
induced hormonal changes. As tested in nonhuman primates, breastfeeding heightens 
the concentration of blood hormones like oxytocin, which has a motivating role in 
nursing and grooming behavior (Maestripieri, Hoffman, Anderson, & Highley, 2009). It is 
suggested that these biological factors induce nursing behavior in females (Hrdy, 2005) 
and make it satisfying for mothers to nurture their children. However, this does not 
mean that men cannot be induced to demonstrate caretaking behavior. That the social 
environment can induce paternal care is for instance suggested by the finding that men 
engage in more paternal care when couple intimacy is high (Belsky, Steinberg, & Draper, 
1991). Also biology helps in inducing paternal care: expectant mothers and fathers both 
experience an increase in prolactin levels and, in humans, higher prolactin levels in 
men are correlated with more paternal behavior (Storey, Walsh, Quinton, & Wynne-
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Edwards, 2000; Fleming, Corter, Stallings, & Steiner, 2002). Experienced fathers are more 
reactive towards cries of babies than first-time or less experienced fathers: They show a 
more enhanced prolactin response and they feel a greater need to respond to the 
infant’s cries (Fleming et al., 2002).  
In other words, while men can be induced to be more responsive to children, it is 
plausible that many mothers – not necessarily women in general, maybe only those who 
have been pregnant or are lactating – will still want to spend more time with their 
children compared to fathers. If these differences in desires are – even partly – caused 
by hormonal changes during pregnancy and lactation, then we may expect these 
differences in desires to exist over a vast range of social environments. Along this line of 
thought, one can expect that completely eradicating the resulting role patterns would 
demand that many, not all, men and women constantly act against their internal 
desires. This could be very hard to do, and even could be dissatisfying.  
Of course, it is exactly the point of moral behavior to act against certain tendencies 
for moral reasons. However, enforcing the total eradication of all gender differences not 
only conflicts with strong spontaneous tendencies, it can therefore also conflict with 
specific values humans have. In general, even though we may all agree that familial care 
is valuable, mothers may value familial care more than fathers do. If we accept that 
what is morally praiseworthy depends on how people affectively respond to it, then 
certain moral evaluations depend on what people value. And in this case, different 
people value different things. We thus should also consider these values as moral reasons 
for acting. As a consequence, a more coherent solution could allow for role patterns to 
exist, without forcing people into a certain gender-role and without disvaluing one or 
the other role in economic terms. This implies that one takes into account the inherent 
desires people have as informing us about prima facie moral values, to see how these 
prima facie values mesh with each other and our other values. Men who prefer child 
care over politics may as well fulfill this role; women who prefer politics over child care 
may pursue their ambitions. (For theoretical support of this interplay, see Section 3.4.) 
To further illustrate this, we can look at the question of how to accommodate the 
possibility that several women want to have both employment and children. Indeed, 
studies show that across Europe, the US and Japan, a relative majority of women prefers 
combining employment and family work above either a work-centered life (focused on a 
career and where family-life is fitted around their paid work) or a home-centered life 
(giving priority on private life and family over paid work). Significantly, men tend to 
prefer a work-centered life more than women do (Hakim, 2008). This makes one expect 
that several women wanting to combine employment or a career with having children 
cannot easily rely on the willingness of their partner to contribute equally in the 
household.  
Here science provides us unforeseen solutions. For instance, in modern societies 
grandparents often invest heavily in their grandchildren (e.g., Pollet, 2007). In extant 
Normative ethics needs more science 
 71 
hunter-gatherer societies as well, children clearly benefit from the help of others than 
their parents, especially of maternal grandmothers (Sear & Mace, 2008). It is suggested 
that during long periods of our evolution, children’s survival depended on the 
additional care they received from others than their mothers (Hrdy, 2005; 2009). On the 
basis of this knowledge, one can consider promoting institutionalized childcare or 
familial assistance, benefiting those mothers who pursue demanding occupations. 
Moreover, fathers can be induced to feel more attentive towards infants as well. We can 
use this and similar information to optimally promote paternal care, although realizing 
that since differences in desires remain, an equal role pattern will be very hard to 
achieve. In sum, to promote women’s professional aspirations, a narrow focus on 
paternal care will not help as much in reaching this aim as other possibilities would. A 
more optimal and desired solution is to keep the possibilities open by promoting or 
facilitating familial care and institutionalized childcare together with paternal care.  
What this account illustrates is that scientific knowledge about children’s needs and 
our evolved nature incites us to consider more successful alternatives to the enforced 
paternal care one tried to implement in the original Kibbutzim. Fathers should have the 
possibility to go on paternity leave, but science teaches us that this possibility alone will 
not be enough to free ambitious mothers from their mother roles. Promoting childcare 
facilities and familial assistance may be a more fruitful option.  
Scientific findings play multiple roles in this example. First, scientific findings make 
us realize that people hold unforeseen values. They make us take more seriously the fact 
that women in general value childcare more than men in general do: According to the 
scientific information we have, this difference is unlikely to be eradicated by 
upbringing. This suggests that one better reconsiders some original goals, e.g., equal 
participation in every kind of work, while other goals such as economic equality can be 
retained. Second, this also suggests that it might be a more successful strategy to make 
it possible for individuals to diversify according to the values one has. Enforcing equal 
roles did not work out. Taking these individual differences in values seriously also urged 
us to find other methods to achieve economic equality. Familial solidarity appeared a 
possible and partial solution for childcare regulations.  
Of course, in this example, certain things have been treated as a given: We assumed 
that the community in question can care about economic equality while disvaluing 
equality in role patterns. We also assumed that the values of all individuals initially 
shape what ought to be promoted, and we assumed that the community wanted to 
promote a system that is feasible. Only if this is accepted by the community, then science 
informs us that we should promote familial childcare systems. But as long as every 
stakeholder agrees about the assumptions, there is no reason to argue about the 
premises. If the community does not agree on any of these assumptions, progress is still 
possible because they can just point out what they would prefer to assume instead, and 
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reason from there on. Hence, science is conditionally and abductively relevant for 
normative conclusions.  
Now, when science guides us away from value sets, points to new moral values and to 
possible solutions, do we then commit the naturalistic fallacy? The structure of the 
reasoning was as follows: 
(1) Initial moral premises: Economic equality and equality in role patterns are good 
and our normative system must be practically feasible and in line with what 
people value.  
(2) Factual premises: In general and over a broad range of situations (varying in 
upbringing, culture, etc.) women value childcare more than men do, making the 
premised moral norms not feasible or difficult to achieve without going against 
basic desires people have.  
(3) Conclusion: Either we have to give up on equality in certain domains of life (such 
as division of labor or economic benefits), or we have to give up on feasibility, or 
we have to give up on including individuals’ values in moral considerations. We 
opt for not totally eradicating sexual differences in time spent in caring for 
children while retaining economic equality by providing child care services. 
Clearly, the conclusion is not derived independently from normative rules. It is 
therefore not a first moral norm. But one might ask what the status of the initial moral 
premises is. Are any of these premises first moral norms? Do any of them define a moral 
value in terms of natural properties? We did not try to establish their truth: They were 
used as assumptions. One can always reject these norms and use different ones, but one 
can also give arguments for or against them, for example when they conflict with too 
many other values, when new scientific findings inform us of possibilities to change 
them or when it appears impossible to promote them. This is exactly what we did: the 
initial moral premises were assumed, then evaluated, after which we retained some and 
rejected others. No naturalistic fallacy has been committed because no norm had the 
status of eternal truth.  
However, seeing the status of moral norms as temporary assumptions invites the 
criticism that science does not offer a definite justification, obligation or ‘foundation’ 
for any normative statement. In reaction, we can only say that we could not agree more: 
We fully endorse that science guides ethics conditionally and abductively, not absolutely. 
The Kibbutzim do not have to be organized that way, this is conditional on whether the 
members of the community accept these values or not. But that does not mean that 
science is not relevant for morality. Science does guide ethics, not by inferring true 
moral principles but by pointing us to the values people do hold and which value sets 
are incoherent. In the following section we will additionally argue that the criticism of 
scientific ethics is often contradictory.  
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3.3.2 Criticisms of scientific ethics and the quest for a foundation 
How do critics oppose the sketched conditional procedures? To answer this question we 
draw on the clarifications made in Section 3.2.2. There we argued that Moore’s concept 
of the naturalistic fallacy and Hume’s idea of an is/ought gap are arguments against 
ethical foundations. Moore’s critique was aimed towards early evolutionary ethicists 
like Spencer who did commit the naturalistic fallacy; it was not used to criticize ethicists 
who do not provide such an analytical foundation. Hume’s critique was aimed towards 
objectivist and rationalist moral systems; it was not used against those who do not try to 
provide eternal, a priori moral truths. Contemporary critics however, accuse current 
scientific ethicists (and more specifically, evolutionary ethicists) of committing the 
naturalistic fallacy, while at the same time critiquing them for not providing a 
foundation for ethics. Let us dig deeper in this request for foundations as made by 
contemporary critics of scientific ethics. 
Several scientific ethicists have argued that scientific information can be used to 
argue for and against specific values (e.g., Flanagan, 1996; Casebeer, 2003b). Some of 
these scholars grant a special role to evolutionary theories (e.g., Ruse, 1995). The idea is 
that information about our evolved nature is particularly relevant to ethics because it 
highlights general human possibilities and constraints. Hence, evolutionary theories, 
together with empirical data that corroborate these theories, can guide normative 
ethics in the most general way. As Rosenberg (2000, p. 9) asserts, of all sciences 
evolutionary theory “maximally combines relevance to human affairs and well-
foundedness.”  
Among scientific ethics, it is mostly this kind of evolutionary ethics that is under 
attack. This is understandable from a historical perspective. Some evolutionary ethicists 
did try to ground ethics in evolution by inferring a first moral principle from our 
evolved nature (Richards, 1986; E. O. Wilson, 1984). Most evolutionary inspired scientific 
ethicists however mainly engage in the reasoning as sketched in the example (Ruse & 
Wilson, 1986). Nonetheless, both accounts have been criticized.  
As one of the established critics of scientific ethics, Paul Farber (1994) reviewed 
accounts of evolutionary ethics throughout history. His work demonstrates the same 
reasoning as recent philosophical criticism against scientific ethics. Therefore Farber’s 
The Temptations of Evolutionary Ethics is here used as a template to analyze this criticism. 
According to Farber, sociobiology – which relates animal and human behavior to its 
evolutionary history – “offers no new hope, no new foundation” for ethics (ibidem, 156). 
With this statement, Farber warns against reintroducing the naturalistic fallacy in 
evolutionary ethics, which is the most well-known way of grounding ethics. However, 
should one abandon hope together with foundations?  
Although Farber acknowledges the existence of nonfoundational accounts, he is little 
enthusiastic about them. He discusses a range of programs in twentieth-century 
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evolutionary ethics, several of which do not commit the naturalistic fallacy and make no 
attempt at grounding anything. One of them is the strong program, which attempts to 
provide moral guidance by informing us about our biological nature. Farber rejects this 
program because “an established picture of human nature from which to derive useful 
lessons is far away” (ibidem, 160). In regards to the weak program, which aims at an 
understanding of what morality is, Farber argues that it does not provide moral 
guidance. Still, he recognizes it as “a possible source of relevant information” (ibidem, 
160) and adopts the ambitions of the weaker program in using scientific information “in 
order to avoid misguided moralizing” (ibidem, p. 160). This seems to hint at a 
contradiction, especially because ‘the avoidance of misguided moralizing’ can be taken 
at least as some kind of moral guidance. In the Kibbutzim example, we concluded that 
scientific discussions can lead to conditional moral guidance. Evolutionary information 
is a helpful guide for moral practice, exactly because it constrains the desirable 
possibilities, while it suggests otherwise unnoticed options.  
Farber finds these approaches wanting and concludes pessimistically that “the 
newest program for an evolutionary ethics looks […] unpromising as a theory of ethics” 
(ibidem, p. 166-7). The only option he considers for evolutionary science is to provide a 
foundation for ethics (ibidem, p. 163-165). However, as argued in our discussion of the 
naturalistic fallacy, nothing can offer a foundation for ethics. Indeed, also Farber 
(ibidem, p. 165) is aware that all attempts to construe a unified rational ethics have “hit 
on hard times”. Consequently, if a foundationalist ethics proves to be impossible, why 
strive for it or demand it? Why would one not seek other alternatives? 
Only at the end of his book does Farber briefly speculate on another possibility: 
“perhaps if philosophers develop an ethical theory […] that is nonfoundationalist, 
evolutionary considerations may enter the philosophical arena” (ibidem, p. 165). He 
tentatively mentions pragmatism and Rawls’ Theory of Justice (1971). But, then again, he 
adds, these ethical philosophers rarely mention evolutionary ethics. The possibility that 
their ethics could benefit from evolutionary findings is not even considered by Farber. 
He simply concludes that evolutionary ethics looks unpromising as a theory of ethics. 
We think that, given Farber’s opposition towards committing the naturalistic fallacy, he 
should either consider a nonfoundationalist approach for a scientifically informed 
ethics (with evolution as part of the sciences) or make clear what he intends with a 
theory of ethics.  
Criticism like Farber’s is well spread. Peter Woolcock, for example, argues that all the 
work in evolutionary ethics he studied committed the naturalistic fallacy. But he also 
claims that “in order to have some normative relevance, a descriptive theory would 
seem to have to be able to leap the is/ought gap (Woolcock, 1999, p. 290). And since 
evolutionary theory cannot leap this gap, he concludes that the naturalistic fallacy 
invalidates all efforts at an evolutionary ethics (ibidem, p. 282). Between the lines, he 
does suggest that there can be other ways to ground ethics. For instance, he argues that 
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ethical terms may not be “identical in meaning with some natural property, nonetheless 
they might be identical in fact with some natural property, just as water does not mean 
“H2O,” even though in fact it is identical with H2O” (ibidem, p. 284, our emphasis). But 
Woolcock does not consider this a serious option for science. Therefore, his argument is 
similar to that of Farber’s: there is the impossible demand that a descriptive theory 
should leap the is/ought gap if it is to be relevant to ethics. At the same time, ethicists 
who are inspired by scientific theories (in casu evolutionary theory) are accused of 
committing the naturalistic fallacy. This is inconsistent, unless Woolcock explains how 
the is/ought gap is different from the naturalistic fallacy in this regard (which he does 
not). Moreover, if nothing can ground ethics, considering grounding to be a criterion for 
ethical relevance is highly questionable.  
Last but not least, Alexander Rosenberg acknowledges that science can inform ethics 
conditionally. But he also claims that this is not enough: “for a theory of human nature 
to have ramifications for moral philosophy itself, it will have to do more than any of 
these things” (Rosenberg, 2000, p. 120). According to Rosenberg, to be morally 
interesting, a theory of human nature must at least be able to derive some moral 
statement – a principle, value, obligation, etc. – from a descriptive theory. One cannot 
begin with assumptions with normative content because then “these assumptions are 
doing all the real work, and […] the biological theory makes no distinctive contribution 
to the derivation” (ibidem). Indeed, the normative assumptions in the Kibbutzim 
example do some of the work – but the scientific information is relevant, both for 
eliminating certain value sets because they are less consistent than others, as for 
pointing us towards certain values. Still, Rosenberg demands an independent derivation 
of moral statements from a descriptive theory if this descriptive theory is to be truly 
relevant to ethics. But why would he demand this? Even more so when taking that he, 
too, explicitly connects the derivation of first principles with the illegitimate bridging of 
the is/ought gap: “the possibility of deriving […] the existence of some moral principle 
[…] rests on two preconditions. The first is that we can derive “ought” from “is”” 
(ibidem). Even though Rosenberg does not express his opinion on whether he accepts 
the reasoning behind the naturalistic fallacy or not, that this first precondition cannot 
be realized “seems to me [Rosenberg] at least as widely held a view as any other claim in 
moral philosophy or meta-ethics” (ibidem). Like Woolcock, perhaps he does not follow 
Moore’s original interpretation of the naturalistic fallacy. Perhaps he too has some kind 
of foundation in mind that is not refuted by it. Unfortunately, once again, there is no 
indication that he really is considering such an alternative.  
In sum, according to the discussed authors, scientific ethicists either commit the 
naturalistic fallacy or fail to make their descriptive theory morally relevant. This also 
counts when using evolutionary theory in order to ground ethics, as has been the case 
in several sociobiological and evolutionary epistemological approaches. Discussing the 
question when science would be relevant for normative ethics, these critics suggest that 
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it should provide either a new foundation (Farber, 1994), leap the is/ought gap 
(Woolcock, 1999) or derive moral statements from a descriptive theory (Rosenberg, 
2000). But in light of the same naturalistic fallacy that these authors invoke to refute 
evolutionary ethics, these suggestions are all impossible.  
Only Farber suggested a way out of these impossibilities, namely that in a 
nonfoundational ethical theory, evolutionary considerations may be of relevance. While 
Farber never examined this option further, we already illustrated in Section 3.3.1 that 
scientific ethics can be practically relevant even if one is not trying to ground ethics.  
Unwarranted criticism of scientific ethics is not constrained to abstract philosophical 
discussions. We gave examples of foundational ethics in section 3.2.1: Of particular 
relevance are religious ethics, such as the popular version promoted by Intelligent 
Design and Creationist (IDC) proponents. The analysis we just presented helps us to 
make clear that a related but much less honest criticism is enthusiastically propagated 
by IDC propaganda. This movement accuses scientific ethicists of inferring an immoral 
normative system from the state of the world. At the same time, they accuse scientific 
ethicists of not providing a foundation for ethics, thus concluding on an amoral view of 
the world. Both criticisms are motivated by the IDC movement assumption that 
normative ethics is by definition foundational. As a consequence, IDC proponents 
cannot imagine any other consequence from a scientific worldview than either 
immorality or amorality. Let us look more closely at their objections. 
We can distinguish two lines of reasoning in the IDC literature. One argument implies 
that a scientific worldview prescribes immoral behavior and the other argument implies 
that a scientific worldview reasons morality out of existence.  
As to the first objection, the idea is that evolution is not just a description of where 
we come from; it is a creation myth, an encompassing world-view or a naturalist 
creation story. A creation story has profound implications for human morality. 
According to Phillip Johnson, evolutionary theory is “the secular equivalent of the story 
of Adam and Eve” (Johnson, 1991, p. 131). In Darwin on trial Johnson claims that 
“Darwinist evolution is an imaginative story about who we are and where we came 
from, which is to say it is a creation myth. As such it is an obvious starting point for 
speculation about how we ought to live and what we ought to value” (ibidem). Dembski 
argues that if God is no longer present “one’s accountability is only to the laws of 
nature.” We have seen that according to popular IDC websites, what one ought to do can 
be inferred in a very straightforward way from genesis (Section 3.2.1). When religion is 
replaced with a secular worldview, they suggest that this merely amounts to replacing 
genesis with evolution – as a result, one can likewise read one’s values from evolution as 
one could read them in genesis. We can again illustrate this with the question of the 
proper role of men and women, discussed by Answers in Genesis. According to Darwinism, 
Bergman (2007) says, man is superior to woman: “Reasons for male superiority included 
the conclusion that war and hunting pruned the weaker men, allowing only the most fit 
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to return home and reproduce. Women, in contrast, were not subject to these selection 
pressures but were protected by men, allowing the weak to survive.” The link between 
‘the fittest’ and ‘the most superior’ is made in the beginning of this ‘answer: “According 
to Charles Darwin, the central mechanism of evolution is survival of the fittest. In this 
concept, inferior animals are more likely to become extinct while the superior ones are 
more likely to thrive” (Bergman, 2007). In defense of their own view, creationists stress 
that men and women are equal in the image of God. That men and women have a 
different role does not mean that one role is superior to the other. The supposed fact 
that Darwinism implies the superiority of men over women is thus meant to discredit 
Darwinism in the eyes of their fellow fundamentalist Christians. Either way, the IDC 
movement translates its view of the origin and justification of morals to a naturalist 
worldview. Just as for them the origin and justification of morals can be read in genesis, 
naturalists presumably can read the origin and justification of morals in human 
evolution. 
The other creationist line of argument is that, because evolution is firmly embedded 
in a naturalist worldview which excludes God, this amounts to rejecting morality. 
Namely, the naturalistic fallacy precludes that anything moral can follow from a secular 
worldview. This is acknowledged on another creationist website, Creation Ministries 
International: “If humans are really just rearranged pond scum — the results of survival 
of the fittest — then what could possibly be the basis for saying that the Columbine 
killers did wrong? It is a logical fallacy (called the Naturalistic Fallacy) to derive moral 
codes from science. Morality tells us what people ought to do, while science can at best 
only tell what people actually do” (Sarfati, 2000). We find this theme pervasive 
throughout creationist literature from the 1920’s up until Intelligent Design. From 
William Jennings Bryan, who represented the World Christian Fundamentals Association at 
the 1925 Scopes trial2, we can read another remarkably poetic passage: “Science is a 
magnificent force, but it is not a teacher of morals. It can perfect machinery, but it adds 
no moral restraints to protect society from the misuse of the machine. It can also build 
gigantic intellectual ships, but it constructs no moral rudders for the control of storm-
tossed human vessels. It not only fails to supply the spiritual element needed but some 
of its unproven hypotheses rob the ship of its compass and thus endanger its cargo” 
(Bryan, 1925). Why should we respect a bunch of chemicals? As Wysong puts it: “If life 
 
                                                     
2 In the early twenties of the twentieth century, creationist forces rallied against the teaching of evolution. 
This process accumulated in the famous Scopes trial in Dayton, Tennessee, in 1925 (Tennessee vs. John Scopes, 
a.k.a. ‘The Monkey Trial’). John T. Scopes, a high school biology teacher, was accused of violating Tennessee's 
Butler Act which made it unlawful to teach evolution.The verdict was in favor of W.J. Bryan: Scopes was found 
guilty of illegally teaching evolution and was fined a hundred dollar. However, the Tennessee supreme court 
reversed the verdict on the technical ground that the fine was set by the judge rather than, as the state 
constitution required, by the jury (http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/scopes/scopes.htm). 
 78 
came into existence through purely natural, materialistic chance processes, then, as a 
consequence, we must conclude life is without moral direction and intelligent purpose. 
This absence of direction would in effect mean man could direct his own life, or be 
guided by a situation ethic. Answers to life’s many questions would come from 
materialistic philosophy. Materialistic philosophy relieves one of moral responsibility to 
anyone, including the supernatural. Atoms have no morals, thus, if they are our 
progenitors, man is amoral.” (Wysong, 1976, p. 6, our emphasis).  
But morality needs an absolute basis, creationists argue, and this basis can be found 
in religion: “Science may indicate that if a 20 kg weight is dropped from a height of 100 
metres on someone’s head, it would probably kill him; morality is determined by our 
Creator who declares that murder (intentional killing of innocent humans) is wrong.” 
(Sarfati, 2000) Or as Answers in Genesis again warns us: “Can the concepts of right and 
wrong really be meaningful apart from the biblical God?” (Lisle, 2008) And further: 
“Words like should and ought only make sense if there is an absolute standard given by 
one who has authority over everyone” (Lisle, 2008). 
With Kitcher, we may conclude that the two visions are mutually contradictory. 
Nothing can be amoral and immoral at the same time (Kitcher, 1982). But the relevant 
misconception is that creationists do not consider that ethics might be nonfoundational. 
Either science must provide a foundation for morality (but then it commits the 
naturalistic fallacy and yields an immoral system) or science is not relevant for ethics at 
all (and amorality is the result).  
3.3.3 Conclusion 
Notwithstanding the criticisms of evolutionary ethics, the example of the Kibbutzim 
made clear that science, including evolutionary theory, can inform ethics without 
committing the naturalistic fallacy. Moreover, common arguments against scientific 
ethics are misguided: Critics demand scientific ethicists to provide a foundation for 
ethics while at the same time opposing an analytic foundation for ethics. There is 
therefore a need to rethink ethics as nonfoundational. This insight is also socially 
relevant: a conception of normative ethics as necessarily foundational is widespread and 
undergirds IDC’s criticism of scientific ethics.  
This leads to the following questions: How can we philosophically support a scientific 
ethics, and what kind of normative system would follow from a scientific ethics? In what 
follows, we will first argue that scientific ethics is underpinned by naturalism. 
Naturalism rejects the foundations as conceived of by its critics, but for other reasons 
than Hume and Moore rejected them. Naturalism also offers a general view of what 
constitutes right and wrong. As such, there is no need to abandon hope together with 
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foundations. We finally discuss some normative and meta-ethical consequences of 
naturalistic ethics and individual differences in moral cognition.  
3.4 Naturalistic ethics  
Scientific ethicists support their argument for normative ethics informed by science by 
referring to naturalism. Most ethical naturalists commit to methodological and 
ontological naturalism. As Flanagan, Sarkissian and Wong (2008, p. 5) argue: “Ethical 
naturalism is not chiefly concerned with ontology but with the proper way of 
approaching moral inquiry” (see also Flanagan, 1996). Prinz (2007, p. 4-5) pledges 
allegiance to four kinds of naturalism, including metaphysical or ontological naturalism 
and methodological naturalism. Casebeer (2003b, p. 9) approaches ethics by referring to 
“methodological naturalism” when stating that “the methodological and 
epistemological assumptions of the natural sciences should serve as standards for this 
inquiry.” He presupposes ontological naturalism to a certain extent: “for the moment 
we should hold our methodological naturalism close so as to see if normativity can be 
derived without postulating “spooky” non-natural entities” (Casebeer, 2003b, p. 9) 
Others refer to naturalism as the view that is committed to the methods and findings of 
science (Rosenberg, 2000).  
In the subsequent sections we give a pragmatist interpretation of this naturalistic 
view of ethics. Our first question is: What could this method of moral inquiry consist of 
and does it imply deriving first norms? We then move on to ontological naturalism. 
3.4.1 Methodological naturalism and foundations  
How can we possibly interpret the commitment of naturalist ethicists to the methods of 
the natural sciences? Does this mean that we can copy the methods of these sciences to 
normative ethics, and if so, why would we do that? To find out why the methods of the 
natural sciences are such an esteemed template, let us look into the pragmatic reasons 
for endorsing them.  
We argue that it can be considered legitimate to engage oneself to a specific 
constellation of methods and aims when this constellation has been shown to be more 
productive in leading to a predetermined aim than another constellation. According to 
Rosenberg for instance, naturalism implies that the methods of the natural sciences are 
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to guide philosophy because of the contingent historical fact that science has been more 
successful than any other approach in predicting new phenomena and exerting control 
over the physical world (Rosenberg, 2000). Thus, science is committed to its methods 
because these methods successfully reached a certain aim. It is, now, this successful 
constellation of methods and aims that became the standard for scientific inquiry, not 
only its methods.  
An example can illustrate the importance of the idea of a method-aim constellation. 
Fred Wilson (2007, p. 251-252) reviews methods and aims used throughout the history of 
natural philosophy. Before the 16-17th century, for instance, ‘rational intuition’ was 
thought to give one direct access to natural laws; rational intuition was thus seen as the 
method most conducive to the aim of finding natural laws. Some patterns in nature 
were supposed to reflect natural laws or motions, others to reflect unnatural motions. 
Natural motions were thought to be essential to a particular substance (e.g. falling down 
is essential to an earthy object), unnatural motions were thought to be induced by an 
external substance (e.g. the parabolic motion of a projectile is not essential to the 
object; someone or something – an external substance – must have thrown it to give the 
object its forward thrust). Natural laws, so it was believed, could not be observed; they 
were to be found by the method of rational intuition. Science was to deduce these 
natural laws. However, this conviction did not lead to great progress in questions such 
as projectile motion. Galileo changed the aims: one should not seek to distinguish the 
natural laws versus the unnatural motions. One should try to find exceptionless 
patterns in the observable world and forget about whether they are essential to the 
object or not. Galileo also changed the method: these patterns can be found by 
observation of and experiments on the behavior of changing things. This new science 
was very successful (F. Wilson, 2007, p. 254). Therefore, observation came to have a 
more prominent role in the scientific method while the aim of distinguishing natural 
versus unnatural motions was abandoned.  
Rather than simply taking the methods and aims of science and translating them to 
normative ethics (see Sections 3.4.2-3.4.3), we take the sketched reasoning behind 
naturalism in science and apply it to ethics. We hence ask the empirical question what 
constellation of aims and methods until now has been most successful in normative 
inquiry. We consider a method of normative inquiry to be successful if it leads to its 
predetermined purpose. We can first ask how successful foundational ethics has been in 
solving specific moral problems, compared to the nonfoundational method in Section 
3.3.1.  
3.4.1.1 Analytic foundations 
The twentieth century was dominated by analytical ethics, which gained attention due 
to Moore’s Principia Ethica. As a field, it thus grew out of a strong rebuttal of the 
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possibility of analytical normative ethics: Moore deemed it impossible to give an analytic 
definition of the most important normative moral term, thus precluding the rest of 
ethics as a normative moral system. 
Accordingly, analytical ethicists did not primarily aim to discuss normative 
questions, but rather examined other aspects of the meaning of moral terms and moral 
statements, while still aiming for analytic truths in ethics. Analysis was mainly used in 
the domain of meta-ethics and not in the domain of normative ethics. Thus we can at 
least conclude that progress in analytical ethics was never seen as progress in 
normative ethics – in the best case, it provided the basis on which normative ethics 
could be constructed. Nonetheless, the focus on analysis in the twentieth century 
seemed to suggest that this was at times the preferred method for all ethics.  
Accordingly, the relevance and merits of analytical ethics for normative ethics are 
contested. Holmes (1990), for instance, discusses the relevance of analytical ethics for 
bioethics. He argues that analytical ethics can only clarify normative issues and cannot 
provide moral wisdom. Similarly, while agreeing that conceptual analysis can clarify the 
logical connections between moral concepts, he doubts that it can resolve which 
normative theory is true or a better solution. Therefore he advises that bioethicists do 
not turn to conceptual analysis to solve their problems (Holmes, 1990). A similar 
pessimism towards foundational normative ethics is found in Farber’s work. Farber 
mentions that philosophers since Sidgwick have tried to systematize morality, but 
without success (Farber, 1994, p. 165). Also Edward O. Wilson (1975, p. 562) describes the 
result of analytical ethics in the twentieth century as “several oddly disjunct 
conceptualizations”. Williams equally expresses his dissatisfaction with this method in 
the original (1972) preface of Morality: An introduction to ethics: 
This sad truth is often brought forward as a particular charge against 
contemporary moral philosophy of the ‘analytical’ or ‘linguistic’ style: that it is 
peculiarly empty and boring. In one way, as a particular charge, this is unfair: 
most moral philosophy at most times has been empty and boring, and the number 
of great books in the subject (as opposed to books involved in one way or another 
in morality) can be literally counted on the fingers of one hand. The emptiness of 
past works, however, has often been the emptiness of conventional moralizing, 
the banal treatment of moral issues. Contemporary moral philosophy has found an 
original way of being boring, which is by not discussing moral issues at all.” (Williams, 
1993/1972, p. xvii, our emphasis) 
Thus, if analytic philosophy is not in the first place about normative ethics because it 
aims at truth rather than at knowing what we ought to do, and if analytic philosophy 
has not previously been conducive to normative progress, may we then conclude that 
purely analytic philosophy will not lead to any normatively relevant truths at all? 
According to the sketched reasoning behind naturalism, this means we can reject this 
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method-aim constellation. Indeed, naturalism does not reject analysis per se, but it 
rejects the possibility of finding true statements by means of pure conceptual analysis. 
It thus rejects the suitability of this particular method for the specific aim of finding 
true statements; or stronger, it rejects the plausibility of ever finding analytic truths. 
This supports the conclusion of the naturalistic fallacy, namely that one cannot 
analytically ground norms in facts. However, the naturalistic fallacy was arrived at by 
assuming the plausibility of ever finding analytic truths: It did not reject this method-
aim constellation. Thus, naturalistic ethicists accept the conclusion of the naturalistic 
fallacy but not the underlying reasoning. Naturalism offers another reason for why one 
should not analytically ‘ground’ ethics: it is unlikely that analytic truths will ever be 
found.  
One can reasonably expect that scientific ethicists who explicitly endorse naturalism 
as here presented explicitly reject the idea of analytically grounding ethics. In fact, this 
is the case with some authors who have been accused of committing the naturalistic 
fallacy. Ruse (1995), for example, claims that he is grounding ethics and is consequently 
refuted by Woolcock (1999) for committing the naturalistic fallacy. But Ruse explicitly 
endorses the is/ought gap. A closer look teaches us that with ‘grounding’ Ruse certainly 
does not aim to analytically derive a first principle (Ruse, 1995). Casebeer (2003b) 
explains that one cannot analytically ground ethics or find true moral principles by 
conceptual analysis. In other words, he recognizes that one cannot find an analytically 
true first principle – not because ‘good’ is a simple notion, but because the notion of 
finding truth by pure analysis (i.e., analytic truth) is flawed. His reasoning largely builds 
on Quine’s Two Dogma’s of Empiricism (1951) and is in contrast with Moore’s reasoning 
which relied on the possibility of finding analytic truths: While Moore reasons that one 
cannot give an analytic definition of ‘good’ because ‘good’ is a simple term, Casebeer 
rejects the idea of simple terms and analytic definitions altogether. Also according to 
Flanagan et al. (2008, p. 5), “moral philosophy should not employ a distinctive a priori 
method of yielding substantive, self-evident and foundational truths from pure 
conceptual analytical testing”. Consequently and importantly, naturalists like Casebeer 
and Flanagan do not rely on analytic statements when backing up their moral principles 
with facts or when proposing certain universal moral values. Their arguments are not 
about the very meaning of a moral word or about the true nature of a moral notion: 
“With regard to the alleged is-ought problem, the smart naturalist makes no claims to 
establish demonstratively moral norms.” (Flanagan et al., 2008, p. 14)  
Thus, we can safely conclude that naturalistic ethics, and scientific ethics, does not 
aim to find an analytic foundation for ethics. This practically neutralizes the criticism 
that they commit the naturalistic fallacy. If they would commit this fallacy, we could 
more poignantly argue that they start form a principle that is at odds with their 
naturalistic commitments.  
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Nonetheless, we haven’t made clear yet what methods and aims scientific ethicists do 
follow.  
3.4.1.2 Methodological naturalism in ethics 
Can the modern methods and aims of the natural sciences serve as standards for 
normative inquiry? Let us first consider the aims of science that are put forward by 
philosophers of science. According to Rosenberg, science aims to predict and control the 
natural world (Rosenberg, 2000). According to Ernst Nagel, science aims to provide 
systematic and supported explanations (E. Nagel, 1961, p. 15), enabling the explanation 
and prediction of new phenomena that were not yet in the evidence on which the 
explanation was built (idem, p. 64). Are these aims the same as those of normative 
inquiry? In the literature, several objects have been postulated as the aim of ethics. We 
already saw that, according to Moore (Moore, 1993/1903, §14), ‘Ethics’ must aim at 
truth. Others, like Warnock, situate the object of morality in the amelioration of the 
human predicament (Warnock, 1971, p. 16) and Thomas Nagel identifies morality as the 
combination of a personal perspective with an objective perspective (T. Nagel, 1985, p. 
3). While many other proposals exist, they do not consider it the aim of normative 
inquiry to explain, predict or control what will happen. Most proposals generally 
converge on the proposition that normative ethics aims to guide action, while this is not 
included in the aims of the natural sciences. Hence, the aims of science are not the aims 
of normative ethics.  
What about the methods of science? The natural sciences test hypotheses against 
observations. When inconsistencies are discovered, hypotheses or theories are adjusted. 
Data from observations are only seldomly adjusted because the existing methods allow 
obtaining reliable and objective data from observation. Reliable data are (stated simply) 
the same when gathered under the same experimental circumstances, and they are 
objective in that everybody is able to see or (re)confirm the same raw data. But even 
when taking – for the sake of argument − that values are amenable to observation, we 
do not (or not yet) have an experimental method or theory to gather raw data in a way 
that makes everybody see, or be convinced by, the same values. As a result, as things 
stand now, one cannot simply copy the methods of science to normative inquiry either. 
So we question that normative ethics can be committed to the aims and methods of the 
natural sciences in the sense of copying them. How then can normative ethics proceed? 
Ontological naturalism may provide an answer. 
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3.4.2 Ontological naturalism  
If success of a method-aim constellation would be the only criterion for choosing a 
method and aim, methodological naturalism in normative ethics would amount to a 
radical pragmatism. The only thing that would matter is whether or not a particular 
method yields a particular aim, independent of its connection with reality. As Wallace 
(1994) describes (but does not endorse) such a radical view: “Any choice of what it is for 
instance to be morally responsible is completely undetermined by the facts (whatever is 
independent of us) and so it would have to be grounded exclusively in our practical 
interests and desire” (Wallace 1994, p. 89). Accordingly, the epitomical pragmatist 
William James suggested that there are good reasons to have religious faith even if there 
are no good epistemic reasons for having religious faith.  
However, Casebeer (2003b) refers to naturalism as the view that is committed to the 
methods and findings of science. We have seen that neither Casebeer nor Flanagan are 
willing to postulate the existence of non-natural entities. Prinz is equally unwilling to 
introduce “fairies and spirits” (Prinz, 2007, p. 2) as he commits himself to the view that 
“nothing can exist that violates these [natural] laws, and all entities that exist must, in 
some sense, be composed of the entities that our best scientific theories require.” In 
naturalists’ view, the claims of scientific ethics can thus in the first place be questioned 
by empirical findings. According to Flanagan et al. (2008, p. 5), “the claims of ethical 
naturalism cannot be shielded from empirical testing.” Prinz (2007, p. 3) allies with 
Quine when stating that “all claims are subject to empirical revision”. This clarifies how 
naturalistic ethicists understand their commitment to the methods and findings of 
science. They do not co-opt the aims of the natural sciences. They do co-opt their 
methods for testing normative ethicists’ claims on their empirical plausibility. But this 
is not the end of the story.  
We can find two proposed functions of scientific findings and methods in naturalistic 
ethics: one positive and one negative. Science can constrain what moral norms we ought 
to accept, and science can suggest what other moral norms we ought to start from in 
constructing a normative theory. We can find this two-pronged function in the works of 
Casebeer (2003b) and Flanagan et al. (2008) or Flanagan (1996). The latter describes the 
method of naturalistic ethics as consisting of two components: One component is 
descriptive-genealogical and consists of scientific descriptions and explanations of the 
moral phenomenon (normative practices, judgments and so on). It can also include 
literature, art, human practices; or anything that may inform us about the values people 
hold (Flanagan, 1996). But merely describing the moral phenomenon will not yield a full 
normative theory: normative theories are underdetermined by empirical findings, 
different normative theories fit the picture. However, this descriptive-genealogical 
component does suggest what norms to start from, namely those that are already part 
of, or can plausibly be expected to be possible parts of, our moral practices. The second 
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component is normative: we draw upon this information and extract successful 
normative practices from unsuccessful ones (Flanagan, 1996). This means that we favor 
a norm or set of norms because this is conducive to a certain aim, for example, it 
systematizes what we should aspire to. Whether we should retain the aim of 
systematizing is itself a pragmatic question (Flanagan, 1996) – it depends on whether 
this ever works. In later work, Flanagan et al. (2008, p. 50) refer to the function of 
satisfying and coordinating the needs, interests, and purposes of the members of a 
community as another potential aim. The naturalist then “points to certain practices, 
values, virtues and principles as reasonable based on inductive and abductive 
reasoning” (Flanagan et al., 2008, p. 14). 
Casebeer analogously asserts that “robust moral norms […] can be constrained by and 
derived from the sciences” (Casebeer, 2003b, p. 34). He aims to develop a theory that 
helps to delineate those values that are conducive to human flourishing.  
Despite subtle differences, Flanagan et al., and Casebeer thus describe a similar view 
on this: We start from existing moral practices. This is a purely descriptive endeavor. 
We then construe a theory of moral values. Values are not simply what people think 
they desire. People value long term or encompassing goals and therefore can have to 
forego their short term values. Also, what people think they desire need not be what 
they really would desire if they were fully informed. Therefore, naturalistic ethicists 
formulate a theory of what people value based on internal norms and a theory of human 
nature. They thus constrain possible normative theories on the basis of postulated 
criteria, such as needs, coordination and human flourishing. Thus, what is right or 
wrong depends on the motivational system of human beings.  
Thus, in naturalistic ethics science is conditionally relevant for ethics: What is right 
or wrong depends on the values that are inherent to human beings. Science can inform 
us if and how these norms are attainable aims. Science can also inform us if these norms 
are attainable aims and what sets of norms are practically or epistemically coherent. 
Therefore, scientific findings can be a help in reevaluating, constraining and adapting 
our internal norms. However, science is also constructively relevant in that it has a say 
in what moral systems we start from. We may not always have full epistemic access to 
what is valuable for us. As in the Kibbutzim example, men and women may have 
thought that they really desired full equality, both in economic terms as to their social 
roles. Scientific findings though suggest that one might value childcare more than one’s 
explicit ideology dictates. As argued in the previous chapter, individuals may be 
inclined to think that one mostly cares about public health and criminality in forming 
an opinion about recreational drug use. Scientific data and scrutiny of one’s conclusions 
though may point to other concerns that implicitly play a role in one’s explicit 
commitments. In addition to this interaction between science and ethics, moral norms 
and systems that presuppose the existence of facts that are not supported by science are 
ruled out. Naturalistic ethics is furthermore inherently nonfoundational. Every moral 
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norm we accept may be revised in the future in light of other moral norms we came to 
accept, in light of extra-moral norms (such as feasibility) or in light of scientific 
findings.  
As a final remark, critics may question if nonfoundational ethics is better than 
foundational ethics. Granted that foundational ethicists have never succeeded in finding 
a first moral norm and proceed in endless discussions of matters of right and wrong, 
how is nonfoundational ethics any different? It does not aim at finding a first norm, and 
insists on being open-ended, with every norm and principle being open to revision. But 
if this is all there is to nonfoundational ethics, then what it does is take foundational 
ethics’ failures only to call them a success. However, it is the strength of 
nonfoundational ethics that it is prepared to build systems from an open-ended basis. It 
evaluates the system, not by rejecting its basis and starting anew, but by adapting it 
where necessary and keeping its good parts. Foundational ethics on the other hand 
avows to start from an unimpeachable foundation. When that foundation is rejected, 
one has to start anew. Thus while foundational ethics never gets off the ground for long, 
nonfoundational ethics is like a boat one rebuilds while on open water. The latter keeps 
on floating while the former can never set sail.  
3.4.3 Naturalism and individual differences in moral cognition  
Another possible objection with naturalistic ethics is that it seems to lead to relativism. 
We have seen that in general, naturalists propose a theory of what values are, and this 
theory depends on the human constitution. However, different people have different 
needs, desires, and flourish in different environments. Different ecologies may relate to 
different optimal lifestyles. If we combine naturalistic ethics with the knowledge that 
there are deep and widespread individual differences in affective intuitions, giving rise 
to individual and group differences in moral and extra-moral values, we seem to arrive 
at a view where some people converge on different normative systems than others. 
There might also be cultural groups that have internalized different values, possibly in 
coordination with their environment. In the discussed naturalists’ view, normative 
systems are at least partly shaped by people’s internal values. So how do naturalistic 
ethicists generally treat the topic of individual or group differences in moral values?  
Casebeer (2003b) does not specifically address the topic of individual or group 
differences. Certain sections in his work suggest that he is committed to the formulation 
of one general normative theory in which particular rules can be specified. After 
stressing the nature of theories as tools he suggests that “there are certain constants in 
both the environment and the creatures that live in it, and the tools that rely more on 
those constants than others do will have more general applicability.” (Casebeer, 2003b, 
p. 64). However, he explicitly denies that there is a single theory that will be perfect for 
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every situation. This sentence is immediately followed by: “Of course, if the situation 
changes, our tools may have to change as well.” (ibidem). Moreover, in order to find 
what most generally works, we have to allow “experiments in living”: “General 
considerations about epistemic progress in knowing how to function well will lead us to 
tolerate a Gaussian normal distribution of “experiments in living”” (ibidem). Thus, 
while Casebeer seems to value generalizability or universalizability, it is not seen as an 
essential characteristic of moral norms. He allows for different systems to be equally 
worthy, depending on the environment. Additionally, even in a single environment 
where only one system would be correct, we might not yet know what is most generally 
the optimal system for that environment. Therefore, experiments in living are to be 
tolerated because they can inform us about what most generally works. Thus, Casebeer 
suggests that different moral requirements apply in different environments and 
different moral systems ought to be tolerated.  
Flanagan (1996) and Flanagan et al. (2008) explicitly discuss the objection of 
relativism, i.e. the idea that different moral systems can be equally good. In their view, 
naturalism avoids extreme relativism (according to which all moral systems are equally 
right) and nihilism (nothing is worth anything) because “the ends of creatures constrain 
what is good for them”. With this, Flanagan et al. (2008) mean that values depend on the 
motivational system of the species Homo sapiens. In other words, in their theory, values 
are not internal to any particular individual member of that species but internal to our 
species and external to individuals. For example, if an individual desires a solitary 
lifestyle, this may not be a correct reflection of what is valuable for that individual 
because, given human nature, loneliness is unlikely to make the person happy in the 
long term. Nonetheless, they hold that the values of human beings differ depending on 
the ecology, because different ecologies are better suited for different lifestyles. As a 
consequence, they defend a view that they dub ecological relativism: “what is good 
depends on what is good for a particular community, but when that community 
interacts with other communities, then these get a say” (Flanagan et al. 2008, p. 18). 
Here, the preferred scope of generality is the community, provided there are no 
interactions with outsiders. Thus, Flanagan et al. (2008) also hold that, depending on the 
ecology, different moral systems are equally good.  
The view we exemplified here zoomed in on individual differences in moral views. 
We concluded that, within the community, different individuals hold different values, 
and we have to enable them to live in accordance with their own values. Moreover, all 
this depended on the view of the community, implying that other communities could 
come to different conclusions. Thus, in our view individuals’ values and communities’ 
values interact. We come to the view that different norms apply to different individuals 
and to different communities. Indeed, we suggest that Casebeer and Flanagan et al. 
(2008) neglect individual differences in human values. If what is right or wrong is 
shaped by human flourishing, values, needs and desires, and if individuals differ deeply 
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in certain needs, values and desires, this variation should also be included in normative 
theories. 
In all this, we have to keep in mind that no normative moral theory is final. All 
normative moral theories, including those that are relative to local or individual 
circumstances, are open-ended and can be reviewed in the light of new information. 
This includes information about practical and psychological feasibility. Each individual 
can change his or her moral system based on a reconsideration of one’s moral and 
epistemic values, for example after discussion or conflict with other individuals (e.g., 
Prinz, 2007, p. 287-308). Indeed, we can consider that pedophiles, psychopaths, sexists, 
and so on will conclude on widely different moral systems than others and allowing 
criminals to hold to their own moral systems will therefore create intractable practical 
problems. Moreover, some values are directed at others’ behavior as is the case in moral 
condemnation (see Chapter 2). If the same behavior elicits condemnation from one 
individual and praise from another then it is hard to comply with their requests. So we 
have to ask: Given that different people come to different conclusions about what 
behavior is better, is it even possible to tolerate this diversity or to actively promote a 
society where different moral behaviors can exist next to each other? It might well be 
that, given our nature as social beings, we come to see that, for certain issues, we better 
hold to moral values that can be universalized. We can adduce empirical arguments 
when and why we should relativize or universalize our moral judgments. This is the 
topic of chapter four.  
3.5 Conclusion 
Today, many philosophers still aim at establishing a normative system built on an 
unimpeachable foundation; or they demand such a foundation from others. At the same 
time, they refer to the naturalistic fallacy as a legitimate criticism against instantiations 
of scientific ethics, mostly evolutionary ethics.  
We have shown that both arguments when used together can be contradictory: as the 
naturalistic fallacy precludes certain foundations, it is not honest to demand scientific 
ethicists to give a scientific foundation for ethics. Moreover, if one’s view of ethics is 
foundational, it is unclear how normative ethics can exist in a naturalistic worldview. 
The idea of ethics as nonfoundational is therefore an important one.  
In the last sections, we discussed the reasoning that led to a view of ethics informed 
by science and against foundational views. Defenders of scientific ethics refer to 
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naturalism to support their view. Naturalists take the implausibility of a foundational 
ethics at face value and endorse another approach. Their approach suggests that we 
evaluate the sets of moral values we observe in the world, based on our other moral 
values and extra-moral values. Every resulting moral statement, principle and theory is 
open to revision. 
Naturalistic ethics has the advantage that it allows us to question each moral norm 
without needing to rebuild the entire system. However, it needs to take seriously that 
different moral requirements apply to different individuals and different groups. Since 
each normative moral system is open-ended, we can adduce additional arguments for 
and against toleration, universalizability or relativism. This is the topic of the 
subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter 4  
Varying versions of moral relativism and 
toleration  
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4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we evaluate naturalistic arguments for and against certain normative 
reactions towards individual differences in moral cognition. We focus here on moral 
requirement relativism and toleration. Among naturalist philosophers, both defenders 
and opponents of moral relativism and toleration argue that normative moral theories 
should be constrained and inspired by empirical findings. However, the empirical 
research is underutilized in moral philosophy. At the same time, philosophers draw 
distinctions between, for example, extreme and moderate relativism, and between 
cultural and individual relativism, and ask if any of these is in accordance with human 
psychology. However, operating largely independent of these schools of thought, moral 
psychologists generally do not employ these distinctions, making it difficult to examine 
the extent to which their research findings do or do not support various philosophical 
positions. In part because of this disciplinary divide, philosophers may have largely 
overlooked work on folk morality that bears on moral relativism or toleration. Thus in 
order to review naturalistic arguments for and against these views, and optimally utilize 
empirical findings, it is necessary to link empirical studies with the specific moral 
theory they bear relevance to.  
In this chapter, our aim is to bridge this disciplinary divide and integrate the 
conceptual landscape in order to guide future arguments for and against moral 
relativism and toleration. Focusing on authors who adhere to a naturalist methodology, 
we will use empirical findings to inform normative theories. We start by introducing 
various versions of moral relativism; we then introduce toleration.  
4.2 Moral relativism 
The term “moral relativism” is associated with a variety of very different concepts, some 
of which function mainly to oppose the view. While certain authors use the notion in a 
very inclusive way, others restrict it to a specific notion. In this dissertation, we use the 
notion of moral relativism in a broad, inclusive manner: We suggest a notion of moral 
relativism that is defensible and that coherently encompasses descriptive, meta-ethical 
and normative moral relativism. As a consequence of this approach, and because various 
specific notions of moral relativism abound in the philosophical literature, one may 
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object that our presented notion does not describe moral relativism at all. In order to 
anticipate such objections we first give a very short illustration of the breath of narrow 
and inclusive notions of moral relativism. We hope at least to make clear that, given this 
breath of notions of moral relativism, no definition seems to be standard and it might be 
useful to unify the many disjunct concepts discussed under the header of moral 
relativism into one coherent notion.  
Opponents of moral relativism sometimes commit to a very narrow definition of 
moral relativism. They often hold the idea that, if moral relativism were true, we could 
not condemn any behavior, including the Holocaust, and this because according to 
moral relativism all moral theories are equally legitimate. This is a form of extreme 
moral relativism. It is indeed the case that cultural relativists sometimes defend or 
respect practices such as female genital mutilation/modification (FGM) (e.g., Shweder, 
2009), but this does not mean that all moral relativists do so or that even those 
defending FGM are willing to defend every kind of behavior. Also, some relativists hold 
that all existing moral views are equally true (Prinz, 2007), but a theory being true does 
not make it right: We can additionally evaluate all true theories on their moral merits 
(Prinz, 2007; Hales, 2009; Harman 1975).  
Others focus on a specific aspect of relativism. According to Rovane (2011, p. 32), 
“relativism is not an epistemological doctrine. It is a metaphysical doctrine.” As such, 
“relativists deny that there is a single, consistent, and complete body of truths, and they 
affirm instead that there are many, incomplete bodies of truths that cannot be 
conjoined; in other words, they hold that there are many worlds rather than one, or 
multimundialism (Rovane, 2011, p. 36, Rovane’s emphasis). In contrast to Rovane’s (2011) 
rejection of relativism as merely an epistemic doctrine, most moral relativists keep to 
defending that moral truth is relative, which is an epistemic claim (e.g., Harman, 1975; 
Prinz, 2007).  
Still others use an inclusive notion of moral relativism and make a distinction 
between normative, descriptive and meta-ethical claims (e.g., Moser & Carson, 2001). 
Political notions of toleration and pluralism are sometimes also included under the 
umbrella of relativism (e.g., Long, 2011). 
We do not have a reason to constrain the notion of moral relativism. In fact, as we 
will argue, we think that various notions of moral relativism have very specific aspects 
in common. Thus, we first want to give a coherent view of moral relativism at large. In 
line with many others (e.g., Miller, 2011; Brandt, 1967; Corradetti, 2009) we will make a 
distinction between descriptive, meta-ethical and normative moral relativism. First we 
give an example of meta-ethical relativism and propose a general notion. We then 
compare this view to related notions of moral relativism and to moral views that are 
sometimes used as relativism’s opposite. Then we review existing meta-ethical, 
descriptive and normative views of moral relativism.  
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4.2.1 The notion of moral relativism 
Schematically, we will construe the notion of moral relativism as consisting of three 
necessary components. We will introduce them using the example of meta-ethical 
relativism. We take the specific case of meta-ethical relativism where the truth of moral 
statements is relative to a moral framework (cf. Harman & Thompson, 1996). This moral 
framework can be an internal or external set of moral values, principles or sentiments 
that play a relatively stable and justifying role in moral reasoning (e.g., one is willing to 
justify one’s moral judgments by reference to these moral values).  
Consider the following example, inspired by Lyons (1976/2001): Assume that pro-
choice activists endorse a moral framework that prioritizes the value of personal choice 
over the value of the unborn life. According to (some kinds of) meta-ethical relativism, a 
pro-choice activist − say, Jane − can veridically judge that abortion is permissible 
because it is in accordance with her moral framework (i.e., her judgment being in 
accordance with her framework makes the judgment true). Nonetheless, if a pro-life 
activist - say, Claudia − abhors abortion, this statement is also true because it is in 
accordance with Claudia’s moral framework that prioritizes the value of the unborn life 
over personal choice. In this example, the truth of moral statements thus depends on 
the moral framework of the person uttering a moral statement. Since this example 
relativizes the truth of the moral statement to the appraiser, it is a form of appraiser 
meta-ethical relativism.  
Second, meta-ethical (truth) relativism holds that there is variation in, here, these 
moral frameworks. In our example, some people are pro-choice activists and others are 
pro-life activists. Some of their moral judgments will therefore veridically differ because 
their moral frameworks differ. Skeptics may object that relativism need not imply 
variation in moral frameworks: It may mean that morality is relative to a moral 
framework, even if there is only one moral framework. However, in that view, almost all 
moral theories would be compatible with moral relativism, which would render the 
notion of moral relativism trivial. For example, according to consequentialism, 
something is wrong relative to the moral framework of utilitarianism, which then 
happens to be the only correct moral framework.  
Finally, this variation (in moral frameworks) cannot be entirely eliminated, even when 
applying all accepted epistemic rules. Assume that the truth of moral statements is only 
relative to the moral framework one endorses and that different individuals adhere to 
different moral frameworks. If it is the case that a pro-choice framework is, for example, 
epistemically correct while a pro-life framework is not, then the expression 'abortion is 
wrong' becomes false no matter who utters it. If moral relativism would allow that all 
variation in moral frameworks could be eliminated, moral relativism would be 
compatible with (most forms of) moral universalism, objectivism, realism and so on. 
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This meaning of moral relativism would be too broad for our purposes; rather, we hold 
that many moral frameworks are equivalent.  
We can generalize this three-pronged view of moral relativism as: X is relative to Y, 
where X is an aspect of the moral phenomenon and where there is irrevocable variation 
in Y. Reasoning thus, other kinds of relativism exist, for example those that 
(additionally) relativize the truth of moral statements to the body of information 
someone has at a certain moment (e.g., Claudia’s statement is true relative to the fact 
that she believes, at the moment she utters her statement, that embryos have a soul), or 
those that relativize an aspect of morality according to the actor, this is, the person 
having an abortion, etc. Still another form of meta-ethical moral relativism is that the 
meaning of moral terms is relative to a moral world. We can also hold that X − the 
permissibility or requirement of performing a morally relevant action − is relative to Y – 
the actor, the moral framework of the actor, or still something else. When we relativize 
moral permissibility or requirement of a morally relevant action to Y, we speak of 
normative moral relativism. Finally, we can hold that the use of moral statements is 
relative to affective intuitions that are beyond reasonable discussion. This is an example 
of descriptive relativism: we are merely describing how moral statements are being 
used, when they are uttered. Throughout this chapter, we will generally discuss 
relativity to internal moral frameworks.  
4.2.2 A note on being committed to relativism 
Before we go on, we must clarify the difference between moral relativism as a 
philosophical theory and being committed to moral relativism. It might well be that moral 
truth is relative, or that different people are required to do different things. This 
however does not mean that lay people in any way use moral language in accordance 
with moral relativist theories, think of morality as relative, relativize their moral 
statements or require different things from different people in a way consistent with 
moral relativism. It is useful to make the analogy with Mackie’s error theory. According 
to Mackie, when people make moral judgments, they conceive of moral properties that 
exist in the world. However, there are most likely no such objective moral prescriptions, 
because these would be very queer properties. Therefore, our moral judgments are in 
error. Analogously, it might be the case that what is a moral fact depends on the kind of 
person one is, or that different people should do different things, while at the same 
time, people in fact think of the moral judgments they make as inherently non-relative. 
Thus moral relativism might be the most plausible theory of morality, while people, 
being convinced that morality is inherently universal, are constantly ‘in error’.  
If someone, stating that ‘abortion is wrong’, holds that abortion is wrong for 
everyone in the same circumstances, then we will say that this person is a moral 
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universalist. If, on the other hand, someone stating that ‘abortion is wrong’, holds that 
this only holds for herself and maybe her community but not for people with another 
moral framework, then we will say that this person is a moral relativist. This distinction 
will prove important in the next sections and the following chapters. 
4.2.3 Related and opposite notions 
Relativism is similar to value pluralism, the view that there are many different moral 
values (Mason, 2011). Raz (1986, p. 395) defines value pluralism as “the view that there 
are various forms and styles of life which exemplify different virtues and which are 
incompatible.” Several pluralists denounce moral relativism, but they usually do so by 
equating relativism with a very constrained view. However, there are also subtly 
different kinds of value pluralism that may be different from some of the subtly 
different kinds of normative relativism. For example, moral relativism could stress that 
what you ought to do is different from what another individual ought to do, and this 
because what is valuable depends on, or is relative to, what kind of person you are. This is 
incompatible with Raz’s notion of strong moral pluralism: According to this kind of 
strong moral pluralism, incompatible virtues cannot be ranked relative to each 
individual; what you ought to do does not depend on what kind of person you are. For 
every person, the same requirements occupy the same position in the moral hierarchy. 
In sum, moral relativism and value pluralism are general categories that are partly 
overlapping – each embrace various more specific terms, and some of these terms 
belong to both categories.  
An influential tradition discusses related normative and political views under the 
header of relativism, as the following quote makes clear: “Toleration – the principle that 
we should refrain from persecuting others despite having both motive (we judge them 
to be wrong) and opportunity (we have the power to do so) […] is also thought to be a 
component (or a consequence of) relativism about morality. Relativism is sometimes 
taken as requiring that we suspend our judgment of others, or as a reason for offering 
toleration at all” (Long, 2011, p. 310-311). However, toleration as a universal 
requirement does not seem to fit in our scheme of moral relativism. It can be a relativist 
requirement, if, for example, some contexts require toleration while other contexts do 
not, or when some people should tolerate while others should not. Moreover, toleration 
also need not be a consequence of relativism. As we will see, toleration is usually 
endorsed by absolutists holding that from two incompatible views at least one must be 
wrong. Indeed, as is the case in Long’s description, toleration is usually defined as the 
view that one should not interfere with what we judge to be wrong. This is at odds with 
Long’s and others’ notion of relativism, which entails that we should suspend our 
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judgment. However, we will further see that the notion of toleration can also be related 
to moral relativism.  
As to normative relativism’s counterparts, we can turn to the three components that 
are outlined. The first component relates an aspect of morality to Y, for example moral 
frameworks. Most often, proponents of relativist views then have in mind that ‘what is 
related to’ is constituted (at least partly) by a subject’s or culture’s moral views and not 
entirely by objects, facts, or anything that exists independently of people’s minds. For 
example, they may hold that no moral framework exists entirely out of people’s heads. 
This makes moral relativism markedly different than moral objectivism, the latter here 
holding that what is right or wrong is substantially mind-independent. With this 
meaning of moral objectivism we stay very close to its use by scholars whose work we 
will discuss later in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 (e.g., Ruse, 1986; Nichols & Folds-Bennett, 2003; 
Goodwin & Darley, 2010). Moral relativism is not incompatible with objectivism – we can 
envision the existence of different, objective, moral worlds (e.g., Rovane, 2011) – but 
throughout this dissertation moral relativism will be construed as a substantially mind-
dependent notion. The second aspect in the sketched scheme concerns scope, where 
relativism is distinct from universalism. While moral relativism entails variation in Y, 
moral universalism holds that acts are true or false, right or wrong, or are used in the 
same way, for or by everyone. Universalism does not necessarily entail any 
metaphysical claim: Morality might be mind-dependent but still be the same for 
everyone, for example because we all possess the same species-typical evolved moral 
psychology (e.g. Ruse, 1986). Objectivism and universalism may thus be orthogonal 
concepts, though objectivism usually entails universalism. The third aspect in our 
scheme concerns irrevocable variation in Y. Value pluralists hold that there are 
different values. However, while relativists hold that not all conflicts between values 
can be resolved, certain value pluralists hold that conflicts between these values can be 
resolved (e.g., Nagel, 1979, discussed in Wong, 2006).  
These concepts will be of interest in Section 4.4, when we evaluate normative 
theories’ empirical assumptions. But first we compare our notion of moral relativism 
with other, specific theories of meta-ethical, descriptive and normative moral 
relativism. We hope to show that these existing theories all fall under our encompassing 
scheme. 
4.2.4 Meta-ethical relativism 
Harman’s meta-ethical relativism is a clarifying example (Harman & Thomson, 1996). 
According to Harman, meta-ethical relativism is a claim about the truth conditions of 
moral judgments: judgments about what is morally right or wrong are true or false 
relative to a moral framework, just as the speed of motion is relative to a spatiotemporal 
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framework. Moral frameworks are shaped by the set of values one holds, and these 
cannot be entirely explained by referring to external (mind-independent) factors. The 
truth of moral notions is thus subjective. Harman infers from observation that different 
people most likely hold different sets of values, hence there are different moral 
frameworks. Since variation in people’s values is at least partially subjective, it cannot 
be entirely eliminated by objective discussion. Therefore, Harman concludes, none of 
these moral frameworks is more correct than the others (Harman & Thomson, 1996, p. 
8). As such, two incompatible moral judgments can both be true, depending on the 
moral framework one refers to. If Claudia asserts that an abortion is wrong, and Jane 
asserts that the same abortion is not wrong, both their assertions might be veridical, 
albeit each is true relative to a different framework (Lyons, 1976/2001, p. 127-128). This 
fits our working definition of moral relativism. 
4.2.5 A note on extreme meta-ethical relativism 
Peculiar to Harman’s meta-ethical relativism is the position that no existing moral 
framework is more correct than any other; all singular moral statements to which 
people subscribe are relatively true or false but none are universally true. Harman thus 
defends an extreme form of moral meta-ethical relativism. Extreme meta-ethical relativism 
holds that no moral judgment is universally true or false. Moderate meta-ethical relativism 
holds that some moral judgments are universally true or false while others are 
relatively true or false (adapted from Moser & Carson, 2001, p. 3). This distinction 
between extreme and moderate will be more important when we discuss normative 
views: We will be mainly concerned with moderate normative moral relativism and 
toleration. 
4.2.6 Descriptive relativism 
Harman considers his meta-ethical account to be a plausible inference from a descriptive 
moral relativist claim. Descriptive relativism is a claim about the nature and extent of 
moral disagreement: It is the claim that some moral disagreement is not objectively, 
reasonably or rationally resolvable. The moral disagreement is then said to be 
intractable or fundamental. We have seen in chapter one that there are good reasons to 
assume that descriptive moral relativism is true, thus that some moral disagreements 
are fundamental. However, whether a specific moral disagreement is fundamental may 
depend on what procedure for solving moral disagreement we commit to. 
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Harman lays out his theory as follows (Harman & Thomson, 1996, p. 12-14): Some 
moral disagreements seem to be intractable because, as we have seen, they rest on 
disagreements about basic values, and these basic values derive from affective attitudes. 
No matter what factual arguments we adduce, Harman explains, they cannot bring us to 
change our affects. People differ in these attitudes because they are acquired by 
enculturation in a system of conventions; different cultural systems and different 
positions within them lead to the internalization of different values, mediated by affect. 
Hence, Harman’s descriptive relativism is also consistent with the aforementioned 
schematic view, namely, what is deemed to be right or wrong is relative to one’s moral 
framework, which derives from an affective attitude. There are individual and cultural 
differences in people’s affective attitudes and hence in their moral frameworks, and we 
cannot eliminate this variation by objective discussion since these attitudes cannot be 
traced back to factual evidence. 
Harman’s descriptive relativism fits with other frequently promulgated accounts. 
Brandt (1967/2001, p. 25-26) describes the notion of fundamental moral disagreement as 
follows: “To say that a disagreement is “fundamental” means that it would not be 
removed even if there were perfect agreement about the properties of the thing being 
evaluated.” To assert that moral disagreements are non-fundamental is thus to presume 
that “all ethical diversity can be removed, in principle, by the advance of science, 
leading to agreement about the properties of the things being appraised”.  
Doris and Plakias (2008) likewise speak of fundamental moral disagreement as 
disagreements that would not be resolved if the disputants were operating under ideal 
circumstances. The same terminology is used by Levy (2002), who says that some 
disagreements can ultimately be brought back to disagreements about values that 
cannot be further discussed. Ivanhoe (2009) similarly holds to the view that “there are a 
variety of distinct ethical values in the world that cannot be reduced to one another or 
derived from any higher common source.” All this fits with the schematic description in 
that moral disagreement is caused by subjective values; variation exists in those values 
and this variation cannot be removed by committing to a certain epistemology.  
4.2.7 Normative relativism  
In order for a normative theory to be relativistic, the prescription should state that, 
first, what one has to do or is allowed to do is relative to a moral framework, second, 
there is variation in moral frameworks, and third, this variation cannot be eliminated. 
This is called moral requirement relativism (Moser & Carson, 2003). An example of 
moral requirement relativism is agent relativism (Streiffer, 1999; Lyons, 1976/2001): 
different requirements or permissions apply to different individuals depending on these 
individuals’ moral framework. This is not to be confused with appraiser relativism. 
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Appraiser relativism is the meta-ethical position that different moral judgments are 
true or false relative to the appraiser (Streiffer, 1999; Lyons, 1976/2001) -  as in the 
example in Section 4.2.1.  
Importantly, there are many different kinds of moral requirement relativism. First of 
all, we must ask whose framework a moral requirement can be relative to. For example, 
there is a continuum with cultural relativism at one end and individual relativism at the 
other end. Individual moral requirement relativism holds that an action is right or 
wrong depending on the moral framework of one individual, e.g. the agent. This is 
discussed under the header of subjectivism by Williams (1993/1972, p. 26). For Williams, 
moral relativism is constrained to cultural moral relativism (id., p. 20-25). Cultural 
normative relativism then holds that an action is right or wrong relative to the moral 
framework of a culture. 
Individual relativism does not mean that someone who is totally informed about the 
state of the outside world can never do something wrong. People can always elect not to 
follow the prescriptions of their own moral framework because they have other 
incentives, i.e., they can choose to act in a manner that, by their own reckoning, is 
immoral. Moreover, choices may arise in a manner that reveals a lack of clarity in the 
individual’s hierarchy of moral values, such that, upon subsequent reflection, the 
individual may determine that her actions were immoral. For example, an individual 
might ponder whether she should have defended a friend accused of academic 
misconduct knowing that he cheated on his exams. Reflecting on her commitments, she 
may decide that she holds justice to be more important than the loyalty she felt at the 
moment of defense, and hence that she was, in retrospect, wrong. In contrast to 
individual relativists, cultural relativists hold that whether an action is right or wrong 
depends on the moral framework of the culture of the actor, i.e., the hierarchy of values 
that prevail in the actor’s society. While this is not obviously in accordance with 
morality being relative to a subjective appraisal, we hold that the moral viewpoint of a 
culture depends on the moral views of the individuals who make up the given society.  
4.3 How to deal with moral disagreement  
Notions of moral relativism, toleration and being a moral relativist play an important 
role when discussing how to react towards moral disagreements. Certain authors 
suggest that we should tolerate other points of view, but mainly when there are 
irresolvable individual differences in moral attitudes (e.g., Williams, 1996). Importantly, 
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there might be irresolvable moral differences if moral rules hold universally or are 
perceived to hold universally. In that case, moral disagreements are not irresolvable 
because they are both true or right. They can be irresolvable because the means or 
consequences of interference are undesirable. For example, a disagreement can be 
irresolvable because intrusion with a different lifestyle would inevitably lead to conflict 
or even war. A moral disagreement can also be irresolvable because we do not (yet) 
know what is right or wrong. So conceived, toleration need not be classified under the 
header of moral relativism − though it is compatible with holding other norms that are 
relativist, and it can be a relativized norm if only some people are required to be 
tolerant. Moreover, toleration does not even necessarily follow from moral relativism. A 
universalist, for example, may hold that all legal actions ought to be tolerated by 
everyone.  
Most often – albeit not necessarily, toleration is discussed against the background of 
moral universalism (hence, not moral relativism). Toleration is associated with 
‘endurance’ and with ‘patience in suffering’; it is thus taken to imply that one objects to 
and would rather not want to bear the other point of view.  
When moral rules are relatively right or wrong, other options open up. In this case, 
certain authors assert that, in case of irresolvable moral disagreement, we should 
relativize our moral judgments or even incorporate other moral views in our own lives. 
In that case, one does not tolerate the other point of view but accepts it as praiseworthy. 
However, toleration is not incompatible with moral relativism. If moral statements are 
relatively true while individuals cannot but hold moral statements to be universalizable 
(cf. error theory), then toleration might be a corollary of meta-ethical relativism. 
Another example is when some individuals are required to tolerate other points of view 
while others are not: this is an example of moral requirement relativism because 
different requirements hold for different people. Most often though, as we will see in 
Section 4.3.1, toleration and relativism are seen as alternatives. In the following four 
sections though we merely introduce the concepts. 
4.3.1 Toleration: non-interference 
Toleration is a common view discussed under the rubric of advisable reactions towards 
moral disagreement. It is a normative claim, stating that one is morally required to 
tolerate moral diversity. A minimal notion of toleration entails that one does not 
interfere with what one considers to be wrong. More demanding notions include that 
one should also respect, or even stand up for, those who hold different objectionable 
moral views.  
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While different ideas about toleration abound, they often come down to the notion 
that there are certain actions with which one should not interfere even though one 
judges them to be wrong according to one’s own moral framework. This may sounds 
contradictory even though it is exactly what toleration is held to mean. In an edited 
volume about toleration (Heyd, 1996), we can read that “the concept of tolerance 
consists of beliefs and actions that are justifiably (and maybe morally) disapproved of 
and yet are said to be immune from negative interference” (Heyd, 1996, p. 11); the 
virtue of toleration “emphasizes the moral good involved in putting up with beliefs one 
finds offensive” (Williams, 1996, p. 19); toleration “is the refusal, where one has the 
power to do so, to prohibit or seriously interfere with conduct that one finds 
objectionable,” (Horton, 1996, p. 28); toleration “permits continued private moral 
hostility toward the values and activities that are the object of toleration,” (Herman, 
1996, p. 61), and “tolerance presupposes a complexity of two sentiments: the first, an 
impulse to intervene and regulate the lives of others, and the second, and imperative - 
either logical or moral - to restrain that impulse,” (Fletcher, 1996, p. 158). The idea of 
toleration is often criticized for being psychologically impossible or otherwise 
constituting a logical contradiction. We will discuss criticisms of toleration in Section 
4.4.2.3; we want to note though that not all the authors we just quoted oppose 
toleration. Some of them rather try to solve this so-called “paradox of toleration” (Heyd, 
1996, p. 11). 
4.3.2 Toleration: respect  
Simply not interfering with others’ lives is often rejected as an insufficient practice of 
toleration. Instead, several authors suggest that one should also respect other points of 
view. Heyd (1996) describes respect as the practice of evaluating individuals 
independently of their acts. Respect here entails that one judges the act but one does 
not judge the person, one tries to understand the individual and does not treat the 
individual differently because of his or her actions. Forst (2007) lists respect as the 
practice of recognizing one another as moral-political equals. Specifically, “their 
common framework of social life should — as far as fundamental questions of rights and 
liberties and the distribution of resources are concerned — be guided by norms that all 
parties can equally accept and that do not favor one specific ethical or cultural 
community.” More demanding is the notion of active toleration as used by Lester and 
Roberts (2009). They argue that one could also stand up for the rights of those that hold 
diverging moral views. We will use the notion of respect when speaking of treating 
others as equals such as standing up for others’ rights irrespective of their moral views.  
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4.3.3 Pluralistic relativism and ambivalence 
A notable relativist theory is Wong’s (2006) notion of pluralistic relativism and his idea 
of accommodation. Wong (2006) rejects toleration. Instead, he recommends that in case 
of disagreement over what to do, one should accommodate, meaning that one should 
attempt to understand the others’ viewpoint. This is always possible, he contends, 
because all (legitimate) moralities start from the same assumptions and values; it is just 
that they are interpreted in different ways and that their value hierarchies are different. 
For example, stated simplistically, the Western world prioritizes autonomy over 
community, while the Eastern world prioritizes community over autonomy. Individuals 
from both types of cultures can nevertheless understand that autonomy and community 
are valuable. When confronted with another morality, Wong suggests, one has to put 
oneself in the other’s shoes. Once one understands the other’s values one should also 
incorporate them, thereby opening new moral options in one’s own life. This process is 
called accommodation. 
This is an alternative to toleration. Here we can also ask, if all the values in all 
legitimate moralities can also hold for any other morality, is this relativism? After all, 
moral notions are universally right or wrong in this view. Recalling our schematic view 
of relativism, moral notions are right or wrong depending on these basic values that 
constitute moralities and these values are mind-dependent: this is the case in Wong’s 
account. There is also variation in moral frameworks: one holds the value of autonomy 
paramount, another that of community, and so on. Considering the third component of 
relativism, it seems that this variation between individuals could, in principle, be 
eliminated because we can come to understand all other (legitimate) moralities. 
However, a closer look reveals that this variation is not eliminated within individuals. 
Indeed, Wong’s (2006) theory is relativistic because it centralizes the notion of 
ambivalence. Ambivalence happens when one comes to understand the other’s point of 
view and thereafter has two values in mind; in the case of previous disagreement, these 
values will prescribe irreconcilable actions but now they do so for one and the same 
actor. If community-values order one to take care of one’s family, while autonomy-
values order one to pursue one’s own interests, one experiences ambivalence. Hence 
different irreconcilable actions are prescribed and, no matter what one chooses, the 
other option would still have been right too. In Wong’s (2006, p. 21) words, “even if we 
are firm in taking a side, we can understand that something of moral value is lost when 
we act on that side, and the loss is of such a nature that we cannot simply dismiss it as a 
regrettable though justifiable result of the right decision.” This ambivalence, as we 
understand Wong, resembles the experience of a moral dilemma. An agent is in a moral 
dilemma when there is internal conflict: she 
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regards herself as having moral reasons to do each of two actions, but doing 
both actions is not possible… The agent thus seems condemned to moral 
failure; no matter what she does, she will do something wrong (or fail to do 
something that she ought to do) (McConnell, 2010).  
Hence, when one is in a state of ambivalence, different irreconcilable actions are 
prescribed. This is what makes the theory relativistic – the only peculiarity being that 
the irreconcilable variance is not between individuals but within an individual. 
We can object that this makes Wong’s view a form of strong moral pluralism (see 
Section 4.1.3) because each value belongs to every moral framework. However – and it is 
here that ambivalence differs from a dilemma – while experiencing ambivalence, one 
can still invoke practical reasons for following one or the other action. Important 
practical considerations have to do with following a consistent life path or conforming 
to one’s role in several social structures. While a moral dilemma can confront one with 
the options of giving money to charity or lending it to a friend, ambivalence happens 
when the head of a global charity organization realizes that a quiet life at a farm would 
also have been a valuable option (and the other way around) if he or she had lived a 
different life throughout. In the end, what to do still depends on what kind of person 
one is and what kind of life one lives.  
Thus, Wong’s view of accommodation is a form of moral requirement relativism: 
different people are required to do different things.  
In our view, the notion of accommodation - while conceived as an alternative to 
toleration by Wong (2006) – also requires toleration as a temporary reaction to moral 
disagreement. In order to accommodate others’ values or in order to know whether 
another view is respectable, one has to tolerate the objectionable behavior until such 
time as one has either accommodated or rejected the act. (Note that toleration does not 
legitimate interference with the action, but does legitimate reasonable discussion.) 
Graham (1996) similarly defends a view of toleration as a temporary state. He argues 
that toleration is best seen as a reaction to meta-ethical objectivity (thus, non-
relativism). If moral judgments are objectively true or false, one has to tolerate actions 
of which one disapproves during the time that one is still trying to discern moral truth. 
Toleration as patience assumes that eventually one will accommodate, accept or reject 
the other’s view.  
Not only that, accommodation also requires of people that they relativize their moral 
judgments. We have seen that it is possible to defend moral requirement relativism, 
meta-ethical relativism or descriptive relativism while all individuals in fact think of 
morality as universal. This would amount to a sort of error theory, comparable to 
Mackie’s error theory. However, in order to accommodate, one should first tolerate 
objectionable behavior before entertaining the idea that a view, incompatible with one’s 
own, might be equally correct. This seems necessary in order to undertake the next 
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steps, which are to fully understand the value, internalize it, and give it a proper place 
in one’s own life. In the end, one holds that what other people have to do is different 
from what is required of oneself, which again means that one relativizes one’s moral 
judgments. Accommodation thus is a rather demanding requirement, as it necessitates 
states of toleration and relativism.  
Wong’s view shows remarkable similarities with the notion of respect as used by, for 
instance, Levy (2002, p. 62-66). While toleration can require one to inhibit acting in 
accordance with one’s judgments, respect here demands that one tries to understand 
the value of certain other ways of life, in order to either affirm them as worthwhile or 
reject them as illegitimate. This goal of affirmation or rejection is not always included in 
notions of respect though; usually respect is a form of toleration, entailing that one 
objects to aspects of the respected way of life rather than understanding it. Accordingly, 
we will use the notion of respect as a form of toleration (see Section 4.2.2). 
4.3.4 A note on extreme normative relativism and toleration 
It is important to dispel one last misconception that can hinder readers in considering 
moral requirement relativism and toleration as interesting options. We have seen that 
there is extreme and moderate meta-ethical relativism; there is an analogous distinction 
between extreme and moderate normative relativism and between extreme and moderate 
toleration. Moderate normative relativism holds that some moral actions are relatively 
right or wrong while other moral actions are universally right or wrong. Extreme 
normative relativism holds that all moral actions are relatively right or wrong, implying 
that every action can be required or ought to be tolerated. Analogously, we use extreme 
toleration to mean that one tolerates indiscriminately and thus allows morally deviant 
behavior to take place. Moderate toleration means that only a certain set of 
objectionable behavior is tolerated (e.g., only lawful though objectionable behavior, and 
not illegal behavior, or only fundamentally different moral views). Opponents of moral 
relativism and toleration often equate relativism with extreme normative relativism or 
toleration. Graham (1996, p. 44) for example holds that “[meta-ethical] relativism in 
turn provides support for toleration; if no one belief or set of beliefs is superior to any 
other in terms of truth, all must be accorded equal respect,” (our emphasis). According to 
Levy (2002, p. 25), opponents of relativism often associate relativism with something 
like the following: “If relativism is true, then there are no absolute moral standards in 
the name of which we can denounce the Nazi holocaust, the slave trade or the Spanish 
Inquisition; […] If relativism is true, then anything goes (or so its opponents fear).” 
Indeed, extreme normative relativism was widely defended by early 20th century 
anthropologists and social scientists, often in the form of cultural relativism (e.g., 
Sumner, 1906/2001; Benedict, 1934/2001). However, contemporary moral philosophers 
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hardly ever defend extreme normative relativism, be it in its cultural or individual 
variant. As such, toleration might even be a universal requirement if normative ethics is 
relative: Moderate normative relativism is characterized by some requirements being 
relative while others might hold for everyone. Moreover, meta-ethical relativism does 
not necessarily imply a normative view; as such the extreme meta-ethical view that all 
moral judgments can be true does not necessarily imply that all moral actions ought to 
be tolerated, permitted, etc. It is conceivable that among the set of true moralities, not 
all of them are morally right.  
While extreme forms of relativism are compatible with the scheme presented in the 
beginning of this chapter, all of the normative works under discussion defend a 
moderate form of relativism as here defined. Wong holds that there are different 
moralities, but only a subset of these are legitimate. Which moralities are legitimate is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, but Wong (2006) expands considerably on criteria to 
delineate the set of legitimate moralities. Notable criteria in Wong’s (2006) view are 
constraints due to the function of morality as a tool to regulate conflicts of interest, and 
constraints due to human nature, needs, and desires. Levy (2002), explicitly inspired by 
Wong, arrives at a similar view. 
4.4 Arguments for and against moral relativism and 
toleration 
In this section, we will lay out certain defenses and criticisms of moral relativism and 
toleration. In this chapter, we are mainly interested in the presumed or asserted 
psychological constraints, because these claims provide grounds for comparison with the 
empirical findings under discussion in Section 4.5. We thus draw mainly on work that 
explicitly acknowledges the importance of moral psychology for normative ethics (in 
chapter seven we will deal with practical constraints).  
Obviously, the authors who we will discuss fully endorse the dictum that one cannot 
draw prescriptive or normative conclusions from descriptive statements only (Hume, 
1739-1740); they also do not have the intention of committing the naturalistic fallacy 
(Moore, 1993/1903). None of their statements should be interpreted as a priori 
knowledge, analytic truth or a demonstration of the eternal truth of a certain moral 
view.  
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4.4.1 Arguments for moral relativism and toleration 
Most arguments for toleration or moral relativism depend on the existence of 
fundamental moral disagreement (e.g. Levy, 2002). They can also be called procedural 
arguments because they presume that, in order to solve moral disagreement, we must 
follow a specific procedure. If this procedure does not resolve the disagreement then 
the incompatible moral statements all prescribe permitted actions, or we may not 
legitimately judge, interfere with or restrict the behavior that one considers to be 
wrong. Arguments from fundamental moral disagreement are usually used to argue for 
meta-ethical relativism (e.g., Hales, 2009), but some authors argue for normative views 
such as normative moral relativism, or toleration in the background of universalism. 
Importantly, the resultant prescriptions only hold for those cases where there is 
fundamental moral disagreement, not for all moral disagreements: we are thus talking 
about moderate normative views.  
Levy gives the example that, when one cannot convince others with ‘reasonable’ 
arguments, then one has no right to impose one’s view on others (Levy, 2002, p. 77). 
Following the same line of argument, Wong (1984) first argues that there is fundamental 
moral disagreement, as some moral disagreements cannot be resolved by accepted 
arguments (Wong, 1984, p. 66). This only has normative implications if we add one or 
more normative principles. As an example he introduces an interpretation of Kant’s 
formula of humanity as an end in itself. This formula states that all human beings are 
ends in themselves because they are rational by nature. Whereas Kant believed his 
principle to be universally valid, Wong merely argues that it is a plausible expression of 
the moral traditions of Europe and other cultures. In other words, it is likely that many 
of us implicitly or explicitly endorse Kant’s principle; hence we start from common 
ground when arguing about right or wrong. Wong wants to show that arguments for 
toleration are plausibly valid when one accepts or holds this formula, for the following 
reason: according to Wong, Kant’s principle implies that one should not interfere with 
others’ ends unless one can justify the interference to be acceptable to them were they 
fully rational and informed of all relevant circumstances (Wong, 1984, p. 181). Wong 
calls this the justification principle. We can clarify this reasoning with the following 
example: Images of dead fetuses are repulsive and saddening. These affective reactions 
might induce one to disapprove of abortion. However, such images, and the affects they 
induce, might not be a reasonable argument according to representatives of the pro-
choice side of the debate. When someone cannot give reasonable arguments against 
abortion, then that person is not justified in prohibiting or interfering with an abortion, 
even though that person is convinced that abortion is wrong. Hence, one should not 
interfere with certain behavior even though one thinks that the behavior is wrong. This 
is a valid argument for toleration. Of course, this argument for toleration relies on the 
justification principle. As a consequence, if one does not accept the justification 
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principle, one will not be convinced of the virtue of toleration. If one does accept the 
justification principle, Wong adds, and since one still judges the behavior to be wrong, 
one should weigh the principle of toleration against the principle that urges one to stop 
the behavior in question. Wong’s early principle of toleration already includes that one 
only ought to tolerate those who practice a true morality (Wong, 1984, Chapter 12); but 
it is only in 2006 that Wong greatly expands on what kind of moralities are true (Wong, 
1984) or adequate (Wong, 2006). In this more recent work, he still adheres to, among 
others things, a procedural argument for a normative view, but here he prefers 
accommodation over toleration. 
A particularly popular procedural argument is the enculturation argument (Levy, 
2002, p. 45, 77). Some authors assume that if one acquires one’s values via processes that 
do not constitute good reasons for our moral outlook, then one simply does not possess 
good arguments in favor of one’s own values or in opposition to someone else’s values 
and one may not impose them on others. Enculturation processes are processes that 
contingently shape moral outlooks. Arguably, one’s moral outlook is also contingently 
shaped by evolved human nature, one’s specific upbringing, genetic factors, 
environment, etc., all of which are a likely causal factor in the existence of individual 
differences in moral cognition (Henrich and Boyd 1998; Van Vugt et al. 2007; Ishii and 
Kurzban 2008; Bogaert et al. 2008). Hence this argument can be applied to these cases as 
well.  
However, the enculturation argument and analogous arguments imply that 
reasonable discussion has not weeded out unreasonable values and strengthened or 
created reasonable ones. The origin of our moral values may not provide a good 
argument for our moral outlook, but this does not mean that no good reasons for 
specific values exist. In sum, this kind of argument falls prey to the genetic fallacy: It 
assumes that the origin of an opinion is relevant to the veracity or legitimacy of the 
opinion. In this case, reason can justify certain moral attitudes and reason can shape 
moral attitudes in the long term, even when everyday moral judgments are often more 
directly caused by affective intuitions. Thus, when developing an argument from 
disagreement, it is important to focus on reasoning practices more broadly, not merely 
on the origin of a moral attitude.  
We have seen that toleration is deemed paradoxical. In order to solve this so-called 
paradox of toleration, several authors have suggested that we oppose the urge to 
interfere by cultivating values that inhibit us to interfere or that help us to tolerate. 
Thus, while certain authors suggest that we should tolerate other points of view, most 
authors additionally focus on how we can do that. In this context, following Williams 
(1996), it is useful to make a distinction between practices of toleration and tolerant 
attitudes. Practices of toleration encompass not interfering with and actively standing 
up for others’ lives whose moral values one objects to. Because practices of toleration 
may be thwarted by an urge to interfere with objectionable ways of life, we have to 
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adduce certain attitudes that may facilitate such practices. For example, we should value 
human beings as autonomous agents. We thus counteract the values that make us 
interfere with the value of autonomy. Williams’ suggestions are reasonable when one is 
a universalist awaiting the resolution of moral disagreements, and if one indeed values 
the capabilities of other people to make their own decisions.  
In 2006, Wong defends accommodation and ambivalence, which are a version of 
moral requirement relativism because, in this view, different people have to do different 
things. Hales (2009) arrives at a similar view. While accommodation and ambivalence 
are also meant to bolster practices of toleration, they cannot be subsumed under 
tolerant attitudes because they do not imply that the tolerated behavior is morally 
wrong. Here one adduces a view of moral legitimacy of the to-be-tolerated behavior in 
order to enhance practices of toleration.  
Ivanhoe (2009) defends a view he calls ethical promiscuity, which is similar to, and 
inspired by, Wong’s (2006) moral ambivalence and accommodation. In the face of 
irreconcilable differences and moral pluralism, Ivanhoe argues, one should celebrate 
this state of affairs. Ethical promiscuity insists that we work to appreciate the “mad 
variety of values” and be open in the quest for new ones. Ivanhoe backs up Wong’s view 
of accommodation with extra values that can bolster attitudes of tolerance. Openness is 
a virtue in itself, Ivanhoe insists; moreover, ethical promiscuity is constituent of leading 
a good life because it avoids a severe deformation of character, it enables us to share 
and enjoy a richer and more edifying life, it is a form of respect for good forms of life, 
and it avoids harm, which is also a source of satisfaction and delight.  
Similarly, one can find tolerance intrinsically valuable, or value it because it prevents 
one from imposing one’s view on others and in the process harming them (Levy, 2002, p. 
55-56). Respect has similarly been defended because individuals purportedly feel a need 
to be morally recognized, including by those who live other moral lives (Levy, 2002, p. 
63). This recognition is deemed valuable because it is a part of what humans need. Many 
norms can be adduced in formulating an argument for a normative view such as respect, 
non-interference or accommodation.  
In sum, for some authors, the fact of irreconcilable differences (whether they reflect 
universalism, pluralism, relativism, or simply lack of knowledge) must be met with 
practices of toleration. In order to succeed in doing so, we need attitudes of toleration, 
such as accommodation, ethical promiscuity, or the value of autonomy. Together with 
the existence of disagreement, a stated reasoning constitutes an argument for moral 
requirement relativism or toleration if one accepts that the ways to solve the moral 
disagreement would be wrong and if one can accept the attitudes that bolster practices 
of toleration. We thus go from an ‘is’ and one or more ‘oughts’ to a new ‘ought.’ The 
kinds of values one needs to accept, and the kind of reasoning procedure one thinks is 
reasonable, all depend on one’s meta-ethical and descriptive theories. For example, 
Saunders (2009) appeals to reflective equilibrium as a procedure for justifying moral 
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norms and resolving disagreement because reflective equilibrium does not require that 
individual moral intuitions are directly responsive to rational reflection. If one is 
committed to meta-ethical relativism, accommodation is unlikely to be accepted. 
Nonetheless, most suggestions have been criticized for being psychologically 
unattainable; in what follows we will review these objections. 
4.4.2 Constraints and arguments against various forms of normative 
relativism 
In 1975, E.O. Wilson sparked considerable debate with the publication of Sociobiology. At 
the end of the section that he notoriously opens with an appeal to “biologicize” ethics, 
Wilson writes that it “should also be clear that no single set of moral standards can be 
applied to all human populations, let alone all sex-age classes within each population. 
To impose a uniform code is therefore to create complex, intractable moral dilemmas - 
these, of course, are the current condition of mankind,” (Wilson, 1975, p. 564). We see 
that Wilson rejects imposing a uniform code because the alternative is not a functional 
moral system. Nowadays though, different kinds of moral relativism and toleration have 
been rejected by naturalist philosophers for similar reasons.  
Some philosophers have objected that we cannot ask individuals to relativize their 
moral norms because moral relativism would not fit with our moral psychology: It is not 
attainable due to the workings of our mind. First of all, in order to accommodate other 
points of view, one has to be capable of entertaining the idea that different 
requirements, that are incompatible with each other, hold for different people. A first 
critique argues that this way of thinking about morality is not possible. This is the 
problem of feasibility. A second critique holds that, if we do think of morality as relative, 
then we will not rely upon our own values anymore. This is the problem of confidence. A 
third criticism is that judging an action to be wrong implies that we are motivated to 
stop the action. An appeal to tolerate what we condemn is unstable because it goes 
against the drive to interfere with what we condemn. This is the paradox of toleration. A 
fourth critique holds that normative relativism is practically impossible because we 
cannot coordinate very different ways of live in one community. This is the problem of 
practical feasibility. We will discuss this last problem in chapter seven because we are in 
this chapter merely concerned with human psychology. 
4.4.2.1 Feasibility and psychological feasibility 
Flanagan (1991) expanded upon the requirement of feasibility. His formulation, the 
“principle of minimal psychological realism” reads:  
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“Make sure when constructing a moral theory or projecting a moral ideal 
that the character, decision processing, and behavior prescribed are 
possible, or are perceived to be possible, for creatures like us,” (Flanagan, 
1991, p. 32).  
One can interpret Ruse (1986) as an explicitly psychological version of this position. 
Ruse (1986) argues that we evolved to think of morality as objectively true in the service 
of motivating us to act upon our values. As a consequence, people are innately 
objectivist about morality – when they judge something right or wrong they have 
strong inclinations to think of this judgment as having a basis that is independent of 
their beliefs; correspondingly, they are also inclined to believe that the judgment should 
hold universally. Another consequence is that, should one manage to think of a 
judgment as relative, then one necessarily would no longer think of it as a moral 
judgment. This leads us to ask if people indeed are inclined to be moral objectivists. 
Ideally, we should then ask how morality develops and if there are cross-cultural 
similarities. As this is an empirical question, we will discuss studies that bear on moral 
relativism in Section 4.5. Ruse and others do rely on the contemporary majority view in 
moral psychology and on their own intuitions about morality.  
As we will see in Section 4.4, a deeper and more up-to-date reading of empirical 
studies reveals that both mainstream moral psychology and personal intuitions are 
constrained by modern Western moral philosophies; as such, they presuppose that folk 
morality is objectivist. Other studies support a more nuanced view on folk moral 
relativism. This knowledge should invite philosophers to become more familiar with the 
empirical literature at hand; it should also invite more empiricists to directly address 
the question of folk moral relativism without presupposing it. 
Wong (2006) presents a more nuanced take on psychological realism. He claims that 
we should not ask whether something is feasible; after all, we might not be able to 
decide this. Even if people are not moral relativists now, that does not mean they never 
can be. Hence, we should not dismiss a moral theory only because we cannot say that it 
is possible. Instead the criterion for accepting a theory should be that “it is not 
impossible.” Even stronger - though this is a normative statement - moralities that 
wrongly reject possible requirements should be ruled out as legitimate moralities: 
“Interestingly, however, seeing that certain possibilities are real enough (if not realistic) 
also works as a constraint on adequate moralities. Those moralities that in some way 
depend for their acceptance on denying the reality of certain possibilities must also be 
ruled out as inadequate” (Wong, 2006, p. 176). This more nuanced interpretation of the 
problem of feasibility leads us to ask if we can reasonably say that it is impossible for 
human beings to think of morality as relative, for example after setting up 
developmental conditions under which maturing individuals become moral agents with 
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relativistic views of morality. Can we point to conditions that are likely to make us 
moral relativists? Do they make us think of morality as relative? 
Flanagan (1991) adds another possibility. He stresses that we have to make a 
distinction between the attainability of relativism for everyone and its feasibility for 
particular individuals (Flanagan, 1991, p. 48). In this view, it might be psychologically 
plausible to impose a relativist morality on some people (i.e., asking them to tolerate 
other views) but not on everyone. Whether a society like that would be feasible is an 
open question, but does not concern us in this section. Interpreted like this, the problem 
of feasibility simply leads us to ask whether some people are moral relativists, and what 
kind of people are moral relativists. As to the last two possibilities, we will see in Section 
4.4 that empirical studies indicate that age, education, culture and personality correlate 
with the likelihood that someone is a moral relativist. These studies could bear on moral 
theories; while many are only informative for business ethics, there is a niche for 
empirical questions that bear on normative theory at large. 
4.4.2.2 Confidence 
Moral relativism would lead us to undermine our adherence to our own values. This 
problem of confidence is foregrounded by Ruse (1986) when he says that “we think 
[morality is] binding upon us because we think it has an objective status” (his emphasis).  
In contrast to Ruse’s position, Wong does not think that his view of ambivalence will 
lead us to lose confidence in our moral values. In this, it is different than a moral 
dilemma. Indeed, on the one hand, according to Wong, ambivalence turns moral 
questions into mere practical choices; moreover, ambivalence means that our moral 
commitments must remain open-ended and flexible: “We must remain ready to affirm 
values and priorities that are not presently encompassed by our current commitments,” 
(Wong, 2006, p. 237).  
On the other hand, practical considerations will lead us to think of our own values as 
the best values for us, “because we could not possibly strive equally to realize all 
valuable ways of life,” (Wong, 2006, p. 236). Even though we realize that other values 
might be better, they are either better for others or better for us but only in different 
circumstances (Wong, 2006, p. 235-236). The question of confidence has been addressed 
by empiricists by comparing moral ideology with other aspects of moral functioning. 
Here we find empirical data in support of the view that, cross-culturally, relativism is 
related to decreased confidence (Forsyth et al., 2008). However, as before, no distinction 
is made between different kinds of relativism in the empirical literature. As to the 
matter at hand, a pragmatist view as described by Wong is a form of relativism; as such, 
studies suggest that his view is not correct. On the other hand, people might be cultural 
relativists yet stringently adhere to a personal moral code. Philosophy can inform 
empiricists about the nuances that should be tested for; empiricists can inform 
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philosophers about the kinds of relativism that increase or decrease specific aspects of 
confidence. We will discuss relevant empirical findings in Section 4.5.2 
4.4.2.3 The paradox of toleration 
Fletcher (1996) gives a clear account of the paradox of toleration. Toleration here means 
that we do not interfere with acts that we judge to be wrong. However, Fletcher assumes 
that judging an act to be wrong is intricately linked to an impulse to intervene. For this 
reason, toleration will never hold for long. It can, in the longer run, lead to indifference 
when the act becomes demoralized, as has been the case with many sexual acts in 
contemporary Western societies. It can lead to respect when we decide that the other 
party was right, as is the case when we recognize the value of community. Or, toleration 
can break down and lead to intervention in the long run. Ivanhoe (2009) explicitly 
follows Fletcher when he criticizes toleration as psychologically unstable. Wong (2006) 
equally criticizes his own 1984 view of toleration by calling it schizophrenic. However, 
these criticisms beg the question of whether disapproving is in fact psychologically 
linked to an impulse to intervene with the act, and if so, if that impulse is overridingly 
powerful or not. This is, after all, an empirical question. Moreover, all this implies that 
toleration is only a problem if we see it as a permanent solution. We might equally well 
ask if toleration works as an intermediate step (e.g., Graham, 1996). Would it, for 
example, make a difference if, on the one hand, we tolerated with the intention to 
resolve the disagreement, or, on the other hand, we tolerated with the intention to 
endure the other’s behavior for an undetermined time? 
4.5 Empirical studies on moral relativism 
Our aim in this section is twofold: We review empirical studies that might be relevant to 
the critiques – the purported constraints – on normative relativism. We also aim to 
integrate these and future empirical studies with each other and with the philosophical 
literature. In order to do so, it will be useful to note that the discussed distinctions 
matter when empirical researchers address morality; we will see that the difference 
between extreme and moderate relativism and the continuum from individual to 
cultural relativism have been neglected to date. 
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4.5.1 Are people moral relativists? 
4.5.1.1 Defining moral relativism away 
4.5.1.1.1 Piaget and Kohlberg 
Piaget argues that, by the age of seven, children are moral realists, and that they can 
come to think of moral rules as autonomous after the age of ten. Realism to Piaget 
means that one regards duty and value as independent of the mind and imposing itself, 
regardless of the circumstances (Piaget, 1932, p. 106). A rule is conceptualized as 
autonomous when it is thought of as man-made and as legitimated by consensus or 
conformity. Different rules can be fair if everybody agrees with them or follows them 
(Piaget, 1932, p. 57). Hence, in this view, children start off as moral non-relativists but 
develop in the direction of relativity (Piaget, 1932, p. 316). Kohlberg added four more 
stages after the two moral stages proposed by Piaget. He argues that social interactions 
subsequently lead us to develop adequate conceptions of morality. Individuals who have 
reached stage six think of moral judgments as guided by universal ethical principles 
that all humanity should follow. Stages three to five are characterized by the content of 
norms, rather than the form of norms, as in stage six. Accordingly, individuals who have 
reached stages three to five think that all moral rules are guided by those specific 
universal principles, while individuals who have reached stage six hold that moral rules 
are right whenever they are universalizable. 
Piaget and Kohlberg should be credited for their pioneering work in moral 
psychology. Nonetheless, their conception of morality was biased towards non-
relativism. Both defined the moral domain by referring to Kant. Piaget came to disagree 
with Kant’s criterion of universalizability and objectivity, but Kohlberg postulated that 
universalizability was the last stage of moral development. This necessarily limits the 
scope of empirical investigation. If the researcher does not conceptualize a certain rule 
as universalizable, it will not be studied as such, even though subjects could categorize 
the rule as moral. Granted, one needs a prior conception of morality in order to know 
what to investigate. However, this conception could be minimal and broader at the 
start, allowing the data to guide the investigation by, for example, asking participants if 
the rule has anything to do with morality as they conceptualize it. When starting from 
philosophical conceptions of morality, we see that non-relative theories are only a 
subset of existing moral philosophies. Hence Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s prior conceptions 
of morality are too narrow; as a consequence, their methods are biased towards finding 
people to be moral non-relativists (e.g., Rest, 1988).  
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4.5.1.1.2 Domain theory and the moral/conventional distinction 
The above problem shows up to an even larger extent in domain theory and, more 
specifically, research concerning the postulated moral-conventional distinction. 
Theorists (e.g., Turiel, 1983; Turiel et al., 1987; Smetana, 2006; Shweder, 1990) hold that 
most individuals develop the capacity to distinguish two kinds of social interactions. 
One cluster of interactions is perceived as belonging to the moral domain and triggers 
associated mental computations. The other cluster is perceived as belonging to the 
conventional domain and triggers different, convention-specific mental computations.  
According to the most prominent domain-theorists, those following Turiel (1983), moral 
and conventional transgressions are thought to be distinguished along the following 
dimensions: moral transgressions are, first, transgressions that involve a victim who is 
harmed, whose rights have been violated, or who has been subjected to an injustice. 
These are perceived as universal justifications. When asked why a moral transgression is 
wrong, people accordingly refer to these justifications. A conventional transgression, on 
the other hand, is wrong because there are implicit or explicit social strictures ruling 
against it, such as laws, sanctions, or prevailing opinions or practices. Second, moral 
transgressions are wrong independent of the rulings of authority structures or 
authority figures, while the wrongness of a conventional transgression depends on such 
authorities’ decrees. Third, moral transgressions are generalizably wrong. This means 
that they are wrong in every social system, independent of convention, while 
conventional transgressions might not be wrong in a different social system (Turiel, 
1983; see discussion in Kelly et al., 2007). A fourth characteristic is seriousness: Moral 
transgressions are more seriously wrong than conventional transgressions. This 
characteristic does not always hold and is not considered to be of primary importance 
(Turiel et al., 1987, p. 171-176; Smetana, 1993). Lastly, moral transgressions are less often 
deemed permissible than conventional transgressions.  
Often, the moral/conventional theory is held to imply that people distinguish 
between moral and conventional transgressions along all or many of the dimensions 
indicated: it is claimed that the moral and the conventional are qualitatively different 
systems of thought, and not merely points along a continuum (Wainryb et al., 2004). 
Given that there are different possible interpretations of these core ideas (e.g., Sousa, 
Holbrook, &Piazza, 2009; Stich, Fessler, & Kelly, 2009), it is useful to explain how 
individuals might come to perceive the distinction between moral rules and 
conventions. In 1983, Turiel provided the theoretical foundations of the 
moral/conventional distinction in his seminal work The development of social knowledge. 
He refers to the work of such philosophers as Gewirth, Searle, Dworkin and Rawls to 
defend the view that there is a distinction between acts that are wrong in themselves 
(or because of their inherent consequences) and acts that are wrong because of the 
social context (Turiel, 1983, p. 33-40). He further hypothesizes why individuals would 
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perceive such a distinction. Harmful acts, for example, have intrinsic features, such as 
causing empathic distress in the perpetrator, that allegedly cause the individual, in the 
course of his or her social development, to condemn these acts as wrong in themselves 
(Turiel, 1983, p. 35, 42-43). Referring to Rawls (id., p. 39), Turiel argues that the same 
holds for violations of rights and justice. Violations of conventions, on the other hand, 
do not have intrinsic consequences; instead, the reasons they are wrong are to be found 
in the social context. Wearing your pajamas at school might be wrong these days around 
here, but it would not be wrong if wearing your pajamas at school was a local 
convention. In order to be a convention, a prescription must address a behavioral 
uniformity that has a social function such as coordinating interactions; such functions 
are only possible if members of a society share knowledge about the given conventions. 
Conventions are validated by, and can be altered by, consensus or by general usage 
(Turiel, 1983, p. 35). During their development, individuals gain knowledge about these 
conventions and their function and, as a consequence, come to condemn transgressions 
of prevailing convention as wrong, not in themselves, but because of the social context.  
Turiel’s empirical hypothesis is thus that individuals come to develop (at least) two 
broad, distinguishable ways of thinking about behavior, namely, a) intrinsically, 
universally wrong behavior, and b) conventionally, variably wrong behavior.  
In order to test this theory, a moral/conventional task has been developed. An 
example of such a task can be seen in Table 1. Participants are first presented with a 
scenario describing a violation of a prescription (i.e., a transgression, e.g. hitting a child 
for fun), after which they are asked to answer a set of questions that reveals their 
reasoning pattern. Typically, participants are first asked if the behavior was permissible 
(‘permissibility question’, usually phrased as ‘ok or not ok’). They are then asked why it 
is or is not permissible (‘justification question’). Additionally, they may be asked for the 
‘authority dependence’ of the transgressions, e.g., if the behavior would still be wrong if 
an authority figure ruled otherwise. Other commonly employed questions are if it would 
still be wrong if the event had occurred somewhere else, at another time, where 
everybody did it, in another culture, where they don't have a rule about it (Nucci & 
Turiel, 1978; 1993), and so on, all of which are ‘generalizability questions.’ The 
contention is that some transgressions will show a ‘moral response pattern,’ meaning 
that, depending on what specific questions were asked, they will be viewed as 
generalizably wrong, viewed as wrong independent of authority, and viewed as wrong 
because they go against universal principles such as harm, justice or rights. Other 
transgressions will purportedly show a ‘conventional response pattern,’ meaning that 
they will be judged to be variably wrong, depending on authority and social context, 
and that they will be seen as meriting less punishment. 
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Table 8: The moral/conventional task 
 
 
MORAL CONVENTIONAL 
Example of a scenario Paul is a six-year-old 
child who goes to a 
public elementary 
school. One Friday he 
walked up to one of 
the other children in 
his class and hit him 
just for fun. 
After playtime, the 
children were 
supposed to put their 
toys back where they 
had found them. Luis 
put his toy on a shelf 
nearby instead of 
putting it where he 
had found it. 
Permissibility Is it OK for [X] to 
[act]? 
No No 
Justification Please thoroughly 
explain why you 
marked this option 
Participant refers to 
universal principles of 
harm,  justice or rights 
Participant refers to 
social context, e.g., 
authority or social 
norms 
Authority 
dependence 
If the government 
passed a law that said 
it was ok to 
do what [X] did, 
would that make [X]’s 
action OK? 
No Yes 
Generalizability If [X] lived 
somewhere where 
everyone else did 
this, would it be wrong 
for [X] to do this? 
Yes No 
Note. This is an example of a classical moral/conventional task. All scenarios and two 
questions (the authority dependence and generalizability question) are adapted from Huebner, 
Lee, & Hauser (2010). The permissibility question is adapted from Kelly et al. (2007). The 
justification question is adapted from Sousa et al. (2009). The inner eight cells show the 
signature moral response pattern and the signature conventional response pattern. 
 
What does this tell us about folk moral relativism? Often, a transgression being 
generalizably wrong because it violates universal principles is juxtaposed to it being 
relative, both in experimental studies and according to the theory. Turiel (1983, p. 35) 
thus describes conventions as justified by, and relative to, the societal context. The 
result is that they vary from one social system to another or when general usage or 
consensus differs, while immoral acts are generalizably wrong. The property of 
justification can be assessed by asking subjects why this transgression is wrong, while 
the property of generalizability can be assessed by asking if the act would also be wrong 
in a different social system, or when general usage or consensus differ. Either of these 
criteria can determine that the transgression is non-relatively wrong. Thus, two 
conditions have to apply before we can decide that a transgression is relatively wrong. If 
a transgression is seen as wrong in two different societies but is seen as wrong because 
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it causes harm, then it is non-relatively wrong. If a transgression is claimed to be wrong 
because of consensus, but is claimed to be wrong even when varying a range of societal 
factors, we cannot decide it is relative. Hence, it will be much easier under this 
paradigm to decide that a rule is non-relative than to decide that it is relative. 
Consonant with the aforementioned asymmetry in the affordances of the Turiel 
paradigm, an impressive corpus of empirical investigations employing this conceptual 
framework supports the conclusion that people are moral non-relativists (e.g., Wainryb 
et al. 2004; Turiel et al., 1987). Indeed, studies find that transgressions that are 
intuitively judged to be in the moral domain are consistently categorized as 
generalizably wrong and as wrong due to issues of harm, justice, and rights (e.g., Nucci 
& Turiel, 1993). Despite this voluminous evidence, however, we argue that the methods 
used in these studies will fail to detect moral relativism when it occurs.  
Like Kohlberg, Turiel (1983) premises his approach on a narrow conception of 
‘morality’ and ‘conventionality,’ drawing on a selection of philosophical theories that 
support universal accounts of morality (e.g., Searle, 1969). Morality is defined as 
“analytically independent of systems of social organization that coordinate 
interactions,” (Turiel, 1983, p. 39). Moral right and wrong are determined by, and 
justified by, universal values of justice, rights, and ‘do no harm.’ As a consequence, what 
is morally wrong is morally wrong everywhere and its wrongness is justified by these 
universal values – wrongness is not determined by consensus. This is not a description, 
as moral systems do vary – it is a definition about the proper moral domain. In this 
conception, by definition, relativistic rules cannot be moral rules. For example, socio-
functional accounts of morality as a device to regulate cooperation (e.g. Wong, 2006) are 
excluded from the scope of research.  
In the moral/conventional task, participants are confronted with transgressions that 
have been selected and categorized by the researchers. In early studies (e.g. Nucci & 
Turiel, 1978; Turiel et al., 1987, p. 172-174; Nucci & Nucci, 1982), researchers or 
independent jurors classified the transgressions based on the prior definitions of ‘moral’ 
and ‘conventional.’ Some later studies (e.g. Nichols, 2004; Nucci & Turiel, 1993) adapt 
previously used scenarios. Thus, researchers pick out transgressions that would either 
elicit the moral response pattern or the conventional response pattern in themselves. 
This opens the possibility that participants had to rate a biased sample of 
transgressions. There might be transgressions that many of us would intuitively classify 
as ‘moral’ but that are not generalizable or not dependent on issues of harm, justice or 
rights according to the researchers. Such transgressions would not have been included 
in these studies because they could not have been classified as either ‘moral’ or 
‘conventional’ due to their ‘atypical’ combination of characteristics. Hence, the finding 
that participants rated all ‘moral’ transgressions as generalizable means nothing more 
than that the participants agreed with the researchers regarding the generalizability of 
the selected transgressions.  
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In addition, participants have typically been asked to rate a small number of 
transgressions. This opens the possibility that their answers were specific to the 
transgression considered and not to morality per se (Wright et al., 2008). Studies that 
included a wider range of scenarios and did not have inclusion or characterization 
criteria based on Turiel’s (1983) classification did not find this clear-cut conceptual 
distinction (e.g. Huebner, Lee, & Hauser, 2010; Nichols, 2004; Kelly et al., 2007). Also, 
there are cultural differences in how people classify transgressions. When participants 
belong to the same cultural group as do the researchers, we can expect that their 
response patterns will reflect the same intuitions as those of the researchers. Clear 
cultural differences have been found in the response patterns in regard to putative 
moral or conventional transgressions (e.g., Miller et al., 1990).  
Clearly, most studies do not ask participants whether they think of the transgression 
as moral or conventional - the distinction is made by the researchers, and its 
affirmation by participants is entirely implicit, dependent on their answers to questions 
intended to tap into the relevant properties. Wright et al. (2008) presented participants 
with a broad range of issues and asked them to explicitly classify them as moral or 
conventional. They found that, for almost all issues, there was no consensus among 
participants. Many issues were considered moral by one participant and conventional 
by another participant; some of these issues would have been classified as moral 
according to Turiel’s (1983) criteria, while other issues would have been classified as 
conventional. Huebner et al. (2010) employed principal components analysis to explore 
how participants’ judgments regarding a wide variety of putative moral and 
conventional transgressions assort. While arguing that postulated moral transgressions 
do cluster together, they also report that postulated conventional transgressions seem 
to form a continuum from conventional at one end to moralized at the other end.  
Findings such as these indicate that there are reasons to doubt the a priori rationale 
given for drawing the moral/conventional distinction where many researchers place it 
(see also Bauman & Skitka, 2009). We suggest that, unless one knows the participants’ 
categorization, there is no reason to categorize particular transgressions one way or 
another (indeed, there might not even be a strict conceptual distinction at all, but 
instead a continuum, with ‘moral’ and ‘conventional’ as poles).  
This has important implications for the empirical question of whether or not people 
are moral relativists. Testing a very limited range of moral issues is only informative if 
one expects that some individuals will be extreme relativists, namely, they will give 
relativist answers irrespective of what moral issues they have to evaluate. But suppose it 
were the case that people were moderate moral relativists, deeming as ‘moral’ some 
transgressions that researchers in the Turiel tradition did not include or would have 
classified as ‘conventional.’ If participants are not asked how they classify such 
transgressions, and if participants are presented with only a small set of transgressions 
that have been pre-selected by researchers on the basis of the intuition that (in the 
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researcher’s opinion) each is clearly moral or conventional, then even copious research 
will not reveal people’s relativist leanings. 
4.5.1.1.3 Ethical ideologies 
A more open-minded body of research relevant to the present discussion is that 
employing the Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ) developed by Forsyth (1980). Forsyth 
proposes that people differ in their personal ‘ethical ideologies’: people differ in the 
degree they are relativists and idealists, two orthogonal continua ranging from low to 
high. Forsyth describes highly relativistic individuals as those that “feel that moral 
actions depend upon the nature of the situation and the individuals involved, and when 
judging others they weigh the circumstances more than the ethical principle that was 
violated,” (Forsyth, 1992). At first glance, this definition might seem to differ 
substantially from our previous definition of relativism. Nonetheless, consider the 
components of the EPQ designed to categorize people along this dimension. Participants 
employ a 9-point Likert scale to indicate how much they agree with each of ten items. In 
Table 2, we reproduce these ten items, noting in the right column the extent to which 
each item bears on relativism as we have defined it. Items differ in the extent to which 
they tap into whether people think of moral principles as variable, and whether moral 
disagreements can be resolved.  
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Table 9: Items 11-20 of the Ethics Position Questionnaire (left) (Source: Forsyth, 1980) 
and their relation to moral relativism (right). 
 Item Morality is  … 
11 There are no ethical principles that are so important that  
they should be a part of any code of ethics. 
Variable, relative to a 
code of ethics 
12 What is ethical varies from one situation and society to 
another.  
Variable, relative to 
situation and society  
13 Moral standards should be seen as being individualistic; 
what one person considers to be moral may be judged to  
be immoral by another person. 
Variable, relative to 
individual  
14  Different types of moralities cannot be compared as to 
“rightness.” 
Variable  
and irresolvable 
15 Questions of what is ethical for everyone can never be 
resolved since what is moral or immoral is up to the 
individual. 
Relative to individual, and 
irresolvable  
16 Moral standards are simply personal rules which indicate 
how a person should behave, and are not to be applied in 
making judgments of others.  
Relative to individual 
17 Ethical considerations in interpersonal relations are so 
complex that individuals should be allowed to formulate 
their own individual codes. 
Relative to individual 
18 Rigidly codifying an ethical position that prevents certain 
types of actions could stand in the way of better human 
relations and adjustment. 
Unclear, maybe variable 
19 No rule concerning lying can be formulated; whether a lie  
is permissible or not permissible totally depends on the 
situation. 
Variable, relative to 
situation  
20 Whether a lie is judged to be moral or immoral depends 
upon the circumstances surrounding the action. 
Variable, relative to 
circumstances  
 
Most items combine at least two of the three criteria of individual relativism. When 
an individual scores high on all of these criteria, we can conclude that the participant 
explicitly endorses moral relativism as here defined. The items are biased towards 
extreme moral relativism: moderate moral relativists would agree that some moral 
standards are individualistic (item 11) or personal rules (item 16), but they would not 
necessarily agree with the more general wording that is used. Moreover, it is not clear if 
normative relativism is assessed. ‘Relativist’ answers are also concomitant with other 
interpretations, such as meta-ethical relativism (moral statements are relatively true or 
false) (see also Goodwin & Darley, 2010). On the other hand, Forsyth (1992) explicitly 
avoids an a priori commitment to an objectivistic moral philosophy. All things 
considered, this is a useful starting point if we want to know about the possibility of lay 
people being folk moral relativists.  
Studies that make use of the EPQ frequently inform us about variation in moral views, 
as suggested by Flanagan (1991). Researchers often report that, among adults, age is 
negatively correlated with relativism (e.g., Chen & Liu, 2009; Dubinsky et al., 2005; 
 122 
Hartikainen & Torstila, 2004; Fernando et al., 2008; Vitell & Paolillo, 2003). In most 
studies, religiosity is negatively correlated with relativism (Chen & Liu, 2009; Barnett et 
al., 1996; Vitell & Paolillo, 2003 but see Fernando et al., 2008). Relativism also differs 
significantly between nations (Forsyth et al., 2008; Alas et al., 2010), with the East 
generally being more relativistic than the West (Forsyth et al., 2008). We see here that a 
very general but less biased conception of relativism yields a more nuanced view on folk 
moral relativism. We suggest that more elaborate scales could differentiate between 
normative and meta-ethical relativism, between cultural and individual relativism, and 
between extreme and moderate relativism. 
4.5.1.1.4 Moral heuristics 
Experimental philosophers have recently begun to examine individuals’ implicit moral 
heuristics by presenting them with scenarios and varying the relevant conditions 
therein. However, these studies mostly tap into meta-ethical commitments: participants 
are asked to assess the truth value of moral statements, rather than their judgments of 
right and wrong about diverging moral behavior (Sarkissian et al., forthcoming; 
Goodwin and Darley, 2008, 2010). While these studies offer preliminary indications that 
some individuals could be meta-ethical relativists, it would be useful to explicitly try to 
tap into implicit normative intuitions.  
A critique that might be raised is that researchers mostly study moral psychology by 
analyzing subjects’ explicit verbal reports of their reasoning while many moral 
psychologists now hold that moral behavior and moral judgment do not correlate with 
explicit reasoning (e.g., Haidt, 2001; interestingly, Piaget [1932] was already aware of 
this difficulty). On the other hand, explicit verbal reasoning is used to convince others 
about one’s moral judgments and to influence others’ moral behavior (also Haidt, 2001). 
This suggests that it is appropriate to approach the issue of folk morality from different 
angles: moral behavior, implicit moral judgments, and explicit moral reasoning.  
4.5.1.2 Development  
Many developmental studies are premised on the assumption that there is a 
moral/conventional distinction. These studies suggest that young children (ages 4-7) 
are non-relativists about morality (e.g., Nichols & Folds-Bennett, 2003; Wainryb et al., 
2004). However, some of the previously mentioned caveats are important, most notably 
that only a small number of typically moral items were tested (hitting, kicking, helping, 
and breaking another child’s toys). This raises the issue that a distinction should be 
made between extreme and moderate relativism. This distinction is even more 
important in light of Gabennesch’s critique on the development of the 
moral/conventional distinction. Gabennesch suggests that certain issues might be 
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relativized more easily than others. He reviews previous studies and notes that both 
moral and conventional transgressions are non-relativistically wrong for young 
children, while transgressions classified as conventional become relativistically wrong 
for older children. He also notes that some conventional transgressions are more likely 
than others to continue to be reified at a later age. This, he argues, is caused by their 
lack of transparency, the extent to which their human origins are visible for the subject. 
A range of factors influence a rule’s transparency. For example, a rule with which the 
child is familiar will be more transparent than a new one; a rule that applies only to 
certain groups or only in certain contexts will be more transparent; and so on. In 
accordance with this, it was found that non-relativism was not exclusive to moral issues 
(Nichols & Folds-Bennet, 2003; Wainryb, 2004). Given the previously stated critique 
(Section 4.4.1.1) that it should be up to the participant to explicitly classify rules as 
‘moral’ or ‘conventional,’ there are no sufficient grounds to conclude that only 
conventional rules can become relative, while moral rules cannot.  
Kelly et al. (2007) provide findings consonant with the suggestion that moral rules 
can be thought of as relative. They find that participants are indeed more likely to say 
that more historically and locally variable moral rules against slavery or cannibalism 
are ok or not depending on time and place. However, as Kelly et al. (2007) did not ask 
participants to justify their responses, we cannot know for certain how their findings, 
including order effects, articulate with folk moral relativism. Also, Nichols (2004) found 
in one study that moral non-objectivism was positively correlated with years spent in 
college. Moral non-objectivism being a function of education is consonant with the 
transparency hypothesis; nonetheless, more research is needed to establish a potential 
causal link between non-objectivism, relativism, and education. Moreover, this finding 
did not replicate in additional studies (id.). In short, preliminary data suggest that 
factors that have to do with the rule in question can interact with age or education to 
make a rule relative, independent of the rule being moral or conventional. While other 
factors undoubtedly matter in reifying rules (Shweder, 1990), Gabennesch’s critique is a 
promising one.  
4.5.2 Confidence 
Can empirical studies inform the philosophical discussion about moral confidence? In 
order to find out, we must know how philosophers understand moral confidence. Being 
motivated by moral commitments as such is a major aspect of moral confidence (Ruse, 
1986). Another aspect is that we do not cling to an “anything goes” philosophy or that 
flexibility does not make us indecisive (Wong, 2006), in sum, that we are still able to 
make consistent decisions in a specific direction. 
Research that makes use of Forsyth’s EPQ sheds light on the question of whether 
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moral confidence is undergirded by moral non-relativism. More relativistic adult U.S. 
consumers are less likely to find a range of consumer practices wrong (Vitell & Paolillo, 
2003). Practices examined concerned illegal behavior such as changing price tags as a 
consumer on consumer products, lying about a child’s age in order to get a lower price, 
not telling the truth when negotiating about the price of a car, and illegally copying 
computer software. Among marketing managers, those who score high on relativism 
have been found to think that ethics is less important for a firm’s long term plans (Vitell 
et al., 2003). Chinese managers are reportedly more favorable towards bribery and 
kickbacks if they score higher on relativism (Tian, 2008). In another study, relativists are 
shown to be more accepting of violating property rights (Winter et al., 2004). Business 
undergraduates at a U.S. university who score higher on relativism score lower on 
corporate social responsibility, the extent to which they take the wider social impact of 
their business into account instead of just caring about profits and stockholders 
(Kolodinsky et al., 2010). As for behavior, Forsyth (1980) and Forsyth and Berger (1982) 
did not find a relationship between ethical position and cheating behavior on a test. On 
the other hand, Indonesian consumers scoring high on relativism report being more 
likely to engage in questionable but legal activities, and being more likely to initiate an 
illegal activity from which they would benefit (Lu & Lu, 2010). In all this, it might be that 
moral confidence decreases relativism as well as the other way around. Fernando et al. 
(2008) find that relativist Australian managers score lower on the “corporate ethical 
values scale,” which measures the employee’s perceived ethical values in his company, 
and the authors hypothesize that corporate ethical values have a causal influence on 
relativism scores. 
The moral/conventional distinction is again important here. Relativism might lead us 
to being less motivated by morality, or it might make us indecisive about what values to 
follow because many conflicting actions have become legitimate. However, other 
motivations, for example, motivations to follow personal values, might remain intact. If 
moral relativists think of certain rules as less serious and more permissible than moral 
objectivists, we can say that moral relativists are less confident about those rules. 
Nichols (2004) categorized adult participants as moral objectivists if they said that there 
was no fact of the matter regarding a moral disagreement; otherwise, they were 
classified as moral objectivists. Both groups had to complete a moral/conventional task. 
Nichols found that both objectivists and non-objectivists made a distinction between 
moral and conventional rules in regard to permissibility (for three of the four studies 
conducted) and seriousness (for all four replications). However, in all four studies, non-
objectivists found moral transgressions less serious (but equally permissible) than 
objectivists, suggesting a negative relationship between relativism and confidence. 
In conclusion, most results are in accordance with moral relativism being negatively 
correlated with moral confidence in three ways: perceived seriousness of moral 
transgressions, judging a wide range of immoral behaviors to be wrong, and acting 
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morally. Nonetheless, these studies do not inform us much regarding the direction of 
causality, which could go both ways – as such, philosophers’ intuitions that relativism 
correlates with decreased confidence might reflect an existing correlation, but with the 
causal arrows going from confidence to relativism instead of the other way around. 
Also; these studies do not make a distinction between different kinds of moral 
relativism. Here, it would be of interest for philosophical theories to develop a 
relativism scale that taps into more pragmatist accounts of moral reasoning. 
4.5.3 Accommodation 
Accommodation is about more than merely relativizing one’s moral judgments. Wong 
(2006) also urges us to accept diverging moral views, internalize others’ values and 
incorporate them into our lives. But can we indeed fully understand moral views that 
we did not accept before?  
Schwartz (1994) reviews the content of moral values and universal aspects in this 
regard. He finds that, if only for methodological reasons, one cannot find universal 
aspects in the content of moral values. Nonetheless, there is near universality in a small 
subset of values and, importantly, there is considerable evidence that many people can 
come to recognize the worth of values from different cultures when they did not 
recognize these before. 
Graham, Haidt and Nosek (2009) equally find that harm and justice are generally 
acknowledged as morally relevant. However, there is much disagreement about the 
moral relevance of authority, loyalty and purity. It is as yet an open question if someone 
can come to understand and incorporate the value of disgust where one did not do so 
before.  
4.5.4 Toleration: non-interference and respect 
We mentioned philosophers who argue that toleration – not interfering with behavior 
that one judges to be morally wrong – is psychologically unstable. The purported reason 
is that a moral judgment involves the desire to regulate others’ behavior – indeed, some 
moral sentiments function to regulate others’ behavior rather than one’s own (see 
Chapter 2) . There are different gradations of intervention, and openly judging an act 
may in itself partially inhibit others from performing the given act. Also, even in the 
case where judgments are kept private, studies suggest that people prefer to distance 
themselves from others who hold diverging moral beliefs. Haidt et al. (2003) found that 
participants preferred roommates who held similar political and moral views. They 
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were much more willing to have more moral variation in a classroom seminar, and 
slightly less at the university as a whole. Other kinds of diversity (e.g., demographic) 
were much more readily accepted in roommates. This was partly replicated by Wright et 
al. (2008), whose study we discussed in Section 4.4.1. Participants were less accepting of 
someone as a potential roommate who differed in moral issues, than of encountering a 
morally disagreeing person in a seminar or at the university as a whole. Participants 
were also less accepting of encountering someone who disagreed on moral issues than 
when encountering someone who differed on non-moral issues. They also found that 
participants would sit farther away from, and more turned away from, a discussion 
partner who disagreed on a moral issue than a discussion partner who disagreed on a 
conventional issue. Other subtle changes in behavior occur: participants in an 
experimental setting gave fewer raffle tickets to a student whom they thought 
disagreed with them on moral attitudes than they gave to a student who was said to 
disagree on non-moral attitudes (Wright et al., 2008). This indicates that, at least at the 
interpersonal level, the requirement of toleration may run counter to subtle 
discriminatory mechanisms such as shunning and excluding. These processes will 
obviously not occur between groups that do not intimately interact in the first place, 
thus intergroup toleration seems more feasible than intragroup toleration.  
Nonetheless, Lester and Roberts (2009) noticed that even when participants claimed 
to tolerate behavior that was symbolic of a worldview they did not agree with, people 
were less willing to defend the rights of groups with which they did not agree. However, 
after taking a course on the seven major world religions, students claimed to be more 
willing to defend the rights of suppressed groups and to allow individuals from all other 
worldviews to execute their rights. This effect was slight, but significant. It is hard to 
know whether participants’ self-reports reflect their actual behavior, but explicitly 
formulated judgments might have a general effect on one’s own and others’ behavior 
(see also Haidt, 2001).  
The possibility of toleration might depend on the principles in question, and the 
relativism or age of actors. In observations of naturally-occurring behavior among 7 to 
14 year old children in Chicago, Nucci and Nucci (1982) find that moral transgressions 
elicited more retaliatory actions than did conventional transgressions; however, 
conventional transgressions elicited more ridicule than did moral transgressions, and 
there were no differences in threats and commands to stop the act between the two 
kinds of transgressions. There were no main age effects for retaliation, threat, ridicule 
or command. Smetana (1981) asked 2 to 9 year old children if perpetrators deserved 
punishment and how much (none, a little or a lot). She found that moral transgressions 
were deemed more punishable than conventional transgressions. Hollos, Leis and Turiel 
(1986) tested 8-18 year old Nigerians and found that these participants wanted an 
authority figure to react to moral transgression by flogging the transgressor. However, 
in line with the previously discussed age differences, 8-11 year old subjects thought that 
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conventional transgressions should be punished by flogging, while 15-18 year old 
subjects gave this response significantly less often. These findings suggest that both 
moral and conventional transgressions do elicit interference from children and 
adolescents, be it in the form of punishment, retaliation, ridicule, threats, or commands. 
However, since it is likely that moral transgressions are less tolerated than conventional 
transgressions, it is also likely that, mediated by age, relativized moral judgments will 
elicit less punishment than universal or objective moral judgments. 
Similar age differences are evident in the realm of respect. Here we have to ask how 
people judge others with whom they morally disagree, as a person, as opposed to 
judging their moral opinions. In Section 4.5.1.1.2, we discussed the study of Wainryb et 
al (2004), conducted among 5 to 9 year old children. The moral issues used were 
breaking other children’s toys and kicking other children. The children used positive 
descriptors to describe the characters who expressed divergent beliefs bearing on taste, 
ambiguous facts, and facts, but they described as bad characters those who expressed 
divergent moral beliefs. Regardless of the realm of disagreement, 7 to 9 year olds 
described disagreeing characters as nice or normal more often than did 5 year olds, but 
this was mostly caused by age differences in the non-moral domains. Enright and 
Lapsley (1981) presented a short vignette to adults, students from grades 3 to 12, and 
college students, and asked for their judgment about a moral dilemma. They then 
confronted participants with an audio-taped peer stating the opposite judgment. 
Participants could then choose what they thought about the other person. Possible 
items were “The other does not seem to be a predominantly good person but there is 
some good in everyone” (level 1), “The other is probably as good a person as anyone 
else” (level 2) and “I cannot tell what kind of a person the other is until I know much 
more about the other’s beliefs” (level 3). The authors found that college students were 
most likely to agree with level 3-like items, denoting that one can judge others, but not 
based on only this one moral belief; adults (older than college students but matched on 
amount of education) scored slightly lower than college students. This indicates that 
character judgments are initially linked to moral belief judgments, and that respect 
increases with age or education, regardless of the realm of disagreement. This is also 
analogous to the preliminary finding that education is positively related to relativism 
(see Section 4.4.1). Again, we conclude that factors that have to do with the rule in 
question could make diversity more or less difficult to respect.  
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4.6 Conclusions 
Naturalist philosophers welcome empirical evidence to constrain or support theories of 
normative relativism and toleration. An important critique against all versions of 
normative relativism holds that individuals think of morality as non-relative, therefore 
it is not feasible to impose normative relativism as a requirement. At first sight, results 
from moral psychology inspired by Kohlberg and findings from domain theory, indeed 
suggest that morality is inherently non-relative: children and adults are non-relativists 
about moral rules, and they only relativize rules that are not in the moral domain. 
However, a closer look suggests that skepticism is in order, as much of moral 
psychology defines morality as non-relative, either implicitly or explicitly. 
Subsequently, no measures are taken to independently decide whether or not 
participants’ moral reasoning is at work. As such, no relative rule will ever be described 
under the headings of moral psychology. While it might well be the case that people are 
moral non-relativists, the methods employed in most of this research are biased against 
finding moral relativist leanings.  
Other traditions, for example research making use of the Ethics Position 
Questionnaire, do find diversity in moral views. Moral relativism is less abundant in the 
West and among religious people, and it may decline with age among adults (but may 
increase with children’s development). Promising possibilities of folk moral relativism 
can also be found in moral development research and studies that are critical of 
mainstream interpretations of the moral/conventional distinction. Older children treat 
a wider range of rules as relative than do younger children. Assuming that some of these 
rules might be categorized as moral by the children themselves, children might become 
more relativistic in the course of moral development (though for adults age is 
negatively related to relativism as measured by the EPQ). The relativity of moral rules 
might also depend on the specific properties of the rule, most notably the degree to 
which their human origins are transparent. In all of this, we have to keep in mind that it 
is unlikely that people are extreme moral relativists. Therefore, it is important to test 
participants on a range of issues. Here, the lack of an encompassing theory of folk moral 
relativism makes it difficult to predict what moral rules are likely to be relativized and 
who will be what kind of moral relativist.  
The second worry is that we need the idea that morality is objective in order to have 
confidence in our moral values. Some results are in accordance with moral relativism 
being negatively correlated with moral confidence as measured by perceived 
seriousness of moral transgressions and judging moral behavior. However, researchers 
have yet to explore the relationship between moral relativism and actual behavior. 
Moreover, these studies do not inform us much regarding the direction of causality, 
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which could go either way – as such, philosophers’ intuitions that relativism correlates 
with decreased confidence might reflect an existing correlation, but with the causal 
arrows going from confidence to relativism instead of the other way around. More 
research on this topic is clearly necessary. 
A third constraint is linked to the requirement of toleration: judging an action to be 
wrong purportedly implies that we are motivated to stop the action or disrespect the 
individual. Studies do find a link between moral condemnation and interference; this 
speaks against toleration as a feasible strategy towards much of moral diversity. 
However, we find the same moderating factors for toleration and respect as for moral 
relativism – age (development in children) and education seem to impact one’s capacity 
to tolerate and respect certain other ways of life. Interestingly, in these studies, 
researchers did not ask participants if they condemned the behavior. Instead, they first 
collected participants’ moral judgments and then confronted them with someone 
holding a conflicting view. This means that the participants might have been relativists. 
As such, they would not have condemned the view but relativized their judgments. Now, 
we cannot speak of toleration for a particular action when participants judge that action 
as permissible relative to the agent. Namely, toleration is defined as not interfering with 
what one considers to be wrong. This should not distract us though: practically, we are 
interested in non-interference and respect, irrespective of the accompanying judgment. 
This leads to the possibility that relativism is linked to non-interference and respect, 
even though toleration is a paradoxical concept. This speculation is somewhat 
substantiated by the fact that relativism as well as interference and respect are 
mediated by the same factors. 
Findings to date also suggest that distance, operationalized as the amount of intimate 
interaction, can be a mediating factor in the kinds of possible interference. Moral 
diversity is not desired in intimate contexts, and individuals ‘distance’ themselves from 
those holding other moral views. This can make moral diversity in an intimate context 
problematic. This can also create groups, and exacerbate moral diversity between 
groups. In turn, moral diversity between groups likely falls prey to problems, such as 
structural discrimination and political inequality. However, the problems that confront 
within-group disagreement (shunning) are different than the problems that befall 
between-group disagreement (structural discrimination). This suggests the need to 
distinguish between cultural and individual moral diversity. 
We therefore arrive at the following circumspect conclusions. Major traditions in the 
empirical literature seem to support the view that morality is intuitively thought of as 
objective. However, a closer reading indicates that caution is in order here. It is indeed 
unlikely that people are extreme moral relativists, meaning that no moral rules are 
thought of as objective or universal. However, this should not be taken as implying that 
moral rules are intrinsically non-relative: there are both individual differences and 
properties of the rules themselves that influence whether or not a rule is thought of as 
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relative. Results indicate that, in the course of moral development, children might 
become more relativistic. More transparent rules might be more likely to become 
relativized. In order to relativize a rule, one might try to clarify its functionality. In sum, 
it is likely that many people are, or can be, moderate moral relativists. However, this 
might come at the cost of increased permissiveness towards a range of immoral acts and 
decreased perceived importance of ethics. 
We shortly visited the paradox of toleration. Indeed, condemnation seems 
consistently linked to punishment and interference. However, non-interference and 
respect are also mediated by age and education. We do not know if this was linked to 
moral condemnation as researchers supposed participants generalized their moral 
judgments. It could be that non-interference and respect can be elicited by moral 
relativism. This question is worth pursuing empirically.  
All in all, this is a relatively underexplored field, both in empirical work and in 
philosophical theories. We argue that empiricists can learn from philosophers when 
investigating folk moral relativism. Future research would provide a clearer portrait of 
the nature and extent of folk moral relativism were investigators to adopt some rules of 
thumb. First, participants should always be asked to categorize events as moral or non-
moral instead of leaving this categorization solely to the researchers. Second, a 
distinction should be made between the extremes of individual and cultural relativism. 
Preliminary evidence indicates that adults are more likely to tolerate cultural than 
individual diversity. Since this is an important philosophical and social distinction, it is 
one of the mediating factors that deserve empirical attention. Third, we would urge 
researchers to investigate the development of relativism for ‘transparent’ moral issues, 
such as gender discrimination, hierarchy, inequality, or modes of punishment. One 
should take into account that relativism most likely does not mean extreme relativism. 
Finally, investigators should probe implicit heuristics as well as explicit reasoning and 
behavior. Behavior is also of primary importance for discussions surrounding 
confidence and toleration. Lastly, studies in which participants are asked to evaluate the 
person and her rights as well as her behavior are particularly informative for the notion 
of respect.  
In contrast to the diversity of philosophical perspectives being developed on these 
issues, most empirical researchers have been, and continue to be, deeply influenced by 
modern Western moral philosophies; as such they conceptualize morality as objective. 
Due to its influence on methodological design, this perspective then biases empirical 
findings accordingly. Similarly, most empirical research that addresses relativism, 
objectivity, or universalism does so in broad categorical fashion, ignoring philosophers’ 
distinctions between different kinds of moral relativism, and this despite the fact that at 
least some of the empirical findings to date indicate that such distinctions should be 
taken seriously. It is time that, on the one hand, more philosophers recognize the 
empirical nature of much of the discussion surrounding relativism, and, on the other 
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hand, moral psychologists question their conceptual assumptions. Awareness of both 
existing findings and lacunae therein should invite philosophers to become more 
familiar with the empirical literature at hand; it should also invite more empiricists to 
directly address the question of folk moral relativism without presupposing it.  
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5.1 Introduction 
In chapter four, we gave arguments for and against normative moral relativism and 
toleration. On the one hand, certain authors argue that toleration is valuable (e.g., 
Wong, 1984) or that one should relativize moral judgments about others in order to 
accommodate different moral views (Wong, 2006). On the other hand, relativizing one’s 
moral judgments might be constrained because of aspects of individuals’ moral 
cognition. Certain authors argue for the inability to see moral rules as variable and 
relative to a moral framework (e.g., Ruse, 1986). If we consider a rule to be relative, it 
ceases to be a moral rule, we might become less confident about how to act and we 
might become more permissive towards a range of objectionable acts. In this chapter we 
focus on the objection that we cannot relativize moral judgments.  
At present, empirical research does not allow us to conclude that relativizing moral 
judgments is impossible. Nonetheless, major research traditions in psychology converge 
on a view of morality as objective and universal. We have seen that there is a 
widespread conviction that people distinguish moral from conventional events, that is, 
between, on the one hand, acts that are generalizably wrong and wrong because they go 
against universal principles of harm, justice or rights, and, on the other hand, acts that 
are variably right or wrong depending on the social context. This debate has figured 
prominently in the empirical literature regarding the moral/conventional distinction, 
in particular studies following Turiel’s (1983) seminal work The development of social 
knowledge.  
However, we have also seen that research on the moral/conventional distinction is 
biased. First, the experimental paradigm often reveals little about moral relativism, and, 
second, the methods used in these studies will fail to detect moral relativism when it 
occurs. Where less biased research is conducted, there is no clear delineation of moral 
rules as perceived as universal.  
Still, the idea of core moral issues is widespread and has not often been challenged: 
The idea remains that harmful acts are perceived to be universalizably or generalizably 
morally wrong. In this view, moral universalism could be inherent to certain moral 
issues without necessarily being inherent to other moral issues. Nonetheless, Kelly et al. 
(2007) suggested that even core moral issues such as harm do not reliably elicit other 
moral features. Their study quickly met with counter-criticism (Sousa, Holbrook, & 
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Piazza, 2009). Then again, the ensuing discussion revealed that there is much ambiguity 
over how the moral/conventional claim ought to be interpreted or tested (Stich, Fessler, 
& Kelly, 2009).  
In this chapter we revisit the question of the extent to which people think of harmful 
transgressions as generalizably wrong and wrong because they go against universal 
principles. We discuss two prominent properties addressed in the moral/conventional 
literature, namely generalizability and justification. Additionally, we revisit certain 
criticisms of the moral/conventional task and lay out our concerns about most existing 
methods. Subsequently, modifying previous methods (Kelly et al., 2007), we report new 
findings on lay people’s commitments in regard to the distinction between moral and 
conventional transgressions. The results reveal that people do not always think of 
harmful transgressions as generalizably wrong because of universal principles. We 
finally discuss the importance of these findings in light of recent criticisms of 
moral/conventional research and in light of the question of the practical feasibility of 
relativizing moral judgments.  
5.2 Methodological criticism of the moral/conventional 
distinction 
In chapter four, we discussed several problems that plagued the theory that postulates 
the existence of a moral/conventional tradition. We also saw that methodological 
problems plagued research into the moral/conventional distinction, most notably the 
following two: First, whether intentionally or not, researchers may choose only the 
most unambiguous transgressions, leaving unexamined a potentially large class of 
transgressions that do not elicit a signature response pattern where one would 
nonetheless theoretically predict one. When researchers do employ a wider range of 
transgressions, the results do not support this postulated clear-cut distinction 
(Huebner, Lee, & Hauser, 2010; Nichols, 2002, 2004). Second, when testing individuals 
from diverse backgrounds, the same transgression might elicit considerably different 
features in different individuals or cultures (Nichols, 2004; Shweder, Mahapatra, & 
Miller, 1987; Wright, Cullum, & Schwab, 2008). All this could mean that no feature 
reliably predicts the occurrence of another feature, and that we cannot predict which 
issues will elicit the moral response pattern and which will elicit the conventional 
response pattern. 
The case of the drunken sailor 
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Nevertheless, until fairly recently, the finding that harm transgressions elicit the 
signature moral response pattern had been relatively robust, suggesting that harmful 
interactions tap into a core moral domain (e.g., see (Royzman, Leeman, & Baron, 2009). 
However, Kelly et al. (2007) point out that many studies of adults use playground 
transgressions, that is, transgressions that spontaneously occurred on school or 
kindergarten playgrounds, such as pushing a child. Kelly et al. (2007) therefore decided 
to conduct a survey with more adult, and more variable, harm transgressions, such as 
whipping as a punishment, slavery, and physical abuse as part of a military training. 
Consider the following example (Kelly et al., 2007): 
In the United States, slaves were an important part of the economy of the South 
200 years ago. American slaves were used mainly to maintain households, and to 
supply agricultural labor. 
 
Was it OK for Americans to keep slaves 200 years ago? (Yes/No) 
 
On a scale from 0 to 9, how would you rate the Americans’ behavior? (0=not at all 
bad; 9=very bad) 
Kelly et al. (2007) then present participants with another scenario: 
In ancient Greece and Rome, slaves were an important part of the economic and 
social system. Greek and Roman slaves were used as oarsmen, as soldiers, to 
maintain households, and to supply agricultural labor. 
 
Was it OK for the ancient Greeks and Romans to keep slaves? (Yes/No) 
 
On a scale from 0 to 9, how would you rate the ancient Greeks and Romans’ 
behavior? (0=not at all bad; 9=very bad) 
Note that this method is slightly different from classical moral/conventional tasks in 
that it does not ask a generalizability question but instead introduces a second, related 
scenario. This generalizability scenario describes the same act in a different social context, 
before asking if the act would be OK then and there (permissibility question); the 
generalizability scenario and accompanying questions thus constitute the generalizability 
probe. We will refer to the other scenario as the neutral scenario. Order was randomized 
for these two scenarios. The aim was to see if participants perceived the wrongness of 
slavery as generalizable or dependent on the social context and authority. The authors 
found that slavery was not consistently perceived as generalizably wrong: while most 
participants deemed it wrong in the U.S. South 200 years ago, fewer participants 
deemed it wrong for ancient Greece and Rome. Kelly et al. (2007) also explored other 
harm transgressions. In general, they found that their harm transgressions were often 
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not deemed generalizably wrong, nor did they evoke highly authority-independent 
response patterns. They conclude that this casts doubt on whether harm transgressions 
evoke the moral response pattern. 
Sousa et al. (2009) replicated this study. For one scenario (whipping generality, see 
Section 5.3), they found a much larger percentage of participants that considered the 
harmful act to be generalizably wrong, thus raising doubts about the robustness of 
previous findings, and reinstating the hypothesis that harmful acts are uniformly 
viewed as generalizably wrong. In this study, we pursued this question further, asking 
whether or not harmful acts are indeed generalizably wrong. We adapted the ‘whipping 
generalizability’ scenario in line with theoretical concerns (see Section 5.3), and 
administered it to a large online sample of participants. 
Sousa et al. (2009) criticize Kelly et al. (2007) for (among other things) not asking 
participants to justify their answers. Permissibility answers should not be taken at face 
value, they argue: Even response patterns that apparently disconfirm the 
moral/conventional distinction may be driven by rationales that confirm the 
moral/conventional distinction. Sousa et al. (2009) indeed report participants’ 
justifications, but their sample sizes were too small to yield reliable conclusions. 
Because Kelly et al. (2007) did not ask participants to justify their answers, it is an open 
question as to what rationales participants would have given in their study. We 
therefore added justification questions to the survey design.  
In the next section, we address an additional, related difficulty in 
moral/conventional studies, namely, the problem of biased generalizability probes. We 
also clarify which justifications we take to disconfirm the moral/conventional 
distinction. 
5.3 Problems plaguing measures of generalizability 
Though intended to cast a stark light on methodological problems plaguing previous 
moral/conventional tasks, in one important respect, the Kelly et al. (2007) study 
extended such problems rather than solving them. Specifically, we contend that both i) 
the types of generalizability questions traditionally employed, and ii) the 
generalizability scenarios used by Kelly et al. (2007) and Sousa et al. (2009), are highly 
ambiguous and likely to introduce measurement bias. Related to the remark by Sousa et 
al. (2009), participants might indeed introduce several non-moral and moral 
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assumptions that influence their answers. In contrast to Sousa et al. (2009) however, it is 
not only the non-moral considerations that we are concerned about.  
Let us first address rationales that are related to the moral domain. Consider again 
the slavery scenario. Though most participants deemed slavery wrong in the United 
States, substantially fewer participants thought slavery was wrong in ancient Greece 
and Rome. This is contrary to what moral/conventional theory would predict, namely 
that participants would judge slavery as wrong in the U.S. South because it was harmful, 
and wrong in ancient Greece and Rome because it was also harmful. However, in this 
scenario many factors varied between the neutral scenario and the generalizability 
scenario, and this variation may have driven the patterns of participants’ responses. For 
example, given cultural schemas that, on the one hand, highlight the horrific aspects of 
American slavery and, on the other hand, valorize ancient Greece and Rome as the 
origins of Western civilization it is likely that the average well-educated Westerner 
assumes that slaves in the U.S. South suffered greater physical harm than did slaves in 
ancient Greece and Rome; that slaves in ancient Greece and Rome had more rights than 
slaves in the U.S. South; and so on. Compared to associations attending schemas of 
ancient Greece and Rome, systematic associations between slavery in the U.S. South and 
more harmful, and thus morally worse, conditions could readily account for differences 
in the frequency of ‘not OK’ judgments across the two conditions.  
Analogous biases may have been present in the whipping generalizability scenario. In 
this scenario, a sailor is drunk while he should have been on watch; the ship’s officer 
therefore punishes him by giving him five lashes with a whip. In the neutral scenario, all 
this happens on a large modern American cargo ship in 2004. In the generalizability 
scenario, this happens on a ship where whipping is common practice, in accord with the 
law, and deemed appropriate by everyone. Problematically, however, the 
generalizability scenario differed from the neutral scenario in other, important ways, 
namely it took place on an (unspecified) cargo ship 300 years ago. However, 300 years 
ago was a different time than now, and not whipping sailors might have had different 
moral consequences. Being drunk on duty could have made the ship vulnerable to the 
attacks of cruel one-eyed pirates that hardly exist these days (so participants may 
think). Participants may assume that the average modern American would not need to 
be whipped to remain disciplined; in contrast, sailors 300 years ago might surely have 
needed harsher measures (because they, for all the participants know, could be unruly 
vagabonds from the American South transporting slaves).  
In sum, in these scenarios, the same act was depicted in the generalizability scenario 
and in the neutral scenario. However, the time and place of the act differed in such a 
way that the consequences of the act in the generalizability scenario might have been 
systematically more moral than the consequences of the act in the neutral scenario. 
This difference may have driven the increase in the percentage of participants evincing 
the ‘conventional’ response pattern in response to a moral transgression. Conceivably, 
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this problem might have been mitigated somewhat by asking participants to justify 
their permissibility answers, as Sousa et al. (2009) note. However, it is unlikely that, in 
response to an open question, participants will articulate every reason that plays a role 
in their judgment, especially if the questions and scenarios are vague and subject to 
myriad interpretations and associations. A better strategy would be to design a 
generalizability probe with fewer confounds.  
A related problem of ambiguity arises with the generalizability question in the 
classical moral/conventional task. Often, the feature of generalizability is assessed by 
merely asking a simple question, for example, whether the act would still be wrong 
somewhere else, where everyone else did it (Huebner et al., 2010). Above, we suggested 
that participants may consistently associate the generalizability scenarios in Kelly et al. 
(2007) with more positive ideas than the neutral scenario, where both scenarios described 
the same moral transgression. Correspondingly, in the classical moral/conventional task, 
the same generalizability question may be interpreted differently when asked about a moral 
transgression than when asked about a different, conventional transgression. Before we 
clarify in what way interpretations of this generalizability question could be biased, it is 
important to first explain what, exactly, should vary in the generalizability questions, 
and what should stay the same. 
It is clear from previous theoretical and empirical work that, according to 
moral/conventional theory, moral transgressions are perceived as wrong independent 
of convention, and that this can be tested by asking a generalizability question. As we 
have seen in chapter 4, conventions address an implicit behavioral uniformity or an 
explicit regulation with a social function. Conventions can be altered by consensus or by 
general usage (Turiel, 1983, p. 35). With this description in mind, we find ample 
illustrations that generalizability probes should vary convention: Turiel (1983, p. 35) 
explicitly mentions that “moral issues are not perceived as relative to the social 
context;” for example, “an individual’s perception of an act such as the taking of a life as 
a transgression is not contingent on the presence of a rule” (ibid.); or, consider the 
following telling statement: “today one would not say that slavery was morally right in 
the 1800s but morally wrong now simply because of a change in the consensus” (id., p. 
36); or, when Turiel refers to Dworkin’s example of a moral transgression: “The 
vegetarian’s claim, according to Dworkin, is that in spite of a lack of consensus and 
irrespective of its widespread practice, it is wrong to kill animals for food” (id.). 
The importance of varying convention in the moral/conventional task is also 
supported by other authors. Smetana (1981, p. 1333) states that “transgressions that are 
consistently evaluated as (…) universally wrong, even in the absence of rules, have been 
considered moral events” (our emphasis). Royzman (2009, p. 160) asserts that “the 
prototypically immoral acts are generally judged inappropriate even when subjects are 
instructed to consider the performance of these acts under a set of counterfactual 
conditions designed to negate their status as a breach of the established socio-conventional 
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order” (our emphasis). He clarifies the kind of questions that constitute good probes for 
distinguishing moral from conventional transgressions: “Thus (…) a subject may be 
invited to imagine that there is no rule against the act, that the act has been permitted 
by a legitimate authority or that the act is a matter of general agreement” (ibidem). As 
such, generalizability, rule alterability, and authority dependence are all meant to vary 
convention. 
The fact that various concepts are related to the notion of convention also explains 
why different generalizability questions have been employed in the moral/conventional 
task, as they each probe for a specific aspect of convention. Huebner et al. (2010) ask 
their participants if the act would still be wrong if X lived somewhere where everyone 
else did this; this changes the existence of a ‘behavioral uniformity.’ Smetana (1981) asks 
if it would be OK if there were no rule about it, thus varying ‘explicit regulations.’ And 
the questions in Royzman et al. (2009) vary social norms: “Suppose that there were NO 
social norms against [the behavior];” “Suppose that the majority of people in this 
country decided that [the behavior] was OK;” “Suppose that the majority of people in 
another country decided that [the behavior] was OK. Suppose that Julie and Mark were 
born, raised and lived in this other country...” 
While these questions indeed vary some aspects of convention, they leave it to the 
imagination of the participant what other aspects of the situation would vary or stay the 
same. For example, while Huebner’s generalizability question clearly induces 
participants to think about a place where all children hit other children for fun, it is 
unspecified if, in this other place, children consent to being hit, or are also allowed by 
their teachers to hit other children for fun. In this example, most participants will 
probably assume that, even if hitting is the general practice in a school in another place 
and time, the teachers will still forbid it, or it will still be against general consensus. In 
that case, though, we cannot exclude the possibility that participants still condemn the 
moral transgression – even at another time and place where everyone else does it – 
because it is nonetheless against explicit rules or against an implicit consensus. In 
contrast, in the case of the conventional transgression, in places where every child puts 
their toys away wherever they found them, it is at least somewhat likely that ‘putting 
toys away where you found them’ is part of the prevailing convention (thus consented 
and not against the rules). Some other examples of moral transgressions that have been 
used are “a child throwing water at another child,” (Smetana, 1981), and an angry 
student driving his car through a crowded area on the college campus trying to hit 
people,” (Huebner et al., 2010). Examples of conventional transgressions are “a child not 
saying grace before snack,” (Smetana, 1981), and “getting the waiter’s attention by 
yelling across the room” (Huebner et al., 2010). In all of these cases, it is conceivable that 
the moral transgression will be at odds with aspects of the prevailing convention, even 
where ‘everyone else does it,’ or ‘where there is no rule about it.’ When thinking about a 
place or time where people tend to hit others with their car, participants conceivably 
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think about a place and time where this is nonetheless against explicit rules or against 
an implicit consensus. In contrast, in the conventional scenarios, it is somewhat likely 
that there is no rule about the given action in those places where everyone else does it. 
When thinking about a context where everybody yells to get the waiter’s attention, one 
is likely to think that there are also no expectations or rules about more subtle behavior. 
In sum, the moral transgressions that have been used in moral/conventional studies are 
plausibly transgressions that are also generalizably conventionally wrong. Hence, even 
when varying one aspect of convention due to a generalizability question, other aspects 
of convention might still be at odds with the moral transgression. As a consequence, 
such moral/conventional tasks do not effectively test the moral/conventional 
distinction. To be effective, the generalizability probe must vary every aspect of the 
prevailing convention for the conventional and the moral transgression, not simply for 
the former. This lack of symmetry across the testing conditions may partly explain the 
difference in response patterns in previous moral/conventional studies, as the methods 
employed make it impossible to rule out the possibility that moral transgressions are 
deemed generalizably wrong because they happen to be generalizably against 
convention.  
To address this problem, we modified the ‘whipping generalizability’ scenario from 
Kelly et al. (2007) in such a way that the generalizability probe describes the same act, in 
the same moral circumstances, occurring in a situation where this act is entirely in 
accord with convention. 
5.3.1 The present study 
5.3.1.1 Hypotheses  
The moral/conventional theory predicts that moral transgressions elicit the moral 
response pattern. In our understanding, this means that under similar moral 
circumstances, harmful transgressions will be thought of as wrong; that this will be true 
even when the given actions are in accord with convention; and that their wrongness 
will be justified by referring to universal principles of harm, justice or rights.  
We expected that carefully designed, less biased scenarios and questions, would 
disconfirm the moral/conventional theory. As mentioned, we therefore modified a 
scenario (whipping generalizability) from Kelly et al. (2007) in three important ways. 
First, we structure each version of the scenario so as to explicitly vary the 
conventionality of the act without varying the moral consequences. In line with 
previous studies (Kelly et al., 2007 and Sousa et al., 2009), we expected that some 
participants would evince a moral response pattern while others will evince a 
conventional response pattern in reaction to harmful transgressions. The first 
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prediction is that there will be an effect of convention on the permissibility of a harmful 
act: harmful acts that are in accord with convention will more often be considered 
permissible than harmful acts that are not in accord with convention. Such a pattern 
would constitute provisional disconfirmation of the moral/conventional theory. 
Second, we included a justification question in order to allow us to control for 
differences in participants’ underlying rationales and assumptions. The second 
prediction was that there would be an effect of provisional response patterns on 
justifications given. We predicted that participants who evince a conventional response 
pattern would more frequently justify their answers by referring to those matters of 
convention that are explicated in the scenarios when compared to participants who 
evince a moral response pattern. Conversely, participants who evinced a moral response 
pattern would justify their responses by referring to universal principles of harm, 
justice or rights more frequently than participants who evinced a conventional 
response pattern.  
Third, in order to test the presumption that previous investigators’ generalizability 
questions employed moral transgressions that were biased towards also being 
generalizably unconventional, we introduced two versions of the moral/conventional 
test. In one version, we explicitly varied two aspects of convention: consensus and 
common practice. In the second version, we only mentioned and varied one aspect of 
convention, namely common practice. These versions are otherwise identical. 
Participants are randomly assigned to either version 1 or version 2. The third prediction 
is thus that there will be an effect of version on provisional response patterns: In 
version 1, more participants will evince a conventional response pattern than in version 
2, as participants presented with version 2 − which parallels prior investigators’ tasks − 
will be more prone to assume that the harmful act is also against prevailing convention 
than will participants presented with version 1. 
5.3.1.2 Stimuli 
The scenarios are schematically described below. For a literal transcript of the scenarios 
and questions, see Appendix 3. We here present version 1; version 2 is the same as 
version 1 except that we only vary one aspect of convention: the portion of version 1 
that we here display in italics is omitted in version 2.  
Each version consists of two scenarios describing the same act (whipping a sailor). In 
one scenario, whipping is not in accord with prevailing convention, while in the other 
scenario whipping is in accord with convention. We therefore speak of the discordant 
(cf. ‘neutral’) and concordant (cf. ‘generalizability’) scenario. Relevant differences 
between the discordant scenario and the concordant scenario are to be found in the 
second paragraph of the scenario. In order to ensure that concern with issues of legality 
would not influence participants’ responses, all scenarios explicitly stated that the acts 
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described were not illegal. Order of scenarios (discordant versus concordant) was 
randomized.  
5.3.1.2.1 Discordant scenario (harmful act not in accordance with convention) 
Mr. Johnson is an officer on a cargo ship in 2010, carrying goods along the Atlantic 
coastline. All the crew members are American but the ship is mostly in 
international waters. When a ship is in international waters, it has to follow the 
law of the state whose flag it sails under and each ship can sail under only one 
flag. This ship does not sail under the U.S. flag. The law of this ship’s flag state 
allows both whipping and food deprivation as a punishment.  
 
On this ship, food deprivation is always used to discipline sailors who disobey 
orders or who are drunk on duty; as a consequence everyone on this ship has come to 
think that food deprivation is an appropriate punishment. Whipping however is never 
used to discipline sailors and no one on this ship thinks whipping is an appropriate 
punishment.  
 
One night, while the ship is in international waters, Mr. Johnson finds a sailor 
drunk at a time when the sailor should have been on watch. After the sailor sobers 
up, Mr. Johnson punishes the sailor by giving him 5 lashes with a whip. This does 
not go against the law of the flag state. 
Participants answered the following permissibility and justification questions: 
Is it morally permissible for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor?  
(1) Yes, it is morally permissible 
(2) Yes, it is morally permissible but it is wrong for reasons that have nothing to do 
with morality (e.g., it might be unlawful) 
(3) No, it is morally wrong (whether it is right or wrong in other ways or not) 
Why is it morally permissible/wrong for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? Please 
briefly list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 1. 
(Write a minimum of one word.) 
5.3.1.2.2 Concordant scenario (harmful act in accordance with convention) 
Mr. Williams is an officer on another cargo ship in 2010, carrying goods along the 
Atlantic coastline. All the crew members are American but the ship is mostly in 
international waters. When a ship is in international waters, it has to follow the 
law of the state whose flag it sails under and each ship can sail under only one 
flag. This ship does not sail under the U.S. flag. The law of this ship’s flag state 
allows both whipping and food deprivation as a punishment.  
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On this ship, whipping is always used to discipline sailors who disobey orders or 
who are drunk on duty; as a consequence everyone on this ship has come to think that 
whipping is an appropriate punishment. Food deprivation however is never used to 
discipline sailors and no one on this ship thinks food deprivation is an appropriate 
punishment.  
 
One night, while the ship is in international waters, Mr. Williams finds a sailor 
drunk at a time when the sailor should have been on watch. After the sailor sobers 
up, Mr. Johnson punishes the sailor by giving him 5 lashes with a whip. This does 
not go against the law of the flag state. 
Participants again answered the permissibility and justification questions. 
5.3.1.3 Participants 
From December 2010 to January 2011 we recruited participants using Amazon.com’s 
Mechanical Turk web-based employment system (hereafter MTurk). MTurk is a 
‘crowdsourcing’ website that allows people to perform short tasks for small amounts of 
money. Anyone over 18 may use the site. This study was deemed exempt from ethical 
review by the UCLA Institutional Review Board. After discarding incomplete responses, 
we analyzed data from 536 men and 488 women. Three-hundred and ninety participants 
indicated they lived in India, 513 indicated they lived in  the U.S., and 121 participants 
listed another country of residence. These participants came from various European 
countries (41), Canada (15), The Philippines (8), Pakistan (5), Bangladesh (4), Indonesia 
(4), Turkey (4), Australia (3), Egypt (3), and Singapore (3); in addition there were one or 
two participants from each of several countries in Oceania, Asia, Africa, Central and 
South America. Mean age was 30.83+/-10.557 SD years, ranging from 18 to 78. 
5.3.1.4 Analysis 
5.3.1.4.1 Permissibility 
In order to evaluate the extent to which participants consider an act to be morally right 
or wrong, we pooled answer options 1 and 2 of the permissibility question, constructing 
a variable indicating whether the act was judged permissible or not (DISCORDANT-
DICHOTOMOUS for whipping when not in accordance with convention, CONCORDANT-
DICHOTOMOUS for whipping when concordant with convention). We also looked for 
order effects on the unpooled answers of the permissibility question (DISCORDANT and 
CONCORDANT, respectively). 
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5.3.1.4.2 Justification 
We asked two independent coders to categorize participants’ justifications according to 
the scheme presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 10: Justification categories 
 Explanation Example 
Personal The participant refers to the personal values of 
the actors in the scenarios. For example, the 
act is permissible or not because the relevant 
actors do or do not consent in the act. 
“Everyone who could be 
whipped, including the drunk 
sailor, believes that whipping is 
an acceptable punishment that is 
preferable to the alternatives.” 
Group   The participant refers to conventions that are 
specific to the social group or context in the 
scenario. For example, the act is permissible or 
not because the act is or is not in accord with a 
known explicit rule, with a law, or with 
prevailing practice. 
“The sailor knew the laws and 
rules when he (I'm assuming it 
was a man) signed up for the 
crew and when he got drunk.” 
Universal The participant refers to universal principles, 
such as harm, justice, or rights 
“It is morally wrong to hurt other 
people.” 
 
The universal category was analyzed as ‘universal justifications’, while the other two 
were pooled and analyzed as ‘conventional justifications.’ As mentioned in section 5.1, 
consensus is explicitly varied in version 1, but is not mentioned in version 2. 
Justifications can belong to more than one category. We therefore created two 
variables, one indicating whether a conventional justification was mentioned, and one 
indicating whether a universal justification was mentioned. Inter-coder agreement for 
all justifications was moderate (Cohen’s kappa=.561; n=4096); however, as reported 
below, the results are straightforward when using the categorizations of either coder. 
5.3.1.5 Results 
5.3.1.5.1 Version 1: consensus and common practice 
We classified participants according to their permissibility answer patterns (CATEGORY, 
see table 3, first two columns). Participants who perceived whipping as permissible in 
both scenarios (yes-yes) are categorized as ‘permissive’; participants who deemed 
whipping wrong in both scenarios (no-no) are categorized as ‘universalist’; participants 
who thought whipping is wrong when not in accordance with convention but 
permissible when concordant with convention (no-yes) are referred to as 
‘conventionalist,’ and participants whose answers followed the reverse pattern (yes-no) 
are ‘unexpected’ because we do not have a ready explanation for this last category of 
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answer pattern. Table 3 gives a breakdown of the results for version 1; the second 
column lists the percentage of participants who fall into each of the aforementioned 
categories using only the patterns of responses to the permissibility questions. We can 
compare these response patterns with previous findings. Sousa et al. (2007) find that 
16% of participants evince the conventionalist response patterns (‘No-Yes’ in their 
study), while 41% of Kelly et al.’s (2007) participants evince this pattern; the here 
presented result (14.8%) is thus more in line with the former. However, if we exclude 
permissive and unexpected participants, as Sousa et al. (2009) suggest, these 
percentages rise to 26% [14.8/(14.8+39.7+2.4)], compared with 17.2% (Sousa et al. 2009) 
and 45.5% (Kelly et al. 2007). 
Importantly, the categorizations listed in the second column of Table 3 are only 
provisional interpretations, since we cannot definitely know participants’ reasoning 
without inspecting their justifications. The third through fourth columns of Table 3 list 
the percentages of participants classified as universalist or conventionalist by each of 
the two coders on the basis of the participant’s justifications (because participants could 
give more than one justification, these percentages add up to more than 100% in some 
cases).  
 
Table 11: Classification according to permissibility answers: version 1 
Permissibility  
answer pattern  
(discordant-
concordant) 
CATEGORY 
Provisional 
interpretation (%) 
Justifications (coder1,% / coder2,%) 
Discordant scenario Concordant scenario 
universal conventional universal conventional 
yes – yes Permissive (43) 21.4 / 21.0 68.1 / 77.3 17.9 / 17.9 61.6 / 72.5 
no - no  Universalist (39.7) 76.3 / 80.6 11.8 / 17.1 73.0 / 84.4 9.0 / 11.8 
no – yes Conventionalist 
(14.8) 
19.0 / 27.8 72.2 / 67.1 12.7 / 12.7 69.6 / 87.3 
yes - no Unexpected (2.4) 30.8 / 46.2 76.9 / 92.3 61.5 / 61.5 15.4 / 38.5 
Note. Classification of participants according to permissibility answers and percentage of 
participants who gave conventional and universal justifications for each permissibility answer. 
5.3.1.5.1.1 Order 
Chi square tests revealed that order did not have an effect on any of the permissibility 
answers (CONCORDANT: χ²(2,534) = 0.363; p = 0.834; CONCORDANT-DICHOTOMOUS: 
χ²(1,534) = 0.302; p = 0.583; DISCORDANT: χ²(2,532) = 5.489; p = 0.064; DISCORDANT-
DICHOTOMOUS: χ²(1,532) = 1.862; p = 0.172; CATEGORY: χ²(3,532) = 3.815; p = 0.282). 
Participants who read the discordant scenario first were not more or less likely to be 
conventionalists, or to permit whipping in either scenario, than participants who read 
the concordant scenario first. We therefore pooled the two orders. 
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5.3.1.5.1.2 Permissibility  
Does the conventionality of whipping have an effect on permissibility patterns? In order 
to measure the effect of convention, we conducted a within-subject test. Participants 
were more likely to hold that the ‘conventional’ whipping was morally permissible than 
that the ‘unconventional’ whipping was morally permissible (McNemar test, χ²(1,532) = 
245.74; p < 0.001). 
Because order was randomized, half of the participants saw the discordant scenario 
in the first round and the concordant scenario in the second round, while the other half 
saw the concordant scenario in the first round and the discordant scenario in the 
second round. This allows to also perform a separate between-subject analysis for each 
round. These analyses revealed that the effect of convention was mostly driven by the 
second round, that is, after participants had already judged the first scenario. In the first 
round, there was only a marginally significant effect of convention on permissibility: 
participants were more likely to answer that whipping was morally permissible in the 
concordant scenario than in the discordant scenario, (χ² (1,532) = 3.697; p = 0.055). In 
contrast, in the second round, there was a highly significant effect of convention on 
permissibility (χ²(1,534) = 14.648; p < 0.001). The difference between rounds was not large 
enough to create order effects. 
Proponents of the moral/conventional theory might argue that neither the 
‘permissive’ participants nor the ‘unexpected’ participants viewed whipping as a 
transgression, as these participants did not indicate that whipping was wrong in 
response to the discordant scenario. Sousa et al. (2009) assert that such participants 
should be excluded from analyses of this type. However, removing ‘permissive’ 
individuals from the sample does not change the results. If we remove both ‘permissive’ 
and ‘unexpected’ participants, participants are also more likely to hold that the 
conventional whipping is permissible than they are likely to hold that the 
unconventional whipping is permissible. However, said pattern is trivial because, if we 
remove ‘permissive’ and ‘unexpected’ participants, all remaining participants hold 
unconventional whipping to be not permissible, and some of these participants hold the 
conventional whipping to be permissible. Additionally, it is impossible to perform a 
statistical analysis on the remaining data because of insufficient variation in the 
permissibility answers (specifically, permissibility of the discordant scenario has a 
constant value, namely ‘not permissible’). 
Within-subject analysis reveals that participants are still more likely to hold that the 
conventional whipping is permissible than they are likely to hold that the 
unconventional whipping is permissible (McNemar test, χ²(1,303) = 4.790; p < 0.001;).  
Likewise, between-subjects analyses reveal that, in both rounds, conventional whipping 
is more likely to be deemed permissible than is unconventional whipping (first round 
χ²(1,303) = 21.131; p < 0.001; second round χ²(1,303) = 35.257; p < 0.001). 
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Convention thus has an effect on permissibility; the first hypothesis is supported. 
5.3.1.5.1.3 Justification 
Moral/conventional theory adherents might also argue that ‘conventionalist’ 
participants permitted the harmful act in the concordant scenario because these 
participants assumed that the moral consequences would be different from those 
entailed in the discordant scenario. Conventionalist participants would then refer to 
universal principles when judging a harmful act to be wrong and when judging it to be 
right. However, as is evident when we compare universalist and conventionalist 
participants in Table 3 and in Figure 1, conventionalist participants are very likely to 
give conventional justifications for either scenario, much more so than universalist 
participants. A chi square test for each coder’s results treated separately reveals that 
these differences are highly significant (discordant scenario: coder 1 χ²(1,290) = 103.066; 
p < 0.001; coder 2 χ²(1,290) = 67.629; p < 0.001; concordant scenario: coder 1 χ²(1,290) = 
111.119; p < 0.001; coder 2 χ²(1,290) = 149.535; p < 0.001). Conventionalist participants are 
also less likely than are universalist participants to give universal justifications for 
either scenario, as we can see in Figure 2 and Table 3  (discordant scenario:  coder 1 
χ²(1,290) = 79.148; p < 0.001; coder 2 χ²(1,290) = 71.407; p < 0.001; concordant scenario: 
coder 1 χ²(1,290) = 85.138; p < 0.001, coder 2 χ²(1,290) = 129.602; p < 0.001). In fact, 
conventionalist participants simply treat the act as a conventional transgression, 
period.  
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Figure 1: Comparison of conventionalist with universalist participants’ conventional 
justifications; version 1 
 
Note. In this figure we see the fraction of participants that gives conventional justifications for 
their answers to Version 1, according to each coder, for each scenario and category of 
participant. 
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Figure 2: Comparison of conventionalist with universalist participants’ universal 
justifications; version 1 
 
Note. . In this figure we see the fraction of participants that gives universalist justifications for 
their answers to Version 1, according to each coder, for each scenario and category of 
participant. 
5.3.1.5.2 Version 2: common practice only, not consensus 
Table 4 gives the classification of participants according to their answer patterns for 
version 2. The results are similar to those for version 1. We find that 17.5% 
(10.6/(10.6+47.6+2.2) = 0.175, see version 1) of participants give conventionalist answers 
compared to 17.2% (Sousa et al. 2009) and 45.5% (Kelly et al. 2007). 
When comparing the permissibility answers of participants in the two versions, one 
can see that version 2 has a significant effect on the permissibility answer pattern 
(χ²(3,1021) = 8.096; p = 0.044). When we only include conventionalist and universalist 
participants, it is clear that the fraction of conventionalist (universalist) participants is 
significantly lower (higher) in version 2 than in version 1 (χ²(1,575) = 6.612; p = 0.010). 
The third hypothesis is thus confirmed.  
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Table 12: Classification according to permissibility answers: version 2 
Permissibility  
answer pattern  
(discordant-
concordant) 
CATEGORY 
Provisional 
interpretation (%) 
Justifications (coder1,%/coder2,%) 
Discordant scenario Concordant scenario 
universal conventional universal conventional 
Yes – Yes Permissive (39.5) 24.4/32.6 79.8/69.4 22.3/30.1 79.8/66.3 
No - No  Universalist (47.6) 88.8/80.3 10.7/22.3 88.4/79.0 6.4/19.3 
No – Yes Conventionalist 
(10.6) 
28.8/26.9 65.4/73.1 23.1/28.8 94.2/86.5 
Yes - No Unexpected (2.2) 45.5/27.3 72.7/54.5 54.5/45.5 27.3/27.3 
Note. Classification of participants according to permissibility answers, with percentage of 
participants who gave conventional and universal justifications for each permissibility answer. 
 
5.3.1.5.2.1 Order 
Chi square tests revealed that order did not have an effect on any of the permissibility 
answers (CONCORDANT: χ²(2,490)=1.063; p=.588; CONCORDANT-
DICHOTOMOUS: χ²(1,490) = 0.070; p = 0.792; DISCORDANT: χ²(2,489) = 0.771; p = 0.680; 
DISCORDANT-DICHOTOMOUS: χ²(1,489) = 0.702; p = 0.402; CATEGORY: χ²(3,489) = 2.408; p 
= 0.492). 
5.3.1.5.2.2 Permissibility 
Participants were more likely to judge the commonly used whipping to be morally 
permissible than they were to judge the unconventional whipping to be morally 
permissible (McNemar test, χ²(1,489) = 277.323; p < 0.001). 
Once again, we begin with a between-subjects analysis in each round. In the first 
round, there was no effect of scenario on permissibility (χ²(1,490) = 2.390; p = 0.122). In 
the second round, there was a significant effect of convention on permissibility 
(χ²(1,489) = 4.489; p = 0.034). The difference between rounds was not large enough to 
create order effects though. 
Once again, excluding permissive individuals as Sousa et al. (2009) suggested does not 
change the results (McNemar test, χ²(1,296) = 2.435; p < 0.001; round 1 χ²(1,296) = 15.511; 
p < 0.001; round 2 χ²(1,296) = 12.634; p < 0.001). 
Hence, in line with the first hypothesis, as in version 1, convention has an effect on 
permissibility. 
5.3.1.5.2.3 Justification 
As in version 1, conventionalist participants are very likely to give conventional 
justifications for either scenario, much more so than universalist participants 
(discordant scenario: coder 1 χ²(1,285) = 77.358; p < 0.001; coder 2 χ²(1,285) = 50.694; p < 
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0.001; concordant scenario: coder 1 χ²(1,285) = 188.171; p < 0.001; coder 2 χ²(1,285) = 
88.918; p < 0.001). Conventionalist participants are also less likely than universalist 
participants to give universal justifications for either scenario  (discordant scenario: 
coder 1 χ²(1,285) = 88.867; p < 0.001; coder 2 χ²(1,285) = 58.176; p < 0.001; concordant 
scenario: coder 1 χ²(1,285) = 100.917; p < 0.001; coder 2 χ²(1,285) = 50.692; p < 0.001). 
Conventionalist participants thus simply treat the act as a conventional transgression, 
period.  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Comparison of conventionalist with universalist participants’ conventional 
justifications in version 2 
Note. In this figure we see the fraction of participants that gives conventional justifications for 
their answers to Version 2, according to each coder, for each scenario and category of 
participant.  
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Figure 4: Comparison of conventionalist with universalist participants’ universal 
justifications in version 2 
Note. . In this figure we see the fraction of participants that gives universal justifications for 
their answers to Version 1, according to each coder, for each scenario and category of 
participant.  
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5.4 Discussion 
5.4.1 Moral/conventional distinction  
This study contributed to the discussion about the moral/conventional distinction in 
two ways: First, we modified previously used methodologies and replicated the finding 
that harmful transgressions are not uniformly judged to be generalizably wrong. 
Second, we now have evidence that in previous studies biases can have played a role in 
the perceived moral response pattern for moral transgressions. These findings thus 
substantially weaken the claim that harmful transgressions evoke the signature moral 
response pattern, a central pillar of the moral/conventional distinction. 
Kelly et al. (2007) claimed to have demonstrated that harmful transgressions are not 
necessarily perceived as generalizably wrong. However, the scenario-based probes that 
Kelly et al. employed in order to measure generalizability-based reasoning were such as 
to possibly introduce bias: Participants might have associated the ‘neutral scenarios’ 
with more severe moral consequences than the ‘generalizability scenarios’, thus 
explaining the decreased wrongness of the harmful act in the ‘generalizability scenario’. 
We therefore developed a generalizability probe with fewer confounds. First, we 
structured each version of the scenario so as to explicitly vary the conventionality of 
the act without varying the moral consequences. Second, we included a justification 
question in order to allow us to control for differences in participants’ underlying 
rationales and assumptions. Although the fraction of participants who gave 
conventionalist answers was lower than that reported by Kelly et al., it was nonetheless 
still substantial, as we still found that 17.5-26% of participants fit this category. 
Moreover, the first hypothesis was confirmed. The extent to which a harmful act was in 
accord with convention had an effect on the perceived wrongness of this harmful act. In 
version 1, a harmful act was significantly more often wrong when not in accord with 
common practice and consensus. In version 2, a harmful act was significantly more 
often wrong when not in accord with common practice. Moreover, confirming the 
second hypothesis, we demonstrated that participants did not justify the non-
generalizability of harmful transgressions in terms of confounded moral consequences. 
Instead, they referred to  conventional rationales.  
Another problem of bias plagues much of the existing literature on the 
moral/conventional theory, as commonly-used moral/conventional tasks employ vague 
generalizability questions. In the classical moral/conventional task, moral 
transgressions are deemed generalizably wrong, independent of convention. However, 
generalizability questions do not sufficiently vary the prevailing convention. As a result, 
participants might be biased to perceive moral transgressions as generalizably wrong 
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because they are generally against convention and not because they are wrong 
independent of convention. This is in contrast to conventional transgressions, which 
are not perceived to be generally against convention. We developed two versions of the 
same moral scenario, one that varied two aspects of convention and one that varied 
only one aspect of convention. Indeed, more participants evinced a moral response 
pattern in the latter, suggesting that this implicit bias may well have played a role in 
previous findings. We found that moral transgressions are generalizably against 
convention and this biases participants to evince moral response patterns (hypothesis 
3).  
This position is subject to a number of possible criticisms. First, only 10 to 15 percent 
of the participants did not generalize the wrongness of the harmful transgression; if we 
exclude participants from the ‘permissive’ and ‘unexpected’ categories, this rises to 
17.5-26 percent, a non-trivial fraction, but not a majority by any means. Skeptics may 
therefore argue that these percentages are not informative because we did not compare 
whipping with non-harmful transgressions − perhaps these percentages would be 
dwarfed by the fraction of participants that would deem conventional transgressions as 
variably wrong. However, we suggest that the outcome of such a comparison would 
importantly hinge on the nature of the conventional transgressions employed. Huebner 
et al. (2010) have documented the existence of an intermediate class of acts that do not 
reliably elicit either the signature conventional pattern or the signature moral pattern. 
These authors classify members of this class as conventional transgressions. Nichols 
(2002) found that disgusting violations, which would otherwise be classified as 
conventional, were deemed less permissible and more seriously wrong than non-
disgusting conventional transgressions; also, their wrongness was less dependent on 
authority. Therefore, whether conventional transgressions would elicit a smaller 
proportion of generalized responses than did the transgressions employed in our study, 
likely depends on what conventional issues were chosen.  
Others may object that whipping as a punishment constitutes a conventional 
transgression rather than a moral transgression. Indeed, it does go against prevailing 
convention in the discordant scenario. Nonetheless, that is not a reason to classify it as a 
conventional transgression. Virtually all of the moral transgressions used in previous 
moral/conventional tasks violate prevailing convention. A child hitting another child 
on the playground is against the rules, it is not a habit, and there is no consensus that it 
is acceptable.  
Another potential criticism, raised by Sousa et al. (2009), is that harmful 
transgressions need not reliably elicit moral response patterns. Sousa et al. propose that 
Turiel’s hypothesis should be interpreted as follows: “transgressions involving harm and 
injustice or rights violations evoke the moral signature, or, more explicitly, harmful 
transgressions are conceived to be authority independent and general in scope if they 
are perceived to entail injustice or rights violations,” (2009, p. 84). While at first pass 
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Sousa et al.’s linkage of harm and injustice might seem to protect the 
moral/conventional distinction from evidence such as that which is presented here, as 
Stich et al. (2009) have previously argued, this linkage actually undermines the 
purported claims of the generalizable nature of moral prescriptions. As Stich et al. put 
it, “some rights and some principles of justice are geographically and temporally local, 
while others may be universal” (2009:95). Philosophers do not agree as to which 
principles of rights or justice, if any, are universal. It remains an empirical question as 
to whether lay people evince such agreement, but we think it likely that they do not. 
Some participants will likely perceive certain principles as universal, other participants 
will perceive other principles as universal, and so on – at present, we have no means of 
predicting which principle will be perceived as universal by which group of individuals.  
In defense of Sousa et al. (2009) (and here we diverge somewhat from Stich et al. 
[2009]), it is possible to interpret the former as arguing that ‘transgressions, involving 
harm and involving violations of those principles of justice or rights that are perceived 
to be universal by the given participant, evoke the moral response pattern from that 
particular participant.’ However, while this might seem to rescue the 
moral/conventional theory, it is critical to note that, under this definition, it is again 
impossible to predict which transgressions will evoke the moral response pattern. 
Moreover, this definition introduces a potential tautology: if harm in itself is not 
enough, and if principles of justice and rights only evoke a moral response pattern when 
these principles are perceived as universal, then generalizability cannot be used as a 
definitional feature of moral transgressions.  
In sum, in line with previous studies (e.g. Kelly et al., 2007), our results suggest that 
harm does not reliably predict whether or not a moral response pattern will occur. 
Moreover, previous studies (e.g., Nichols, 2002; Shweder et al., 1987) and criticisms of 
the moral/conventional theory (e.g. Stich et al., 2009) suggest that neither are other 
features plausible predictors of the occurrence of a moral response pattern. The onus is 
thus on proponents of a perceived moral/conventional distinction to prove its 
existence.  
5.4.2 Practical feasibility  
In chapter 4, we have seen that Wong suggested accommodation as an alternative to 
toleration. Toleration is deemed paradoxical because it requires one to inhibit 
interference with objectionable actions. Accommodation requires one to trace others’ 
actions to their basic values, understand those values and subsequently incorporate 
them in one’s own value system. Relativizing moral judgments to agents’ basic values is 
thus a first step in accommodation and might increase non-interference and respect. 
While traditional researchers argue that people necessarily think of moral judgments as 
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objective and universal, Kelly et al. find that harmful actions are not always deemed 
generalizably wrong.  
In this study, we further criticized classical moral conventional research as well as 
the methodology used by Kelly et al. (2007). We developed new methods and asked if 
people could relativize moral judgments about harmful actions. We found that some 
participants relativized their moral judgments to the agents: They considered the same 
act to be permissible when in accordance with the agents’ moral appraisals but not 
permissible when not in accordance with the agents’ moral appraisals.  
These findings might shed new light on one problem that plagues toleration: The 
paradox of toleration holds that it is hard not to interfere with acts one considers to be 
wrong. But it is an open question if it would also be hard not to interfere with acts one 
considers to be wrong for oneself but permissible for someone else. Relativist 
participants do not simply condemn the act (whipping), even though they quite likely 
think it is wrong for themselves and their own group. This opens up two questions. First 
of all, relativizing one’s moral judgments might define toleration out of existence. 
Toleration is usually defined as a behavioral prescription towards those acts one judges 
to be wrong. When relativizing a judgment, one does not simply judge the behavior to 
be wrong – one judges it to be wrong for oneself but permissible for someone else. Thus, 
relativism asks us to reconsider the notion of toleration or to apply a new notion that 
aptly describes non-interference with those acts one would condemn for oneself. 
Second, while studies show that condemnation is indeed related to interference, it is an 
open question if relativized judgments also elicit interference. We do not know if 
relativism is related to non-interference and respectful behavior, therefore it remains 
an interesting, to be investigated, speculation that relativism might enable non-
interference and respect. 
While our experimental manipulation thus elicited relativist judgments in some 
individuals, this was not the case for everyone. What could we conclude from this 
variation in participants’ exhibited scope of moral judgments? We could suggest that 
relativism holds for some people and universalism for others, because some people 
prioritize others’ autonomy while other people value universalizability more.  
However, given certain assumptions, this possibility may run into problems of 
coordination. Say we assume that moral judgments are related to behavior, such that a 
relativist  does not interfere with whipping in communities where it is part of 
convention, while a universalist is always inclined to interfere with whipping. The 
universalist decides to raise awareness of the issue, and to motivate politicians to put a 
halt to this practice. Now what will the relativist do? Will the relativist tolerate the 
universalists’ interference or will the relativist stand up for the whipping practice and 
interfere with the interference? Consider two relativists, P and G. They discuss the 
universalist’s (U) actions. 
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G: “What is wrong for me may not be wrong for you. It is wrong for me to whip 
another human being, but it is permissible for people in the whipping culture to whip 
another human being and one should therefore not interfere with their whipping. 
Everyone should accept that; the universalist’s interference is wrong and I will interfere 
with it.”  
P: “What is wrong for me may not be wrong for you. It is wrong for me to whip 
another human being, but it is permissible for people in the whipping culture to whip 
another human being and one should therefore not interfere. However, if the 
universalist thinks interference with this whipping culture is permissible, then it is 
permissible for the universalist to interfere because what is wrong for me (interference) 
may not be wrong for the universalist. I will not interfere with the universalist’s 
interference.”  
If relativists are like P, universalists will win and toleration is self-defeating. 
Universalists will interfere with behavior which is to be tolerated, and likely also with 
the relativists’ behavior, and relativists will permit this. Relativists will not demand or 
enforce toleration from those who are not morally committed to it. But if relativists are 
like G, they will stand up for others’ practices. G’s reaction also seems to be in 
accordance with the relativist who tolerates whipping, and G’s reaction is less 
defeasible. So in evaluating the feasibility of relativism we will have to be more specific. 
Some kinds of relativism may be futile while others are not. We will go into more detail 
regarding different kinds of relativism in the next chapter. 

  
This chapter is a revised version of Quintelier, K.J.P., De Smet, D., & Fessler, D.M.T. (under review). Agent relativism 
reappraised: an empirical study of moral agent relativism. 
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Chapter 6  
Agent relativism reappraised: An empirical study 
of moral agent relativism 
 
- http://themothbox.wordpress.com/ 
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6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, it became clear that being a relativist can lead to intricate 
problems: Relativizing one’s moral judgments appears defeasible, open to interpretation 
or contradictory according to some interpretations. This difficulty is not new: In the 
Theaetetus, Plato ridiculed the relativist teachings of Protagoras (Plato, 1921), and 
Bernard Williams dubbed moral relativism “possibly the most absurd view to have been 
advanced even in moral philosophy,” (Williams, 1972, p. 20). It is then no surprise that 
cartoonists welcome moral relativism as a rich source of inspiration. More formally, 
some moral philosophers oppose theories of moral relativism due to its counter-
intuitive implications (e.g., Streiffer, 1999). Nonetheless, other philosophers defend 
moral relativism by referring to common intuitions, lay people’s speech acts, or 
common understanding of moral terms (e.g., Brogaard, 2008; Beebe, 2010; Prinz, 2007; 
Harman, 1975). Previous empirical studies suggest that survey responders can indeed be 
induced to make moral judgments that are in accordance with relativism (Sarkissian, 
Park, Tien, Wright, & Knobe, forthcoming). Other studies classify participants according 
to their score on a ‘relativism scale’ (e.g., Forsyth, 1980, 1992; Davis, Andersen, & Curtis, 
2001).  
There are several plausible explanations for this academic disagreement. It is possible 
that different individuals have different moral intuitions, or that these intuitions vary 
across moral terms, contexts, etc. (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2009; Gill, 2009). Another, 
compatible, option is that philosophers are talking about different kinds of moral 
relativism (Beebe, 2010; Chapter 4): while some have relativist P from the previous 
chapter in mind, others focus on relativist G. One distinction that has received recent 
attention in philosophical work is agent versus appraiser relativism (Beebe, 2010). While 
appraiser relativism is usually a claim about the truth or meaning of moral judgments, 
agent relativism can be a claim about the permissibility of actions or about the truth or 
meaning of moral statements.  
In contemporary empirical work, the focus is primarily either on relativism in 
general, or on appraiser relativism. While appraiser relativist accounts usually also take 
agent relativism into account, pure agent relativist accounts are rare. In this chapter, 
we primarily address agent relativism. While previous work suggests that some 
individuals use moral terms in accord with appraiser moral relativism, we show in an 
empirical study that individuals also use moral terms in accord with agent moral 
relativism. Parts of the findings from this study were presented in the previous chapter.  
Below, we first explain how we define agent moral relativism and appraiser moral 
relativism, and discuss why these distinctions matter. We then summarize existing 
relevant empirical studies on folk moral relativism. In the main section, an empirical 
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study is described and the findings are reported. In the discussion we discuss the results 
in light of the theoretical and practical importance of agent relativism.  
6.2 Agent and appraiser relativism 
In chapter four, we construed the notion of moral relativism as consisting of three 
necessary components. First, we took moral relativism to mean that descriptive, 
prescriptive, or meta-ethical aspects of moral statements with terms such as ‘right,’ 
‘wrong,’ ‘ought,’ etc. (e.g., their use, legitimacy, or meaning) are relative to a moral 
framework (cf. Harman & Thompson, 1996). Second, moral relativism holds that there is 
variation in these moral frameworks. Finally, this variation in moral frameworks cannot 
be entirely eliminated. 
We then gave an example inspired by Lyons (1976/2001) where two moral relativists 
were judging an abortion. According to meta-ethical relativism, a pro-choice activist – 
say, Jane – can veridically judge that abortion is permissible because it is in accordance 
with his or her moral framework. Nonetheless, if a pro-life activist – say, Claudia – 
abhors abortion, Claudia’s statement regarding the impermissibility of abortion is also 
true because it is in accordance with Claudia’s moral framework that prioritizes the 
value of the unborn life over personal choice. In this example, the truth of moral 
statements thus depends on the moral framework of the person uttering a moral 
statement, or the appraiser.  
The above picture did not vary another important component of moral judgments, 
namely whose moral framework matters in deciding whether a moral judgment is 
correct or not. In the above example, it was the appraiser whose moral framework 
mattered, but one can equally imagine the truth of moral statements to depend on an 
agent. Another example can illustrate this complication.  
Both Susan, another pro-choice activist, and Helen, another pro-life activist, are 
having an abortion. They are agents performing an act with moral relevance. Claudia 
(the pro-life activist) and Jane (pro-choice activist) again contemplate these actions and 
prepare their respective judgments. Claudia and Jane are appraisers, appraising the 
moral acts of the agents. In the previous example, we showed how the truth of moral 
statements was contingent upon its accordance with the speakers’ or appraisers’ moral 
frameworks. Now, if we introduce agents and their moral frameworks, whose moral 
framework constitutes the appropriate frame of reference? Should we assign truth 
values based on the moral frameworks of the agents performing the act, this being 
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Susan and Helen, or based on the moral frameworks of the appraisers judging the act, 
this being Claudia and Jane? Or could any moral framework be an appropriate frame of 
reference? 
According to a moral agent relativist, moral judgments are true if they are in 
accordance with the moral framework of the agent. In this case, it would be true that it 
is permissible for Susan to have an abortion (because Susan is a pro-choice activist) 
while it would be false that it is permissible for Helen to have an abortion (because 
Helen is a pro-life activist). For the moral agent relativist, it does not matter who is 
appraising the act. Both Claudia and Jane would be correct if they admonished Helen’s 
abortion and permitted Susan’s. Jane would be wrong if she permitted Helen’s abortion 
and Claudia would be wrong if she admonished Susan's abortion, even though this is in 
accordance with their own (i.e., Claudia's and Jane's, or the appraiser's) respective 
moral frameworks. 
According to a moral appraiser relativist, the truth of a moral statement depends on 
the appraiser and not on the agent. In that case, the truth values of the very first 
example (in the second paragraph of this Section 2) apply because we can ignore the 
agents’ moral frameworks. In other words, it would be incorrect for Claudia (pro-choice) 
to admonish Helen’s abortion because Claudia has to judge Helen according to the 
appraiser’s, this is, her own (Claudia’s) moral framework, not according to Helen’s moral 
framework.  
Put differently, according to meta-ethical agent relativism, a moral statement about a 
specific act is true or false simpliciter. However, according to meta-ethical appraiser 
relativism, a moral statement about a specific act is not true or false in itself but it is 
true or false depending on the moral framework of the appraiser of the act. As a 
consequence, conflicting moral statements can both be right, depending on appraisers’ 
different moral frameworks.  
Thus far we have discussed meta-ethical relativism, where the truth of a statement is 
relative to the moral framework of an appraiser and/or agent. This implies that meta-
ethical relativism is a form of cognitivism: moral statements have truth-values and we 
can know them.  In contrast, a non-cognitivist would endorse that we cannot know if a 
moral statement is true or false (either because moral statements have no truth values, 
or because we cannot know their truth values). Nonetheless, other forms of relativism 
do not speak to this issue. We can also evaluate the rightness of an act instead of the 
truth of a moral statement, thus employing normative moral statements rather than 
meta-ethical statements. In the case of normative agent relativism, Jane is allowed to 
have an abortion while Helen is not allowed to have an abortion, independent of who is 
evaluating these acts. Thus, according to normative agent relativism, an act is right or 
wrong simpliciter, as long as we specify who is committing the act. The case of 
normative appraiser relativism though is more complex, as it entails that Jane's 
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abortion is right or wrong depending on who is looking at it. Contrary to normative 
agent relativism, Jane's act of abortion is thus not right or wrong in itself. 
6.3 Folk moral relativism: previous studies 
An important feature in the debate is if moral relativism is compatible with lay people’s 
linguistic behavior. Moral philosophers refer to lay people’s speech acts to oppose or 
defend moral relativism. However, different kinds of moral relativism are compatible 
with different speech acts. For example, in his seminal 1975 paper, Harman defends the 
position that the truth of moral judgments is relative to agents by referring to the moral 
judgments lay people would and would not make: “[I]f we learn that a band of cannibals 
has captured and eaten the sole survivor of a shipwreck, we will speak of the primitive 
morality of the cannibals and may call them savages, but we will not say that they ought not 
to have eaten their captive,” (1975, p. 5; our emphasis). Streiffer (1999) and Lyons 
(1976/2001) argue against appraiser relativism on the basis of lay people’s moral 
judgments. When discussing conflicting moral statements (e.g., ‘X is good’ versus ‘X is 
not good’, uttered by two different individuals), they refer to “the conviction shared by 
laymen and philosophers that only one of these [assertions] could possibly be right” 
(Lyons, 1976/2001; quoted by Streiffer, 1999, p. 16). This argument, however, does not 
refute moral agent relativism.  
Different intuitions or moral speech acts thus support or refute different kinds of 
relativism.  Nonetheless, while empirical research on folk moral judgments is 
flourishing, to date, most investigations do not allow us to draw strong conclusions 
about specific kinds of moral relativism (see also Chapter 4). Little studies inform us to 
what extent lay people’s use of moral terms is in accordance with appraiser or agent 
relativism. Can we find clear instances of relativism, and more specifically, agent and 
appraiser relativism?  
Sarkissian et al. (forthcoming) empirically investigated folk moral relativism. They 
were able to manipulate participants’ agreement with a statement either in the 
direction of objectivism or in the direction of relativism. Sarkissian et al. presented 
participants with a short scenario about a man killing his son because he found him 
very unattractive. Participants were then told about a classmate, and about another 
appraiser who could be another classmate, someone from a different culture, or an 
extraterrestrial. In the scenario, the first appraiser, the one who was always a classmate, 
thought the behavior was wrong while the other appraiser thought it was right. 
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Participants then had to indicate how much they agreed with the statement that at least 
one of the appraisers must be wrong. As they had predicted, Sarkissian and colleagues 
found that participants were more likely to disagree with this statement when the other 
appraiser was from another culture, and they were most likely to disagree when the 
other appraiser was from a different planet. The results held for both American and 
Singaporean students and also when American students received all three cases (same 
culture, other culture and extraterrestrial) side-by-side. This relativist response was 
significantly less common when the vignette described a non-moral, factual 
disagreement. These data are consistent with the view that individuals allow the truth 
of moral evaluations to depend on the cultural background of an appraiser. The authors 
concluded that, while people do have objectivist intuitions, different psychological 
processes are at work that lead to objectivist intuitions in some cases and relativist 
intuitions in other cases.  
This study also seems to speak for appraiser relativism and against agent relativism 
(though such detailed questions were not the aim of their research). In another study in 
the same paper they varied the cultural background of the agent. They did not find an 
effect of the cultural background of the agent on participants’ assessments of moral 
truth. However, it is important to note that the cultural backgrounds of these agents 
were still similar to each other (an American versus an Algerian agent), while, 
throughout this study, the appraisers varied much more in cultural background (a 
classmate versus an appraiser from a fictitious primitive society, or versus an 
extraterrestrial). 
Also, it is possible that participants assumed that the stranger or alien was not fully 
informed about the practices and moral values surrounding the event. In that case, it 
might have been right for the extraterrestrial to say that the event was permissible, but 
only because the extraterrestrial was misinformed about the nature of the event.  
This study also suffers from the limitation that participants might have thought that 
different moral consequences result from this act in different cultures. For example, do 
participants reason that the given act is acceptable for another culture because 
individuals in another culture hold different values – which would be in accordance 
with the relativist interpretation? Or are participants inferring morally aversive 
consequences? Participants might have thought that it was necessary for the father to 
kill at least some of his children using some or other criterion, for example because 
letting all one’s children live will inevitably result in future famine and suffering for the 
entire village. This would merely mean that the diversity in evaluations was caused by 
applying the same underlying utilitarian principle. Killing an unattractive son might be 
the best thing to do in a fictitious primitive society, if one assumes that in this society 
food is scarce and unattractive children are prone to die from disease anyway. At the 
same time, killing an unattractive son would still be wrong for appraisers in the U.S. 
Hence, this variation in the truth of moral judgments does not necessarily imply that 
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one is a relativist. In order to avoid such confounds, in our study, we explicitly vary the 
moral framework of agents while keeping all other relevant features constant (see 
Section 5.3). 
In a study of moral objectivism, Goodwin and Darley (2008) asked participants 
whether a specific moral statement was true, false, or an opinion or attitude (in a first 
experiment), or whether there could be a correct answer as to whether the statement is 
true (in a second experiment). Participants were further asked to indicate how they 
interpreted the information that another person disagreed with them; here, the 
response options were: (1) the other was surely mistaken, (2) it is possible that neither 
you nor the other person is mistaken, (3) it could be that you are mistaken, and the 
other person is correct, (4) other. Even though Goodwin and Darley (2008) were 
interested in moral objectivism, we can interpret certain answer patterns as in 
accordance with meta-ethical moral relativism: If the participant indicates that the 
statement can have a truth value (i.e., the participants chooses either response option 
‘true’ or response option ‘false’), and the participant indicates that neither (s)he nor a 
disagreeing person is mistaken about the statement, then the participants’ answers are 
in accordance with meta-ethical relativism: Two logically incompatible moral 
statements can both be true, depending on the appraiser. The authors report that in the 
first study 11% (11 out of 100) of participants and in the second study 8% (12 out of 152) 
of participants conformed to this pattern. Hence, a small but consistent minority of 
participants used moral terms in accordance with meta-ethical appraiser relativism in 
each experiment. However, from this study, no conclusions can be drawn about agent 
relativism or normative relativism. Moreover, it might again be that participants 
assumed that the disagreeing person had different information, or assumed that 
different moral consequences would follow. 
While the above studies tell us nothing about agent relativism, they do indicate that 
appraiser relativism is present in lay people’s moral judgments. However, in both 
studies a non-relativist explanation can be given for this: participants may have 
reasoned that the same moral framework yields different specific moral judgments 
because of the variation in moral consequences, or participants may have reasoned that 
individuals come to different moral conclusions because some of them are not fully 
informed.  
As we have seen in chapter four, other relativism studies make use of Forsyth’s (1980) 
Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ), which includes a scale developed to measure 
relativist commitments in lay people. We have equally seen that the items in this scale 
are somewhat ambiguous as to the individual-cultural distinction. Participants can also 
interpret some items in non-relativist ways and both normative and meta-ethical 
interpretations are possible. How does this scale fare in regard to the agent-appraiser 
distinction? As in chapter four, we analyze the relevant questions and give some 
possible interpretations in this regard. These are listed in table 1. 
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Table 13: : Items 11-20 of the Ethics Position Questionnaire (left) (Source: Forsyth, 
1980) and their relation to agent versus appraiser relativism (right). 
“Please read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree 
by placing in front of the statement the number corresponding to your feelings, where: 
1 = Completely disagree 2 = Largely disagree 3 = Moderately disagree 4 = Slightly disagree 5 
= Neither agree nor disagree 6 = Slightly agree 7 = Moderately agree  8 = Largely agree 9 = 
Completely agree” 
 Item Some possible interpretations 
11 What is ethical varies from one  
situation and society to another. 
- Agent-relativism: what is ethical varies from 
one society and its agents to another.  
- Appraiser-relativism: what is ethical varies 
from one situation or society and its 
appraisers to another. 
- Descriptive statement  
- Non-cognitivism 
12 Moral standards should be seen as  
being individualistic; what one person 
considers to be moral may be judged  
to be immoral by another person. 
- Agent relativism: type of act 
- Appraiser relativism: exact same event 
- Descriptive statement  
- Non-cognitivism 
13 There are no ethical principles that are  
so important that they should be a part  
of any code of ethics.  
- Agent-relativism: there are no ethical 
principles that should be a part of any 
agent’s code of ethics. 
- Appraiser-relativism: there are no ethical 
principles that should be a part of any 
appraiser’s code of ethics. 
- Non-cognitivism 
14 Different types of moralities cannot be 
compared as to "rightness." 
 
- Agent-relativism: different types of agents’ 
moralities 
- Appraiser-relativism: different types of 
appraisers’ moralities 
- Non-cognitivism 
15 Questions of what is ethical for  
everyone can never be resolved since 
what is moral or immoral is up to the 
individual. 
- Agent-relativism: what is ethical for every 
agent 
- Appraiser-relativism: what is ethical for 
every appraiser  
- Non-cognitivism 
16 Moral standards are simply personal 
rules which indicate how a person  
should behave, and are not to be  
applied in making judgments of others. 
- Agent-relativism: moral standards are not to 
be applied in making judgments of other 
agents 
- Appraiser-relativism: moral standards are 
not to be applied in making judgments of 
other appraisers  
- Non-cognitivism 
17 Ethical considerations in interpersonal 
relations are so complex that individuals 
should be allowed to formulate their  
own individual codes. 
- Agents should  be allowed to form their own 
ethical codes 
- Appraisers should be allowed to form their 
own ethical codes 
- Non-cognitivism  
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18 Rigidly codifying an ethical position  
that prevents certain types of actions 
could stand in the way of better human 
relations and adjustment. 
- This is more likely to be about 
consequentialism than about relativism. 
- Descriptive statement 
- Non-cognitivism 
19 No rule concerning lying can be 
formulated; whether a lie is permissible 
or not permissible totally depends  
on the situation. 
 
- Agent-relativism: depends on the situation 
of the liar 
- Appraiser-relativism: depends on the 
situation of the appraiser  
- Non-cognitivism 
20 Whether a lie is judged to be moral or 
immoral depends upon the  
circumstances surrounding the action.  
- Agent-relativism: depends upon the 
circumstances surrounding the action (and, 
most likely, the agent) 
- Descriptive statement 
- Non-cognitivism   
 
Since most items can be interpreted as agent or as appraiser-relativism, this scale 
does not inform us if participants with a high score are agent or appraiser relativists. 
However, item 20 is most likely interpreted as agent-relativism. Even so, we have to 
keep in mind that each item is also consistent with non-cognitivist interpretations of 
morality.  
Overall, we cannot draw any conclusions about the prevalence of agent relativism 
from previous studies.  
6.4 Present Study 
Philosophers often refer to common use of moral statements to argue for agent 
relativism. We think that those philosophers’ arguments for agent relativism have some 
ground. We therefore predict that changing the moral framework of agents will have an 
impact on lay people’s moral judgments.  
From December 2010 to January 2011 we collected participants using MTurk 
(Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk web-based employment system). This study was 
certified exempt from UCLA’s Institutional Review Board. All participants took part in 
both the present study and the study described in the previous chapter. 
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6.4.1 Methods  
As described in Section 6.2, in order to assess whether participants use moral terms in 
accordance with agent relativism, it is important to explicitly vary the moral framework 
of the involved agents. We tested two ways in which participants could be agent 
relativists. We presented participants with a normative manipulation and with a meta-
ethical manipulation. Moreover, we tested whether, on the one hand, participants were 
consistent in their agent relativist speech acts, or, on the other hand, varied their moral 
responses between manipulations (normative or meta-ethical). In order to do so, all 
participants were assigned to both manipulations.  
The scenarios are schematically described below. For a literal transcript of the 
scenarios and questions, see Appendix 3. In the normative manipulation, participants 
were presented with two scenarios describing the same act, one in which the act was 
concordant with the agents’ moral framework and one in which the act was discordant 
with the agents’ moral framework. The relevant variation is to be found in the second 
paragraph of the scenario.  
6.4.1.1 Scenario 1: Agent-discordant  
Mr. Johnson is an officer on a cargo ship in 2010, carrying goods along the Atlantic 
coastline. All the crew members are American but the ship is mostly in 
international waters. When a ship is in international waters, it has to follow the 
law of the state whose flag it sails under and each ship can sail under only one 
flag. This ship does not sail under the U.S. flag. The law of this ship’s flag state 
allows both whipping and food deprivation as a punishment.  
 
On this ship, food deprivation is always used to discipline sailors who disobey 
orders or who are drunk on duty; as a consequence everyone on this ship has 
come to think that food deprivation is an appropriate punishment. Whipping 
however is never used to discipline sailors and no one on this ship thinks 
whipping is an appropriate punishment.  
 
One night, while the ship is in international waters, Mr. Johnson finds a sailor 
drunk at a time when the sailor should have been on watch. After the sailor sobers 
up, Mr. Johnson punishes the sailor by giving him 5 lashes with a whip. This does 
not go against the law of the flag state. 
Participants answered the following permissibility question:  
Is it morally permissible for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? 
(1) Yes, it is morally permissible 
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(2) Yes, it is morally permissible but it is wrong for reasons that have nothing to do 
with morality (e.g., it might be unlawful) 
(3) No, it is morally wrong (whether it is right or wrong in other ways or not) 
Participants were then led to another screen with the following scenario: 
6.4.1.2 Scenario 2: Agent-concordant  
Mr. Williams is an officer on another cargo ship in 2010, carrying goods along the 
Atlantic coastline. All the crew members are American but the ship is mostly in 
international waters. When a ship is in international waters, it has to follow the 
law of the state whose flag it sails under and each ship can sail under only one 
flag. This ship does not sail under the U.S. flag. The law of this ship’s flag state 
allows both whipping and food deprivation as a punishment.  
 
On this ship, whipping is always used to discipline sailors who disobey orders or 
who are drunk on duty; as a consequence everyone on this ship has come to think 
that whipping is an appropriate punishment. Food deprivation however is never 
used to discipline sailors and no one on this ship thinks food deprivation is an 
appropriate punishment.  
 
One night, while the ship is in international waters, Mr. Williams finds a sailor 
drunk at a time when the sailor should have been on watch. After the sailor sobers 
up, Mr. Johnson punishes the sailor by giving him 5 lashes with a whip. This does 
not go against the law of the flag state. 
Participants again answered the permissibility question. They were then led to 
another screen with the meta-ethical manipulation, or to a debriefing page if they had 
seen the meta-ethical manipulation first. 
6.4.1.3 Scenario 3: Agent-discordant, appraiser-concordant  
In the meta-ethical manipulation, participants again saw two scenarios describing the 
same act that was either concordant or discordant with the agents’ moral framework. In 
this manipulation, participants had to assess the truth of the same moral judgment about 
the act, made by an appraiser. At the same time, we also varied the moral frameworks of 
the appraisers − whose judgment participants had to assess − in the opposite direction: 
appraisers evaluated an act that was in accordance with their own moral framework but 
contrary to the agents’ moral framework, and the other way around. This way we can 
distinguish meta-ethical agent relativists from appraiser relativists. Relevant 
differences are to be found in the second paragraph of the scenario. 
Marc and Eric are sailors on Mr. Williams’ ship.  
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They both know that on Mr. Johnson’s ship whipping is never practiced and that 
no one on Mr. Johnson’s ship thinks that whipping is an appropriate punishment. 
They also know that food deprivation is always practiced on Mr. Johnson’s ship 
and that everyone on Mr. Johnson’s ship has come to think that food deprivation 
is an appropriate punishment. Of course, on their own ship, it is just the other way 
around: Everybody on Marc’s and Eric’s ship thinks that whipping is an 
appropriate punishment.  
 
Hence, even though Marc and Eric are sailors on Mr. Williams’s ship, they are both 
fully informed about the different practices and sensibilities on Mr. Johnson’s 
ship.  
 
They have heard that Mr. Johnson whipped a sailor on his ship. Marc says to Eric: 
what Mr. Johnson did was morally permissible. 
Participants then answered the truth question: 
Is what Marc says true or false? 
(1) True 
(2) False 
(3) Neither 
Participants were then led to another screen with the following scenario: 
6.4.1.4 Scenario 4: Agent-concordant, appraiser-discordant  
Peter and Steve are sailors on Mr. Johnson’s ship.  
 
They both know that on Mr. Williams’s ship food deprivation is never practiced 
and that no one on Mr. Williams’s ship thinks that food deprivation is an 
appropriate punishment. They also know that whipping is always practiced on Mr. 
Williams’s ship and that everyone on Mr. Williams ship has come to think that 
whipping is an appropriate punishment. Of course, on their own ship, it is just the 
other way around: no one on Peter’s and Steve’s ship thinks that whipping is an 
appropriate punishment.  
 
Hence, even though Peter and Steve are sailors on Mr. Johnson’s ship, they are 
both fully informed about the different practices and sensibilities on Mr. 
Williams’s ship.  
 
They have heard that Mr. Williams whipped a sailor on his ship. Peter says to 
Steve: what Mr. Williams did was morally permissible. 
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Participants again answered the truth question. 
The order of presentation of the two manipulations was randomized between 
subjects. Within each manipulation, the order of scenarios was also randomized 
between subjects. This yielded eight different orders to which participants were 
randomly assigned. Table 1 shows the final distribution of the participants. The 
normative manipulations in orders one to four were used as part of the study on the 
moral/conventional distinction (Chapter 5; Quintelier, Fessler, & De Smet, submitted).  
 
Table 14: Distribution of participants across randomized conditions  
 Screen 1 Screen 2 Screen 3 Screen 4 Sample size 
(%) 
Order Normative Meta-ethical  
O1 Agent-disc. Agent-conc. Agent-disc./ 
appr.-conc. 
Agent-disc./ 
appr.-conc. 
153 (16.1) 
O2 Agent-disc. Agent-conc. Agent-conc./ 
appr.-disc. 
Agent-conc./ 
appr.-disc. 
120 (12.6) 
O3 Agent-conc. Agent-disc. Agent-disc./ 
appr.-conc. 
Agent-disc./ 
appr.-conc. 
128 (13.5) 
O4 Agent-conc. Agent-disc. Agent-conc./ 
appr.-disc. 
Agent-conc./ 
appr.-disc. 
133 (14.0) 
 Meta-ethical Normative   
O5 Agent-disc./appr.-
conc. 
Agent-
conc./appr.-disc. 
Agent-disc. Agent-conc. 106 (11.2) 
O6 Agent-disc./appr.-
conc. 
Agent-
conc./appr.-disc. 
Agent-conc. Agent-disc. 86 (9.1) 
O7 Agent-
conc./appr.-disc. 
Agent-disc./appr.-
conc. 
Agent-disc. Agent-conc. 124 (13.1) 
O8 Agent-
conc./appr.-disc. 
Agent-disc./appr.-
conc. 
Agent-conc. Agent-disc. 100 (10.5) 
TOTAL    950 (100%) 
6.4.2 Analysis and Results 
We analyzed data from 991 participants (46% women). Mean age was 30.36 years (SD = 
10.055), ranging from 18 to 81 years old. Participants were mostly from the U.S. (47,3%) 
and India (39.9%). The remaining participants (12.8%) were from various countries, such 
as: Canada (13 individuals), United Kingdom (9), Romania (7), Pakistan (6), Serbia (6), 
Germany (5), The Philippines (5), Australia (4), Macedonia (4), Portugal (4), Spain (3), 
other European countries (1-2 per represented country), and other Asian countries (1-2 
per represented country). There were significantly more women in the American group 
(61%) than in the Indian group (33%; χ²(1,864) = 65.651, p < .001) or in the remaining 
group (31%; χ²(1,596) = 34.013, p < .001). The gender distribution in the Indian group 
was the same as in the remaining group (χ²(1,522)= 0.088, p = 767). 
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In order to evaluate the extent to which participants consider an act to be morally 
right or wrong, we pooled answer options 1 and 2 of the permissibility question, 
constructing a variable indicating whether the act was judged permissible or not (agent-
disc-dich for whipping when not in accordance with the agents’ moral framework, 
agent-conc-dich for whipping when concordant with the agents’ moral framework). We 
also did analyses on the unpooled answers of the permissibility question (agent-disc and 
agent-conc, respectively). In order to evaluate the extent to which participants consider 
a moral statement to be true or false, we constructed a dichotomous variable leaving out 
the non-cognitivist ‘either’ answers (agent-disc/appr-conc-dich when whipping is not 
in accordance with the agents’ moral framework and agent-conc/appr-disc-dich when 
whipping is in accordance with the agents’ moral framework). We also did analyses on 
the unpooled answers of the truth-value question (agent-disc/appr-conc and agent-
conc/appr-disc). We also classified participants according to their moral judgments, i.e., 
whether they were agent relativists or something else (norm-class for the normative 
manipulation; meta-class for the meta-ethical manipulation).  
6.4.2.1 Order effects 
There were no order effects across the eight conditions (agent-conc: χ²(14,948) = 13.207, 
p = .510; agent-disc: χ²(14,943) = 16.767, p = .269; agent-conc-dich: χ²(7,948) = 8.328, p = 
.304; agent-disc-dich: χ²(7,943) = 8.079, p = .326; agent-conc/appr-disc: χ²(14,948) = 15.134, 
p = .369; agent-disc/appr-conc: χ²(14,830) = 19.937, p = .132; agent-conc/appr-disc-dich: 
χ²(7,794) = 8.582, p = .284; agent-disc/appr-conc-dich: χ²(7,685) = 13414, p = .063; norm-
class: χ²(21,943) = 23.338, p = .326; meta-class: χ²(42,796) = 46.876, p = .279). We therefore 
pooled data across all orders.  
6.4.2.2 Normative manipulation 
We classified participants according to their moral judgments. Table 2 presents a 
breakdown of the results. The last column lists the percentage of participants whose 
answers fit the given pattern of permissibility answers. Participants who perceived 
whipping as permissible in both scenarios are categorized as 'permissive'; participants 
who deemed whipping wrong in both scenarios are categorized as 'universalist'; 
participants who thought whipping is wrong when not in accordance with the agents’ 
moral framework but permissible when in accordance with the agents’ moral 
framework are referred to as 'agent relativist,' and participants whose answers followed 
the reverse pattern are termed 'reversed' (we suspect that this last category of answer 
pattern reflects participant confusion or frivolity, as it is otherwise difficult to explain).  
We wanted to know if there were effects of gender and nationality. Because gender 
distributions were significantly different in the American group, we conducted chi 
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square tests for each gender and nationality separately. Being an agent relativist was 
not related to gender for either nationality (American: χ²(1,469) = .086, p = .769; Indian: 
χ²(1,395) = .960, p = .327; Remaining: χ²(1,127) = 1.074, p = .300.) nor was it related to 
nationality for either gender (Men, American vs. Indian: χ²(1,450)= .177, p = .674; 
American vs. Remaining: χ²(1, 272)= 1.809, p = .179; Indian vs. Remaining: χ²(1,352) = 
1.173, p = .279; Women, American vs. Indian χ²(1,414) = .763, p = .382; American vs. 
Remaining: χ²(1, 324) = .126, p = .722; Indian vs. Remaining: χ²(1,170)= .034, p = .855). 
 
Table 15: Classification of participants: Normative manipulation 
Discordant Concordant Interpretation 
Permissible? Permissible? Category (CAT) Frequencies (%)a 
Yes Yes Permissive 43.9 
No No Universalist 36.6 
No Yes Agent relativist 17.3 
Yes No Reversed 2.2 
aN=950. 
 
To determine whether participants are more likely to consider whipping permissible 
when it is in accordance with the agent’s framework, we conducted a within-subject 
test. Participants were indeed more likely to hold that the ‘concordant’ whipping was 
morally permissible than that the ‘discordant’ whipping was morally permissible (602 
vs. 454 of 984 participants, McNemar test, χ²(1,984) = 409.669; p < .0001).  
6.4.2.3 Meta-ethical manipulation 
Table 3 presents the results of classifying participants according to their assessments of 
the moral statements. Participants who thought that the statement ‘whipping is 
permissible’ was true when in accordance with the moral framework of the agents but 
false when not in accordance with the moral framework of the agents are referred to as 
'agent relativists,' while participants whose answers followed the reverse pattern are 
'appraiser relativists’ because their truth assessments follow the moral frameworks of 
the appraisers. The ‘mixed’ category consists of individuals who did not assign a truth 
value to the moral statement in one scenario, but indicated that they thought that the 
same statement was true (or false) in the other scenario. We suspect that participant 
confusion or frivolity accounts for this latter category.  
Being an agent relativist was not related to gender for any of the subsamples 
structured by nationality (American: χ²(1,469) = .765, p = .382; Indian: χ²(1,395) = 1.109, p 
= .292; Remaining: χ²(1,127) = .259, p = .611), nor was it related to nationality for either 
gender (Men: American vs. Indian: χ²(1,450) = .825, p = .364; American vs. Remaining 
χ²(1,272) = .248, p = .618; Indian vs. Remaining: χ²(1,352) = 1.413, p = .235; Women: 
American vs. Indian χ²(1,415) = .270, p = .603; American vs. Remaining: χ²(1,324) = .226, p = 
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.635, Indian vs. Remaining: χ²(1,170) = .527, p = .468). Being an appraiser relativist was 
not related to gender for most nationalities (American: χ²(1,469) = .520, p = .471; Indian: 
χ²(1,395) = .004, p = .949; Remaining: χ²(1,127) = 3.925, p = .048). We do not have enough 
participants in the remaining group for each nationality to conduct further analyses on 
this. The Indian group consisted of more appraiser relativists than did the American 
group for both genders (Men: χ²(1,450)= 5.736, p = .017; Women: χ²(1,414) = 10.103, p = 
.001), and the Indian group consisted of more appraiser relativists than did the 
Remaining group for women only: χ²(1,170) = 5.062, p = .024; the distributions in the 
other groups were not significantly different form each other (Men: American vs. 
Remaining: χ²(1,272) = 1.894, p = .169, Indian vs. Remaining: χ²(1,352) = .307, p = .579; 
Women: American vs. Remaining: χ²(1,324) = 1.453, p = .228).  
 
Table 16: Classification of participants: Meta-ethical manipulation 
Agent discordant, 
appraiser concordant 
Agent accordant, 
appraiser discordant 
Category Frequency (%)a 
True False Appraiser relativist 8.7 
False True Agent relativist 14.4 
True True Permissive 37.5 
False False Universalist 21.3 
Neither False/true Mixed 5.4 
False/true Neither Mixed 
Neither  Neither Neither 12.7 
aN=950. 
 
To determine whether participants were more likely to hold that the statement 
‘whipping is permissible’ was true when whipping was in accordance with the agents’ 
moral framework than when whipping was not in accordance with the agents’ moral 
framework, we again conducted a within-subject test; this was indeed the case (429 vs. 
382 of 677 participants, McNemar test, χ²(1,677)=119.443; p < .01).  
6.4.2.4 Consistency  
Finally, we asked whether being an agent relativist in the normative manipulation 
predicted being an agent or an appraiser relativist in the meta-ethical manipulation. We 
constructed dichotomous variables for being an agent relativist or not and for being an 
appraiser relativist or not. Being an agent relativist in the normative manipulation is 
strongly correlated with being an agent relativist in the meta-ethical manipulation 
χ²(1,991) = 809.385, p < .001. In contrast, being an agent relativist in the normative 
manipulation did not correlate with being an appraiser relativist in the meta-ethical 
manipulation: χ²(1,991) = .044, p = .833.  
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6.5 Discussion and conclusions 
6.5.1 Agent and appraiser relativism 
We investigated whether lay people’s moral evaluations are in accordance with agent 
relativism. We tested this in two ways. First, we asked participants to make a normative 
judgment about the same act while manipulating the moral frameworks of the agents. It 
was found that participants were more likely to consider the act morally permissible 
when it was in accordance with the agents’ moral framework. Second, we asked 
participants to assess the truth of the same moral judgment while manipulating the 
moral frameworks of the agents and of the appraisers. This way, the act was either in 
accordance with the agents’ moral framework and discordant with the appraisers’ 
moral framework, or in accordance with the appraisers’ moral framework and 
discordant with the agents’ moral framework. Again, participants were more likely to 
answer that it is true that the act was permissible when the act was in accordance with 
the agents’ moral framework.  
We classified participants according to their answer patterns. We found comparable 
frequencies of agent relativists in both manipulations. This is remarkable given that, in 
the meta-ethical manipulation but not in the normative manipulation, agent relativism 
was competing with appraiser relativism. Likewise, the agent relativist pattern appears 
to reflect a coherent position held by a substantial minority of participants, as it is not 
readily attributable to confusion or frivolity. Were it the case that the agent relativist 
pattern was spuriously generated, we would expect to find it appearing at 
approximately the same rate as other patterns that are parsimoniously likewise 
explained, namely the ‘reversed’ category (2.2% of participants in the normative 
manipulation) and the ‘mixed’ category (5.4% of participants in the meta-ethical 
manipulation); instead, agent relativism was vastly more common than either (17.3% 
and 14.4%, respectively). Similarly, there were no order effects, suggesting that the 
frequency of meta-ethical agent relativists in orders one to four was not influenced by 
the fact that these participants had first seen the normative manipulation. Moreover, 
agent relativism in the normative manipulation predicted agent relativism, but not 
appraiser relativism, in the meta-ethical manipulation. Thus, agent relativism was a 
stable feature in 14 to 17% of participants.  
That a non-trivial fraction of people consistently employ this form of reasoning 
indicates that researchers of moral relativism cannot make claims regarding moral 
relativism without first specifying the type of relativism at issue, nor can they attend 
only to appraiser relativism. Whether they be empiricists or theorists, researchers of 
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moral relativism must take seriously the existence of agent relativism, and must 
consider the important differences between it and appraiser relativism. 
While we have documented the existence of both agent relativists and appraiser 
relativists, these results also indicate that, for many participants, the given act was not 
morally permissible in any of the four situations. Additionally, appraiser relativism may 
be culture-dependent, as Indian participants were more likely to be appraiser relativists 
than were American participants, and Indian women were more likely to be appraiser 
relativists than women in the remaining group. We did not find any cultural differences 
in agent relativism. We did not predict effects of cultural background, and we recognize 
that country of residence is but a crude proxy for a participant’s culture, hence these 
findings should be considered highly preliminary, but deserving of future investigation 
nonetheless. 
Such substantial inter-individual variation in types of moral judging is in line with 
previous suggestions (e.g., Gill, 2009; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2009) that different individuals 
employ (or deploy) quite divergent moral language. The inter-individual variation that 
we have documented thus supports Gill’s position that philosophical theories that 
appeal to lay people’s speech acts cannot rely on a “handful of commonsense 
judgments,” (2009, p. 217), as the philosopher’s commonsense judgment will often fail to 
reflect the actual distribution of moral reasoning in the folk world. 
6.5.2 Agent versus appraiser normative relativism 
We can now return to the problem sketched in the previous chapter. Two relativists, P 
and G, reacted differently towards a universalist (U). How does this relate to the 
distinction made here? First of all, we assume for the sake of argument that both 
evaluations of moral judgments (assessments), and moral evaluations of acts (moral 
judgments), are related to interfering behavior. Thus, those who judge that whipping is 
wrong are inclined to interfere with the permitted whipping. Those who think that 
whipping is permissible for a group of agents are not inclined to interfere with it. Those 
who think that ‘whipping is permissible’ is true, are inclined to permit it, and those who 
think that ‘whipping is permissible’ is false, are inclined to interfere with it.  
The universalist who generally admonishes whipping will interfere with whipping 
(by raising awareness and demanding policies that prevent this kind of punishment). 
Two relativists react to the universalist: 
G: “What is wrong for me may not be wrong for you. It is wrong for me to whip 
another human being, but it is permissible for people in the whipping culture to whip 
another human being. Everyone should accept that; the universalist’s interference is 
wrong and I will interfere with it.”  
Agent relativism reappraised 
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P: “What is wrong for me may not be wrong for you. It is wrong for me to whip 
another human being, but it is permissible for people in the whipping culture to whip 
another human being.  If the universalist thinks interference with this whipping culture 
is permissible, then it is permissible for the universalist to interfere. I will not interfere 
with the universalist’s interference.”  
Now, clearly, G is an agent relativist and not an appraiser relativist. G thinks 
whipping is permissible (thus should not be interfered with) if all those involved in the 
act of whipping condone it. But G does not think that the truth of ‘whipping is 
permissible’ depends on those who are appraising the act. According to G, moral truth 
and permissibility merely depend on the agents, and not on the appraisers, and that is 
the end of the matter. G holds that every appraiser (including the universalist) should 
take the perspective of the agents (and all those involved) into account when judging an 
act, and universalists are sometimes wrong to interfere. 
P on the other hand relativizes moral statements to the agent and also to the 
appraiser. As a consequence, anyone who condemns whipping can veridically say that 
whipping is wrong and is permitted to act upon that. Thus P will not interfere with 
whipping in virtue of being an agent relativist, nor will P interfere with the interference 
of universalists.  
Of course, and importantly so, all this depends on the existence of a causal relation 
between moral judgments (or evaluations of moral judgments) and an impulse to act 
(e.g. to interfere). It remains an interesting question to what extent this assumption is 
correct. This may depend on the function of each specific moral judgment, e.g., whether 
a judgment functions to condemn others or whether it functions as one’s conscience. 
However, if there is such a link, agent/appraiser relativism will be defeasible by 
universalism in a way that pure agent relativism is not.  
Our argument also depends on a perceived close relation between assessments and 
moral judgments, such that ‘‘P is permissible’ is true’ is, according to lay people, 
equivalent to ‘P is permissible’. In this case, this assumption seems to be upheld because 
being an agent relativist in the normative condition (P is permissible) was predictive of 
being an agent relativist in the meta-ethical condition (it is true that P is permissible). 
Thus, given these assumptions, it seems that agent relativists can stand up for the rights 
of those holding different moral views, even when these views are under attack. 
However, coordination between non-interfering relativists and interfering others is 
not the only thing that constrains the possibility of relativizing one’s moral judgments 
or of  tolerating and respecting different ways of life. As an issue of practical feasibility, 
we have to take into account that living a life in accordance with our own values can be 
either supported or dwarfed by the actions of others. Wong (2006) and Hales (2009) 
discuss how ‘what we ought to do’ depends on what kind of person we are. However, 
what we can do also depends on others’ behavior and institutions that enable certain 
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ways of life. Thus our social environment can be a benefit or a hindrance to our personal 
commitments. This is the topic of the next chapter.  
  
This chapter is a revised version of Fessler D.M.T., and Quintelier K. (forthcoming). Suicide Bombers, Weddings, and 
Prison Tattoos. An Evolutionary Perspective on Subjective Commitment and Objective Commitment. In Richard 
Joyce, Kim Sterelny & Brett Calcott (Eds.), Signaling, Commitment, and Emotion. Cambridge: MIT Press.  
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Chapter 7  
Commitment and practical feasibility 
 
- Kaplan, 2010 
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7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we take a break from empirical research, move our focus away from 
the topic of morality and take a look at commitment instead. Commitment partly 
overlaps with morality, and can inform us about the practical feasibility of 
differences in lifestyles. Throughout this chapter, we will give examples of moral 
issues. At the end of this chapter, we discuss our findings in the light of toleration 
and of relativizing our moral judgments. 
Consider three hypothetical suicide bombers. The first seeks to die in a suicide 
attack because he believes that doing so is an effective means of achieving his goals, 
including obtaining access to sexual opportunities and ensuring the material and 
spiritual welfare of his family. The second seeks to die in a suicide attack because he 
is outraged at the treatment that he and others like him have received at the hands 
of their oppressors, he feels that his honor has been tarnished, and therefore longs 
to visit vengeance upon his enemy. The third seeks to die in a suicide attack 
because, having already recorded a videotape detailing his plan, the social costs of 
backing out would be enormous. In common parlance, all three are said to be 
committed to terrorist acts. However, this broad term masks important differences 
among these cases. For example, the presence of alternative avenues may readily 
dissuade the first bomber; the second bomber is less easily discouraged, yet may 
nonetheless falter at the critical moment; the third bomber is more reliable still. In 
reality, terrorist organizations recognize these differences, and seek to create 
redundant motivations by employing all three facets in conjunction (see Moghadam, 
2003).  
The central features of the notion of commitment are that, first, at the time at 
which commitment is initiated, multiple courses of action present themselves to the 
actor; in committing, the actor is choosing one of these options to pursue. Second, 
by definition, that choice is intended to endure despite the continued or anticipated 
attractiveness of alternatives. For example, business partners may promise to share 
workload equally, intending to keep their promise even when they could easily 
parasitize on the other. Importantly, markedly different proximal mechanisms 
might generate these two features of ‘selecting among options’ and ‘the durability of 
the choice.’ This heterogeneity is reflected in the remarks of Schelling, a seminal 
contributor to the modern study of commitment: “The ways to commit […] are 
many. Legally, one files suit. Reputationally, one takes a public position. Physically, 
one gathers speed before taking an intersection. Emotionally, one becomes 
obsessed” (Schelling, 2001, p. 49). In this chapter, we propose that, as inspection of 
these instances suggests, commitment draws attention to some of the many possible 
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factors that influence whether an individual’s behavior will be in line with one’s 
personal values.  
The goal of this chapter is to first disambiguate two major types of commitment, 
then stress the importance of hitherto neglected forms of commitment, and finally 
consider how disambiguating the processes at issue sheds light on coordination 
issues. We begin by distinguishing between subjective commitment and objective 
commitment (Section 7.2), then introduce the notion of a commitment device 
(Section 7.3). These concepts are all defined in relation to the committing individual 
– whether others play a role in committing, and what role they play, is irrelevant to 
these prior distinctions. In Section 7.4 we introduce various kinds of social 
interactions that can play a role in commitment, focusing on the costs and benefits 
that third parties incur in this regard. In Section 7.5 we turn to the communicative 
facets of commitment involving social interactions, arguing that signals stemming 
from objective commitments are more reliable than those that derive from 
subjective commitments. Many social commitments employ existing practices, 
hence in Section 7.6 we explore how culture shapes commitment through 
institutions.  
7.2 Subjective and objective commitment 
By subjective commitment we mean an internal, psychological phenomenon wherein, 
either consciously or subconsciously, individuals appraise one course of action as 
intrinsically superior to other courses of action, leading them to pursue it. In 
contrast to the first suicide bomber in the opening example, in cases of subjective 
commitment, the selected option is chosen not because it is deemed instrumentally 
superior, i.e., more likely to achieve some objective separate from the course of 
action itself, but rather because this course of action is valued more highly in and of 
itself. By our definition, commitments caused by reputational issues are not 
subjective, unless one is also (and then subjectively) committed to upholding one’s 
reputation. Analogously, individuals also have a subjective valuation of money, yet 
it would be nonsensical (or at least not useful) to say that an actor who engages in 
an action because he is paid to do so is subjectively committed to that course of action 
– at most, he might be subjectively committed to earning money. By the same token, 
in our terminology, an actor who is himself indifferent between two options, but 
selects one over the other because he knows that others will praise him for doing so, 
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is not subjectively committed to his choice but to the ensuing praise. Nonetheless, 
reputation is important for commitment. In Section 7.4, we will argue that 
reputation can play a significant role in all forms of commitment; this, however, 
depends on the role of third parties in a focal actor’s commitments.  
In pure subjective commitments, no externally generated costs befall the actor 
should the selected course of action subsequently be abandoned in favor of another 
option. We stress the source of costs here because subjective commitment does 
entail costs, but these arise internally, primarily in the form of aversive emotional 
states should the commitment be broken. In contrast, as we define it, objective 
commitment encompasses interactions with the external world that create a 
situation wherein the actor has narrowed the range of options, in that costs that are 
external to the actor will be incurred in the event of a subsequent change of course. 
The case of the third suicide bomber in our opening example illustrates the external 
nature of such costs: once the videotape has been made, the bomber’s own attitude 
toward the terrorist plan becomes far less relevant to the costs that he will suffer if 
he fails to carry it out – were he to back out, dissemination of the videotape would 
ensure the ostracism of him and his family. Note that for objective commitment to 
obtain, it is crucial that the actor voluntarily takes steps that change the costs of 
alternative courses of action. If such changes are the product of events not 
involving the actor’s own actions, then the term “commitment” does not apply, e.g., 
when robbed at gunpoint, the victim is coerced, not committed, to handing over his 
wallet. 
Neither subjective or objective commitment necessarily requires the other form 
in order to ensure that commitment is successful (i.e., that the selected course of 
action is followed to its conclusion). Strong subjective commitment requires no 
objective commitment because the actor’s current ranking of the relative 
desirability of the various courses of actions is wholly predictive of the actor’s 
future rankings: In strong subjective commitment the valuation of one option over 
others does not change over time, the course of action selected is pursued to its 
completion without fail. For example, our second hypothetical suicide bomber may 
be so firm in his belief in the moral rectitude of his cause, and so unwavering in his 
hatred of his foe, that neither concern for himself, empathy for his victims, nor 
obstacles in his way will lead him to abandon his plans. Conversely, strong objective 
commitment requires no subjective commitment because the alternative courses of 
action have been made prohibitively expensive (or, in some cases, eliminated 
entirely). For example, in order to protect themselves from security forces, some 
terrorist organizations make it difficult, or even fatal, to leave the organization once 
one has joined, thereby substantially obviating the need for unwavering ideological 
or emotional motives (see Crenshaw, 1987; Miller, 2006). 
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In all objective commitments, the act of choosing alters the cost/benefit ratios, or 
availability, of the various courses of action. The same is not true of many forms of 
subjective commitment, as, much of the time, there is no feedback from the course 
of action to the emotions and values that motivated the choice. However, a subclass 
of subjective commitments involves selecting a course of action that, by virtue of its 
inherent subsequent effects on the actor, generates secondary subjective 
motivations that reinforce the original hierarchy of preferences. For example, an 
individual who wishes to reduce his salt intake for health reasons will, if he adheres 
to a low-sodium diet, find that his appetite for salt eventually diminishes, making 
his new diet more palatable than his old diet. Likewise, a teenager who wishes to 
overcome the aversive aspects of cigarette smoking in order to appear fashionable 
will, if she smokes consistently, become chemically dependent on nicotine. Mere 
habit may also offer mild forms of secondary subjective reinforcers: Following 
practices that have become habitual requires less concentration than deviating 
from them. Nevertheless, as centuries of discussions in philosophy and theology 
attest, many of the most important manifestations of subjective commitment lack 
such secondary subjective reinforcers – when discussing sexual fidelity, courage in 
battle, and similar challenges, observers have long understood that it is precisely 
because the relative attractiveness of the alternative, un-chosen options remains 
unaltered (or even increases) after one has chosen to commit that strong forms of 
subjective commitment are often needed to fulfill the selected course of action. One 
partial solution to this challenge is to augment the initial choice with secondary 
choices, as discussed below.  
7.3 Commitment Devices 
In some circumstances, once a course of action has been selected from among the 
available options, provided that the option takes some time to be completed, it is 
possible to then additionally select a second course of action, unrelated to the first, 
that serves to increase the probability that the commitment will be successful. We 
define a commitment device as any action that is taken with the intention of 
increasing the probability that a commitment will be successful. Both subjective and 
objective commitment can be boosted by commitment devices. 
Actors can seek to maintain subjective commitment by structuring their 
environment in a manner that reinforces or re-generates the initial motivation to 
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commit. For example, after being demoted for drinking on the job, an alcoholic may 
be subjectively committed to giving up alcohol. However, anticipating that the 
shame and regret undergirding this commitment will fade over time, while the pain 
of alcohol withdrawal will increase, the alcoholic may seek to maintain his 
subjective commitment by posting a copy of his demotion letter on his wall, thereby 
re-eliciting the subjective state that led to his decision. We suggest that 
commitment devices are quite common. Religious symbols and icons displayed in 
the home evoke feelings of piety and reinforce the choice to forgo temptation; 
photos of loved ones, lockets, and similar reminders are akin to minor emotional 
spark plugs, reinvigorating dedication to the goal of benefiting the depicted 
individuals (e.g. Gonzaga, Haselton, Smurda, Davies, & Poore, 2008); and so on.  
As is true with regard to subjective commitment, commitment devices are not an 
intrinsic part of objective commitment. Some choices are themselves costly or 
impossible to reverse, hence taking them objectively commits the actor to pursuing 
the chosen action. For example, as noted earlier, in some terrorist or criminal 
organizations, once one has joined the organization, subsequent options are limited 
to a choice between continued membership and death.  
Nevertheless, commitment devices can also bolster objective commitment. For 
example, being committed to raising awareness for a certain cause involves 
objective commitment, as the act of rallying for the environment generates 
reputational costs if the actor changes camp at some later date. However, for every 
additional public action to the benefit of the cause, one creates an objective 
commitment, as this commitment device increases the reputational cost of 
changing sides.  
7.4 Social facets of commitment 
7.4.1 Investment  
Neither subjective commitment, nor objective commitment intrinsically requires 
interaction with other parties. For example, suicide can be pursued in isolation by 
simply stopping the consumption of food and drink (a process involving subjective 
commitment, as both the opportunity to change course and the attractiveness of 
alternatives continue to exist until the process is completed) or jumping off a 
precipice (a process involving objective commitment, as other options simply 
Commitment and practical feasibility 
 187 
evaporate once the action is begun). However, social interaction is usually a part of 
commitment. Interesting complications develop when a social component occurs, as 
social interaction in the context of commitment raises two distinct classes of issues, 
namely investment and communication.  
Social interactions can function as commitment devices, or as investments in 
other’s commitments. 
Because social interactions are themselves powerful elicitors of emotions, social 
interactions can strengthen the emotional underpinnings of subjective 
commitment. Similarly, because we are prone to both imitate prestigious 
individuals and conform to the ideas held by a majority of the members of our 
group, others can have a strong influence on an actor’s values. As a consequence of 
these and similar phenomena, social interactions can reinforce the hierarchy of 
preferences at the heart of subjective commitment. Together, these effects allow 
certain forms of social interaction to serve as commitment devices for subjective 
commitment. For example, our aforementioned alcoholic may join a self-help 
support group in which he is encouraged to revisit his shameful past failures, is 
provided with extensive input regarding the value of abstention, and is placed in 
relationships with successful role models. In this case, the members of the support 
group cooperate with the focal individual in order to help him fulfill his 
commitment. Resembling the manner in which objects can help sustain subjective 
commitment, the support group can operate as a subjective commitment device.  
Social interactions can also be a powerful source of commitment devices in 
objective commitments, as interactions can be used to change the cost or 
availability of alternative courses of action. In some cases, others are directed to 
enact a commitment device on behalf of the actor, as when Odysseus instructed his 
crew to first tie him to the mast of their vessel, then ignore his subsequent orders 
until they had sailed beyond the point where he would be able to hear the Sirens’ 
seductive songs. In other cases, others are themselves the source of some of the 
costs and benefits of various courses of action, such that they are part and parcel of 
the commitment device. For example, publicly swearing an oath or issuing a 
promise creates a context wherein failing to adhere to the selected course of action 
entails reputational costs that increase the incentive to adhere to the commitment. 
This already shows that certain institutional services can have a mediating effect 
on living in accord with the values one is committed to. Overly repressive reactions 
to recreational drug use, for example cutting in subsidized rehabilitation programs 
in favor of repression and criminalization, will not do well for a drug user caught in 
flagrante delicto. Then again, repression might scare and discourage adventurous 
individuals from trying drugs in the first place.  
Whenever others play a role in commitment devices, they pay some cost in doing 
so, even if, in the minimal case, it is only time and attention. This raises the question 
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of why others are willing to pay such costs. In some cases, others are subject to 
larger contracts that encompass the given interaction – payroll officers are paid to 
manage payrolls; Odysseus’ crew was obliged to follow his orders; doctors are paid 
to visit patients; and so on. In other cases, despite the absence of a larger contract, 
other parties participate in a non-symmetrical and non-reciprocal manner. For 
example, in the oath-swearing case, reputational factors are at stake precisely 
because observers benefit from knowing whether the focal actor is the sort of 
person who adheres to oaths, cares about others’ opinions, and so on, information 
that is useful to the observers because they can then employ it in making decisions 
regarding possible relationships with the focal actor. In still other cases, 
participation is a non-symmetrical reciprocal act; for example, in Alcoholics 
Anonymous, it is believed that an experienced sponsor benefits by mentoring a new 
member, as mentoring purportedly assists the sponsor in his own pursuit of 
sobriety. Most interesting, perhaps, are those cases in which participation is a 
symmetrical reciprocal act, i.e., all parties are in pursuit of the same objective, and 
they each generate a commitment device for the other. For example, rotating 
savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) are a mechanism that, among other 
functions, provides reciprocal social commitment devices that generate objective 
commitment to save up lump sums. In a common variant of this institution, at 
scheduled intervals, each member contributes a fixed amount to a pool, and the 
pooled funds are given to a single member at each meeting; this cycle is repeated 
until all members have received the pool one time. Once an individual has joined a 
ROSCA group, she is objectively committed to adhering to the contribution 
schedule, as failing to do so will elicit the wrath of those pool recipients whose 
proceeds would thereby ultimately be less than their net contributions. Although 
the respective roles are sequential rather than simultaneous, these social 
commitment devices are relatively symmetrical: Due to simple self-interest, each 
member is motivated to perform the role of enforcer for each of the other members 
(Fessler, 2002). This symmetry means that the system can be self-sustaining: It does 
not rely on any additional benefits to ensure that actors are willing to pay the costs 
of enacting commitment devices for one another.  
The recognition that enacting commitment devices for others entails investment 
can focus researchers’ attention on the benefits that those who serve in such a 
capacity reap. The higher the costs, the greater the benefits must be if the 
commitment device is to be reliably enacted. Given this, reciprocal symmetrical 
arrangements such as ROSCAs in which each party performs the same function for 
the other will often be among the most stable such systems.  
However, as attentive readers may have noticed, costs and benefits do not need 
to coincide in time. This creates the possibility of defection: A focal actor may claim 
to commit to a certain action but then change her behavior as soon as third parties 
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have invested. In the next section, we turn to the question of when signals of 
commitment are reliable versus when defection is likely.  
7.4.2 Communication and reliability 
The communicative aspect of commitment has long played a central role in 
scholarly treatments of the topic (e.g., Schelling, 1960). In both situations involving 
conflict (ibid.) and situations involving cooperation (Hirshleifer, 1987), the optimal 
course of action by one party is often contingent on the course of action selected by 
the other party. In such contexts, commitment is frequently conceptualized as a 
pledge that is communicated by one party, with the intention of influencing the 
behavior of the other party (Schelling, 2001, p. 48; Hirshleifer, 1987; Nesse, 2001). A 
signaled commitment is a threat if the signaler pledges to do something at a cost to 
himself that inflicts a cost on the adversary. The intention is to change the 
adversary’s behavior in a way that will be beneficial to the signaler. At the same 
time, the adversary’s new behavior will also be more beneficial to the adversary in 
light of the possibility that the threat will be carried out. For example, during an 
armed robbery, the robber threatens to shoot the victim if he does not hand over his 
wallet. Shooting is bad for the victim but also bad for the robber, who faces harsher 
punishment if caught. Before the threat, handing over his wallet would not be in the 
victim’s interest. When threatened, it becomes in the victim’s interest to hand over 
his wallet. However, it also becomes in the thief’s interest that the victim do so 
because carrying out the threat (shooting) is costly to the thief. Conversely, a 
signaled commitment is a promise if the signaler pledges to do something at a cost 
to himself that will provide a benefit to the other party. The intention is again to 
regulate the other party’s behavior such that it is beneficial to the signaler. At the 
same time, the partner’s new behavior will also be more beneficial to the partner in 
the event that the promise is kept. As the examples suggest, threats occur primarily 
in cases of conflict, while promises are common in cases of cooperation. 
Threats and promises are members of a larger class of signals describing 
purported future actions by the signaler; those inform the recipient about its 
optimal choice among the available courses of action. In deciding whether to act on 
such signals, recipients must, however, consider the signal’s reliability, where 
reliability has to do with the accuracy of the forecast that the signal provides 
concerning the signaler’s future behavior. As we have seen, regulating behavior 
contingent on a signal of commitment is beneficial only if the threat would 
otherwise be followed through to completion; regulating behavior contingent on a 
promise is beneficial only if the promise is followed through to completion.  
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But how can the recipient be certain that the signal of commitment is reliable? In 
the robbery example, shooting is very costly to the robber, so he would do well to 
avoid it, while the victim, knowing this, would do well to keep his wallet if the 
threat is, in fact, an empty one. Among the factors that influence the reliability of 
signals of commitment (and hence their impact on recipients’ behavior) the 
distinction between subjective and objective commitment plays a central role. 
Subjective commitments can certainly be powerful determinants of behavior. 
Consider, for example, that the evolved psychological systems that motivate eating 
and drinking markedly increase the attractiveness of these behaviors as the period 
of deprivation progresses, yet subjectively committed hunger strikers nonetheless 
sometimes fulfill their threats by fasting to death in pursuit of political objectives. 
Nevertheless, despite such dramatic examples of the powerful and enduring nature 
of some subjective commitments, recipients of signals of subjective commitment 
face the problem that such signals can be unreliable for two reasons. First, if the 
focal actor’s internal motivators change between the time of the signal and the time 
of the behavior of interest to the recipient, then the signal will inaccurately forecast 
the behavior. The fact that today someone is passionately in love, or fervently 
dedicated to a political cause, does not preclude the possibility that they will not be 
so tomorrow, or next year – people ‘fall out of’ love, become disillusioned with 
causes, substitute new beliefs and values for old ones, and so on. Second, the focal 
actor may seek to deceive the recipient in order to manipulate the recipient’s 
subsequent actions.  
As prior investigators (e.g., Frank, 1988) have noted, signals associated with 
subjective commitment afford deceptive manipulation. By virtue of the fact that the 
determinants of the focal actor’s commitment are internal, they cannot be directly 
observed by the recipient of the signal. As a consequence, it will often be relatively 
simple for the focal actor to send signals that falsely convey the nature or degree of 
the commitment – declarations of love or political dedication are unreliable because 
it is relatively easy to lie about one’s emotions and values. In the abstract, there is 
no intrinsic connection between sentiments and statements, hence recipients of 
statements of subjective commitment are often rightly skeptical of them. And yet, 
subjective commitment is an undeniably real phenomenon. Seeking to explain the 
ultimate functions of subjective commitment, a number of investigators have asked 
how subjective commitment might nonetheless lead to signals of sufficient 
reliability.  
Hirshleifer (1987) and Frank (1987; 1988) promulgated versions of what has 
become an influential theory of subjective commitment wherein many emotions are 
described as evolved mechanisms that not only generate subjective commitment, 
but, moreover, signal to other parties by virtue of costly voluntary acts. Around the 
same time, Gauthier (1986) proposed a somewhat parallel account of internalized 
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moral norms. Hirshleifer, Frank, and Gauthier all propose that witnessing acts that 
have some cost attached to them, particularly when numerous and distributed over 
a prolonged period, leads the observer to accurately infer the dispositional nature of 
the focal actor, i.e., to discern that actor’s chronologically stable hierarchy of 
preferences. In other words, through repeated actions, the actor establishes a 
reputation that accurately captures his enduring propensities.  
Such accounts hold that the honesty of the signal is maintained through 
budgetary constraints, cognitive constraints, or both. What do we mean by this? 
Turning first to budgetary constraints, it is claimed that the larger the number of 
signals emitted, the greater the costs of employing a deceptive strategy. Habitually 
acting in a manner consistent with a given disposition is therefore claimed to 
provide a reliable index of that disposition to long-term observers. However, as 
illustrated by the case of spies and sleeper cells, if the benefits are great enough, it 
will be worth paying substantial costs to repeatedly emit false signals. Moreover, 
even in cases that do not involve malice aforethought, at the time that an 
opportunity for substantial gain through defection occurs, past signaling costs are 
already sunk, hence, from a cost/benefit perspective, the only logical consideration 
is whether the costs of the reputational damage caused by defection, outweigh the 
benefits of defection. If the benefits of defection are sufficiently large so as to 
outweigh the reputational costs, it is economically rational to defect. In short, 
cost/benefit considerations suggest that, while many past acts of accurate signaling 
may well predict future instances when costs are low, there is no inherent strategic 
impetus for continued consistency when opportunities for substantial gain through 
defection present themselves. This means that, while the mechanisms that underlie 
much of subjective commitment (e.g., moral emotions such as guilt, shame or 
loyalty) may well have evolved in part because they reliably indicated future actions 
and thus persuaded recipients of the focal actor’s trustworthiness, such mechanisms 
will often not suffice in high-stake situations.  
Turning to cognitive constraints, a second tenet of Frank’s (1987; 1988) position is 
that the reliability of repeated observations of signals derives in part from the 
greater cognitive demands of deception, relative to honesty. Because sustained 
pretense is more cognitively taxing than acting in a manner that accurately reflects 
one’s motives, multiple observations over prolonged periods will reveal the 
reliability of a focal actor’s signals, as a manipulative actor will make occasional 
mistakes that reveal the underlying misrepresentation. While evidence continues to 
accumulate that deception is indeed more cognitively demanding than honesty 
(e.g., Walczyk et al., 2009), this argument nonetheless suffers from limitations 
similar to those that weaken the budgetary reasoning discussed above. First, we can 
expect cognitive resources to be marshaled in proportion to the importance of the 
task at hand. In pursuit of substantial benefits through long-term deception, spies 
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and sleeper cells succeed at manipulating others in part through rehearsal and 
memorization, practices that, while costly, are worth the price given the benefits at 
issue. Second, all such considerations apply primarily to cases of malice 
aforethought, and are less relevant to decision making at the time that a new 
opportunity for substantial gains through defection presents itself. Overall, the 
observation that deception is sufficiently common − such that it apparently selected 
for evolved mechanisms for detecting cheaters (Cosmides & Tooby, 2005; 
Verplaetse, Vanneste, & Braeckman, 2007) − suggests that, over evolutionary time, 
cognitive constraints have often not been prohibitive when it really matters. In 
sum, while existing signaling accounts of emotions and morality may shed light on 
contributors to subjective commitment, they do not resolve the problem of the 
fundamentally unreliable nature of signals of subjective commitment. 
In contrast to signals associated with subjective commitments, objective 
commitments are maintained by factors that are external to the individual. As a 
consequence, observers will often be able to more directly discern the determinants 
of the focal actor’s actions, thus increasing their ability to forecast the focal actor’s 
future behavior. Of course, signals associated with objective commitment are not 
entirely immune to deceptive manipulation. Focal actors can falsely create the 
impression that such external factors exist when they do not. For example, Kahn 
(1965, p. 11) gives the example of winning the drivers’ game of chicken by removing 
the steering wheel and conspicuously throwing it out the window. This signals that 
one cannot move out of the way, thus motivating the opponent to move out of the 
way first. However, these actions are potentially subject to deception, as the thrown 
wheel may not, in fact, be the steering wheel from the given car, the focal actor may 
have a secondary means of steering (such as a smaller steering wheel not visible to 
the opponent), and so on (Kurzban, pers. comm.). Nonetheless, while both 
subjective and objective commitment signals are amenable to deception, signals 
associated with objective commitment can more readily be subjected to systematic 
scrutiny, thus increasing their reliability. As a consequence, we may expect 
objective commitments to have a stronger effect on others’ behavior. 
A key factor influencing the ability of observers to forecast the behavior of focal 
actors in situations of objective commitment is the extent of the costs underlying 
the given commitment. If alternative courses of action have not been eliminated, 
then signals associated with objective commitments are only as reliable as the size 
of the costs attending alternative courses of action, as this predicts the likelihood 
that the focal actor will not subsequently change course – when the costs are low, 
objective commitment is weak, i.e., the actor may subsequently decide that the costs 
are worth paying, and alter course accordingly. However, once again, observers will 
have greater access to this information than is true in subjective commitment, and 
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hence signals referencing this information will be more reliable than is often the 
case with regard to subjective commitment. 
This does not mean that, in cases in which no deception is involved and the costs 
of alternative courses of action are high, forecasts based on signals associated with 
objective commitment are perfect. With the exception of those objective 
commitments in which alternative courses of action have been irreversibly 
eliminated, it is possible that external costs and benefits will change before the 
fulfillment of the course of action, whereafter the focal actor’s behavior may then 
change accordingly. However, particularly when compared with the fluctuations of 
emotions and values, many features of the world may be quite stable. More 
importantly, even when they are not stable, their change can be observed in ways 
that internal states cannot. Correspondingly, particularly in stable environments, 
observers can be expected to have greater confidence in forecasts associated with 
objective commitment than in those associated with subjective commitment.  
Taken together, the above considerations indicate that, while caveats apply, 
signals associated with subjective commitment will generally be less reliable than 
signals associated with objective commitment. The focal actor motivated by 
subjective commitment who stands to benefit from signaling her commitment to 
others therefore faces the dilemma that, being unreliable, such signals will likely 
not have sufficient effect on others’ actions. A partial solution is to create an 
observable commitment device that reinforces subjective commitment, as 
knowledge of this device can provide some reassurance to observers. For example, 
our aforementioned demoted alcoholic might document for his employer that he 
has joined Alcoholics Anonymous. However, because commitment devices of this 
type merely enhance subjective commitment, signals associated with them still 
suffer from the problems of reliability intrinsic to subjective commitment itself. 
Because of the fundamental asymmetry in reliability between subjective and 
objective commitments, a focal actor motivated by subjective commitment who 
wishes to substantially increase her ability to influence observers will therefore 
often be best served by initiating parallel objective commitments through the use of 
commitment devices. 
Consider the problem of marriage. A substantial corpus of literature supports the 
assertion that, consonant with the central role of reproduction in natural selection, 
much of contemporary human behavior in this domain reflects the workings of 
evolved psychological mechanisms (for a review, see Sefcek, Brumbach, Vasquez, & 
Miller, 2006). Viewed in evolutionary terms, heterosexual courtship presents a 
prototypical signaling dilemma of the type described above. For women, a 
committed male partner affords substantial fitness benefits through provisioning, 
co-parenting, and protection. However, women face a signaling problem: Men who 
wish to pursue a high-investment strategy run the risk that their partners will be 
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surreptitiously unfaithful, leading these men to miss-allocate their investment by 
provisioning another man’s progeny. A woman who seeks to secure a high-investing 
partner therefore profits by signaling that she will be faithful to her prospective 
husband. However, given the benefits to women of securing investment from one 
man and genes from another (reviewed in Pillsworth & Haselton, 2006), men, in 
turn, should be skeptical of women’s declarations of subjective commitment. 
Elizabeth Pillsworth and Robert Kurzban (pers. comm.) have each proposed that 
limerence, the form of romantic love motivating sincere courtship (Tennov, 1979), 
impels the actor to conspicuously and consistently spurn alternative suitors, 
thereby generating observable objective commitment by narrowing the options 
available to the woman. Once a woman has a child by a man, the costs to her of 
being abandoned by her mate increase. These costs then create an objective 
commitment in the woman to being faithful.  
Now, consider the same situation from the perspective of a male suitor. Because 
the obligate biological costs of reproduction are low for men, men have the option 
of pursuing either a long term strategy (one or a few partners in whom much is 
invested) or a short term strategy (many partners in whom little is invested). As a 
consequence, women should be skeptical of men’s declarations of subjective 
commitment in this regard, as some purported dads are likely to be deceptive cads. 
Because provisioning loomed large among the benefits that men provided to women 
and their children in ancestral populations, and hence plays a central role in mating 
psychology today, one solution available to the male suitor is to provide initial gifts 
that are sufficiently substantial as to constitute an objective commitment. American 
folk culture specifies that the man should give the woman a diamond engagement 
ring and, importantly, it should cost 25% of his annual salary; this is to be followed 
later by a similarly-priced wedding ring. Because the gifts become the property of 
the recipient (i.e., the man cannot subsequently retrieve the rings), these practices 
constitute sequential additive objective commitment devices (Sozou & Seymour, 
2005; see also Brinig, 1990) – due to the financial constraints involved, the farther 
down the path to the altar that the man proceeds, the less feasible it becomes for 
him to alter course and seek to woo another woman. Lastly, although engagement 
and wedding rings are a culturally and historically parochial invention, the 
institution of requiring male suitors to provide a substantial up-front payment is 
not unique to modern nations, occurring in two-thirds of societies (Anderson, 2007). 
Bride wealth or bride service (providing labor, rather than wealth, to the bride’s 
family) occur in almost half of extant foraging societies (Apostolou, 2008). Dowries 
on the other hand, where parents provide payment to a man when he is to marry 
their daughter, are found only in a small fraction of the world’s societies (see 
Anderson, 2007), 2.44% according to Apostolou (2008). Moreover, they have a 
different function than bride wealth: Dowries are associated with social 
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stratification wherein parents are able to move up the social hierarchy by providing 
inducements for higher-status men to marry their daughters (Anderson, 2007).  
7.5 The role of institutions in commitment 
Many classes of public behaviors can act as objective commitments or as 
commitment devices. Once the chosen course of action has been broadcast, 
deviation from that course can entail reputational costs. However, this is not the 
only avenue whereby public behaviors can play a role in commitment. When 
individuals take on a social role associated with obligations or responsibilities, failure 
to properly perform that role may lead to active punishment by other parties.  
What public acts belong to a specific role is culturally defined. For example, in 
regard to the case mentioned in the introduction, the role of “living martyr,” the 
final stage of preparation for a suicide bombing mission, has been highly codified 
among Palestinian terrorist organizations, and the testimonial video shot during 
this phase is likewise culturally dictated, with standardized props and set phrases 
being employed (see Moghadam, 2003). Performing the prescribed actions that will 
serve to publicize one’s status as martyr generates powerful objective commitment; 
this in turn bolsters or rekindles subjective commitment (Sosis & Alcorta, 2008). 
Importantly, such practices are neither limited to rare or malicious behaviors such 
as suicidal terrorism. For example, in the cultures in which they occur, engagement, 
wedding rings and formal marriage ceremonies serve the dual purpose of 
publicizing the commitments at issue and linking them to a widely-shared set of 
cultural pre- and proscriptions. This linkage increases the likelihood that failure to 
adhere to cultural strictures will elicit punishment. In turn, because prospective 
punishers decide whether or not to punish in part based on the likelihood that 
others will punish, reducing ambiguity as to the acceptability of any given act 
increases the likelihood that a given prospective punisher will punish (see DeScioli 
& Kurzban, 2009; Boyd, Gintis, & Bowles, 2010). Thus, punishment is more likely 
when all participants in a culture interpret a public act, its expectations, and its 
ensuing obligations in the same way. By formalizing the public acts whereby roles 
are assumed, culture thus provides actors with powerful objective commitment 
devices that allow them to reliably signal their commitments and future actions to 
other parties. 
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It appears that all societies employ institutionalized practices to formalize and 
publicize commitments, generating objective commitment. In particular, oaths and 
similar formal pledges or promises appear to be a human universal (Brown, 1991). 
Oaths can serve as objective commitment devices via a variety of pathways. 
Although the degree varies across instances, all oaths and promises are attended by 
norms of sanctity, such that violating them constitutes a moral failing above and 
beyond mere dishonesty, inconsistency, or hypocrisy. As such, these acts attach 
substantial additional costs to deviation from the selected course of action. Indeed, 
oaths often contain within them an invocation of external costs should the oath be 
violated. A common variant of this is to appeal to supernatural agents or forces as 
sanctioners, as in “…may God strike me dead,” or “…cross my heart and hope to die.” 
Supernaturalism is not mandatory, however, and some oaths even contain within 
them an explicit social contract empowering others to enforce the oath, as in the 
initiation vow of the Nuestra Familia prison gang in California: “If I go forward, 
follow me; if I hesitate, push me; if they kill me, avenge me; if I am a traitor, kill me” 
(quoted in Phelan & Hunt, 1998). 
Thus, culturally-constituted practices may generate objective commitment to a 
group. However, the assumed role may be publicized not only to members of the in-
group, but also to members of out-groups. For example, some of the most powerful 
rites binding a new member to a group involve permanent body modification. Such 
advertisements of affiliation can constitute objective commitment devices as, in the 
event of intergroup hostility or discrimination, emblematic body modification that 
identifies group identity will elicit hostility from out-group members. Practices such 
as ritual surgical modification and scarification are more common in groups that 
engage in intergroup warfare than in peaceful groups or those that engage in 
intragroup conflict, a pattern explicable in terms of the need for warlike groups to 
bind their members to the group in order to prevent freeriding (Sosis, Kress, & 
Boster, 2007). Similarly, in the U.S., prison gangs such as Nuestra Familia are 
engaged in endemic violent conflict; these gangs employ a graded system of 
tattooing wherein the more visible the tattoo, the greater the perceived dedication 
to, and hence status within, the group (Phelan & Hunt, 1998). This is clearly a 
product of the levels of objective commitment generated by different tattoos, as, for 
example, individuals tattooed on the face and neck cannot pass as non-members of 
the gang, hence neutrality is impossible during intergroup conflicts.  
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7.6 Commitment and gene-culture co-evolution 
As previous commentators have noted at length (Hirshleifer, 1987; Frank, 1987, 
1988), objective commitment can be used to increase cooperation in a wide variety 
of domains, as each party can be confident that, due to the increases in the cost of 
defection entailed by the given objective commitment, the other party will 
cooperate. Importantly, while people occasionally invent novel objective 
commitment devices to facilitate cooperation, concordant with their linkage with 
both culturally-defined roles and reputation and punishment, this objective is 
usually achieved through existing culturally-defined practices. That such 
institutions are frequently available precisely in those contexts in which they are 
most useful is explicable in terms of cultural group selection. Consider the case of 
body modification discussed above. Intergroup conflict is an important source of 
selective pressure in cultural evolution, as groups that can successfully solve the 
free-rider problem can marshal larger and more cohesive combat forces than those 
that cannot, leading the former to decimate, or conquer and assimilate, the latter 
(Boyd & Richerson, 2009). Moreover, while dramatic, the case of intergroup conflict 
is not unique. Because groups characterized by higher rates of cooperation will be 
more prosperous, more stable, and more competitive than groups characterized by 
lower rates, cultural group selection can be expected to favor the cultural evolution 
of a wide variety of institutionalized practices that support cooperation (Boyd & 
Richerson, 2009). This principle is nicely illustrated in Kanter’s (1968) study of 
utopian communities, in which community longevity is shown to be correlated with 
both the contribution of all private assets to the common pool and the public 
renunciation of outside social ties upon initiation. These two measures objectively 
narrow alternative courses of action for all parties. The magnitude of the cost, 
together with the group-wide nature of the measure, increase dedication to, and 
cooperation within, the collective, as all parties know that the others are subject to 
the same objective commitments. 
Noting that longstanding patterns of cultural practice can generate selective 
pressure for the biological evolution of traits that enhance fitness in such cultural 
environments, Richerson and Boyd (2001; Boyd & Richerson, 2009) argue that 
institutions supporting cooperation and collective action have co-evolved with 
psychological propensities that undergird subjective commitment to groups. We 
concur, noting that many institutions appear exquisitely well designed to bolster 
subjective commitment and, correspondingly, humans seem markedly susceptible 
to such practices. Indeed, Kanter’s (1968) study also revealed that the longevity of 
utopian groups is positively related to the presence of ideologies and rituals that 
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involve the diminution of autonomy and surrender to the collective, practices that, 
in even more extreme form, are found among terrorist organizations (reviewed in 
Atran, 2003, and Moghadam, 2003), and, in less extreme form, are readily observed 
in the ceremonies of all major religions, the folk rituals practiced at professional and 
collegiate sporting events, and so on. Nevertheless, much as we agree with 
Richerson and Boyd in this regard, as our earlier example of engagement rings 
implies, we wish to carry their position one step further. We suggest that the 
psychological features responsible for many kinds of commitment, and not merely 
commitment to groups, have co-evolved with diverse cultural practices that shape 
commitment. We thus hypothesize that actors are innately prepared to recognize 
(albeit not always explicitly) the affordances that cultural practices offer as 
commitment devices, including opportunities to employ institutionalized 
commitment devices that both add an objective component to subjective 
commitment and provide other parties with a reliable signal whereby they can 
forecast the focal actor’s future behavior. 
The above hypothesis has two entailments, one cognitive/behavioral, the other 
affective. First, people will seize upon culturally-provided means to solve both the 
personal and the social aspects of commitment problems. For example, Brinig (1990) 
has compellingly demonstrated that, although the institution of the engagement 
ring had existed in some form for centuries, the practice only became widespread 
(and, eventually, highly normative) in the U.S. following the repeal of breach of 
promise-to-marry laws in the first half of the twentieth century. These laws had 
allowed a woman to sue a man for substantial sums if he broke off their 
engagement, with additional compensation awarded in the event that she had lost 
her virginity with him during that period (as was fairly common at the time). This 
legal recourse for women created an objective commitment for men who proposed 
marriage. As a consequence, women enjoyed increased certainty that proposals 
would be followed by marriage. When legislatures repealed these laws, both 
skeptical women and their sincere suitors were left without an institutionalized 
objective commitment device to solve their cooperation problem. Engagement 
rings, already known but not widely employed, provided a solution, and a 
previously rare behavior rapidly became common. Moreover, rings provided 
affordances absent from breach of promise laws, as wearing the ring signals to a 
woman’s other potential suitors that she is no longer available. Accordingly, 
confidence that his partner will display the ring in public (e.g., because she has 
elected to size the ring such that it cannot readily be removed) provides additional 
reassurance to a man that she will be faithful. The ring can enhance a woman’s own 
efforts at reliable signaling via an objective commitment device. Our point here is 
that individual commitment psychology and culture work together. On the one 
hand, cultural practices provide standardized mechanisms for solving cooperative 
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commitment problems, and, on the other hand, such practices are refined and 
transmitted in part due to individuals’ propensities to recognize the relative utility 
in this regard of different practices. 
The second entailment of our gene-culture co-evolutionary account is our claim 
that humans are unique in that, living within a culturally-constituted reality, they 
experience an intimate feedback between subjective commitment and culturally-
shaped objective commitment. In our view, participants in cultural practices that 
generate objective commitment are often deeply moved by those practices precisely 
because they recognize the objective commitment aspect, and thus understand that 
their participation provides a reliable signal to others. We expect, for example, that 
the intensity of the sentiments experienced by a bride and groom at their wedding 
will increase with the size of the audience and the degree to which the wedding 
conforms to cultural templates. The same will be true of the allegiance of a suicide 
bomber to his cause, the devotion of an initiate to his group at an initiation, or the 
dedication of an oath-taker to the principles espoused in her oath. This is because, 
as discussed previously, audience size and cultural standardization are determinants 
of the degree of objective commitment. We propose that the mental mechanisms 
that generate subjective commitment are sensitive to the extent to which recipients 
of signals concerning the focal actor’s future behavior can accept those signals as 
reliable – when subjective commitment leads to objective commitment, the focal 
actor experiences intense emotions in part because she knows that both she and 
others can be confident that her future path is laid. 
In sum, we suggest that, while nonhuman animals likely experience subjective 
commitment of sorts (Dugatkin, 2001), and certainly recognize the external factors 
that generate objective commitment, unlike humans, they are not psychologically 
equipped to recognize how socially transmitted practices can translate subjective 
commitments into objective commitments, nor are they able to experience an 
enhancement of subjective commitments through the enactment of cultural 
commitment devices. Consonant with the highly cooperative nature of our species, 
humans possess an evolved psychology and a corresponding cultural repertoire that 
allows us to engage in commitment to a degree unprecedented in evolutionary 
history. 
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7.7 Relation with relativism 
We have exemplified the role of institutions and, more generally, the role of social 
facets of commitment in supporting a focal individual’s commitments. The 
possibility of being committed to a certain enduring value can be greatly promoted 
or greatly constrained by the social environment. If an enduring value is recognized 
as a public role in a society, and regulates the behavior of the audience, others are 
more likely to punish one for not living up to one’s values. When chosen lifestyles 
are not publicly recognized and interwoven with other cultural habits, we would 
predict them to be harder to follow.  
This has practical consequences for toleration and relativizing moral judgments. 
First of all, our discussion of commitment clarifies why living one’s values requires 
more than non-interference on behalf of others. Merely relativizing or tolerating a 
certain moral decision that is beyond discussion, for example vows of celibacy, 
monogamy, not eating meat, wearing a headscarf etc., is not optimal in the eyes of 
the individual committed to these practices. A subjectively committed individual 
will predict to be tempted from time to time. It is therefore reasonable for the 
committed actor to desire an enabling and punitive attitude from others towards 
not wearing scarfs, promiscuity, etc. Mere non-interference may thus be 
counterproductive to one’s chosen lifestyle, even if there is no direct interaction 
between your and others’ behavior. 
Moreover, commitments often work in the context of communication and 
interaction. One can be committed to monogamy, provided that one’s partner is as 
well. Women dressing modestly are committed to not showing off their bodies to 
prospective suitors; this is only fair in those communities where others do not show 
off either. In many cases, different lifestyles come down to different rules of the 
game, and the committed individual may perceive others as cheaters to their game. 
It is thus inherent to one’s commitments that other morals are being condemned 
instead of relativized. In the case of a monogamous relationship, one’s value of 
monogamy is not a personal value, it expands to a prescription for one’s partner. In 
the case of headscarfs, one’s value of modesty is not merely personal but extends to 
all women fishing in the same pool of possible marriage partners. Thus, the issue of 
commitment makes clear that there are good reasons to condemn others as opposed 
to merely sticking to one’s own values, simply because many values require an 
enabling social environment.  
The issue of commitment may shed new light on the problem of confidence. We 
have seen in chapter four that some philosophers (e.g., Wong, 2006; Hales, 2009) 
suggested that what one is required to do depends on the kind of person one is. This 
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stands in contrast with the fear that relativism will lead to indecisiveness. If all 
actions can be right, all options seem to be equally good. However, once a specific 
commitment is embedded in a recognized cultural practice, this problem may 
disappear. Many public and culturally recognized actions create expectations in 
others, who will change their behavior accordingly. Commitment shows us that one 
has good reason to stay faithful to one’s values, at least when these values entail 
social expectations.  
However, objective commitment can also be very restricting, to the point where 
we may ask if it still serves the purpose of fulfilling one’s ideals. Ideologies have 
lured many individuals to subscribe to severe objective commitments. One can think 
of former communist nations, where politicians created a political system and 
installed security measures such that the system could not be overthrown. 
However, people’s values and subjective commitments may change, or one may 
decide that certain commitments were wrong after all. If one’s installed security 
measures are very efficient, it may have become impossible or very dangerous to 
change strategy. More than one communist party member (for example Imre 
Lakatos), upon deciding to stop being politically active, had to flee the region 
altogether. Thus, even upon ‘discovering’ one’s supposedly ideal life goal, a moral 
truth, or the best political system ever, it is better to keep at least the possibility of 
opting out.  
Commitment is thus an important tool, both for committed individuals and their 
social network. Since it requires coordination, it is an argument for constraining 
individualized life options and relativist moral requirements. However, it does not 
preclude the possibility of toleration and relativism between groups that do not 
substantially interact. It potentially diminishes the problem of confidence because 
our commitments create expectations in other individuals, and once a life path is 
chosen, we have good reason to keep to it. Commitment also shows us that we are 
capable of restricting our options to a great extent. Because the values of human 
beings (either individuals or the species) may change during a life course or due to 
circumstances, it is better to create an environment that allows for change in social 
institutions.  
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Chapter 8 Discussion and conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
We kicked off this dissertation with the observation that different people hold to 
different moral views, and that, in some cases, we legitimate such moral diversity. 
We asked if, and when, we can reasonably and practically tolerate or legitimate 
apparently incompatible moral views. First, we made a detour via the importance of 
individual differences in moral cognition. For example, do they have an impact on 
social and philosophical questions or are they eclipsed by universal aspects of our 
moral nature? We then went on a quest for possible bases on which to resolve such 
moral disagreements, and could not find anything remotely resembling this holy 
grail. Allying with naturalistic ethicists, we found good reasons why some diversity 
in moral cognition has a normative status. That leaves us with the question if we can 
tolerate or accommodate and relativize this diversity. For example, is it possible to 
simply refrain from interfering with objectionable behavior or do we need to 
cultivate additional attitudes such as a relativist view on morals? Can we adopt a 
laissez-faire attitude or do we need to restrain others’ behavior for the sake of social 
order and cohesion? How narrowly constrained by psychological and practical 
limits is the range of bearable diversity?  
In order to solve these questions, we pledged our allegiance to naturalistic ethics. 
Naturalistic ethicists take seriously that most arguments are open to empirical 
investigation. As such, we adduced empirical findings in order to evaluate the issue 
of feasible and advisable reactions to moral disagreement, most notably aspects of 
accommodation and tolerance. Although much of the discussion does translate to 
empirical statements, this research is underexplored. We additionally conducted 
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our own empirical studies to further investigate if lay people can think of moral 
judgments as relative, and if so, what kind of relativism they can be committed to.  
Previous research about individual differences in moral cognition focuses on 
descriptive and meta-ethical issues, such as the origin and extent of individual 
differences and implications for moral realism. Nowadays, these research topics are 
informed by empirical studies. At the same time, there is an extensive normative 
and political research tradition about the feasibility and desirability of practices and 
attitudes of toleration. These theories are usually less directly informed by 
empirical findings. We think this dissertation offers an original approach to the 
normative question of how to deal with fundamental moral disagreement, because it 
links this question with previous and new empirical research. We cannot offer grand 
answers to difficult questions such as when and how to tolerate, but we hope this 
dissertation at least convinces theoretical and empirical researchers to bundle 
strengths.  
In this concluding chapter, we will defend the following circumspect conclusions: 
(1) Constraining ourselves by certain metaphysical and epistemic theories, we 
agree with previous authors that some moral disagreements are 
irresolvable, or, that there is fundamental moral disagreement. This 
conclusion provides the background for our next conclusions. 
(2) Quite likely, there are psychological and practical constraints to practices of 
toleration, but more empirical research is necessary in order to test 
philosophers’ suggestions of tolerance-bolstering attitudes against reality.  
(3) Even if the attitude or the practice of accommodation is too demanding, 
relativizing one’s moral judgments is an interesting possibility. Future 
empirical and theoretical research might therefore focus on comparing 
relativist attitudes towards moral disagreement with skeptical or 
universalist alternatives.  
(4) The concept of toleration presupposes a universalist attitude; it is therefore 
inapt when entertaining the possibility that relativist attitudes may bolster 
practices of toleration.  
We will now discuss each conclusion in more detail.  
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8.2 Fundamental moral disagreement 
Given the pattern and persistence of moral disagreement, it is likely that there are 
no universal moral facts that affect our moral judgments (Gustafsson & Peterson, 
2010, online first). However, this does not mean that there are no moral facts; it 
might just be that we have not yet found the right method that gives access to 
universal moral facts. If only we find this method, we can resolve moral 
disagreements by reference to universal truth. Is this possible? Let us review certain 
proposals for moral truth and how they fare in solving disagreement. 
It is common for evolutionary inspired moral psychologists to focus on so-called 
‘human universals’, features that are fairly common in almost all cultures in the 
world, irrespective of their environment. Indeed, commonalities can be found, 
especially in the perceived moral importance of caring, empathy or harm and in the 
perceived moral importance of justice and fairness (e.g., Henrich et al., 2005; 
Robinson & Kurzban, 2007). Nonetheless, even when reasoning from an 
evolutionary perspective, we may expect to find individual and group differences in 
moral attitudes. First of all, different issues (e.g., foundations, see Haidt & Joseph, 
2007) are deemed morally important by different people and prescriptions related 
to one foundation may conflict with prescriptions related to another foundation. It 
is repeatedly shown that different groups and different individuals prioritize these 
moral foundations differently: The most publicized difference is that liberals (in the 
U.S.A.) or left-wing voters (in the Netherlands) prioritize harm and justice while 
conservatives or right-wing voters assign relatively more importance to matters of 
purity, group loyalty and authority. Since such differences divide the political 
landscape, we may well say that they are socially relevant. Likewise, as illustrated in 
chapter two, evolved fitness strategies are found to relate to moral attitudes 
towards sex and recreational drug use, and in Belgium, the Netherlands, and the 
U.S.A., they correlate with religiosity and political orientation (see also Kurzban et 
al., 2010). This is in line with previous findings that comparative punishments of 
sex- and drugs-related transgressions elicit much more disagreement than similar 
rankings of desired punishments for harmful and unjust acts (Robinson & Kurzban, 
2007). These and many other studies show that there are individual and group 
differences in moral attitudes, and that these differences can, in part, be explained 
by evolutionary theories. The origin of moral attitudes does not preclude the 
existence of good reasons for these views; however, these findings do suggest that 
such differences are not likely to be eradicated soon. On the contrary, they might 
repeat themselves in every generation. It is thus unlikely that we will come to agree 
on moral issues by digging deep in our nature.  
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Focusing on more proximate explanations of moral attitudes, we find that our 
everyday moral judgments are plausibly directly caused by affective intuitions that 
are outside our conscious control. We do give reasons for our moral judgments, and 
these reasons are under our conscious control. However, these reasons are most 
likely not the causes of everyday spontaneous moral judgments but rather post-hoc 
rationalizations. Importantly, certain individual differences in moral judgments 
have been found to relate to individual differences in affective intuitions. If we are 
not aware of the direct causes of our judgments, and individuals differ in these 
factors, we may well ask how we could ever influence our judgments in order to 
resolve moral disagreements.  
Fortunately, this view is too grim. First of all, it is possible to reassess and adapt 
our moral judgments, and align them with the reasons we give and endorse (even if 
these reasons are confabulated after the fact). An influential philosophical tradition 
has reconciled the affective intuitionist model with philosophical theories of moral 
justification (Saunders, 2009; Daniels, 1996; see also Sie & Wouters, 2008; 2009, in the 
domain of moral responsibility). Their suggestions boil down to the claim that a 
moral judgment is justified (or correct, legitimate, …) if it is in accordance with the 
reasons (a.k.a., post-hoc rationalizations) we come up with and endorse. We thus 
aim to hold our moral judgments in narrow reflective equilibrium (Rawls, 1975) with 
our more general reasons by adapting either our reasons or our judgments. This is 
possible: For example, we can adapt our affective intuitions by exposing ourselves to 
others’ judgments or by imaginatively looking at the situation from different angles, 
thus aligning our affective intuitions with those of others or with our reasons. Even 
though this is a slow and laborious process, it opens up the possibility of resolving 
moral disagreements. We just need to reason our way through a moral argument 
until we reach agreement.  
So far, so good, were it not that different people start with different affective 
intuitions, hold to different moral judgments and endorse different reasons. Graham 
and colleagues (2009) did not merely find affectively induced differences in moral 
judgments. They also asked participants which features of a situation they 
considered relevant in judging something good or bad. It appeared that 
conservatives hold that, e.g., the fact that something is unnatural, or disgusting, is 
morally relevant, while for liberals this is much less the case. Now, if different 
people start with different affective intuitions, they will end up with different 
narrowly equilibrated moral systems; therefore, not all moral disagreements can be 
resolved if we take this justification principle as the epistemic norm.  
It appears that we need common ground to reason our way to agreement. Daniels 
(1996) discusses wide reflective equilibrium, wherein an objective aspect is 
introduced. In wide reflective equilibrium, we bring our reasons and judgments in 
accordance with all the relevant scientific theories, thus rejecting moral systems 
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that are not in accord with science. Nonetheless, the array of possible moral systems 
is underdetermined by scientific facts. Given the diversity in affective intuitions, 
different people will still end up with different moral systems if we use this 
procedure. 
Certain naturalistic ethicists (viz., Casebeer, 2003b and Flanagan, Sarkissian, & 
Wong, 2008) defend a thick normative moral theory, making maximal use of 
knowledge about human nature. These authors start from what is considered 
valuable by human beings. This is not determined by what one desires, but rather by 
what one would desire if one was fully informed about human nature and the 
consequences of one’s actions. Given a theory of human nature and this description 
of values, it is possible to fill in broad guidelines for what we should do. Both 
Casebeer (2003b) and Flanagan et al. (2008) focus on commonalities in our human 
nature instead of individual differences, thus guaranteeing a certain universality in 
values. We can adduce a naturalistic normative theory when equilibrating our moral 
systems. However, both acknowledge that different groups ought to do different 
things, because our environment shapes what is valuable for human beings. Thus, 
both Casebeer and Flanagan discuss environment-induced variation. In our view, 
these theories do not fully take into account that micro-environments, personality 
differences and evolved strategies may cause individual differences in what is 
valuable. In any case, naturalistic normative theories do not determine which moral 
system is best suited for each community; here also, the range of legitimate moral 
theories is underdetermined by data. In addition to the existence of group (and 
individual) differences in moral values, we still end up with moral disagreement: 
Even assuming that every individual adheres to the same naturalistic theory, we will 
still end up with different normative moral systems (though the variety might be 
greatly reduced if we all accept the same theory).  
8.3 Toleration 
We discussed two advisable reactions to moral disagreement: toleration and 
accommodation. Accommodation is put forward as an alternative to tolerance, but 
both fall prey to practical and psychological objections. In chapter four, we perused 
the empirical literature in an attempt to get a grip on psychological constraints of 
tolerance and accommodation. In chapters five and six, we tested the possibility of 
adequately relativizing our moral judgments, which is an aspect of accommodation. 
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Lastly, in chapter seven, we discussed possible practical constraints. Let us now 
trace our steps and evaluate our findings.  
Toleration is most often understood as a reaction to what one legitimately objects 
to. However, toleration is deemed paradoxical and psychologically instable because 
it “presupposes a complexity of two sentiments” (Fletcher, 1996, p. 158), namely an 
urge to interfere and an impulse to overcome that urge. Second, it begs the question 
what should be tolerated and what not. There are already two boundaries to 
toleration in virtue of its most common definition: “one the one hand, some things 
should not be tolerated, because they should not be permitted; on the other, some 
things should not be objected to, hence are not the appropriate objects of 
toleration” (Norton, 1996, p. 33). What kind of answers do philosophers suggest to 
the paradox of toleration and the question of the proper range of toleration? Are 
these suggestions possible to live by? 
Following Williams (1996), we consider it useful to make a distinction between 
practices of toleration and tolerant attitudes. Both are usually taken to imply that 
we object to the tolerated behavior. For sake of clarity, we will speak of tolerance 
when we are merely talking about the attitude (moral judgment and behavior), and 
we will speak of toleration when we focus on the practice. We take toleration to 
range from non-interference over equal treatment to active defense of others’ 
rights. Non-interference means that one does not act restrictively towards those 
who act objectionably. However, this can be seen as insufficient. As numerous 
studies point out, even if we refrain from interfering, there are endless other 
possibilities in which one can subtly hinder other individuals from acting in 
accordance with their values (e.g., Lester & Roberts, 2009). Therefore, unconscious 
and structural discrimination should equally be eliminated if one is to speak of 
effective tolerance. In order to uphold political equality, it might even be necessary 
to stand up for others’ rights independently of their moral views. Respect is another 
possible aspect of toleration: here one treats others as moral and political equals 
and organizes a state in such a way that no specific ethical community is favored. As 
we will see below, toleration-bolstering attitudes are often put forward in order to 
enhance the possibility of toleration or in order to resolve the paradox of toleration. 
Toleration is related to more than one paradox (see, e.g., Forst, 2007). We have 
focused on the psychological difficulty that arises when – due to objecting to the 
relevant behavior − one has an impulse to intervene and regulate the lives of others, 
while at the same time one accepts an imperative to restrain that impulse. This 
paradox has to be modified. In chapter two, we mentioned the distinction between 
condemnation and conscience. Certain moral attitudes and moral emotions are self-
directed, such as concerns about ‘the good life’, guilt and shame. Other moral 
attitudes are directed to others’ behavior rather than one’s own (this might have 
been functional from an evolutionary or from a historical perspective, or it might 
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still be functional nowadays). In the case of personal values, it is an open question if 
moral objections (that are then self-directed) would still relate to an urge to 
interfere. Therefore, the paradox of toleration might hold for condemnation and 
not for conscience. We will see in Section 8.5 that this also points to the limits of the 
concept of toleration.  
In any case, studies show that condemnation is related to aspects of intolerance. 
For example, psychologists have found that behavior that is deemed generalizably 
wrong is also deemed more deserving of punishment than behavior that is merely 
conventionally wrong (Smetana, 1981). Likewise, individuals dislike diversity in very 
intimate settings (Haidt et al., 2003; Wright et al., 2008). Participants have also been 
found to distribute a resource (raffle tickets) unfairly to those who hold different 
moral views (Wright et al., 2008). Thus, at first sight it seems that tolerance is a 
paradoxical notion because objection is related to interference, either in the form of 
self-reported desire for punishment or in the form of actual unfair behavior.  
In order to overcome this urge to interfere, several authors suggest that we have 
to cultivate certain toleration-bolstering attitudes. Williams (1996) suggests that 
valuing autonomy is one possible basis of such attitudes. The virtue of toleration 
consists in identifying the dignity of human beings in their autonomy, this is, the 
possibility they have to make their own lives and determine their own convictions. 
For example, political pluralism demands of its citizens a belief in the value of 
autonomy (Williams, 1996, p. 22-23). Thus, one overcomes the urge to interfere by 
juxtaposing this urge to the perceived goodness of the autonomy of the actor, 
because this autonomy would be thwarted were one to interfere. We did not discuss 
(or find) empirical studies relating to the effectiveness of valuing autonomy. We 
think this is an interesting avenue for future empirical research: Are individuals’ 
practices of toleration related to their adherence to the value of autonomy, or, 
indeed, to any other attitude that is suggested to bolster toleration?  
We do find variation in practices of toleration. The kind of transgression no 
doubt will matter: Compared to generalizable (‘moral’) transgressions, conventional 
transgressions generally meet with less punishment (Smetana, 1981) or with 
different kinds of interference (e.g., ridicule instead of punishment, see Hollos et al., 
1986). It also seems that educating individuals about different moral views enhances 
active and passive toleration (Lester & Roberts, 2009), at least according to 
participants’ self-reports. Nonetheless, none of these studies attempted to test 
philosophical theories of toleration, and it is hard to interpret their findings for or 
against a certain philosophical view. 
We previously saw that the range of tolerance was already constrained by its very 
definition: If it should not be objected to, then it is not the appropriate object of 
toleration. In other words, we cannot speak of toleration if the tolerated situation is 
not wrong. A well-known example is the racist who restrains from interfering with 
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people with a different skin color: even though the racist inhibits an urge to 
interfere with something he considers wrong, this is not toleration because there is 
nothing wrong with having a different skin color (e.g., Horton, 1996). Thus, there is 
also a lower limit for when we may speak about toleration, even though the relevant 
behavior (e.g., non-interference) is the same. Again, it might be interesting to know 
if individuals indeed do not employ the notion of toleration when the ‘tolerated’ 
behavior is not wrong. 
Finally, there are also practical limits to toleration. Living one’s values does not 
merely depend on one’s own character. For many social roles, institutions are in 
place that bolster one’s commitment to a specific role. In the early Kibbutzim in the 
example in chapter three, no institutions were in place to support housewives. In 
most contemporary societies, not enough institutions are in place that enhance the 
lives of families with children in which both partners want to have a full-time job. If 
both parents value to be successful and ambitious role-models to their children, not 
many social structures are in place that act as commitment devices (one can think 
of TV-series that mirror one’s choices; crèches in the office building,…). Living one’s 
values is thus reasonably linked to a desire to regulate society, and even others’ 
lives, for example because there is power in numbers. We therefore do not want to 
tolerate too much diversity. 
The practical limits of toleration suggest that distance can be a good thing. If we 
need coordination and homogeneity for a specific valuable way of life, it is 
reasonable to distance ourselves from those who make different moral choices. 
Rather than being discriminating, associative sorting might enable both parties to 
create one’s personal supportive environment. Therefore, tolerance could be easier 
between communities than within communities. On the other hand, this process 
likely exacerbates between group differences, thus creating new problems. 
Nonetheless, moral diversity might be easier to tolerate when it is located between 
groups than when it is located within groups.  
8.4 Accommodation 
We mainly discussed authors that prescribe toleration in cases of fundamental 
moral disagreement: toleration is often defended because we are not allowed to 
interfere when we aren’t able to justify this interference to all parties involved, 
assuming they are rational and informed (Ivanhoe, 2009; Wong, 1984; 2006). 
However, in order to bolster such practices, we need additional attitudes. In the case 
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of fundamental moral disagreement, accommodation opens up as a reasonable 
option (e.g., Wong, 2006). However, in suggesting accommodation as an attitude, 
one has to reject toleration. The reason is that accommodation requires that one at 
least entertains the idea that different moral views are equally legitimate, one thus 
relativizes one’s moral judgments while staying faithful to one’s previous 
commitments. This cannot be subsumed under the header of toleration because the 
relativizing individual no longer objects to the others’ behavior. We will discuss this 
conceptual consequence in Section 8.5; for now, we focus on the psychological and 
practical feasibility of accommodation. 
According to naturalistic ethicists, moral acts are right or wrong relative to, for 
instance, the moral framework of agents. This however does not mean that we are 
capable of relativizing moral judgments. Maybe human beings think of moral rules 
as inherently universal or general, as Ruse (1986), Turiel (1983) and 
moral/conventional theorists suggest. We would then need to describe morality in 
terms of an error theory. Nonetheless, previous studies that conclude on the 
universalizability of moral judgments presupposed moral universalism. As such, they 
only considered universalizably or generalizably wrong acts to be morally relevant. 
We argued that, if we restrict moral psychology to the psychology of universalizable 
judgments, we will never be able to find out if lay people can relativize moral 
judgments. In chapter five, we built on previous research to further reject the 
presumption that individuals reliably think of moral transgressions as generalizably 
wrong and wrong because they go against universal principles. Relativizing moral 
judgments seems at least psychologically feasible. But does it also bolster desirable 
practices? 
We found that some, but not all, individuals relativize specific moral judgments. 
However, we cannot just conclude that this attitude will bolster practices of non-
interference or respect towards the relativized act. First of all, we do not know to 
what extent one is less likely to interfere with something that is considered 
relatively right. For example, the relativist may hold that whipping is wrong in 
culture A and permissible in culture B. Will the relativizing individual now be more 
likely to interfere with whipping in culture A than with whipping in culture B? This 
question is open to empirical investigation, and its answer can thus inform us about 
the effectiveness of relativist attitudes.  
Another important issue is to what extent relativists are likely to stand up for 
others’ rights. This question has a conceptual component: it may depend on 
whether one is merely an agent or also an appraiser relativist for a specific moral 
issue. Assuming that condemnation is related to action; if all moral statements are 
true or false relative to an appraiser, and if all moral acts are right or wrong relative 
to an agent, then a relativizing individual is doomed to indifference because he is 
not motivated to protest against injustice, including others’ intolerant interference. 
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The agent relativist however stops at the level of the agent when relativizing the 
wrongness of moral acts. This is compatible with practices of non-interference, 
respect and active defense of others’ rights. Indeed, we found that some individuals 
were agent relativists but not appraiser relativists about a specific moral issue. 
Further research should investigate if their judgments induce according behavior.  
While relativizing one’s judgments might be a promising attitude to bolster 
practices of non-interference and respect, we could not evaluate the more 
demanding notion of accommodation. On the one hand, on top of relativizing one’s 
moral judgments, it requires one to internalize other values, which doesn’t seem 
plausible. On the other hand, it might diminish practical constraints of non-
interfering practices: If we are ambivalent to the proper course of action, we might 
simply adapt to our community’s most common practices instead of trying to live in 
accordance with our particular values. At present though, this is mere speculation. 
8.5 The conceptual boundaries of toleration 
The notion of toleration, it seems to us, presupposes the universal wrongness of the 
tolerable act. Philosophers only speak of tolerance when the thing that is to be 
tolerated is, simply put, wrong, without further qualifications (e.g., Forst, 2007; 
Heyd, 1996; Williams, 1996). Moreover, toleration is usually discussed by 
universalists (e.g., Horton, 1996). Indeed, the notion of toleration is easily associated 
with attitudes of putting up with, or patiently bearing something objectionable. 
However, practices of toleration (ranging from non-interference to political 
equality) are important in a much broader context, and excluding a useful term as 
toleration from these contexts may leave us with a conceptual gap. Let us illustrate 
this with topics from previous chapters. 
Consider again the difference between condemnation and conscience. We can 
judge something to be wrong for ourselves, and this independent of our judgments 
towards others. For example, imagine telling someone a white lie, gossiping about a 
colleague, inflicting a punishment on a child, not helping an old person on the bus, 
or any other minor fault that makes you feel uncomfortable. In each of these cases 
the act may be accompanied by a feeling of aversion that inhibits the actor from 
acting badly. However, this does not mean that we just as easily judge others when 
they are telling us a juicy gossip or decline to help an old person. In this case, it 
seems that one would not judge others for gossiping even though one can still think 
it is wrong to do it oneself. Nonetheless, it is an open question how this attitude 
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would causally relate to practices of toleration towards gossiping colleagues and 
friends. The problem now is that, if we want to discuss advisable reactions to such 
behavior, we cannot employ the notion of toleration.  
This nuance thus points to a larger issue, namely that many instances of non-
interference and equal treatment are by definition precluded from the discussion of 
toleration. For example, skepticism about our capacity to know what is right and 
wrong may enhance all the virtues usually discussed under practices of toleration, 
but skepticism precludes toleration because skepticism entails bracketing our 
judgments of right and wrong. In a similar vein, demoralizing something or 
relegating an act to the personal domain can strengthen the practices otherwise 
discussed under the header of toleration, were it not that this, again, is at odds with 
the definition of toleration.  
This problem is exacerbated in the context of this dissertation. Being a relativist 
and accommodating moral diversity cannot be subsumed under toleration, even 
though the aim is, exactly, to bolster non-interference, non-discrimination, and 
political and social equality. This cluster of virtuous practices would otherwise be 
neatly summarized as practices of toleration. It seems then that we are in need of 
another term that summarizes the same practices of toleration, without the 
connotation of patiently putting up with the unbearable, and without presupposing 
a specific meta-ethical view such as moral universalism. Thus, there might be need 
for a notion of toleration sensu stricto that encompasses all the virtuous behavior 
associated with toleration sensu lato, but does not imply that the tolerated behavior 
is wrong or perceived as wrong. 
8.6 Conclusion 
Moral universalism, the idea that moral rules are necessarily universal in scope, has 
often been the dominant doctrine in Western moral philosophy. However, contrary 
to universalists’ arguments, it is probably not the case that individuals uniformly 
think of all moral rules as universal. The moderate claim that some individuals (e.g., 
philosophers, experts) perceive moral evaluations to be evidently, or necessarily 
universalizable cannot be upheld either: Both philosophers and lay people can think 
of various action-guiding prescriptions that need not be universalized but are 
nevertheless moral statements.  
We suspect that universalizing moral statements can be a valuable goal in 
normative theories, for epistemic and practical reasons. However, there is no need 
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to postulate universalizability as an essential feature of morality. In fact, we find 
good reasons why morally relevant actions are relatively right or wrong. First of all, 
there are no good methodological and ontological reasons to think of moral acts as 
universally right or wrong. Even according to a thick naturalistic theory of what 
people value, different people ought to do different things, depending on one’s 
values; the set of values that is applicable to a person depends irrevocably on one’s 
environment, one’s community and maybe on personal factors as well. Thus, moral 
systems are relative. This does not mean that all conceivable moral systems are 
equally right: What one ought to do is still heavily constrained by our human 
nature, and practical and psychological constraints. 
Contrary to error theorists, we find good reasons why lay people should think of 
certain moral acts as relatively right or wrong. If we want to tolerate (s.s.) others 
because their actions are, for all we can know, legitimate, relativizing our judgments 
might bolster non-interference, respect and equal treatment. Again, this does not 
mean that a relativist cannot condemn something. This reasoning is best applied in 
the case of fundamental moral disagreements, but it does not hold for those cases 
where an agent’s moral system can be shown to be at odds with facts and theories, 
or her values, intuitions and principles.  
The discussion about tolerance suggests that universalism is often taken for 
granted. A moral relativist (or skeptic) can, by definition, not tolerate. Nonetheless, 
it is still an open question if thinking of an act as relatively right will inhibit 
interference or disrespect. Thus, it might be useful to make a distinction between 
practices of toleration sensu stricto and sensu lato. In the domain of moral 
philosophy, there is a need to take relativism seriously as a plausible normative 
theory. 
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Appendix 1 
Questionnaire: Moral attitudes towards sex and 
drugs (The Netherlands)  
Gelieve de beweringen hieronder te lezen en aan te geven (omcirkelen) in welke mate u het ermee 
eens bent, waarbij: 1 = Sterk mee oneens; 4 = Neutraal; 7 = Sterk mee eens 
 
Eric gaat naar een dance-feestje en overweegt Ecstasy te nemen, een illegaal stemmingsbeïnvloedend middel. 
 
Ecstasy op deze manier gebruiken is moreel verkeerd:  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Ectsasy op deze manier gebruiken zou legaal moeten zijn: 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
 
Megan hangt rond met vrienden en overweegt cannabis te roken, een illegaal maar gedoogd 
stemmingsbeïnvloedend middel. 
  
Cannabis op deze manier gebruiken is moreel verkeerd:  1       2       3       4       5       6       7    
Cannabis op deze manier gebruiken zou legaal moeten zijn: 1       2       3       4       5       6       7    
 
John is op vakantie en overweegt cocaïne te nemen, een illegaal stemmingsbeïnvloedend middel. 
 
Cocaïne op deze manier gebruiken is moreel verkeerd:  1       2       3       4       5       6       7   
Cocaïne op deze manier gebruiken zou legaal moeten zijn: 1       2       3       4       5       6       7   
 
Claudia gaat uit en overweegt speed te nemen, een illegaal stemmingsbeïnvloedend middel  
 
Speed op deze manier gebruiken is moreel verkeerd:  1       2       3       4       5       6       7   
Speed op deze manier gebruiken zou legaal moeten zijn:  1       2       3       4       5       6       7  
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Gelieve voor de volgende uitspraken aan te geven hoe sterk u het ermee eens of oneens bent.  
 
Mensen die recreationele drugs gebruiken zijn vies:  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Het is oké om drugs te bekomen met als doel jezelf beter  
te voelen:       1       2       3       4       5       6       7              
 
Hoe oud bent u?  VUL IN: _________________________ 
 
Wat is uw geslacht?       OMCIRKEL:  Mannelijk   Vrouwelijk  
 
Indien u een vrouw bent (indien u een man bent mag u deze vraag overslaan): gebruikt u 
één van de voorbehoedsmiddelen in de volgende lijst: spiraaltje, anticonceptiepil, prikpil, 
anticonceptiepleister, implantatiestaafje, nuvaring.  
 
(OMCIRKEL)  Ja Nee   
 
Wat is uw nationaliteit? Gelieve al uw nationaliteiten te vermelden als u er meerdere hebt.  
 
VUL IN:__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Waar woont u het grootste deel van de tijd? (VUL IN) 
 
Land:__________________________________Is dit gebied: stedelijk / landelijk ? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
Wat is uw studierichting en –jaar? ___________________________________________________ 
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Hoe gelovig bent u? Omcirkel wat past, waarbij 1 = Helemaal niet gelovig; 4 = Enigszins gelovig; 7 = 
Heel gelovig 
 
OMCIRKEL: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
 
Hoe spiritueel bent u? Omcirkel wat past, waarbij 1 = Helemaal niet spiritueel; 4 = Enigszins 
spiritueel; 7 = Heel spiritueel 
 
OMCIRKEL: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
 
Kies de categorie die het nauwst aansluit bij uw religie of geloof. (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1)Geen/atheïst/agnosticus    
(2)Boeddhist     
(3)Hindoe     
(4)Joods    
(5)Katholiek 
(6)Moslim                 
(7)Protestant 
(8)Andere (gelieve te specificeren) _____________________________________________________ 
 
Indien u Protestant hebt aangeduid, kunt u zeggen tot welke kerk u behoort?  
 
(1)(Voorheen) Hervormd 
(2)(Voorheen) Gereformeerd 
(3)(Voorheen) Evangelisch-Luthers 
(4)Andere Gereformeerde kerken, namelijk (gelieve te specificeren) ____________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(5)Evangelische en Pinksterkerken, namelijk (gelieve te specificeren)___________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6)Overige kerken, namelijk (gelieve te specificeren)________________________________  
 
Wat geloof betreft, kunt u zeggen hoe orthodox u bent? 1 = Orthodox; 7 = Vrijzinnig  
 
OMCIRKEL: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     | 8: niet van toepassing 
 
Welk van de volgende opties beschrijft het best hoe vaak u tegenwoordig een religieuze dienst 
bijwoont? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1)Nooit of bijna nooit     
(2)Een paar keer per jaar     
(3)Ongeveer één keer per maand    
(4)Ongeveer elke week   
(5)Meer dan één keer per week 
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Welk van de volgende opties beschrijft het best hoe vaak u privé, op uw eigen, bidt? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1)Nooit of bijna nooit     
(2)Een paar keer per jaar     
(3)Ongeveer één keer per maand     
(4)Ongeveer elke week    
(5)Meerdere keren per week    
(6)Ongeveer één keer per dag    
(7)Meerdere keren per dag 
 
Hoe goed beschrijven de volgende zaken u? Omcirkel wat past, waarbij 1 = Beschrijft me niet; 4 = 
Beschrijft me enigszins; 7 = Beschrijft me goed 
 
Lichamelijk aantrekkelijk:   1 2 3 4 5 6 7   
Komt uit een goede familie:   1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
Extravert en enthousiast:   1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
Kritisch en ruziezoekend:   1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
Betrouwbaar en zelf-gedisciplineerd:  1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
Angstig en gemakkelijk ontdaan:  1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
Open voor nieuwe ervaringen en complex: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
Gereserveerd en stil:    1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
Sympathiek en warm:    1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
Slordig en achteloos:    1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
Kalm en emotioneel stabiel:   1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
Conventioneel en oncreatief:   1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
 
Gelieve aan te geven in hoeverre u het eens of oneens bent met de volgende stellingen. Omcirkel 
wat past, waarbij 1 = Sterk mee oneens; 4 = Neutraal; 7 = Sterk mee eens 
 
Ik doe bepaalde dingen die slecht zijn voor mij als ze leuk zijn: 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Ik hou van wilde feestjes:    1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Ik zou graag nieuwe en opwindende ervaringen meemaken,  
ook al zijn ze illegaal:      1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
 
Hoe vaak drinkt u in een normale maand alcohol tot u dronken bent? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1)Nooit    
(2)Eén of twee keer per maand 
(3)Enkele keren per maand 
(4)Meerdere keren per maand 
(5)Dagelijks of bijna dagelijks 
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Hoe vaak gebruikt u in een normale maand recreationele drugs (zoals cannabis, paddo’s, poppers, 
enzovoort)? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1)Nooit    
(2)Eén of twee keer per maand   
(3)Enkele keren per maand 
(4)Meerdere keren per maand 
(5)Dagelijks of bijna dagelijks  
 
Hoe zou u uw seksuele geaardheid omschrijven? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1)Exclusief heteroseksueel    
(2)Hoofdzakelijk heteroseksueel    
(3)Biseksueel    
(4)Hoofdzakelijk homoseksueel    
(5)Exclusief homoseksueel 
 
Gelieve eerlijk te antwoorden op de volgende vragen: 
 
Met hoeveel verschillende partners hebt u de laatste 12 maanden seks gehad? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5–6     7–9       10–19 20 of meer 
 
Met hoeveel verschillende partners hebt u seksuele betrekkingen gehad op één en slechts één enkele 
gelegenheid (one-night-stand)? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5–6     7–9       10–19 20 of meer 
 
Met hoeveel verschillende partners hebt u seksuele betrekkingen gehad zonder dat u geïnteresseerd 
was in een langetermijnrelatie met deze persoon? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5–6     7–9       10–19 20 of meer 
 
Seks zonder liefde is Oké. (1 = Sterk mee oneens; 9 = Sterk mee eens) 
 
OMCIRKEL:      1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9 
 
Ik kan me inbeelden dat ik me gemakkelijk voel en kan genieten van "vrijblijvende" seks met 
verschillende partners. (1 = Sterk mee oneens; 9 = Sterk mee eens) 
 
OMCIRKEL:      1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9 
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Ik wil geen seks hebben met iemand voodat ik zeker weet dat we een serieuze langetermijnrelatie 
zullen hebben.  (1 = Sterk mee oneens; 9 = Sterk mee eens) 
 
OMCIRKEL:      1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9 
Hoe vaak fantaseert u over het hebben van seks met iemand waarmee u geen toegewijde 
romantische relatie hebt? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
▫ 1 – nooit 
▫ 2 – heel zelden 
▫ 3 – eenmaal om de twee of drie maanden 
▫ 4 – ongeveer één keer per maand 
▫ 5 – ongeveer één keer om de twee weken 
▫ 6 – ongeveer één keer per week 
▫ 7 – meerdere keren per week 
▫ 8 – bijna iedere dag 
▫ 9 – ten minste één keer per dag 
 
Hoe vaak bent u seksueel geprikkeld wanneer u in contact bent met iemand waarmee u geen 
toegewijde romantische relatie hebt? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
▫ 1 – nooit 
▫ 2 – heel zelden 
▫ 3 – eenmaal om de twee of drie maanden 
▫ 4 – ongeveer één keer per maand 
▫ 5 – ongeveer één keer om de twee weken 
▫ 6 – ongeveer één keer per week 
▫ 7 – meerdere keren per week 
▫ 8 – bijna iedere dag 
▫ 9 – ten minste één keer per dag 
 
Hoe vaak hebt u in het algemeen spontane fantasieën over seks met iemand die u nog maar pas 
leren kennen hebt? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
▫ 1 – nooit 
▫ 2 – heel zelden 
▫ 3 – eenmaal om de twee of drie maanden 
▫ 4 – ongeveer één keer per maand 
▫ 5 – ongeveer één keer om de twee weken 
▫ 6 – ongeveer één keer per week 
▫ 7 – meerdere keren per week 
▫ 8 – bijna iedere dag 
▫ 9 – ten minste één keer per dag 
 
  
  221 
Welke van de volgende opties beschrijft het best uw burgerlijke staat? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1) Nooit getrouwd            
(2) Huidig eerste huwelijk      
(3) Huidig in een tweede of later huwelijk                
(4) Gescheiden van tafel en bed               
(5) Gescheiden         
(6) Weduwe/weduwnaar 
 
Welke van de volgende opties beschrijft het best de burgerlijke staat van uw moeder? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1) Nooit getrouwd            
(2) Nu in haar eerste huwelijk met mijn biologische vader   
(3) Nu in haar eerste huwelijk met iemand anders dan mijn biologische vader 
(4) Nu in haar tweede of later huwelijk, met mijn biologische vader 
(5) Nu in haar tweede of later huwelijk met iemand anders dan mijn biologische vader 
(6) Gescheiden van tafel en bed               
(7) Gescheiden         
(8) Weduwe 
(9) Geen van bovenstaande 
 
Welke van de volgende opties beschrijft het best de burgerlijke staat van uw vader? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1) Nooit getrouwd            
(2) Nu in zijn eerste huwelijk met mijn biologische moeder   
(3) Nu in zijn eerste huwelijk met iemand anders dan mijn biologische moeder 
(4) Nu in zijn tweede of latere huwelijk met mijn biologische moeder 
(5) Nu in zijn  tweede of latere huwelijk met iemand anders dan mijn biologische moeder 
(6) Gescheiden van tafel en bed               
(7) Gescheiden         
(8) Weduwnaar 
(9) Geen van bovenstaande 
 
Indien uw ouders ooit gescheiden zijn, in welk jaar zijn ze dan gescheiden? VUL IN: _________ 
 
Als u nog nooit getrouwd bent, hoe waarschijnlijk denkt u dat het is dat u ooit trouwt? Omcirkel wat 
past, waarbij 1 = Niet waarschijnlijk; 4 = Enigszins waarschijnlijk; 7 = Heel waarschijnlijk 
 
OMCIRKEL: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Als u nog nooit getrouwd bent en in de veronderstelling dat u zou gaan trouwen, wat zou dan uw 
ideale trouwleeftijd zijn? (Of als u al getrouwd bent, hoe oud was u toen u de eerste keer trouwde?) 
 
VUL IN: ____________________ 
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Als u nog nooit getrouwd bent en in de veronderstelling dat u zou gaan trouwen op de door u 
aangegeven ideale trouwleeftijd, wat zou dan de ideale leeftijd zijn van uw partner? (Of als u al 
getrouwd bent, hoe oud was uw partner toen u de eerste keer trouwde?) 
 
VUL IN: ______________________ 
 
Hebt u kinderen? (OMCIRKEL)      Ja         Nee 
 
Als u kinderen hebt, hoeveel hebt u er?  VUL IN: ________________________ 
 
Als u nog nooit kinderen hebt gehad, hoe waarschijnlijk denkt u dat het is dat u ooit kinderen krijgt? 
(OMCIRKEL) 
 
1 Niet waarschijnlijk                                             
2 Enigszins waarschijnlijk                                               
3 Heel waarschijnlijk 
  
Als u nog nooit kinderen hebt gehad, maar u denkt wel dat u ooit kinderen zult krijgen, hoe 
waarschijnlijk is het dan dat u kinderen krijgt voordat u getrouwd bent?  
 
1 Ik zou zeker niet getrouwd zijn 
2 Enigszins waarschijnlijk dat ik niet getrouwd zou zijn 
3 Enigszins waarschijnlijk dat ik getrouwd zou zijn                                              
4 Ik zou zeker getrouwd zijn 
Hoeveel eigen kinderen zou u willen hebben? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
0              1              2              3              4              5              6 of meer 
 
Als u nog nooit kinderen hebt gehad en in de veronderstelling dat u kinderen zou krijgen, wat zou 
dan uw ideale leeftijd zijn om uw eerste kind te krijgen? (Of als u al kinderen hebt, hoe oud was u 
toen u uw eerste kind kreeg?) 
 
 VUL IN: __________________________ 
 
Als u zichzelf over tien of vijftien jaar inbeeldt, hoe vaak denkt u dat u religieuze diensten zult 
bijwonen? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1)Nooit of bijna nooit 
(2)Enkele keren per jaar 
(3)Ongeveer één keer per maand 
(4)Ongeveer iedere week 
(5)Meer dan één keer per week 
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Als u zou trouwen, denkt u dat uw kansen hoger of lager liggen dan bij andere mensen om binnen de 
15 jaar te scheiden? Omcirkel wat past, waarbij 1 = Veel lager; 4 = Rond het gemiddelde; 7 = Veel 
hoger 
 
OMCIRKEL: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Als u zou gaan trouwen, welk percentage waarschijnlijkheid denkt u dat u zou hebben om binnen de 
15 jaar te scheiden? 
 
VUL IN: _________________________ 
 
Als u getrouwd was en kinderen had en uw echtegno(o)t(e) gedroeg zich op een manier die u 
onaanvaardbaar vindt, hoe waarschijnlijk zou het zijn dat u wilt scheiden? Omcirkel wat past, 
waarbij 1 = Niet waarschijnlijk; 4 = Enigszins waarschijnlijk; 7 = Heel waarschijnlijk 
  
OMCIRKEL: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 
In welk land woonde u hoofdzakelijk gedurende uw kinderjaren? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1)Nederland 
(2)België 
Andere (gelieve te specificeren)______________________________________________ 
  
Toen u opgroeide, hoe welgesteld waren uw ouders dan in vergelijking met anderen? Omcirkel wat 
past, waarbij 1 = Helemaal niet welgesteld; 4 = Rond het gemiddelde; 7 = Heel welgesteld  
 
OMCIRKEL: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Kies de categorie die de religie of het geloof het best beschrijft waarmee u bent opgevoed toen u 
kind was. (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1)Geen/atheïst/agnosticus    
(2)Boeddhist     
(3)Hindoe     
(4)Joods    
(5)Katholiek 
(6)Moslim                 
(7)Protestant 
(8)Andere (gelieve te specificeren) _____________________________________________________ 
 
Indien u Protestant hebt aangeduid, kunt u zeggen welke kerk het best deze beschrijft 
waarmee u bent opgevoed toen u kind was?  
 
(1)(Voorheen) Hervormd 
(2)(Voorheen) Gereformeerd 
(3)(Voorheen) Evangelisch-Luthers 
(4)Andere Gereformeerde kerken, namelijk (gelieve te specificeren) ____________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(5)Evangelische en Pinksterkerken, namelijk (gelieve te specificeren)___________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6)Overige kerken, namelijk (gelieve te specificeren)________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Wat geloof betreft, kunt u zeggen hoe orthodox u bent opgevoed? 1 = Orthodox; 7 = Vrijzinnig  
 
OMCIRKEL: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     | 8: niet van toepassing 
 
Welk van de volgende opties beschrijft het best hoe vaak u als kind een religieuze dienst bijwoonde? 
(OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1)Nooit of bijna nooit            
(2)Enkele keren per jaar     
(3)Ongeveer één keer per maand  
(4)Ongeveer iedere week      
(5)Meer dan één keer per week 
  
Wat is de hoogste opleidingsgraad van uw vader? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1) Geen eindexamen voortgezet onderwijs  
(2) Eindexamen voortgezet onderwijs 
(3) Hogeschool (HBO) zonder diploma  
(4) Hogeschool (HBO) met diploma  
(5) Bacheloropleiding of Kandidatuur zonder diploma 
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(6) Bacheloropleiding of Kandidatuur met diploma 
(7) Masteropleiding (opleiding leidend tot licentiaat, baccalaureus, doctorandus, ingenieur, of 
meester) zonder diploma 
(8) Masteropleiding (opleiding leidend tot licentiaat, baccalaureus, doctorandus, ingenieur, of 
meester) met diploma 
(9) Postuniversitair (e.g., specialisatie, doctorandus/promovendus, doctoraat). 
 
Wat is de hoogste opleidingsgraad van uw moeder? (OMCIRKEL)  
 
(1) Geen eindexamen voortgezet onderwijs  
(2) Eindexamen voortgezet onderwijs 
(3) Hogeschool (HBO) zonder diploma  
(4) Hogeschool (HBO) met diploma  
(5) Bacheloropleiding of Kandidatuur zonder diploma 
(6) Bacheloropleiding of Kandidatuur met diploma 
(7) Masteropleiding (opleiding leidend tot licentiaat, baccalaureus, doctorandus, ingenieur, of 
meester) zonder diploma 
(8) Masteropleiding (opleiding leidend tot licentiaat, baccalaureus, doctorandus, ingenieur, of 
meester) met diploma 
(9) Postuniversitair (e.g., specialisatie, doctorandus/promovendus, doctoraat). 
 
Zonder externe bronnen te raadplegen, zijn de volgende zaken voor zover u weet legaal of illegaal? 
Omcirkel wat past, waarbij 1 = legaal; 2 = illegaal; 3 = weet ik niet 
 
HET GEBRUIK VAN: legaal illegaal Weet ik niet 
XTC 1 2 3 
cannabis 1 2 3 
poppers 1 2 3 
speed 1 2 3 
paddo's 1 2 3 
cocaïne 1 2 3 
alcohol 1 2 3 
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Gelieve weer te geven in welke mate u voor- of tegenstander bent van de volgende zaken. Omcirkel 
wat past, waarbij 1 = Fervente tegenstander; 4 = Neutraal; 7 = Fervente voorstander  
 
Stimuleren van het gebruik van het 
Nederlands:   
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Meer belastinggeld naar defensie:  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strengere beperkingen voor pornografie op 
het internet: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Meer wijkagenten om overlast tegen te gaan:   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Meer bindende EU-maatregelen die het milieu 
beschermen: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Het illegaal maken om tegen betaling seks te 
hebben met een prostituee: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Afschaffen van de vervroegde 
invrijheidsstelling bij goed gedrag: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Meer sociale huurwoningen:  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Een verkorting van de periode waarbinnen 
abortus wordt toegestaan: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Een inburgeringsexamen voor immigranten:   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Hogere uitkeringen voor werklozen:  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Meer belastinggeld naar 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Meer aandacht voor de waarde van relaties in 
seksuele voorlichting op school: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Het verbieden van  kleding die het gelaat 
bedekt:  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Beter informeren en begeleiden van  mensen 
met overmatige schulden: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Adverteren voor prostitutie illegaal maken:  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strengere straffen voor mensen die geweld 
gebruiken: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Homoseksuele koppels die kinderen kunnen 
adopteren: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Welke politieke partij heeft, wat hun standpunten betreft, uw voorkeur? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
1 CU 
2 CDA 
3 D66 
4 GL 
5 PvdD 
6 PVV 
7 PvdA 
8 SGP 
9 SP 
10 VVD 
11 Andere (gelieve te specifiëren) _____________________________________________________ 
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Wanneer u beslist of iets goed of fout is, in welke mate zijn de volgende overwegingen relevant voor 
uw besluitvorming? Gelieve elke uitspraak een score te geven binnen de volgende schaal: 
0 = helemaal niet relevant (Deze overweging heeft niets te maken met mijn besluitvorming of ik iets 
goed of fout vind) 
1 = niet erg relevant 
2 = lichtjes relevant 
3 = enigszins relevant 
4 = heel relevant 
5 = extreem relevant (Dit is een van de belangrijkste factoren bij mijn besluitvorming of ik iets goed 
of fout vind) 
 
Of iemand al dan niet emotioneel geleden heeft:  0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of bepaalde mensen al dan niet anders werden behandeld dan 
anderen:      
 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemands actie al dan niet van liefde voor zijn land getuigt:  0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemand al dan niet een gebrek aan respect toont voor autoriteiten:      0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemand al dan niet inging tegen de normen van reinheid en 
fatsoen:      
 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemand al dan niet goed was in wiskunde:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemand al dan niet geeft om een zwakkere of kwetsbaardere:  0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemand al dan niet oneerlijk handelde:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemand al dan niet iets deed om zijn groep te verraden:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemand zich al dan niet voegt naar de tradities van de 
samenleving:      
 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemand al dan niet iets walgelijks deed:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemand al dan niet wreedaardig was:    0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemands rechten al dan niet geschonden werden:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemand al dan niet een tekort aan loyaliteit had:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of een actie al dan niet chaos en wanorde veroorzaakte:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemand al dan niet handelde naar Gods goeddunken:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
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Gelieve de volgende zinnen te lezen en aan te geven in welke mate u het ermee eens of oneens bent, 
waarbij:  
0 = Sterk mee oneens                           
1 = Matig mee oneens 
2 = Lichtjes mee oneens  
3 = Lichtjes mee eens 
4 = Matig mee eens    
5 = Sterk mee eens 
  
Medelijden met zij die lijden is de cruciaalste deugd:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Wanneer de overheid wetten maakt moet het belangrijkste principe zijn 
dat iedereen eerlijk behandeld wordt:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Ik ben trots op de geschiedenis van mijn land:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Repect voor autoriteit is iets wat alle kinderen moeten leren:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Mensen zouden geen dingen mogen doen die walgelijk zijn, ook al doen ze 
er niemand mee kwaad:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Het is beter om goed te doen dan om slecht te doen:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Een van de ergste zaken die iemand kan doen  is een weerloos dier pijn 
doen:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Gerechtigheid is de belangrijkste vereiste voor een samenleving:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
        
Mensen moeten hun familieleden trouw zijn, ook al hebben ze iets fout 
gedaan:  0 1 2 3 4 5 
Mannen en vrouwen hebben elk verschillende rollen te vervullen in de 
samenleving:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Ik zou bepaalde handelingen fout noemen, gebaseerd op het feit dat ze 
onnatuurlijk zijn:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Een mens vermoorden kan nooit goed zijn:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Ik vind het moreel fout dat rijke kinderen veel geld erven terwijl arme 
kinderen niets erven:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Het is belangrijker om een teamspeler te zijn dan om zichzelf uit te 
drukken:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Als ik een soldaat was en het oneens was met de bevelen van mijn overste, 
dan zou ik toch gehoorzamen omdat het mijn plicht is:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Kuisheid is een belangrijke en waardevolle deugd:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
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De volgende zaken beschrijven verschillende begrippen. Gelieve een score te geven voor de mate 
waarin u de omschreven begrippen walgelijk vindt, waarbij: 0 = Helemaal niet walgelijk; 6 = Extreem 
walgelijk. 
 
Snoep stelen in een buurtwinkel:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Horen hoe twee vreemden seks hebben:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
In hondenpoep trappen:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Stelen van een buur:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Orale seks hebben:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Naast iemand zitten die rode zweren heeft op zijn arm:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Een student die spiekt om goede cijfers te halen:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Naar een pornofilm kijken:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Een hand geven aan een vreemde die zweterige handen heeft:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Een vriend bedriegen:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Te weten komen dat iemand die je niet graag hebt seksuele fantasieën 
heeft over u:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Schimmel zien op oude restjes in uw koelkast:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Iemands handtekening namaken op een wettelijk document:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Iemand die u net leren kennen hebt meenemen naar je kamer om seks 
te hebben:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Naast iemand staan die een slechte lijfgeur heeft:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Voorsteken in een rij om de laatste tickets te kopen voor een show:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Een vreemde van het andere geslacht die opzettelijk uw dij streelt in 
een lift:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Een kakkerlak over de vloer zien lopen:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Opzettelijk liegen tijdens een zakentransactie:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Anale seks hebben met iemand van het andere geslacht:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Per ongeluk iemands bloederige wond aanraken:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Appendix 2 
Questionnaire: Moral attitudes towards sex and 
drugs (Belgium)  
Gelieve de beweringen hieronder te lezen en aan te geven (omcirkelen) in welke mate u het ermee 
eens bent, waarbij: 1 = Sterk mee oneens; 4 = Neutraal; 7 = Sterk mee eens 
 
Eric gaat naar een dance-feestje en overweegt Ecstasy te nemen, een illegaal stemmingsbeïnvloedend middel. 
 
Ecstasy op deze manier gebruiken is moreel verkeerd:  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Ectsasy op deze manier gebruiken zou legaal moeten zijn: 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
 
Megan hangt rond met vrienden en overweegt cannabis te roken, een illegaal maar gedoogd 
stemmingsbeïnvloedend middel. 
  
Cannabis op deze manier gebruiken is moreel verkeerd:  1       2       3       4       5       6       7    
Cannabis op deze manier gebruiken zou legaal moeten zijn: 1       2       3       4       5       6       7             
 
John is op vakantie en overweegt cocaïne te nemen, een illegaal stemmingsbeïnvloedend middel. 
 
Cocaïne op deze manier gebruiken is moreel verkeerd:  1       2       3       4       5       6       7         
Cocaïne op deze manier gebruiken zou legaal moeten zijn: 1       2       3       4       5       6       7   
 
Claudia gaat uit en overweegt speed te nemen, een illegaal stemmingsbeïnvloedend middel  
 
Speed op deze manier gebruiken is moreel verkeerd:  1       2       3       4       5       6       7         
Speed op deze manier gebruiken zou legaal moeten zijn:  1       2       3       4       5       6       7  
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Gelieve voor de volgende uitspraken aan te geven hoe sterk u het ermee eens of oneens bent.  
 
Mensen die recreationele drugs gebruiken zijn vies:  1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Het is oké om drugs te bekomen met als doel jezelf beter  
te voelen:       1       2       3       4       5       6       7              
 
Hoe oud bent u?  VUL IN: _________________________ 
 
Wat is uw geslacht?       OMCIRKEL:  Mannelijk   Vrouwelijk  
 
Indien u een vrouw bent (indien u een man bent mag u deze vraag overslaan): gebruikt u 
één van de voorbehoedsmiddelen in de volgende lijst: spiraaltje, anticonceptiepil, prikpil, 
anticonceptiepleister, implantatiestaafje, nuvaring.  
 
(OMCIRKEL)  Ja Nee   
 
Wat is uw nationaliteit? Gelieve al uw nationaliteiten te vermelden als u er meerdere hebt.  
 
VUL IN:__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Waar woont u het grootste deel van de tijd? (VUL IN) 
 
Land:__________________________________Is dit gebied stedelijk / landelijk? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
Wat is uw studierichting en –jaar? ___________________________________________________ 
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Hoe gelovig bent u? Omcirkel wat past, waarbij 1 = Helemaal niet gelovig; 4 = Enigszins gelovig; 7 = 
Heel gelovig 
 
OMCIRKEL: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
 
Hoe spiritueel bent u? Omcirkel wat past, waarbij 1 = Helemaal niet spiritueel; 4 = Enigszins 
spiritueel; 7 = Heel spiritueel 
 
OMCIRKEL: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
 
Kies de categorie die het nauwst aansluit bij uw religie of geloof. (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1)Geen/atheïst/agnosticus    
(2)Boeddhist     
(3)Hindoe     
(4)Joods    
(5)Katholiek 
(6)Moslim                 
(7)Protestant 
(8)Andere (gelieve te specificeren) _____________________________________________________ 
 
Indien u Protestant hebt aangeduid, kunt u zeggen tot welke kerk u behoort?  
 
(1)(Voorheen) Hervormd 
(2)(Voorheen) Gereformeerd 
(3)(Voorheen) Evangelisch-Luthers 
(4)Andere Gereformeerde kerken, namelijk (gelieve te specificeren) ____________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(5)Evangelische en Pinksterkerken, namelijk (gelieve te specificeren)___________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6)Overige kerken, namelijk (gelieve te specificeren)________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Wat geloof betreft, kunt u zeggen hoe orthodox u bent? 1 = Orthodox; 7 = Liberaal  
 
OMCIRKEL: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     | 8: niet van toepassing 
 
Welk van de volgende opties beschrijft het best hoe vaak u tegenwoordig een religieuze dienst 
bijwoont? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1)Nooit of bijna nooit     
(2)Een paar keer per jaar     
(3)Ongeveer één keer per maand    
(4)Ongeveer elke week   
(5)Meer dan één keer per week 
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Welk van de volgende opties beschrijft het best hoe vaak u privé, op uw eigen, bidt? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1)Nooit of bijna nooit     
(2)Een paar keer per jaar     
(3)Ongeveer één keer per maand     
(4)Ongeveer elke week    
(5)Meerdere keren per week    
(6)Ongeveer één keer per dag    
(7)Meerdere keren per dag 
 
Hoe goed beschrijven de volgende zaken u? Omcirkel wat past, waarbij 1 = Beschrijft me niet; 4 = 
Beschrijft me enigszins; 7 = Beschrijft me goed 
 
Lichamelijk aantrekkelijk:   1 2 3 4 5 6 7   
Komt uit een goede familie:   1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
Extravert en enthousiast:   1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
Kritisch en ruziezoekend:   1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
Betrouwbaar en zelf-gedisciplineerd:  1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
Angstig en gemakkelijk ontdaan:  1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
Open voor nieuwe ervaringen en complex: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
Gereserveerd en stil:    1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
Sympathiek en warm:    1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
Slordig en achteloos:    1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
Kalm en emotioneel stabiel:   1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
Conventioneel en oncreatief:   1 2 3 4 5 6 7      
 
Gelieve aan te geven in hoeverre u het eens of oneens bent met de volgende stellingen. Omcirkel 
wat past, waarbij 1 = Sterk mee oneens; 4 = Neutraal; 7 = Sterk mee eens 
 
Ik doe bepaalde dingen die slecht zijn voor mij als ze leuk zijn: 1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Ik hou van wilde feestjes:    1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Ik zou graag nieuwe en opwindende ervaringen meemaken,  
ook al zijn ze illegaal:      1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
 
Hoe vaak drinkt u in een normale maand alcohol tot u dronken bent? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1)Nooit    
(2)Eén of twee keer per maand 
(3)Enkele keren per maand 
(4)Meerdere keren per maand 
(5)Dagelijks of bijna dagelijks 
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Hoe vaak gebruikt u in een normale maand recreationele drugs (zoals cannabis, paddo’s, poppers, 
enzovoort)? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1)Nooit    
(2)Eén of twee keer per maand 
(3)Enkele keren per maand 
(4)Meerdere keren per maand 
(5)Dagelijks of bijna dagelijks  
 
Hoe zou u uw seksuele geaardheid omschrijven? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1)Exclusief heteroseksueel 
(2)Hoofdzakelijk heteroseksueel    
(3)Biseksueel    
(4)Hoofdzakelijk homoseksueel    
(5)Exclusief homoseksueel 
 
Gelieve eerlijk te antwoorden op de volgende vragen: 
 
Met hoeveel verschillende partners hebt u de laatste 12 maanden seks gehad? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5–6     7–9       10–19 20 of meer 
 
Met hoeveel verschillende partners hebt u seksuele betrekkingen gehad op één en slechts één enkele 
gelegenheid (one-night-stand)? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5–6     7–9       10–19 20 of meer 
 
Met hoeveel verschillende partners hebt u seksuele betrekkingen gehad zonder dat u geïnteresseerd 
was in een langetermijnrelatie met deze persoon? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5–6     7–9       10–19 20 of meer 
 
Seks zonder liefde is Oké. (1 = Sterk mee oneens; 9 = Sterk mee eens) 
 
OMCIRKEL:      1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9 
 
Ik kan me inbeelden dat ik me gemakkelijk voel en kan genieten van "vrijblijvende" seks met 
verschillende partners. (1 = Sterk mee oneens; 9 = Sterk mee eens) 
 
OMCIRKEL:      1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9 
 
  
 236 
Ik wil geen seks hebben met iemand voodat ik zeker weet dat we een serieuze langetermijnrelatie 
zullen hebben.  (1 = Sterk mee oneens; 9 = Sterk mee eens) 
 
OMCIRKEL:      1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9 
 
Hoe vaak fantaseert u over het hebben van seks met iemand waarmee u geen toegewijde 
romantische relatie hebt? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
▫ 1 – nooit 
▫ 2 – heel zelden 
▫ 3 – eenmaal om de twee of drie maanden 
▫ 4 – ongeveer één keer per maand 
▫ 5 – ongeveer één keer om de twee weken 
▫ 6 – ongeveer één keer per week 
▫ 7 – meerdere keren per week 
▫ 8 – bijna iedere dag 
▫ 9 – ten minste één keer per dag 
 
Hoe vaak bent u seksueel geprikkeld wanneer u in contact bent met iemand waarmee u geen 
toegewijde romatische relatie hebt? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
▫ 1 – nooit 
▫ 2 – heel zelden 
▫ 3 – eenmaal om de twee of drie maanden 
▫ 4 – ongeveer één keer per maand 
▫ 5 – ongeveer één keer om de twee weken 
▫ 6 – ongeveer één keer per week 
▫ 7 – meerdere keren per week 
▫ 8 – bijna iedere dag 
▫ 9 – ten minste één keer per dag 
 
Hoe vaak hebt u in het algemeen spontane fantasieën over seks met iemand die u nog maar pas 
leren kennen hebt? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
▫ 1 – nooit 
▫ 2 – heel zelden 
▫ 3 – eenmaal om de twee of drie maanden 
▫ 4 – ongeveer één keer per maand 
▫ 5 – ongeveer één keer om de twee weken 
▫ 6 – ongeveer één keer per week 
▫ 7 – meerdere keren per week 
▫ 8 – bijna iedere dag 
▫ 9 – ten minste één keer per dag 
 
 
  237 
Welke van de volgende opties beschrijft het best uw burgerlijke staat? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1) Nooit getrouwd            
(2) Huidig eerste huwelijk      
(3) Huidig in een tweede of later huwelijk                
(4) Gescheiden van tafel en bed                
(5) Gescheiden         
(6) Weduwe/weduwnaar 
 
Welke van de volgende opties beschrijft het best de burgerlijke staat van uw moeder? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1) Nooit getrouwd            
(2) Nu in haar eerste huwelijk met mijn biologische vader   
(3) Nu in haar eerste huwelijk met iemand anders dan mijn biologische vader 
(4) Nu in haar tweede of later huwelijk, met mijn biologische vader 
(5) Nu in haar tweede of later huwelijk met iemand anders dan mijn biologische vader 
(6) Gescheiden van tafel en bed               
(7) Gescheiden         
(8) Weduwe 
(9) Geen van bovenstaande 
 
Welke van de volgende opties beschrijft het best de burgerlijke staat van uw vader? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1) Nooit getrouwd            
(2) Nu in zijn eerste huwelijk met mijn biologische moeder   
(3) Nu in zijn eerste huwelijk met iemand anders dan mijn biologische moeder 
(4) Nu in zijn tweede of later huwelijk met mijn biologische moeder 
(5) Nu in zijn  tweede of later huwelijk met iemand anders dan mijn biologische moeder 
(6) Gescheiden van tafel en bed               
(7) Gescheiden         
(8) Weduwnaar 
(9) Geen van bovenstaande 
 
Indien uw ouders ooit gescheiden zijn, in welk jaar zijn ze dan gescheiden? VUL IN: _________ 
 
Als u nog nooit getrouwd bent, hoe waarschijnlijk denkt u dat het is dat u ooit trouwt? Omcirkel wat 
past, waarbij 1 = Niet waarschijnlijk; 4 = Enigszins waarschijnlijk; 7 = Heel waarschijnlijk 
 
OMCIRKEL: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Als u nog nooit getrouwd bent en in de veronderstelling dat u zou gaan trouwen, wat zou dan uw 
ideale trouwleeftijd zijn? (Of als u al getrouwd bent, hoe oud was u toen u de eerste keer trouwde?) 
 
VUL IN: ____________________ 
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Als u nog nooit getrouwd bent en in de veronderstelling dat u zou gaan trouwen op de door u 
aangegeven ideale trouwleeftijd, wat zou dan de ideale leeftijd zijn van uw partner? (Of als u al 
getrouwd bent, hoe oud was uw partner toen u de eerste keer trouwde?) 
 
VUL IN: ______________________ 
 
Hebt u kinderen? (OMCIRKEL)      Ja         Nee 
 
Als u kinderen hebt, hoeveel hebt u er?  VUL IN: ________________________ 
 
Als u nog nooit kinderen hebt gehad, hoe waarschijnlijk denkt u dat het is dat u ooit kinderen krijgt? 
(OMCIRKEL) 
 
1 Niet waarschijnlijk                                             
2 Enigszins waarschijnlijk                                               
3 Heel waarschijnlijk 
  
Als u nog nooit kinderen hebt gehad, maar u denkt wel dat u ooit kinderen zult krijgen, hoe 
waarschijnlijk is het dan dat u kinderen krijgt voordat u getrouwd bent?  
 
1 Ik zou zeker niet getrouwd zijn 
2 Enigszins waarschijnlijk dat ik niet getrouwd zou zijn 
3 Enigszins waarschijnlijk dat ik getrouwd zou zijn                                              
4 Ik zou zeker getrouwd zijn 
 
Hoeveel eigen kinderen zou u willen hebben? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
0              1              2              3              4              5              6 of meer 
 
Als u nog nooit kinderen hebt gehad en in de veronderstelling dat u kinderen zou krijgen, wat zou 
dan uw ideale leeftijd zijn om uw eerste kind te krijgen? (Of als u al kinderen hebt, hoe oud was u 
toen u uw eerste kind kreeg?) 
 
 VUL IN: __________________________ 
 
Als u zichzelf over tien of vijftien jaar inbeeldt, hoe vaak denkt u dat u religieuze diensten zult 
bijwonen? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1)Nooit of bijna nooit 
(2)Enkele keren per jaar 
(3)Ongeveer één keer per maand 
(4)Ongeveer iedere week 
(5)Meer dan één keer per week 
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Als u zou trouwen, denkt u dat uw kansen hoger of lager liggen dan bij andere mensen om binnen de 
15 jaar te scheiden? Omcirkel wat past, waarbij 1 = Veel lager; 4 = Rond het gemiddelde; 7 = Veel 
hoger 
 
OMCIRKEL: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Als u zou gaan trouwen, welk percentage waarschijnlijkheid denkt u dat u zou hebben om binnen de 
15 jaar te scheiden? 
 
VUL IN: _________________________ 
 
Als u getrouwd was en kinderen had en uw echtgeno(o)t(e) gedroeg zich op een manier die u 
onaanvaardbaar vindt, hoe waarschijnlijk zou het zijn dat u wilt scheiden? Omcirkel wat past, 
waarbij 1 = Niet waarschijnlijk; 4 = Enigszins waarschijnlijk; 7 = Heel waarschijnlijk 
  
OMCIRKEL: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 
In welk land woonde u hoofdzakelijk gedurende uw kinderjaren? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1)Nederland 
(2)België 
Andere (gelieve te specificeren)______________________________________________ 
  
Toen u opgroeide, hoe welgesteld waren uw ouders dan in vergelijking met anderen? Omcirkel wat 
past, waarbij 1 = Helemaal niet welgesteld; 4 = Rond het gemiddelde; 7 = Heel welgesteld  
 
OMCIRKEL: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Kies de categorie die de religie of het geloof het best beschrijft waarmee u bent opgevoed toen u 
kind was. (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1)Geen/atheïst/agnosticus    
(2)Boeddhist     
(3)Hindoe     
(4)Joods    
(5)Katholiek 
(6)Moslim                 
(7)Protestant 
(8)Andere (gelieve te specificeren) _____________________________________________________ 
 
Indien u Protestant hebt aangeduid, kunt u zeggen welke kerk het best deze beschrijft 
waarmee u bent opgevoed toen u kind was?  
 
(1)(Voorheen) Hervormd 
(2)(Voorheen) Gereformeerd 
(3)(Voorheen) Evangelisch-Luthers 
(4)Andere Gereformeerde kerken, namelijk (gelieve te specificeren) ____________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(5)Evangelische en Pinksterkerken, namelijk (gelieve te specificeren)___________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
(6)Overige kerken, namelijk (gelieve te specificeren)________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Wat geloof betreft, kunt u zeggen hoe orthodox u bent opgevoed? 1 = Orthodox; 7 = Liberaal  
 
OMCIRKEL: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7     | 8: niet van toepassing 
 
Welk van de volgende opties beschrijft het best hoe vaak u als kind een religieuze dienst bijwoonde? 
(OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1)Nooit of bijna nooit            
(2)Enkele keren per jaar     
(3)Ongeveer één keer per maand  
(4)Ongeveer iedere week      
(5)Meer dan één keer per week 
  
Wat is de hoogste opleidingsgraad van uw vader? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
(1) Geen diploma secundair onderwijs derde graad  
(2) Diploma secundair onderwijs derde graad  
(3) Hogeschool zonder diploma  
(4) Hogeschool met diploma  
(5) Bachelor of Kandidatuur zonder diploma 
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(6) Bachelor of Kandidatuur met diploma 
(7) Master of Licentiaat zonder diploma 
(8) Master of Licentiaat met diploma 
(9) Postuniversitair (e.g., specialisatie, doctorandus/promovendus, doctoraat). 
 
Wat is de hoogste opleidingsgraad van uw moeder? (OMCIRKEL)  
 
(1) Geen diploma secundair onderwijs derde graad  
(2) Diploma secundair onderwijs derde graad  
(3) Hogeschool zonder diploma  
(4) Hogeschool met diploma  
(5) Bachelor of Kandidatuur zonder diploma 
(6) Bachelor of Kandidatuur met diploma 
(7) Master of Licentiaat zonder diploma 
(8) Master of Licentiaat met diploma 
(9) Postuniversitair (e.g., specialisatie, doctorandus/promovendus, doctoraat). 
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Gelieve weer te geven in welke mate u voor-of tegenstander bent van de volgende zaken. Omcirkel 
wat past, waarbij 1 = Fervente tegenstander; 4 = Neutraal; 7 = Fervente voorstander  
 
Stimuleren van het gebruik van het Nederlands:    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Meer belastinggeld naar defensie:  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strengere beperkingen voor pornografie op het 
internet: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Meer wijkagenten om overlast tegen te gaan:   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Meer bindende EU-maatregelen die het milieu 
beschermen: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Afschaffen van de vervroegde 
invrijheidsstelling bij goed gedrag: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Meer sociale huurwoningen:  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Een verlenging van de periode waar binnen 
abortus wordt toegestaan: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Een inburgeringexamen voor immigranten:   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Hogere uitkeringen voor werklozen:  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Meer belastinggeld naar 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Meer aandacht voor de waarde van relaties in 
seksuele voorlichting op school: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Het verbieden van  kleding die het gelaat 
bedekt:  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Beter informeren en begeleiden van  mensen 
met overmatige schulden: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strengere straffen voor mensen die geweld 
gebruiken: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Homoseksuele koppels die kinderen kunnen 
adopteren: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Welke politieke partij heeft, wat hun standpunten betreft, uw voorkeur? (OMCIRKEL) 
 
1 Belg.Alliantie 
2 CD&V 
3 Groen! 
4 LSP  
5 N-VA  
6 Open VLD 
7 PVDA+ 
8 sp.a  
9 UF 
10 Vlaams Belang  
Andere (gelieve te specificeren) 
 
  243 
Wanneer u beslist of iets goed of fout is, in welke mate zijn de volgende overwegingen relevant voor 
uw besluitvorming? Gelieve elke uitspraak een score te geven binnen de volgende schaal: 
0 = helemaal niet relevant (Deze overweging heeft niets te maken met mijn besluitvorming of ik iets 
goed of fout vind) 
1 = niet erg relevant 
2 = lichtjes relevant 
3 = enigszins relevant 
4 = heel relevant 
5 = extreem relevant (Dit is een van de belangrijkste factoren bij mijn besluitvorming of ik iets goed 
of fout vind) 
 
Of iemand al dan niet emotioneel geleden heeft:  0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of bepaalde mensen al dan niet anders werden behandeld dan anderen:     0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemands actie al dan niet van liefde voor zijn land getuigt:  0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemand al dan niet een gebrek aan respect toont voor autoriteiten:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemand al dan niet inging tegen de normen van reinheid en fatsoen:      0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemand al dan niet goed was in wiskunde:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemand al dan niet geeft om een zwakkere of kwetsbaardere:  0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemand al dan niet oneerlijk handelde:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemand al dan niet iets deed om zijn groep te verraden:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemand zich al dan niet voegt naar de tradities van de samenleving:      0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemand al dan niet iets walgelijks deed:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemand al dan niet wreedaardig was:    0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemands rechten al dan niet geschonden werden:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemand al dan niet een tekort aan loyaliteit had:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of een actie al dan niet chaos en wanorde veroorzaakte:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Of iemand al dan niet handelde naar Gods goeddunken:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
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Gelieve de volgende zinnen te lezen en aan te geven in welke mate u het ermee eens of oneens bent, 
waarbij:  
0 = Sterk mee oneens                           
1 = Matig mee oneens 
2 = Lichtjes mee oneens  
3 = Lichtjes mee eens 
4 = Matig mee eens    
5 = Sterk mee eens 
  
Medelijden met zij die lijden is de cruciaalste deugd:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Wanneer de overheid wetten maakt moet het belangrijkste principe zijn dat 
iedereen eerlijk behandeld wordt:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Ik ben trots op de geschiedenis van mijn land:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Repect voor autoriteit is iets wat alle kinderen moeten leren:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Mensen zouden geen dingen mogen doen die walgelijk zijn, ook al doen ze er 
niemand mee kwaad:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Het is beter om goed te doen dan om slecht te doen:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Een van de ergste zaken die iemand kan doen  is een weerloos dier pijn doen:      0 1 2 3 4 5 
Gerechtigheid is de belangrijkste vereiste voor een samenleving:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Mensen moeten hun familieleden trouw zijn, ook al hebben ze iets fout 
gedaan:  0 1 2 3 4 5 
Mannen en vrouwen hebben elk verschillende rollen te vervullen in de 
samenleving:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Ik zou bepaalde handelingen fout noemen, gebaseerd op het feit dat ze 
onnatuurlijk zijn:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Een mens vermoorden kan nooit goed zijn:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Ik vind het moreel fout dat rijke kinderen veel geld erven terwijl arme 
kinderen niets erven:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Het is belangrijker om een teamspeler te zijn dan om zichzelf uit te drukken:      0 1 2 3 4 5 
Als ik een soldaat was en het oneens was met de bevelen van mijn overste, 
dan zou ik toch gehoorzamen omdat het mijn plicht is:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
Kuisheid is een belangrijke en waardevolle deugd:       0 1 2 3 4 5 
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De volgende zaken beschrijven verschillende begrippen. Gelieve een score te geven voor de mate 
waarin u de omschreven begrippen walgelijk vindt, waarbij: 0 = Helemaal niet walgelijk; 6 = Extreem 
walgelijk. 
 
Snoep stelen in een buurtwinkel:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Horen hoe twee vreemden seks hebben:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
In hondenpoep trappen:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Stelen van een buur:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Orale seks hebben:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Naast iemand zitten die rode zweren heeft op zijn arm:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Een student die spiekt om goede cijfers te halen:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Naar een pornofilm kijken:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Een hand geven aan een vreemde die zweterige handen heeft:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Een vriend bedriegen:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Te weten komen dat iemand die je niet graag hebt seksuele fantasieën 
heeft over u:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Schimmel zien op oude restjes in uw koelkast:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Iemands handtekening namaken op een wettelijk document:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Iemand die u net leren kennen hebt meenemen naar je kamer om seks te 
hebben:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Naast iemand staan die een slechte lijfgeur heeft:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Voorsteken in een rij om de laatste tickets te kopen voor een show:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Een vreemde van het andere geslacht die opzettelijk uw dij streelt in een 
lift:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Een kakkerlak over de vloer zien lopen:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Opzettelijk liegen tijdens een zakentransactie:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Anale seks hebben met iemand van het andere geslacht:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Per ongeluk iemands bloederige wond aanraken:       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
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Appendix 3 
Questionnaire: Drunken sailor (chapters five and 
six) 
Version 1 Order 1 
You will see four stories; please read them carefully. After you have read each story we will ask 
you a few questions.  
 
Mr. Williams is an officer on a cargo ship in 2010, carrying goods along the Atlantic coastline. 
All the crew members are American but the ship is mostly in international waters. When a ship 
is in international waters, it has to follow the law of the state whose flag it sails under and each 
ship can sail under only one flag. This ship does not sail under the U.S. flag. The law of this 
ship’s flag state allows both whipping and food deprivation as a punishment. On this ship, 
whipping is always used to discipline sailors who disobey orders or who are drunk on duty; as a 
consequence everyone on this ship has come to think that whipping is an appropriate 
punishment. Food deprivation however is never used to discipline sailors and no one on this 
ship thinks food deprivation is an appropriate punishment. One night, while the ship is in 
international waters, Mr. Williams finds a sailor drunk at a time when the sailor should have 
been on watch. After the sailor sobers up, Mr. Williams punishes the sailor by giving him 5 
lashes with a whip. This does not go against the law of the flag state. 
 
QUESTION 1: Is it morally permissible for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? 
1. Yes, it is morally permissible  
2. Yes, it is morally permissible but it is wrong for reasons that have nothing to do with 
morality (e.g., it might be unlawful)  
3. No, it is morally wrong (whether it is right or wrong in other ways or not) 
 
QUESTION 2: Why is it morally wrong for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? Please briefly list all 
the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 1. (Write a minimum of one 
word.) 
 
QUESTION 2: Why is it morally permissible for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
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list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 1. (Write a minimum of 
one word.) 
 
QUESTION 2a: Why is it morally permissible for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 1. (Write a minimum of 
one word.) 
 
QUESTION 2b: In what other ways is it wrong for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 1. (Write a minimum of 
one word.) 
 
Mr. Johnson is an officer on another cargo ship in 2010, carrying goods along the Atlantic 
coastline. All the crew members are American but the ship is mostly in international waters. 
When a ship is in international waters, it has to follow the law of the state whose flag it sails 
under and each ship can sail under only one flag. This ship does not sail under the U.S. flag. The 
law of this ship’s flag state allows both whipping and food deprivation as a punishment. On this 
ship, food deprivation is always used to discipline sailors who disobey orders or who are drunk 
on duty; as a consequence everyone on this ship has come to think that food deprivation is an 
appropriate punishment. Whipping however is never used to discipline sailors and no one on 
this ship thinks whipping is an appropriate punishment. One night, while the ship is in 
international waters, Mr. Johnson finds a sailor drunk at a time when the sailor should have 
been on watch. After the sailor sobers up, Mr. Johnson punishes the sailor by giving him 5 
lashes with a whip. This does not go against the law of the flag state. 
 
QUESTION 3Is it morally permissible for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? 
1. Yes, it is morally permissible  
2. Yes, it is morally permissible but it is wrong for reasons that have nothing to do with 
morality (e.g., it might be unlawful)  
3. No, it is morally wrong (whether it is right or wrong in other ways or not 
 
QUESTION 4: Why is it morally wrong for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? Please briefly list all 
the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 3. (Write a mininum of one 
word.) 
 
QUESTION 4: Why is it morally permissible for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? Please briefly list 
all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 3. (Write a mininum of one 
word.) 
 
QUESTION 4a: Why is it morally permissible for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 3. (Write a mininum of 
one word.) 
 
QUESTION 4b: In what other ways is it wrong for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 3. (Write a mininum of 
one word.) 
 
Marc and Eric are sailors on Mr. Williams ship. They both know that on Mr. Johnsons ship 
whipping is never practiced and that no one on Mr. Johnsons ship thinks that whipping is an 
appropriate punishment. They also know that food deprivation is always practiced on Mr. 
Johnsons ship and that everyone on Mr. Johnsons ship has come to think that food deprivation 
is an appropriate punishment. Of course, on their own ship, it is just the other way around: 
everybody on Marc and Erics ship thinks that whipping is an appropriate punishment. Hence, 
even though Marc and Eric are sailors on Mr. Williams ship, they are both fully informed about 
the different practices and sensibilities on Mr. Johnsons ship. They have heard that Mr. Johnson 
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whipped a sailor on his ship. Marc says to Eric: what Mr. Johnson did was morally permissible. 
 
QUESTION 5: Is what Marc says true or false? 
1. True 
2. False 
3. Neither 
 
QUESTION 6: Why is it true what Marc says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
QUESTION 6: Why is it false what Marc says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
QUESTION 6: Why is it neither true nor false what Marc says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
Peter and Steve are sailors on Mr. Johnsons ship. They both know that on Mr. Williams ship 
food deprivation is never practiced and that no one on Mr. Williams ship thinks that food 
deprivation is an appropriate punishment. They also know that whipping is always practiced on 
Mr. Williams ship and that everyone on Mr. Williams ship has come to think that whipping is an 
appropriate punishment. Of course, on their own ship, it is just the other way around: no one on 
Peter and Steves ship thinks that whipping is an appropriate punishment. Hence, even though 
Peter and Steve are sailors on Mr. Johnsons ship, they are both fully informed about the 
different practices and sensibilities on Mr. Williams ship. They have heard that Mr. Williams 
whipped a sailor on his ship. Peter says to Steve: what Mr. Williams did was morally 
permissible. 
 
QUESTION 7: Is what Peter says true or false? 
1. True 
2. False 
3. Neither 
 
QUESTION 8: Why is it true what Peter says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
QUESTION 8: Why is it false what Peter says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
QUESTION 8: Why is it neither true nor false what Peter says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
Version 1 Order 2 
You will see four stories; please read them carefully. After you have read each story we will ask 
you a few questions.  
 
Mr. Johnson is an officer on a cargo ship in 2010, carrying goods along the Atlantic coastline. All 
the crew members are American but the ship is mostly in international waters. When a ship is 
in international waters, it has to follow the law of the state whose flag it sails under and each 
ship can sail under only one flag. This ship does not sail under the U.S. flag. The law of this 
ship’s flag state allows both whipping and food deprivation as a punishment. On this ship, food 
deprivation is always used to discipline sailors who disobey orders or who are drunk on duty; as 
a consequence everyone on this ship has come to think that food deprivation is an appropriate 
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punishment. Whipping however is never used to discipline sailors and no one on this ship 
thinks whipping is an appropriate punishment. One night, while the ship is in international 
waters, Mr. Johnson finds a sailor drunk at a time when the sailor should have been on watch. 
After the sailor sobers up, Mr. Johnson punishes the sailor by giving him 5 lashes with a whip. 
This does not go against the law of the flag state. 
 
QUESTION 1: Is it morally permissible for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? 
1. Yes, it is morally permissible  
2. Yes, it is morally permissible but it is wrong for reasons that have nothing to do with 
morality (e.g., it might be unlawful)  
3. No, it is morally wrong (whether it is right or wrong in other ways or not) 
 
QUESTION 2: Why is it morally wrong for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? Please briefly list all 
the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 1. (Write a mininum of one 
word.) 
 
QUESTION 2: Why is it morally permissible for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? Please briefly list 
all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 1. (Write a mininum of one 
word.) 
 
QUESTION 2a: Why is it morally permissible for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 1. (Write a mininum of 
one word.) 
 
QUESTION 2b: In what other ways is it wrong for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 1. (Write a mininum of 
one word.) 
 
Mr. Williams is an officer on another cargo ship in 2010, carrying goods along the Atlantic 
coastline. All the crew members are American but the ship is mostly in international waters. 
When a ship is in international waters, it has to follow the law of the state whose flag it sails 
under and each ship can sail under only one flag. This ship does not sail under the U.S. flag. The 
law of this ship’s flag state allows both whipping and food deprivation as a punishment. On this 
ship, whipping is always used to discipline sailors who disobey orders or who are drunk on 
duty; as a consequence everyone on this ship has come to think that whipping is an appropriate 
punishment. Food deprivation however is never used to discipline sailors and no one on this 
ship thinks food deprivation is an appropriate punishment.One night, while the ship is in 
international waters, Mr. Williams finds a sailor drunk at a time when the sailor should have 
been on watch. After the sailor sobers up, Mr. Williams punishes the sailor by giving him 5 
lashes with a whip. This does not go against the law of the flag state. 
 
QUESTION 3: Is it morally permissible for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? 
1. Yes, it is morally permissible  
2. Yes, it is morally permissible but it is wrong for reasons that have nothing to do with 
morality (e.g., it might be unlawful)  
3. No, it is morally wrong (whether it is right or wrong in other ways or not) 
 
QUESTION 4: Why is it morally wrong for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? Please briefly list all 
the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 3. (Write a minimum of one 
word.) 
 
QUESTION 4: Why is it morally permissible for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 3. (Write a minimum of 
one word.) 
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QUESTION 4a: Why is it morally permissible for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 3. (Write a minimum of 
one word.) 
 
QUESTION 4b: In what other ways is it wrong for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 3. (Write a minimum of 
one word.) 
 
[Subsequent scenarios and questions 5 – 8 are exactly as as in version 1, order 1]  
Version 1 Order 3 
[First two scenarios and questions 1 - 4 are exactly as in version 1, order 1] 
 
Peter and Steve are sailors on Mr. Johnsons ship. They both know that on Mr. Williams ship 
food deprivation is never practiced and that no one on Mr. Williams ship thinks that food 
deprivation is an appropriate punishment. They also know that whipping is always practiced on 
Mr. Williams ship and that everyone on Mr. Williams ship has come to think that whipping is an 
appropriate punishment. Of course, on their own ship, it is just the other way around: no one on 
Peter and Steves ship thinks that whipping is an appropriate punishment. Hence, even though 
Peter and Steve are sailors on Mr. Johnsons ship, they are both fully informed about the 
different practices and sensibilities on Mr. Williams ship. They have heard that Mr. Williams 
whipped a sailor on his ship. Peter says to Steve: what Mr. Williams did was morally 
permissible. 
 
QUESTION 5: Is what Peter says true or false? 
1. True 
2. False 
3. Neither 
 
QUESTION 6: Why is it true what Peter says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
QUESTION 6: Why is it false what Peter says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
QUESTION 6: Why is it neither true nor false what Peter says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
Marc and Eric are sailors on Mr. Williams ship. They both know that on Mr. Johnsons ship 
whipping is never practiced and that no one on Mr. Johnsons ship thinks that whipping is an 
appropriate punishment. They also know that food deprivation is always practiced on Mr. 
Johnsons ship and that everyone on Mr. Johnsons ship has come to think that food deprivation 
is an appropriate punishment. Of course, on their own ship, it is just the other way around: 
everybody on Marc and Erics ship thinks that whipping is an appropriate punishment. Hence, 
even though Marc and Eric are sailors on Mr. Williams ship, they are both fully informed about 
the different practices and sensibilities on Mr. Johnsons ship. They have heard that Mr. Johnson 
whipped a sailor on his ship. Marc says to Eric: what Mr. Johnson did was morally permissible. 
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QUESTION 7: Is what Marc says true or false? 
1. True 
2. False 
3. Neither 
 
QUESTION 8: Why is it true what Marc says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
QUESTION 8: Why is it false what Marc says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
QUESTION 8: Why is it neither true nor false what Marc says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
Version 1 Order 4 
[First two scenarios and questions 1 - 4 are exactly as in version 1, order 2] 
 
[Subsequent scenarios and questions 5 – 8 are exactly as as in version 1, order 3]  
Version 1 Order 5 
You will see four stories; please read them carefully. We will ask you a few questions about 
these stories.  
 
Mr. Williams is an officer on a cargo ship in 2010, carrying goods along the Atlantic coastline. 
All the crew members are American but the ship is mostly in international waters. When a ship 
is in international waters, it has to follow the law of the state whose flag it sails under and each 
ship can sail under only one flag. This ship does not sail under the U.S. flag. The law of this 
ship’s flag state allows both whipping and food deprivation as a punishment. On this ship, 
whipping is always used to discipline sailors who disobey orders or who are drunk on duty; as a 
consequence everyone on this ship has come to think that whipping is an appropriate 
punishment. Food deprivation however is never used to discipline sailors and no one on this 
ship thinks food deprivation is an appropriate punishment. One night, while the ship is in 
international waters, Mr. Williams finds a sailor drunk at a time when the sailor should have 
been on watch. After the sailor sobers up, Mr. Williams punishes the sailor by giving him 5 
lashes with a whip. This does not go against the law of the flag state. 
 
Peter and Steve are sailors on Mr. Johnsons ship. He is an officer on another cargo ship in 2010, 
carrying goods along the Atlantic coastline. As is the case on Mr. Williams ship, all the crew 
members on Mr. Johnsons ship are American but the ship is mostly in international waters. This 
ship does not sail under the U.S. flag. The law of this ship’s flag state allows both whipping and 
food deprivation as a punishment. On this ship, food deprivation is always used to discipline 
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sailors who disobey orders or who are drunk on duty; as a consequence everyone on this ship 
has come to think that food deprivation is an appropriate punishment. Whipping however is 
never used to discipline sailors and no one on this ship thinks whipping is an appropriate 
punishment. Peter and Steve both know that on Mr. Williams ship food deprivation is never 
practiced and that no one on Mr. Williams ship thinks that food deprivation is an appropriate 
punishment. They also know that whipping is always practiced on Mr. Williams ship and that 
everyone on Mr. Williams ship has come to think that whipping is an appropriate punishment. 
Of course, on their own ship, it is just the other way around: no one on Peter and Steves ship 
thinks that whipping is an appropriate punishment. Hence, even though Peter and Steve are 
sailors on Mr. Johnsons ship, they are both fully informed about the different practices and 
sensibilities on Mr. Williams ship. They have heard that Mr. Williams whipped a sailor on his 
ship. Peter says to Steve: what Mr. Williams did was morally permissible. 
 
QUESTION 1: Is what Peter says true or false? 
1. True 
2. False 
3. Neither 
 
QUESTION 2: Why is it true what Peter says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
QUESTION 2: Why is it false what Peter says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
QUESTION 2: Why is it neither true nor false what Peter says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
We have seen that Mr. Johnson is an officer on a cargo ship in 2010, carrying goods along the 
Atlantic coastline. All the crew members are American but the ship is mostly in international 
waters. When a ship is in international waters, it has to follow the law of the state whose flag it 
sails under and each ship can sail under only one flag. This ship does not sail under the U.S. flag. 
The law of this ship’s flag state allows both whipping and food deprivation as a punishment. As 
stated before, on this ship, food deprivation is always used to discipline sailors who disobey 
orders or who are drunk on duty; as a consequence everyone on this ship has come to think 
that food deprivation is an appropriate punishment. Whipping however is never used to 
discipline sailors and no one on this ship thinks whipping is an appropriate punishment. Now 
what happened on Mr. Williams ship also happened on Mr. Johnsons ship: One night, while the 
ship is in international waters, Mr. Johnson finds a sailor drunk at a time when the sailor should 
have been on watch. After the sailor sobers up, Mr. Johnson punishes the sailor by giving him 5 
lashes with a whip. This does not go against the law of the flag state. 
 
Marc and Eric are sailors on Mr. Williams ship. They both know that on Mr. Johnsons ship 
whipping is never practiced and that no one on Mr. Johnsons ship thinks that whipping is an 
appropriate punishment. They also know that food deprivation is always practiced on Mr. 
Johnsons ship and that everyone on Mr. Johnsons ship has come to think that food deprivation 
is an appropriate punishment. Of course, on their own ship, it is just the other way around: 
everybody on Marc and Erics ship thinks that whipping is an appropriate punishment. Hence, 
even though Marc and Eric are sailors on Mr. Williams ship, they are both fully informed about 
the different practices and sensibilities on Mr. Johnsons ship. They have heard that Mr. Johnson 
whipped a sailor on his ship. Marc says to Eric: what Mr. Johnson did was morally permissible. 
 
QUESTION 3: Is what Marc says true or false? 
1. True 
2. False 
3. Neither 
 
QUESTION 4: Why is it true what Marc says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
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QUESTION 4: Why is it false what Marc says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
QUESTION 4: Why is it neither true nor false what Marc says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
Recall that Mr. Johnson punished a sailor for being drunk while he should have been on watch, 
by giving him 5 lashes with a whip. This does not go against the law of the flag state. On this 
ship, food deprivation is always used to discipline sailors who disobey orders or who are drunk 
on duty; as a consequence everyone on this ship has come to think that food deprivation is an 
appropriate punishment. Whipping however is never used to discipline sailors and no one on 
this ship thinks whipping is an appropriate punishment. 
 
QUESTION 5: Is it morally permissible for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? 
1. Yes, it is morally permissible  
2. Yes, it is morally permissible but it is wrong for reasons that have nothing to do with 
morality (e.g., it might be unlawful)  
3. No, it is morally wrong (whether it is right or wrong in other ways or not) 
 
QUESTION 6: Why is it morally wrong for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? Please briefly list all 
the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 3. (Write a mininum of one 
word.) 
 
QUESTION 6: Why is it morally permissible for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? Please briefly list 
all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 3. (Write a mininum of one 
word.) 
 
QUESTION 6a: Why is it morally permissible for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 3. (Write a mininum of 
one word.) 
 
QUESTION 6b: In what other ways is it wrong for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 3. (Write a mininum of 
one word.) 
 
Recall that Mr. Williams punished a sailor for being drunk while he should have been on watch, 
by giving him 5 lashes with a whip. This does not go against the law of the flag state. On this 
ship, whipping is always used to discipline sailors who disobey orders or who are drunk on 
duty; as a consequence everyone on this ship has come to think that whipping is an appropriate 
punishment. Food deprivation however is never used to discipline sailors and no one on this 
ship thinks food deprivation is an appropriate punishment.  
 
QUESTION 7: Is it morally permissible for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? 
1. Yes, it is morally permissible  
2. Yes, it is morally permissible but it is wrong for reasons that have nothing to do with 
morality (e.g., it might be unlawful)  
3. No, it is morally wrong (whether it is right or wrong in other ways or not) 
 
QUESTION 8: Why is it morally wrong for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? Please briefly list all 
the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 1. (Write a minimum of one 
word.) 
 
QUESTION 8: Why is it morally permissible for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 1. (Write a minimum of 
one word.) 
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QUESTION 8a: Why is it morally permissible for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 1. (Write a minimum of 
one word.) 
 
QUESTION 8b: In what other ways is it wrong for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 1. (Write a minimum of 
one word.) 
Version 1 Order 6 
You will see four stories; please read them carefully. We will ask you a few questions about 
these stories.  
 
Mr. Johnson is an officer on a cargo ship in 2010, carrying goods along the Atlantic coastline. All 
the crew members are American but the ship is mostly in international waters. When a ship is 
in international waters, it has to follow the law of the state whose flag it sails under and each 
ship can sail under only one flag. This ship does not sail under the U.S. flag. The law of this 
ship’s flag state allows both whipping and food deprivation as a punishment. On this ship, food 
deprivation is always used to discipline sailors who disobey orders or who are drunk on duty; as 
a consequence everyone on this ship has come to think that food deprivation is an appropriate 
punishment. Whipping however is never used to discipline sailors and no one on this ship 
thinks whipping is an appropriate punishment. One night, while the ship is in international 
waters, Mr. Johnson finds a sailor drunk at a time when the sailor should have been on watch. 
After the sailor sobers up, Mr. Johnson punishes the sailor by giving him 5 lashes with a whip. 
This does not go against the law of the flag state. 
 
Marc and Eric are sailors on Mr. Williams ship. He is an officer on another cargo ship in 2010, 
carrying goods along the Atlantic coastline. As is the case on Mr. Johnsons ship, all the crew 
members on Mr. Williams ship are American but the ship is mostly in international waters. This 
ship does not sail under the U.S. flag. The law of this ship’s flag state allows both whipping and 
food deprivation as a punishment.On this ship, whipping is always used to discipline sailors who 
disobey orders or who are drunk on duty; as a consequence everyone on this ship has come to 
think that whipping is an appropriate punishment. Food deprivation however is never used to 
discipline sailors and no one on this ship thinks food deprivation is an appropriate punishment. 
Marc and Eric both know that on Johnsons ship whipping is never practiced and that no one on 
Mr. Johnsons ship thinks that whipping is an appropriate punishment. They also know that 
food deprivation is always practiced on Mr. Johnsons ship and that everyone on Mr. Williams 
ship has come to think that food deprivation is an appropriate punishment. Of course, on their 
own ship, it is just the other way around: everyone on Marc and Erics ship thinks that whipping 
is an appropriate punishment. Hence, even though Marc and Eric are sailors on Mr. Williams 
ship, they are both fully informed about the different practices and sensibilities on Mr. 
Johnsons ship. They have heard that Mr. Johnson whipped a sailor on his ship. Marc says to Eric: 
what Mr. Johnson did was morally permissible. 
 
QUESTION 1: Is what Marc says true or false? 
1. True 
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2. False 
3. Neither 
 
QUESTION 2: Why is it true what Marc says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
QUESTION 2: Why is it false what Marc says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
QUESTION 2: Why is it neither true nor false what Marc says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
We have seen that Mr. Williams is an officer on another cargo ship in 2010, carrying goods along 
the Atlantic coastline. All the crew members are American but the ship is mostly in 
international waters. When a ship is in international waters, it has to follow the law of the state 
whose flag it sails under and each ship can sail under only one flag. This ship does not sail under 
the U.S. flag. The law of this ship’s flag state allows both whipping and food deprivation as a 
punishment. As stated before, on this ship, whipping is always used to discipline sailors who 
disobey orders or who are drunk on duty; as a consequence everyone on this ship has come to 
think that whipping is an appropriate punishment. Food deprivation however is never used to 
discipline sailors and no one on this ship thinks food deprivation is an appropriate punishment. 
Now what happened on Mr. Johnsons ship also happened on Mr. Williams ship: One night, while 
the ship is in international waters, Mr. Williams finds a sailor drunk at a time when the sailor 
should have been on watch. After the sailor sobers up, Mr. Williams punishes the sailor by 
giving him 5 lashes with a whip. This does not go against the law of the flag state. 
 
Peter and Steve are sailors on Mr. Johnsons ship. They both know that on Mr. Williams ship 
food deprivation is never practiced and that no one on Mr. Williams ship thinks that food 
deprivation is an appropriate punishment. They also know that whipping is always practiced on 
Mr. Williams ship and that everyone on Mr. Wiliams ship has come to think that whipping is an 
appropriate punishment. Of course, on their own ship, it is just the other way around: no one on 
Peter and Steves ship thinks that whipping is an appropriate punishment. Hence, even though 
Peter and Steve are sailors on Mr. Johnsons ship, they are both fully informed about the 
different practices and sensibilities on Mr. Williams ship. They have heard that Mr. Williams 
whipped a sailor on his ship. Peter says to Steve: what Mr. Williams did was morally 
permissible. 
 
QUESTION 3: Is what Peter says true or false? 
1. True 
2. False 
3. Neither 
 
QUESTION 4: Why is it true what Peter says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
QUESTION 4: Why is it false what Peter says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
QUESTION 4: Why is it neither true nor false what Peter says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
[Subsequent scenarios and questions 5 – 8 are exactly as as in version 1, order 5]  
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Version 1 Order 7 
[First two scenarios and questions 1 - 4 are exactly as in version 1, order 1] 
 
Recall that Mr. Williams punished a sailor for being drunk while he should have been on watch, 
by giving him 5 lashes with a whip. This does not go against the law of the flag state. On this 
ship, whipping is always used to discipline sailors who disobey orders or who are drunk on 
duty; as a consequence everyone on this ship has come to think that whipping is an appropriate 
punishment. Food deprivation however is never used to discipline sailors and no one on this 
ship thinks food deprivation is an appropriate punishment.  
 
QUESTION 5: Is it morally permissible for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? 
1. Yes, it is morally permissible  
2. Yes, it is morally permissible but it is wrong for reasons that have nothing to do with 
morality (e.g., it might be unlawful)  
3. No, it is morally wrong (whether it is right or wrong in other ways or not) 
 
QUESTION 6: Why is it morally wrong for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? Please briefly list all 
the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 1. (Write a minimum of one 
word.) 
 
QUESTION 6: Why is it morally permissible for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 1. (Write a minimum of 
one word.) 
 
QUESTION 6a: Why is it morally permissible for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 1. (Write a minimum of 
one word.) 
 
QUESTION 6b: In what other ways is it wrong for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 1. (Write a minimum of 
one word.) 
 
Recall that Mr. Johnson punished a sailor for being drunk while he should have been on watch, 
by giving him 5 lashes with a whip. This does not go against the law of the flag state. On this 
ship, food deprivation is always used to discipline sailors who disobey orders or who are drunk 
on duty; as a consequence everyone on this ship has come to think that food deprivation is an 
appropriate punishment. Whipping however is never used to discipline sailors and no one on 
this ship thinks whipping is an appropriate punishment. 
 
QUESTION 7: Is it morally permissible for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? 
1. Yes, it is morally permissible  
2. Yes, it is morally permissible but it is wrong for reasons that have nothing to do with 
morality (e.g., it might be unlawful)  
3. No, it is morally wrong (whether it is right or wrong in other ways or not) 
 
QUESTION 8: Why is it morally wrong for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? Please briefly list all 
the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 3. (Write a mininum of one 
word.) 
 
QUESTION 8: Why is it morally permissible for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? Please briefly list 
all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 3. (Write a mininum of one 
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word.) 
 
QUESTION 8a: Why is it morally permissible for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 3. (Write a mininum of 
one word.) 
 
QUESTION 8b: In what other ways is it wrong for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 3. (Write a mininum of 
one word.) 
Version 1 Order 8 
[First two scenarios and questions 1 - 4 are exactly as in version 1, order 6] 
 
[Subsequent scenarios and questions 5 – 8 are exactly as as in version 1, order 7]  
Version 2 Order 1 
You will see four stories; please read them carefully. After you have read each story we will ask 
you a few questions.  
 
Mr. Williams is an officer on a cargo ship in 2010, carrying goods along the Atlantic coastline. 
All the crew members are American but the ship is mostly in international waters. When a ship 
is in international waters, it has to follow the law of the state whose flag it sails under and each 
ship can sail under only one flag. This ship does not sail under the U.S. flag. The law of this 
ship’s flag state allows both whipping and food deprivation as a punishment. On this ship, 
whipping is always used to discipline sailors who disobey orders or who are drunk on duty. 
Food deprivation however is never used to discipline sailors.One night, while the ship is in 
international waters, Mr. Williams finds a sailor drunk at a time when the sailor should have 
been on watch. After the sailor sobers up, Mr. Williams punishes the sailor by giving him 5 
lashes with a whip. This does not go against the law of the flag state. 
 
QUESTION 1: Is it morally permissible for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? 
1. Yes, it is morally permissible  
2. Yes, it is morally permissible but it is wrong for reasons that have nothing to do with 
morality (e.g., it might be unlawful)  
3. No, it is morally wrong (whether it is right or wrong in other ways or not) 
 
QUESTION 2: Why is it morally wrong for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? Please briefly list all 
the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 1. (Write a minimum of one 
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word.) 
 
QUESTION 2: Why is it morally permissible for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 1. (Write a minimum of 
one word.) 
 
QUESTION 2a: Why is it morally permissible for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 1. (Write a minimum of 
one word.) 
 
QUESTION 2b: In what other ways is it wrong for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 1. (Write a minimum of 
one word.) 
 
Mr. Johnson is an officer on another cargo ship in 2010, carrying goods along the Atlantic 
coastline. All the crew members are American but the ship is mostly in international waters. 
When a ship is in international waters, it has to follow the law of the state whose flag it sails 
under and each ship can sail under only one flag. This ship does not sail under the U.S. flag. The 
law of this ship’s flag state allows both whipping and food deprivation as a punishment. On this 
ship, food deprivation is always used to discipline sailors who disobey orders or who are drunk 
on duty. Whipping however is never used to discipline sailors.One night, while the ship is in 
international waters, Mr. Johnson finds a sailor drunk at a time when the sailor should have 
been on watch. After the sailor sobers up, Mr. Johnson punishes the sailor by giving him 5 
lashes with a whip. This does not go against the law of the flag state. 
 
QUESTION 3Is it morally permissible for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? 
1. Yes, it is morally permissible  
2. Yes, it is morally permissible but it is wrong for reasons that have nothing to do with 
morality (e.g., it might be unlawful)  
3. No, it is morally wrong (whether it is right or wrong in other ways or not) 
 
QUESTION 4: Why is it morally wrong for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? Please briefly list all 
the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 3. (Write a mininum of one 
word.) 
 
QUESTION 4: Why is it morally permissible for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? Please briefly list 
all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 3. (Write a mininum of one 
word.) 
 
QUESTION 4a: Why is it morally permissible for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 3. (Write a mininum of 
one word.) 
 
QUESTION 4b: In what other ways is it wrong for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 3. (Write a mininum of 
one word.) 
 
Marc and Eric are sailors on Mr. Williams ship. They both know that on Mr. Johnsons ship 
whipping is never practiced. They also know that food deprivation is always practiced on Mr. 
Johnsons ship. Of course, on their own ship, it is just the other way around: whipping is always 
practiced on Marc and Erics ship. Hence, even though Marc and Eric are sailors on Mr. Williams 
ship, they are both fully informed about the different practices on Mr. Johnsons ship. They have 
heard that Mr. Johnson whipped a sailor on his ship. Marc says to Eric: what Mr. Johnson did 
was morally permissible. 
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QUESTION 5: Is what Marc says true or false? 
1. True 
2. False 
3. Neither 
 
QUESTION 6: Why is it true what Marc says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
QUESTION 6: Why is it false what Marc says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
QUESTION 6: Why is it neither true nor false what Marc says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
Peter and Steve are sailors on Mr. Johnsons ship. They both know that on Mr. Williams ship 
food deprivation is never practiced. They also know that whipping is always practiced on Mr. 
Williams ship. Of course, on their own ship, it is just the other way around: whipping is never 
practiced on Peter and Steves ship. Hence, even though Peter and Steve are sailors on Mr. 
Johnsons ship, they are both fully informed about the different practices on Mr. Williams ship. 
They have heard that Mr. Williams whipped a sailor on his ship. Peter says to Steve: what Mr. 
Williams did was morally permissible. 
 
QUESTION 7: Is what Peter says true or false? 
1. True 
2. False 
3. Neither 
 
QUESTION 8: Why is it true what Peter says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
QUESTION 8: Why is it false what Peter says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
QUESTION 8: Why is it neither true nor false what Peter says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
Version 2 Order 2 
You will see four stories; please read them carefully. After you have read each story we will ask 
you a few questions.  
 
Mr. Johnson is an officer on a cargo ship in 2010, carrying goods along the Atlantic coastline. All 
the crew members are American but the ship is mostly in international waters. When a ship is 
in international waters, it has to follow the law of the state whose flag it sails under and each 
ship can sail under only one flag. This ship does not sail under the U.S. flag. The law of this 
ship’s flag state allows both whipping and food deprivation as a punishment. On this ship, food 
deprivation is always used to discipline sailors who disobey orders or who are drunk on duty. 
Whipping however is never used to discipline sailors. One night, while the ship is in 
international waters, Mr. Johnson finds a sailor drunk at a time when the sailor should have 
been on watch. After the sailor sobers up, Mr. Johnson punishes the sailor by giving him 5 
lashes with a whip. This does not go against the law of the flag state. 
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QUESTION 1: Is it morally permissible for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? 
1. Yes, it is morally permissible  
2. Yes, it is morally permissible but it is wrong for reasons that have nothing to do with 
morality (e.g., it might be unlawful)  
3. No, it is morally wrong (whether it is right or wrong in other ways or not) 
 
QUESTION 2: Why is it morally wrong for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? Please briefly list all 
the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 1. (Write a mininum of one 
word.) 
 
QUESTION 2: Why is it morally permissible for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? Please briefly list 
all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 1. (Write a mininum of one 
word.) 
 
QUESTION 2a: Why is it morally permissible for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 1. (Write a mininum of 
one word.) 
 
QUESTION 2b: In what other ways is it wrong for Mr. Johnson to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 1. (Write a mininum of 
one word.) 
 
Mr. Williams is an officer on another cargo ship in 2010, carrying goods along the Atlantic 
coastline. All the crew members are American but the ship is mostly in international waters. 
When a ship is in international waters, it has to follow the law of the state whose flag it sails 
under and each ship can sail under only one flag. This ship does not sail under the U.S. flag. The 
law of this ship’s flag state allows both whipping and food deprivation as a punishment. On this 
ship, whipping is always used to discipline sailors who disobey orders or who are drunk on 
duty. Food deprivation however is never used to discipline sailors.One night, while the ship is in 
international waters, Mr. Williams finds a sailor drunk at a time when the sailor should have 
been on watch. After the sailor sobers up, Mr. Williams punishes the sailor by giving him 5 
lashes with a whip. This does not go against the law of the flag state. 
 
QUESTION 3: Is it morally permissible for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? 
1. Yes, it is morally permissible  
2. Yes, it is morally permissible but it is wrong for reasons that have nothing to do with 
morality (e.g., it might be unlawful)  
3. No, it is morally wrong (whether it is right or wrong in other ways or not) 
 
QUESTION 4: Why is it morally wrong for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? Please briefly list all 
the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 3. (Write a minimum of one 
word.) 
 
QUESTION 4: Why is it morally permissible for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 3. (Write a minimum of 
one word.) 
 
QUESTION 4a: Why is it morally permissible for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 3. (Write a minimum of 
one word.) 
 
QUESTION 4b: In what other ways is it wrong for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor? Please briefly 
list all the reasons you thought of while you were answering question 3. (Write a minimum of 
one word.) 
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[Subsequent scenarios and questions 5 – 8 are exactly as as in version 2, order 1]  
Version 2 Order 3 
[First two scenarios and questions 1 - 4 are exactly as in version 2, order 1] 
 
Peter and Steve are sailors on Mr. Johnsons ship. They both know that on Mr. Williams ship 
food deprivation is never practiced. They also know that whipping is always practiced on Mr. 
Williams ship. Of course, on their own ship, it is just the other way around: whipping is never 
practiced on Peter and Steves ship. Hence, even though Peter and Steve are sailors on Mr. 
Johnsons ship, they are both fully informed about the different practices on Mr. Williams ship. 
They have heard that Mr. Williams whipped a sailor on his ship. Peter says to Steve: what Mr. 
Williams did was morally permissible. 
 
QUESTION 5: Is what Peter says true or false? 
1. True 
2. False 
3. Neither 
 
QUESTION 6: Why is it true what Peter says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
QUESTION 6: Why is it false what Peter says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
QUESTION 6: Why is it neither true nor false what Peter says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
Marc and Eric are sailors on Mr. Williams ship. They both know that on Mr. Johnsons ship 
whipping is never practiced. They also know that food deprivation is always practiced on Mr. 
Johnsons ship. Of course, on their own ship, it is just the other way around: whipping is always 
practiced on Marc and Erics ship. Hence, even though Marc and Eric are sailors on Mr. Williams 
ship, they are both fully informed about the different practices on Mr. Johnsons ship. They have 
heard that Mr. Johnson whipped a sailor on his ship. Marc says to Eric: what Mr. Johnson did 
was morally permissible. 
 
QUESTION 7: Is what Marc says true or false? 
1. True 
2. False 
3. Neither 
 
QUESTION 8: Why is it true what Marc says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
QUESTION 8: Why is it false what Marc says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
 
QUESTION 8: Why is it neither true nor false what Marc says? (Write a minimum of one word.) 
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Version 2 Order 4 
[First two scenarios and questions 1 - 4 are exactly as in version 2, order 2] 
 
[Subsequent scenarios and questions 5 – 8 are exactly as as in version 2, order 3]  
Demographic and control questions 
What is your gender? 
1. Male  
2. Female 
 
What is your age? 
 
Why was the sailor punished? 
1. He burned the flag 
2. He was drunk when he should have been on watch 
3. He had used violence 
 
What is your highest level of education? 
1. Less than K12 or no secondary level diploma 
2. K-12 or secundary level diploma 
3. Some high school 
4. High school diploma 
5. Some college 
6. 2-year college degree 
7. 4-year college degree 
8. Bachelor-level degree 
9. Master-level degree (MS, MA, etc...) 
10. Doctorate-level degree (PhD) 
11. Other  
 
What is the annual income in your household? 
1. Under $2,500 
2. $2,500 to $12,499 
3. $12,500 to $24,999 
4. $25,000 to $37,999 
5. $38,000 to $49,999 
6. $50,000 to $74,999 
7. $75,000 to $99,999 
8. $100,000 or more 
 
What country do you live in? 
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ZIP/Postal Code: 
 
What languages do you speak? Please also indicate your first language, this is the language you 
speak the best. 
 
Indicate on this scale from 0 to 6 if you consider yourself liberal or conservative. Select the one 
number that seems most appropriate to you. 
1. 0 Extremely Liberal 
2. 1 Moderately Liberal 
3. 2 Slightly Liberal 
4. 3 Neither Liberal or Conservative 
5. 4 Slightly Conservative 
6. 5 Moderately Conservative 
7. 6 Extremely Conservative 
 
Indicate on this scale from 0 to 6 if you consider yourself a Republican or a Democrat. Indicate 
the one number that seems most appropriate to you. 
1. 0 Extremely Republican 
2. 1 Moderately Republican 
3. 2 Slightly Republican 
4. 3 Neither Republican or Democrat 
5. 4 Slightly Democrat 
6. 5 Moderately Democrat 
7. 6 Extremely Democrat 
 
Have you ever taken this survey before? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
Do you have any comments about this study? (This is optional)  
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